Spartans in Darkness: American SIGINT and the Indochina War, 1945-1975

522 Pages·2002·28.4 MB·English

by  NSA

Declassified and approved for release by NSA on 21 December 2007 pursuant to E.O. 12958,
as amended MDR 52331
Cover Photo:
(U) Sentry atop a bunker complex at the Phu Bai station in 1972
TepSE6RET::eeMINli'})(1
UNITED STATES CRYPTOLOGIC HISTORY
Series VI
The NSA Period: 1952 - Present
Volume 7
(U) Spartans in Darkness:
American SIGINT and the
Indochina War~ 1945-1975
Robert J. Hanyok
CENTER FOR CRYPTOLOGIC HISTORY
NATIONAL SECURITY AGENCY
2002
lQP S~SR~llJSQMINl::X1
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(U) Dedication
Iktill'l' till' battle [ofThormopyl.u-], Diuncces. the Spartan. was wumed that the
number01"till' Persians\\assnch thatwhen they loosed theirbows. thearrowswould
block IIll'sun. 'So much Iht'better'.«bscrvod Diancces.'Iftho Persianshide thesun.
then wewillfight in till' shade rather than sunlight',
Herodotus, 111(' Histories
Thisbookis dedicatedto thoseAlliedcryptologists in Indochina, whosedevotion to
duty, under the worst ofconditions, was borne with the courage, virtuosity, aplomb, and
humorthatonlytrue professionalscan display.
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Table ofContents
Page
(U) Foreword xi
(U) Preface xiii
(U) Acknowledgments xix
(U) Prelude: Indochina Before 1950
1
(V) The French Arrive :~
(U)Threats to the French: Nationalists and Ho ChiMinh 4
(U)Japanese E".,.pansion 6
(C) V.S. Policy 8
(C) Resistanceto Japanese Occupation 9
(D)The French Counter Ho 10
(V) The AmericanView 12
(D) Bao Dai Returns 1~~
(D)Operation Lea 14
(C) The Beginning ofthe End for the French 14
(S//SI)
Chanter 1-'MLe Grand Nombre Des Rues Sans Joie:
I
land the Franco-Vietnamese War, 1950-1954
17
(Sf/51) America's PostwarCOMINT Predicament 17
(e)'111E.' Earlv COMI~T Effort a <tinstViet:\linhCommunications. 1945-1950 18
(SI/SI)The Asian Crucible:
'--_ Indochina War.1950 21
oof*~~l'nceltain Relations: COMINTPartn~rshi )switl 26
.........•....... ~~1
~(~S~fJ~/S~I~)nE~a\~'e~s~d~ro~p~p~in~g~.O~nlH~e~I~I:r------lt~h~E.'~B~a~tttll~e~07fnD~ie~n~B~ien
Phu .. , 35
(U)The Battle Begins .......•........\................•........ ~H
> •••••••
(S/fSI)The ~SA Emergency Plan for SoutheastAsia \ 42
(V) "Weare blowing up everything, Adieu." -; \ t~
fSI/SI) Fir.s... Interlude: The Geneva Settlem-.ent.a.nd
L t.
IDrawdown, 1954-1955 . 49
(S//SI)
Chapter 2 - M"The Strugglefor Heaven's Mattdatr=:e,-=-:............,
Crisisin~()uthVietnam~. ~962 5:~
SIGINTand the Internal . .
(U) Ngo Dinh Diem: The Embattled President, ...........•.\..\...•..............54
(D) Diem's War Against Internal Dissent ~ •..........'....•.•............... ;')8
EO
1.4. (c)
EO
1.4. (d)
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EO
1.4. (c)
Page
(V) "It istimefor the struggle": Hanoi andtheSouthernlnsurrectfon 62
(SIISO SIGINTand the Attempted S()llpSAgain;LBiem, 1960,:1962>../ 66
(U) The Formation ofthe Natifll)alLiberati~I1Front.December lCJ60/ 70
•(S/ / S1)~America Plans the Mainland SIGIN'['lluildUp,D96] <'" ,,/, •••••••••••••••• n
~'~'he Berh?~~ld g
- (S/ / S1) m[ First in :\.sia:(Establishin the SIGIN'.:I'.Site /// "7
Th,ul.mdDl )6] ;4
(S//S1)
Chapter 3 - ~"To Die in the South": SIGINT~the Ho Chi Minh
Trail, and the Infiltration Problem,I/1t968/ H:~
(I,") An Embattled Kingdom: Group959 and Hanoi's Role
in the Strugglefor Laosr-l1962 ; ; H7
r:'
(C) MilitaryGroup 559, the'roristruetiollofthe He)Chi Minh Trial.
and the Southern InfiltrIatniofnrill~r6129. 63 Y4
(e) GI'OUp 7:19 and Maritime 101
(S//SI)The Rest ofthe Story, Part 1: SIGINTand Infiltration, 1963-1967 10:1
(U) '111e Rest ofthe Story. Part 2: TheVinh Windowand the Breakthrough
on the Infiltration Problem. 1967-1968 110
Chapter 4 - (U) The Burden's First Fanfare:
American SIGINTArrives in the Republic ofVietnam, 1961-1964 119
(C) Definingthe Struggle: TheCounterinsurgency Plan. 1960-1961 120
(Sf/SI)The SIGINT Plan for Southeast Asia. 1961 122
(C)TheArrival orthe :~rdRRlTin Saigon, 1961 12:1
(l,")The BeginningsoftheASAAirborne Radio Direction
