Space, Time and Causality: Royal Institute of Philosophy Conferences Volume 1981

212 Pages·1983·10.182 MB·English

by  J. L. Mackie (auth.), Richard Swinburne (eds.)

SPACE, TIME AND CAUSALITY
SYNTHESE LIBRARY
STUDIES IN EPISTEMOLOGY,
LOGIC, METHODOLOGY, AND PHILOSOPHY OF SCIENCE
Managing Editor:
JAAKKO HINTlKKA, Florida State University
Editors:
DON ALD DAVIDSON, University of Chicago
GABRIEL NUCHELMANS, University of Leyden
WESLEY C. SALMON, University ofP ittsburgh
VOLUME 157
ROYAL INSTITUTE OF PHILOSOPHY CONFERENCES
VOLUME 1981
SPACE, TIME AND
CAUSALITY
Edited by
RICHARD SWINBURNE
Department of Philosophy,
University of Keele, Keele, Staffordshire
D. REIDEL PUBLISHING COMPANY
DORDRECHT : HOLLAND / BOSTON: U.S.A.
LONDON: ENGLAND
library of Congress Cataloging in Publication Data
Main entry under title:
Space, time, and causality.
(Synthese library; v. 157)
'The papers in this volume are revised versions of papers read to a
conference at the University of Keele in September 1981, sponsored by
the Royal Institute of Philosophy'-Pref.
Bibliography: p.
Includes index.
1. Space and time-Congresses. 2. Causation-Congresses.
I. Swinburne, Richard. II. Royal Institute of Philosophy.
BD632.S63 1982 110 82-18123
ISBN-13: 978-94-009-6968-1 e-ISBN-13: 978-94-009-6966-7
DO I: 10.1007/978-94-009-6966-7
Published by D. Reidel Publishing Company,
P.O. Box 17, 3300 AA Dordrecht, Holland.
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All Rights Reserved
Copyright © 1983 by D. Reidel Publishing Company, Dordrecht, Holland
Softcover reprint of the hardcover 15t edition 1983
No part of the material protected by this copyright notice may be reproduced or
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TABLE OF CONTENTS
FOREWORD vii
PREFACE ix
INTRODUCTION xi
ABSOLUTE VERSUS RELATIVE SPACE AND TIME
J. L. MACKIE I Three Steps Towards Absolutism 3
JON DORLING I Reply to Mackie 23
ELiE ZAHAR I Absoluteness and Conspiracy 37
TIME AND CAUSAL CONNECTIBILITY
LA WRENCE SKLAR I Prospects for a Causal Theory of Space-Time 45
RICHARD SWINBURNE I Verificationism and Theories of Space-Time 63
TEMPORAL AND CAUSAL ASYMMETRY
RICHARD A. HEALEY I Temporal and Causal Asymmetry 79
W. H. NEWTON-SMITH I Temporal and Causal Asymmetry 105
CAUSALITY AND QUANTUM MECHANICS
NANCY CARTWRIGHT I How the Measurement Problem Is an Arti-
fact of the Mathematics 125
JEREMY BUTTERFIELD I Measurement, Unitarity, and Laws 135
vi TABLE OF CONTENTS
CAUSALITY, RELATIVITY, AND
THE EINSTEIN-PODOLSKY-ROSEN PARADOX
MICHAEL REDHEAD I Nonlocality and Peaceful Coexistence 151
PETER GIBBINS I Quantum Logic and Ensembles 191
NOTES ON CONTRIBUTORS 207
INDEX OF NAMES 209
FOREWORD
The Royal Institute of Philosophy has been sponsoring conferences in alter
nate years since 1969. These have from the start been intended to be of
interest to persons who are not philosophers by profession. They have mainly
focused on interdisciplinary areas such as the philosophies of psychology,
education and the social sciences. The volumes arising from these conferences
have included discussions between philosophers and distinguished practitioners
of other disciplines relevant to the chosen topic.
Beginning with the 1979 conference on 'Law, Morality and Rights' and
the 1981 conference on 'Space, Time and Causality' these volumes are now
constituted as a series. It is hoped that this series will contribute to advancing
philosophical understanding at the frontiers of philosophy and areas of
interest to non-philosophers. It is hoped that it will do so by writing which
reduces technicalities as much as the subject-matter permits. In this way the
series is intended to demonstrate that philosophy can be clear and worthwhile
in itself and at the same time relevant to the interests of lay people.
STUART BROWN
Honorary Assistant Director
Royal Institute ofP hilosophy
vii
PREFACE
The papers in this volume are revised versions of papers read 'to a conference
at the University of Keele in September 1981, sponsored by the Royal
Institute of Philosophy. The general theme ofthe conference was the implica
tions for our understanding of space, time and causation of the developments
of modern physics, and especially of those two great theories of modern
physics - Relativity Theory and Quantum Theory.
It is very sad to have to record that after participating in the conference
with his usual vigour, but before he could complete the final revisions to his
paper, J. L. Mackie died on December 12th 1981. I should like to dedicate
this volume to his memory. John Mackie believed that philosophical argu
ment, applied to knowledge provided by other disciplines and above all
by science, could lead to a clear and unified world-view. He has contributed
in a major way to debates about most areas of philosophy. His enthusiasm
for the subject showed in his readiness to argue about it with almost any
opponent, however humble or awkward. He always did so with great courtesy;
as one who argued with him about many philosophical matters from a dia
metrically opposed position over many years can certainly testify. Oddly
enough, the issue discussed in our two contributions to the present volume
was one of very few about which we had a small measure of agreement.
January 1982 RICHARD SWINBURNE
INTRODUCTION
A major role of the philosopher of science is to put major scientific theories
