Spinoza’s Theologico-Political Treatise: Exploring ’the Will of God’

207 Pages·2003·3.854 MB·English

by  Theo Verbeek

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SPINOZA’S THEOLOGICO-POLITICAL TREATISE
This book presents the first accessible analysis of Spinoza’s Tractatus Theologico-
politicus, situating the work in the context of Spinoza’s general philosophy and its
17th-century historical background.
According to Spinoza it is impossible for a being to be infinitely perfect and to have
a legislative will. This idea, demonstrated in the Ethics, is presupposed and further
elaborated in the Tractatus Theologico-politicus. It implies not only that on the level
of truth all revealed religion is false, but also that all authority is of human origin and
that all obedience is rooted in a political structure. The consequences for ‘authority’
as it is used in a religious context are explored: the authority of Scripture, the
authority of particular interpretations of Scripture, and the authority of the Church.
Verbeek also explores the work of two other philosophers of the period – Hobbes
and Descartes – to highlight certain peculiarities of Spinoza’s position, and to show
the contrasts between their theories.
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Spinoza’s Theologico-political
Treatise
Exploring ‘the Will of God’
THEO VERBEEK
Utrecht University, The Netherlands
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First published 2003 by Ashgate Publishing
Published 2016 by Routledge
2 Park Square, Milton Park, Abingdon, Oxon OX14 4RN
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Routledge is an imprint of the Taylor & Francis Group, an informa business
Copyright ©2003 Theo Verbeek
The author has asserted his moral right under the Copyright, Designs and Patents
Act, 1988, to be identified as the author of this work.
All rights reserved. No part of this book may be reprinted or reproduced or utilised
in any form or by any electronic, mechanical, or other means, now known or
hereafter invented,including photocopying and recording, or in any information
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Product or corporate names may be trademarks or registered trademarks, and are
used only for identification and explanation without intent to infringe.
British Library Cataloguing in Publication Data
Verbeek, Theo
Spinoza’s theologico-political treatise : exploring ‘the
will of God’
1. Spinoza, Benedictus de, 1632-1677. Tractatus
theologico-politicus 2. Philosophy and religion
I. Title.
199.4'92
Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data
Verbeek, Theo, 1945-
Spinoza’sTheologico-politicaltreatise:exploring‘thewillofGod’/Theo Verbeek.
p. cm.
Includes bibliographical references and index.
ISBN 0-7546-0493-4
1. Spinoza, Benedictus de, 1632-1677. Tractatus theologico-politicus. 2.
God–Will–History of doctrines–17th century. I. Title.
B3985.Z7 V47 2002
199'.492–dc21
2001053620
ISBN 9780754604938 (hbk)
ISBN 9781138263536 (pbk)
Typeset by Express Typesetters.
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Contents
Foreword vii
Author’s Note viii
Introduction 1
1 Religion and Truth 17
2 ‘The Will of God’ 43
3 ‘The Word of God’ 67
4 The Impossibility of Theology 93
5 ‘Government by God’ 121
6 The Freedom to Philosophize: Descartes and Spinoza 151
Epilogue 181
Bibliography 187
Index 197
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Foreword
For all the too many years that I have been working on this book there were various
people who in sharing with me their thoughts on Spinoza and commenting on earlier
drafts have greatly contributed to its final form. In alphabetical order they are: Erik-
Jan Bos, Wiep van Bunge, Sarah Hutton, Jonathan Israel, Cees Leijenhorst, Pierre-
François Moreau, Han van Ruler, Karl Schuhmann, Leen Spruit and Piet
Steenbakkers. If it did not look ungrateful to them I would add that they bear no
responsibility whatsoever for the result. What I mean to say is that I might have
avoided the errors left in it if I had listened to them more carefully. I also recall with
great pleasure the various occasions that provided me with an opportunity to present
my argument and quite often to considerably modify it: a colloquium at Marsh’s
Library (Dublin) in the summer of 1994; a seminar at the Istituto Italiano per gli
Studi Filosofici (Naples) and a colloquium on toleration organized by the University
of Chicago, both in the spring of 1996; the annual meeting of the Vereniging ‘Het
Spinozahuis’ in Rijnsburg in May 1998; a colloquium organized in November 1998
in Milan (CRS) by Luisa Simonutti, on determinism and freedom in English and
Dutch thought of the 17th century (‘Dal necessario al possibile’); a conference of the
British Society of the History of Philosophy, organized at Keele University in March
1999 on philosophical reactions to Christianity in modern thought; and a colloquium
on Spinoza’s Theologico-political treatise, organized by the cultural representatives
of France, Germany, Great Britain, Italy and Spain, at the Maison Descartes
(Amsterdam) in November 1999 to celebrate in a truly European spirit the new
critical edition of that work by Fokke Akkerman and Pierre-François Moreau (Paris:
PUF, 1999). Guest lectures on the subject were given at the Leiden-Utrecht Zeno
Research Institute in Philosophy, the Erasmus University (Rotterdam) and the École
Normale Supérieure (Fontenay). I take great pleasure in thanking all who were
somehow engaged in organizing these venues and am profoundly grateful for their
help and encouragement. I thank my publisher, Sarah Lloyd, and various other
people working for Ashgate for the efficient and intelligent way they dealt with my
problems.
