Spirit and Man: An Essay on Being and Value

257 Pages·1963·10.264 MB·English

by  Nathan Rotenstreich (auth.)

SPIRIT AND MAN
SPIRIT AND MAN
AN ESSAY ON BEING AND VALUE
by
NATHAN ROTENSTREICH
Professor of Philosophy
The Hebrew University of Jerusalem
I I
THE HAGUE
MARTINUS NI]HOFF
1963
Copyrighl1963 by Marlinus NijJwjf, TIre Hague, Netherlands
All righls reserved, including the right to translate or to
reproduce this book or paris thereof in any form
ISBN-I3: 978-90-247-0127-8 e-ISBN-I3: 978-94-010-3614-6
DOl: 10.1007/978-94-010-3614-6
TABLE OF CONTENTS
Part One / DIMENSIONS
I. Consciousness
a. Alertness 3
b. Elucidation 4
c. Spontaneity 7
d. Cognition 9
e. Self-consciousness 11
f. Truth and self-consciousness 12
g. Activity and structure 15
h. Trends of consciousness 16
1. Privacy and community 18
k. Identity 19
II. Experience 22
III. Spirit and Principles 44
Part Two / FEATURES
IV. On human Nature
1. Features are a topic for philosophical contemplation 77
2. Some factual features of human life can be understood only
by referring to philosophical distinction 81
3. Cognition and posture 83
4. Environment and world 84
5. Education 85
6. Instincts 86
7. Language and learning 87
8. Learning 89
9. Tools 92
10. Historicity 95
11. Potentiality and individuality 99
12. The dynamic relation between factors 103
13. Anthropocentrism 106
14. Finiteness 112
15. The analysis is not too optimistic 121
V. The linguistic capacity 124
Part Three / SIGNIFICANCE
VI. Freedom
a. The preference of the preferable 157
b. Levels of freedom 190
VII. The worthiness of Man 217
Index 253
PART ONE
DIMENSIONS
CHAPTER I
CONSCIOUSNESS
Our aim is to present a constructive theory of consciousness and spirit.
A difficulty arises, however, in that the nature of consciousness, which
we construe as a type of activity crystallizing itself into a specific plane
or phase of reality, does not lend itself to complete description. This
limitation holds not only for the nature of consciousness, but for every
other phase of reality as well. Nevertheless, we are able to arrive at
some experience of its nature and some elementary understanding of
the way in which it functions. Our first objective will be to point out
several characteristics of consciousness, beginning with the position it
occupies in relation to external reality. This end is best achieved by
proceeding introspectively at first, so as to aware of consciousness and
through analysis of the basic directions of conscious activity, to arrive
at a tentative description of consciousness. In this way, we are able to
arrive at an analysis of the major functions of consciousness.l
(a) Alertness. Alertness is distinguished by both an orientation to,
and transcendence of the environment or given situation. We only en
counter this position of alertness when the human being is not totally
submerged in the conditions and circumstances to which he orients
himself; when he somehow understands and, by so doing, ceases to be a
mere part of them and becomes independent - at least partially - of
them.
Consciousness masters a situation through being alert but does so from
its own position and does not become a part of the mastered situation.
It must be stressed that alertness cannot be compared or reduced to the
relationship of the living organism in general to its enviroment as when
it turns to its environment for e.g. its nutritional needs. Alertness is
1 By beginning our analysis of the nature of consciousness with a description of its
functions, we avoid the difficulties brought forward by Gilbert Ryle in his Concept of
Mind (London, 1951). Since from the first we deal with the activities of a conscious
being, we do not face the danger of assuming "a ghost in the machine." We do not
introduce a distinction between consciousness and the existing individual, but remain
within the scope of his existence, pointing out the directions of his activity. The fact
that we deal with consciousness does not make it a self-contained entity. The distinction
is methodological and not ontological.
4 DIMENSIONS
not an essential attribute or ability of life, or the living organism as
such. Moreover, alertness is a kind of understanding ofth e environment
and as such it has been called orientation. (By "orientation" we do not
mean an analysis of the circumstances and a clear drawing of conclu
sions from it).