under the philosophical microscope. Once the scientist has constructed his
theory, given it precise mathematical form, used it to make predictions, and
found that these confirm the theory, the philosopher comes and examines
the theory. He asks first what does the theory mean, what is it telling us
about the world. Some philosophers and scientists (variously called instru
mentalists, operationalists, or anti-realists) have held that the whole meaning
of the theory is contained in its predictions about what can be observed -
e.g. that the atomic theory of chemistry, as put forward in the nineteenth
century, was simply a shorthand summary of observable data, of which
chemical substances combine with other chemical substances in what pro
portions by mass and volume to form other substances; of the viscosity,
boiling points and melting points of substances. But most philosophers and
scientists these days are realists. They think of scientific theories not just as
predicting devices, but as devices which tell us about the unobservable entities
and properties which lie behind and cause the phenomena which we observe.
They understand talk about 'molecules', 'atoms', 'protons', 'photons',
'electrons' and 'neutrinos' as talk about very small things which possess
properties such as mass and charge, not just as terms in a scientific theory
which is a successful predicting device. Yet even if you adopt this realist
attitude to science, it is not always clear just what the scientific theory is
claiming - are electrons supposed to be small round material objects, like
billiard balls but very much smaller; or are they supposed to be rather dif
ferent from anything observable on the large scale? If the world about which
the scientist tries to tell us is very different from the world which we can
observe with the naked eye, he will have a problem in describing it - for our
ordinary language is designed for talk about the observable world. The
scientist will therefore need to use words in slightly different senses from
their normal senses. The role of the philosopher is to show when and how this
is happening, and so to make clear just what the scientific theory is claiming.
The physicist may tell us that electrons may be regarded either as waves or
as particles. But if he is claiming that they are both waves and particles, the
philosopher needs to clarify this claim. For superficially it is hard to make
xi
xii INTRODUCTION
sense of this - how can something be both the propagation of a disturbance
in a medium (which is what a wave is) and a material object? A second task
for the philosopher when he has spelled out what the theory means is to show
why the scientist's evidence is in fact evidence for that interpretation of the
theory. The theory tells us about things unobservable. Why should we take
particular observations as evidence in favour of the existence of just those
things?
Relativity Theory and Quantum Theory present abundant scope for
philosophical investigation. They are both theories of great mathematical
sophistication which have proved very successful predictors of observations.
But the descriptions in words which physicists give of the meaning of these
theories are highly paradoxical. Ordinarily we suppose that an event occurs at
a defmite time and place - i.e. at a defmite interval after some other specified
event and at a definite distance from it. But the Special and General Theories
of Relativity, at any rate as they are normally expounded, challenge this
understanding. We are told that the distance in space and the interval in time
between events depends on the frame of reference in which rulers and clocks
used for measurement are situated - the Earth, say, or a spaceship moving
across the Earth's surface. There is no true distance in space or interval
in time between events; there is just 'distance in F', and 'distance in F",
'temporal interval in F', and 'temporal interval in F' '. Again, we ordinarily
wish to distinguish between real motion (e.g. the motion of a train across
the countryside) and apparent motion (e.g. the motion of the countryside
as seen from the train). But relativity theory seems to tell us that in reality
there is no such thing as absolute motion. Indeed it seems to go even further
and say that space and time are not separate things in which there are separate
intervals. The real entity is space-time, intervals in which really exist - any
division of these intervals into spatial and temporal components is an arbitrary
one. We need to elucidate and make sense of these claims, if we can; and
clarify precisely whether the evidence of observation supports these claims.
Similar problems arise with Quantum Theory. Ordinarily we suppose that
physical objects are at defmite places at definite times moving with definite
velocities and momenta. Yet Quantum Theory, at any rate on some inter
pretations, seem to suggest not merely that we cannot know the exact position
and momentum of a particle, such as an electron or photon, but that it does
not have these. It only has the probability of being in a certain place and
having a certain momentum - until it is 'observed' (i.e. interacts with some
measuring apparatus which gives a reading which we can observe). Then if its
position is measured, this acquires a definite value, while its momentum