I dedicate this book to the memory of a great scholar and a generous friend Onofrio
Nicastro (1939–1994). Despite his fatal illness I could have some talks with him
when I started work on this project but feel frustrated and sad that I have not been
able to profit more from his unfailing hospitality, his profound knowledge and his
perfect wisdom.
Utrecht, February 2002
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Author’s Note
In quotations from Spinoza the first reference is to the critical edition by Carl
Gebhardt (G, followed by volume and page number), which can also be found in
some translations. Since quotations from the Political treatise, which consists of
short paragraphs, can be easily identified without reference to any critical edition,
the only reference I give there is by chapter and paragraph number. In the case of the
Short treatise this is followed by a reference to the critical edition by Filippo
Mignini (M, followed by page number). The critical edition of the Theologico-
political treatiseI used is that by Akkerman and Moreau.
These references are generally followed by one to the English translation by
Curley (C, followed by volume and page number) and, in the case of the Theologico-
political treatise, which as yet is not translated by Curley, to that by Shirley.
Translations were all checked against the original Latin. Deviations from the
translations of Curley or Shirley are generally not noted. Spinoza’s works are cited
as follows:
CM Metaphysical thoughts(Cogitata metaphysica)
Ep. Correspondence(Epistolae)
Eth. Ethics(Ethica)
KV Short treatise(Korte verhandeling...)
PPC The ‘geometrical’ version of Descartes’ Principia (Principia
philosophiae Renati Des Cartes more geometrico...)
TIE Treatise on the Improvement of the Intellect(Tractatus de intellectus
emendatione)
TP Political treatise(Tractatus politicus)
TTP Theologico-political treatise(Tractatus theologico-politicus)
Adn in TTP Notes on the Theologico-political treatise (Adnotationes in
Tractatum theologico-politicum).
Classical authors are cited in standard editions and the Bible quoted after the
Authorized Version. Other abbreviations used in the text are listed below:
AT Descartes, Œuvres, eds Charles Adam and Paul Tannery
CSM Descartes, The Philosophical Writings, trans. J. Cottingham,
J. Stoothoff, D. Murdoch and A. Kenny
NNBW Nieuw Nederlandsch Biografisch Woordenboek, eds P.C.
Molhuysen, P.J. Blok and K.H. Kossmann.
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Introduction
Every reader of Spinoza’s Theologico-political treatise(1670) will know that it is a
difficult book but will also realize that its difficulties are not like those of, say, the
Critique of Pure Reason or the Phenomenology of the Mind. Its vocabulary is not
technical at all; nor is its reasoning complicated or its logic extraordinary. If it is
difficult it is not because of particular phrases, paragraphs, concepts, but because
one fails to see how things combine; how particular arguments fit into a
comprehensive argument; how a single chapter or couple of chapters relate to the
book as a whole and how the book relates to Spinoza’s other work; indeed, it is not
clear most of the time what it is all about even if every now and then one stumbles
across something familiar and recognizable.