(b) Elucidation. Because alertness represents distance or detachment
of consciousness from, and mastery of, the situation, it implies lucidity
(lucidity being the distinction between the position of orientation and the
state towards which man orientates himself). However, as distinguised
from orientation, the activity of elucidation involves the ability to ana
lyze. Elucidation of a given situation implies, beyond grasping it as a
whole, reducing it to its component parts. Language is a manifestation
of the elucidating activity or the ability to analyze or grasp distinctions.
The linguistic expression is by its very nature discursive because it
describes (names) the moment of impression, thus fixing it; thereby,
counteracting and overcoming its fleeting nature. Underlying the
linguistic form is a lucid orientation to the situation. Still, there is a
similarity between the activities of alertness and elucidation, for the
ability to grasp distinctions manifests itself in both. However this same
capacity in itself, is merely a manifestation of the relative superiority
and independence of consciousness with regard to the situation to which
it orientates itself and which it analyzes into its components. Hence
we may say that in the position of relative independence, alertness de
lineates the sphere of conscious activity while the elucidation activity
is directed at the specific contents and items of this sphere. Alertness
is the activity of consciousness directed towards a situation, while
elucidation is potentially the activity of consciousness directed towards
itself (a reflective relation).
Through the activity of elucidation contents are brought into relief;
precisely contents which previously have been grasped only in their
broad outlines become apparent in their particular features. By grasping
the particular features of an impression, we also grasp its content.
Broadly speaking, we may say that consciousness is not only the sum
total of qualities accompanying contents, but also connotes (1) the
distance existing between the situation as given and as grasped and (2)
our grasping ability directed towards a situation. A new perspective,
therefore, becomes manifest through consciousness, that of making the
grasped content into an object. Being conscious does not imply becom
ing submerged in the stream of impressions but on the contrary released
from it. By this release we also place the impressions opposite ourselves
CONSCIOUSNESS 5
as objects giving them a stability that is not inherent in them. The
conscious activity raises the given data from the plane of impressions
to one of a specific polar structure; a reality featuring objects as one
pole and consciousness directed towards them, as the other. Hence
both alertness and elucidation add new contents to reality, endowing
it with the perspective of the distinction between subject and object,
aside from grasping and analyzing it. To consciousness is due the estab
lishment of the position of the object vis-a.-vis the subject and the
latter's recognition of the former's status along with its own. Both
alertness and elucidation refer to, or are directed at an object. By the
very fact of recognition, the situation comes to the foreground as an
object of our intentionality. The situation as such is not created by our
attention - it is only transformed - in terms of its meaningful status,
into an object. To be a situation is a given fact; to become an object is
a specific perspective or outlook introduced by the act of grasping as
alertness or elucidation or both.
From what has been said it follows that consciousness is not just a con
tinuation of the stream of impressions set by it as objects, but a new
beginning as well as one of self-direction toward these impressions. The
fleeting nature of impressions is overcome, not by an inherent power,
but by the activity of consciousness directed towards them, establish
ing them as objects. Moreover, the transformation of impressions into
stable contents is not just a transition like the one from the sensum red
to the sensum green; it is actually a transition from factuality to a
perspective. The perspective ofthe status of objects introduces a change
in the position of the impressions because, as stated, it transfers them
to a structural plane of polarity between consciousness or, broadly
speaking, between subject and object. Impressions are transformed into
objects because there is consciousness, while consciousness proper is
present and active because there are objects: a mutual, interdependent,
and preconditioned relation.
According to psychiatric analysis, the ego and its object are assessed
by one and the same act - one by which consciousness created at once
the polarity between itself and what it facesl. At the same time, cons
ciousness is essentially superior to the situation because of its acts of
distinction. Alertness and elucidation are not only conscious activities
but the very source of the polarity between the status of subject and
of object and the distinction between consciousness and the situation.
1 F. S. Rotschild, Das I ch und die Regulationen des El'lebnisvol'gangs, Bale -New York,
1950, pp. 38, 41.