Finding Mission, 1961-1963 129
(l:)Tactical SIGINTSupport to ARVN Operations 134
(8,,/31)TIll' Marines, Air Force, and NSAEstablish Their
Southeast Asia Mainland Missions l:P
(S//SI)The Communists' BigCommunications Change, April 1962 146
(L') Phu Bai: The FirsIt 'ADmerican-only Base 1.50
(:f''/I,'S::I):1\.U Re\O. I'l...1U (IC'I') '1)q'M.lt1II"E.0ftl}C'Frell(-h.1(".7'6."::; •••••••••••••••••• b-.')~
(I") "Apres Moi. LeDeluge: SIGINTand the Fall ofPresident Diem. 196:~ I;')!)
Second Interlude: (U) The Center Does NofHold:
Post-Diem South Vietnam, 1964 ~., 171
EO 1.4. (c)
EO 1.4. (d)
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Chapter 5 - CU)Skunks, Bogies, Silent Hounds, and the Flying Fish:
The GulfofTonkin Mystery, 2-4 August 1964 175
(U) The Desoto Missions 17R
(LJ) Operations Plan :34A 1H1
(LJ) Round One: The 2August Battle IH6
(V) Interlude: Maneuvers and Watchfulness. 3 August 194
(U) Round Two: "Everythingin Doubt" - '11l(~ -+ August Action 195
(LJ) The Silent Dogs: What till' SIGI~T Really Did (and Did Not) Report :!.oo
(Sf/SI) Exhibit A: The First Attack Message 200
H1//ST) Exhibit B: The Lack ofVietnamese Command Control,
Communications. and Intelligence 204
(ti//SI) Exhibit C: The "After-Action" Report 207
(e) Exhibit D: AMatterofCertainty 211
(S//SI) Exhibit E: And Some More Silent Dogs 214
(SI/SI) Xlaintaining the Line: The NSASummary Reports
and the "Del Lang Chronology" 214
(Sf/SI) GulfofTonkin Redux: The 18September"Attack" 219
Chapter 6 - (S/lSI) Xerxes' Arrows:
SIGINT Support to the Air War, 1964-1972 2:l1
(C) Washington Plans the Air War. 1964-1965 2:~2
(C) NorthVietnam'sAir Defense System 2~l4
(Sf/Sl) In Search ofa Target: TIll' Early Days of SIUINTSupport
to Air Operations, 1962-196.~ 2:~9
(S//SI) SIGI~Tand the AirWar, 1965-1968 24;~
(S//E1l)Project Hammock 249
(e) Settingtill' Trap: Operation Bolo,.Ianuary 1967 2~):!.
(C)The Battle.Ioined: Ail'Combat to the Bombing Halt,
.Ianuary 1967-l\farrh 1968 2;,4
(Sf/SI) Iron HOI"Sl': Automatingthe SIGINTSupportto the Air War :!.;'l8
(Sl/SI) Flying for Uncle Ho: Foreign Communist Pilots
During the Vietnam War. 1964-1972 :!.61
(C) "Take nothingon faith": SIGIKTand the Son Tay Raid.
21November 1970 26:l
(C)The FinalAir Battles: Teaball and SIGINTSupport
to the LinebackerOperations. May-October 1972 269
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EO 1.4. (c)
EO 1.4. (d)
(U) Third Interlude: "\Vho'll Stop the Rain?"
America Enters the GroundWar, 1965-1967 ./ 2H;~
el~) ProppingUp the Domino: American Cryptology Enters a Wider War :!Hi)
(U)TheArmySecurityAgency / 2Hi)
eV)The Naval SecurityGroup / 29:1-
(l;)TheAir ForceSecurityService ; 294
'-- ---"1
:1-96
(V) Centralization ofSIGIl\'T: The Missing Ingredient 196
Chapter 7 - (U) A Springtime ofTrumpets:
SIGINTand the Tet Offensive aoI
(S//81)TheGround Warand the Development of
SIGINT Indicators, 1965-1967 :30-1-
(U) Hanoi and Washington Planfor Victory :~()9
(U)l:.S. Intelligence and the Start ofthe Winter/Spring Offensive :31;')
(U)The Fulcrum ofOurVision: The Siege of Khe Sanh and
Its Effects on American Intelligence :~20
(to) Countdown toTel: SIGINT Reporting During.Ianuarv 1968 :~26
(U) The l\'lyskryofthe:30.lanuary"Premature"Attacks :~:~-1-
(L:) The Storm Breaks: Tetand the American Reaction :~:F
(I") AfterTel: Cryptologic Postmortem :{40
(lJ) Trapped in the Looking Glass: The Post-Tot Reality Hits Washington :{-1-7
(U) Fourth Interlude: Grasping at the
Straws ofVictory, 1968-1970 .:357
(S//~I) Huntingthe Elusive COSV:\':
ACase Study ofthe Limits of SIGI~T. 1970 :~h()
Chapter 8 - (B/lSI) In Our Own Image: NSA, Vietnamizatlon,
and the Expansion ofSouth Vietnamese SIGINT, 1969-1973 :~6<')
I I
I :~7()
(~/I~n ~SA SIGI~T Asia~ :37:~
Looks for a New Partner in Southeast
(:5/1~l) American :\10\'(lS in: The Sabertooth TrainingProgram
and Vietnamese Expansion. 1961-196:~ .......................•.......... :{76
(9/181) AMatterof Distant Trust: TIlt' Persistent ProblemofSecurity
in the Vietnamese SIGI~TOrganization ......................•.......... :{HO
EO 1.4. (c)
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