The secondary literature is not very helpful. There is little unanimity as to whether
Spinoza explains the origin of civil society by a covenant, whether he endorses
democratic government, whether the book is against all religion or only against
specific aspects of a specific religion, how we should read the chapters on prophecy
(chaps 1 and 2), on the interpretation of Scripture (chap. 7), on theocracy (chaps 17
and 18). Even if many people would probably agree that ‘toleration’ is one of the
issues, little is done to match this with chap. 19, which seems to aim at subjecting
all theological and pastoral activity to the sovereign; and even though few people
would find it difficult to understand the point of the chapter on miracles (chap. 6),
there is little inclination to connect it with, say, that on prophecy (chap. 2) or the
interpretation of Scripture (chap. 7). The safest course generally is to select one
particular topic and be satisfied with some very broad hints about the rest.
Still, a close reading of even a single paragraph may end in considerable
confusion. For example, Spinoza starts his book with a definition: ‘Prophecy, that is
[sive], revelation, is the certain knowledge of some matter revealed by God to man.’1
So revelation would be prophecy; prophecy would be revelation; revelation as well
as prophecy would be ‘certain knowledge’ (certa cognitio). But usually ‘revelation’
is either a process (God revealing himself or his will) or the result of a process
(revealed knowledge about God and his will). The two are mediated by a prophet,
although that is by no means necessary – after all there is an important tradition
according to which God reveals himself (also) in nature.2Leaving that point for what
it is, it is not evident that revelation and prophecy are strictly identical. Hobbes, for
example, makes a useful distinction between ‘revelation’, as the process of directly
receiving a message from God (in a dream or vision or through a voice), and
‘prophecy’, as the process by which the recipient (a ‘prophet’) communicates
whatever he believes was ‘revealed’ to him by God to others – a distinction which,
as we shall see, Spinoza also relies on in a different context.3Most Christians, on the
other hand, although they would concede that prophecy is revelation and that
revelation yields knowledge (albeit knowledge of a particular kind, not to be
confused with ordinary, natural, knowledge), would not be prepared to say that
revelation is always prophecy given their belief that God reveals himself, not only
1
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2 Spinoza’s Theologico-political Treatise
in the Old Testament (the ‘Prophetic Books’), but also in the New Testament (the
‘Apostolic Books’) – and an apostle is not a prophet, as Spinoza himself will insist
later on.4
And what does it mean that prophecy (revelation) is ‘knowledge’? That it is
‘certain knowledge’? Or would it be significant that Spinoza does not use ‘science’
(scientia) or ‘wisdom’ (sapientia) but ‘cognition’ (cognitio), that is, anything from
‘awareness’ up to ‘knowledge by acquaintance’?5 And does ‘certain’ (certa) mean
‘known to be true’ or is it no more than ‘some kind of’? A Spinozist at any rate, who
learned from the Ethicsthat truth and certainty are reserved to adequate ideas, would
not agree that awareness is ‘certain’, that is, known to be true. In any case, if
prophecy is ‘known to be true’ the Spinozist would have to admit, not only that it is
philosophy, but also that it consists of adequate ideas.6 And that indeed is what
Spinoza seems to be aiming at: ‘Given this definition natural knowledge could also
be called prophecy, for whatever we know by natural light also depends on
knowledge of God and his eternal decrees.’7 But on almost the same page the
identity of philosophy and prophecy is denied or at least qualified:
The only difference with what is generally called divine knowledge is that the latter goes
beyond the limits of the former [philosophy] and cannot be explained by the laws of
human nature in themselves. Yet in respect of the certainty involved in natural knowledge
and the source from which it derives, that is, God, it is in no way inferior to prophetic
knowledge, unless one would be willing to understand, or rather to dream, that prophets
have human bodies but non-human minds and that their sensations and consciousness are
of an entirely different order from our own.8
Despite the fact that philosophy is not inferior to revelation either in truth or in
certainty, revelation goes beyond it. But apart from the fact that that is clearly a
contradiction in itself – for how can revelation go beyond philosophy without
philosophy losing its certainty? – it is also against Spinoza’s general philosophy,
according to which the real coincides with the conceivable. The idea therefore that
there could be something real and knowable (to a prophet) but inconceivable (for a
philosopher) is absurd.9 Besides, the only conceivable reason why there could be
knowledge going ‘beyond the limits of ordinary knowledge’ is that prophets have
faculties other people have not, but that is impossible because they had a human
body and therefore a human mind – indeed, the idea that it could be otherwise is
dismissed as ‘a dream’.