6 DIMENSIONS
Consciousness sheds light on itself and on its referent. It is a self-building
activity. The autonomous building up of the conscious activity is an
expression of the nature of consciousness as an activity also directed
towards itself, which is an indication of its relative superiority. By
virtue of its inherent self-directedness, consciousness is from the very
first more flexible, or contains more possibilities than those inherent
in an opaque situation to which it refers. By the very fact that cons
ciousness is directed towards itself, a new dimension is added - that
of depth: consciousness of consciousness. This dimension of depth is
yet another manifestation of the distance between consciousness and
the situation. Consciousness, as the referent of its own activity, con
stitutes a situation, i.e. the conscious activity is considered from the
point of view of self-consciousness as an object; hence what has been
an activity directed at objects becomes a situational referent for self
consciousness.
From a description of these two activities of consciousness, alertness
and elucidation, we have arrived at the conclusion that through the
conscious activity a new perspective is added to the world, that of po
larity between objects and consciousness or subject. Thus consciousness
is both a term in the subject-object relation and responsible for the
introduction of the distinction between the two poles. While the dis
tinction between the status of subject and object is not a given one, but
rather introduced and that at the same time for both, it is not imposed.
Thus the status of subject is an explication of the conscious-activity;
yet this explication itself is an act of consciousness - because in the
final analysis there is no explicator other than consciousness. On the
other hand, the position of being an object is not merely given in or
read from the encountered and grasped situation. Consciousness, by
virtue of its very position and activity, is bound to regard the situation
as an object. The presence of consciousness involves the introduction
of the category or status of object which, as such, would be void, were
it not for the factuality of the situation encountered by consciousness.
The category of subject is consciousness' interpretation of its own factu
ality, while the category of object is an interpretation of a factuality
encountered.
Subject and object may, at this juncture, be termed categories of pers
pective in order to stress the fact that through them a new phase or
vista of reality is revealed. They may be termed fundamental categories
in order to stress the fact that they make a new relationship to the world
possible and are more fundamental than those listed in the usual tables
CONSCIOUSNESS 7
of categories; substance, causality, etc. Through the latter we come to
know what has already been established as an object while the funda
mental categories of subject and object delineate the sphere of con
sciousness versus objects. The particular categories listed in the tables
of categories are only the specific guides to understanding ofthe already
established object. We do not mean to say that the fundamental cate
gories make the material categories superfluous. What we do mean is
that the fundamental categories represent: (a) a distinction within the
world and not a relationship between the objects of one world; and (b)
a basic cognitive situation and not a particular, confined and thus
experiential net of relations interpreted through the material catego
ries of SUbstance, causality, time, space, etc. In any case, if conscious
ness has the power of introducing a new perspective into the world,
it cannot be regarded as a mere occurrence or event among other oc
currences and events.
Our use ofthe term category requires some clarification. We do not use
it (as applied to subject and object) in the sense of a judgment referring
to the datum as is done in the Kantian tradition, but rather as desig
nating spheres of reality. In this respect we are closer in terminology
to the classic Aristotelian tradition, which defines categories as the
supreme genuses of being. By establishing something as an object (or
subject), we point to its status as a genus of reality and thus make a
more fundamental assertion than one ascribing substantiality or cau
sality, etc., to an object. To be sure, Aristotle considered the category
of substance to be the most basic, even though it too was included in
the list of categories. But it seems that in searching for the most funda
mental stratum of assertions, we must go even beyond the category of
substance. From this standpoint, we find the most fundamental or
supreme genuses or categories to be those of subject and object,
through which something most generic is asserted about the world.
This, then, is the sense in which we employ the term "category" in the
context of our analysis.
(c) Spontaneity. So far, consciousness has been shown to be charac
terized by: (a) alertness, i.e. concerned with situations, by virtue of
which it is superior to and independent of the situations encountered;
and (b) elucidation, which too manifests the independence of con
sciousness. It is now possible to propose that a third major attribute
consists in its independent activity, or, to use a traditional term, its
spontaneity. By spontaneity we mean the ability of consciousness to
initiate its own activities, to determine its own objectives and objects