At the end of the day the alleged identity of ‘prophecy’, ‘revelation’ and ‘certain
knowledge’ turns out to rest on an equivocation on the word ‘divine’. The reason
why natural knowledge (Spinoza’s philosophy) is called ‘divine’ is that it is based
on a concept of God which, being rational, is accessible to everyone, whereas the
reason why prophecy is called ‘divine’ is that it goes beyond what people can
‘naturally’ know, that is, that it is not ‘divine’ in the first sense – indeed, the ‘God’
of Spinoza is not the ‘God’ of prophecy, the first being ‘nature’ and the second a
supreme legislator of a kind which, according to philosophy, is inconceivable and
therefore impossible. It also rests on an equivocation on ‘certain cognition’, which
is taken sometimes as subjectively certain awareness (or belief) and sometimes as
objectively certain knowledge (science). As a result, the point of Spinoza’s
definition of ‘prophecy’ is not to explain the meaning of the word ‘prophecy’ but to
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Introduction 3
lay down a dialectical principle such that he can establish an identity of some sort
between his own philosophy and traditional religion.10
This becomes even more evident if one looks at Spinoza’s definition of ‘prophet’,
which is clearly contrary to that of ‘prophecy’. According to Spinoza a ‘prophet’ is
someone who ‘interprets God’s revelations for those who cannot have certain
knowledge of the things revealed by God and can embrace them only by faith’.11
What the definitions of ‘prophet’ and ‘prophecy’ have in common is their concern
with ‘things revealed by God’. But whereas according to the definition of ‘prophecy’
the result is ‘certain knowledge’ (even to the point that it is identical with
philosophy), the definition of ‘prophet’ suggests that there is a real distinction
between knowledge and belief and a corresponding difference between philosophy
and prophecy. Some people ‘cannot have certain knowledge’ of the things revealed
by God and embrace them ‘by faith’. So faith is an alternative to knowledge, made
possible by prophecy. Accordingly, there is a real distinction between ‘reason and
knowledge’, which in an objective way arecertain, and ‘faith and belief’, which are
at best believed to be certain. Philosophy and prophecy may both be ‘divine’ but
they cater for different types of people and deliver with different degrees of
certainty.
This also reflects on the way those two types of ‘cognition’ are communicated. By
following the arguments of a philosopher we eventually know and understand the
things he knows and understands in the way he himself knows and understands them
and become as certain of their truth as he himself is; but if we listen to a prophet we
at best accept his words ‘on authority’ and embrace whatever he says by ‘faith’. So
there is a difference, not only in the result (knowledge by understanding versus
belief on authority), but also in the process leading to that result. Whereas in the first
case we speak of ‘learning’ and ‘teaching’, Spinoza calls the second process
‘interpretation’. A prophet ‘interprets’ God’s decrees as they are ‘revealed’ to him.
Others come to ‘know about’ God through a prophet (provided they trust and believe
him) but can justify their beliefs and be certain of them only by alleging his
authority. The philosopher, however, knows God on the basis of a concept and
everyone having the same concept will know God in the way he does:
An interpreter of God is someone who has a revelation of God’s decrees, which he
interprets to others who did not have this revelation and accept it solely in reliance on the
prophet’s authority. Now if those who listen to prophets were themselves to become
prophets just as those who listen to philosophers become philosophers the prophet would
not be an interpreter of divine decrees; for his hearers would not rely on the testimony and
authority of the prophet but on the divine revelation itself and on their own inward
testimony, just as the prophet does. Similarly, sovereign powers are the interpreters of their
own sovereign right, since the laws they enact are upheld only by their own sovereign
authority and are supported only by their own testimony.12
‘Having a revelation’ is a private experience (an ‘inward testimony’) which cannot
be shared with others but only ‘interpreted’ for others. This ‘interpretation’ is what
we call prophecy, that is, the words spoken by a prophet – which shows,
incidentally, that, like Hobbes, Spinoza makes a distinction between ‘revelation’ and
‘prophecy’. Moreover, an ‘interpreter’ does not bring other persons into a state of
mind even remotely comparable with his own; indeed, however much we listen to a