Soviet Russia and Far East

401 Pages·1949·12.763 MB·English

by  David J. Dallin

SOVIET RUSSIA
AND
THE FAR EAST
BY
DAVID J. DALLIN
LONDON
HOLLIS & CARTER
1949
Copyright, 1948, by Yale University Press
Printed m the USA. for Hollis b Carter, Ltd,,
2), Ashley Place, London, S.W. 1
First published, w ?
All rights reserved. This book may not be
reproduced, in whole or in part, in any form
(except by reviewers for the public press),
without written permission from the publishers.
Preface
In Soviet Russia’s international relations Europe has always oc­
cupied a more important place than has the Far East; for a com­
prehension of Soviet policies, however, the Far East is at least as
important as Europe. In east Asia, Soviet policy could set itself
its most ambitious goals, develop new political methods, and test
new techniques long before they could be applied in Europe\|As \
early as the ’twenties the Far East had emerged as an important
workshop of new devices and strategies in Soviet international
activities. A China ripe for the great upheaval; Japan as a buffer
against the Anglo-Saxon world; a Manchurian railway worth
fighting for; Outer Mongolia as the first Soviet satellite state;
Tannu Tuva, the first area to complete the full course from
“sovereignty” and “integrity” to the position of a third-rate prov­
ince of the Soviet Union—these were the major elements of a
peculiar policy conducted from Moscow: a policy often success­
ful, sometimes 'miscalculated, but always a policy sui generis,
bold, and dynamic, peaceful in relations with a. superior power,
aggressive toward inferior force.iln this scheme of things, the
Soviet Far East itself became an advanced military base, a strong­
hold in the Pacific constantly being fortified for further action;
an outpost of Soviet might, and a base for expansion. Many a
misconception and many an error in evaluation of Soviet policy
in general could have been avoided had the Far Eastern pattern
been better known and understood. ^
Strictly speaking, “the Far East” is an inexact designation for
this book. Embracing, as it must, relations between the Soviet
Union on the one hand and China, Japan, and Korea on the other,
the subject matter of this volume could not be limited to that
sector of land in eastern Asia and the adjacent islands that are usu­
ally called the Far East. Russian relations with China have ex­
tended deep into central Asia; Chinese Turkestan and Mongolia
have been important objects of Sino-Soviet contests. This book
must therefore also be concerned with the peripheral areas of
IV Soviet Russia and the Far East
China. Furthermore, no work dealing with Soviet foreign policy^
in the Far East would be complete if it did not consider the activi­
ties of the Communist parties in the countries of the Orient.
Sometimes these parties proclaimed proudly and publicly the ties
that bound them to Moscow; at other times they preferred to
parade as “independent” and “nationalist” forces. Actually, they
at no time ceased to function as an arm of Soviet international
activities.
Chronologically this volume begins with the crucial year 1931
and covers the period down to the present time. This book con­
stitutes a part of my work on Russian policy in the Far East
which will embrace a period of about 90 years, from the date of
the Russian acquisition of the key area in the Pacific to our days.
The history of the period from i860 to 1930 is the subject of a
companion volume to be published in the spring of 1949.
The author wishes to express his gratitude to Eugene David­
son, of the Yale University Press, at whose suggestion this work
on the Far East was undertaken; to Professor M. Pavlovsky, of
Shanghai, for valuable assistance in placing at my disposal im­
portant data and source material; to Professor Robert T. Oliver
for his expert advice on Korean problems; to Professor Harry R.
Rudin for comments and suggestions concerning this manuscript;
to Alexander Dallin for research and assistance in the literary
shaping of the book; and to Mrs. Tilly Klorman for valuable aid
in editing the manuscript.
Contents
Preface E:
List of Maps R-
PART I.
JAPAN IN THE ’THIRTIES
I. Militant Japan i
The Appeasement of Japan y
Relations Deteriorate 9
Resistance or Peace? 14
Retreat from Manchuria 17
II. The Semiwar 22
The First Anti-Comintern 28
Diplomatic War 32
Russia and Japan’s War with China 35
Fighting Continues 37
III. Communism in Japan and Korea 45
IV. “In Japan’s Secret Service” 53
PART II.
CHINA BEFORE THE WAR
V. War and Peace with Chiang Kai-siiek 6i
Moscow and the Sian Incident 67
Rapprochement with China 71
VI. The Soviet Sphere of Influence in the ’Thirties 77 '
The Mongolian Colony 77
The Colony of Tannu Tuva 84
The Drive into Sinkiang 91
VII. The Chinese Soviets 104
A Soviet Government in China 107
The Long Adarch in
The Essence of Chinese Communism 11 j
Imitating Russia <-0
vi Soviet Russia and the Far East
VIII. Moscow and Yenan 124
Resistance or Retreat? 127
Russia and the “United Front” in China 129
Once Again the Trotskyites 135
United Front in Action 137
Fighting Resumed 143
PART III.
THE YEARS OF THE WORLD WAR
IX. Peace with Japan 148
The Tripartite Pact 153
Soviet-Japanese Agreement 160
Russia at War in Europe 166
X. Russia and the Pacific War 174
Germany Prodding Japan into War 176
Japan Prodding for a New Hitler-Stalin Pact 178
American Expectations and Illusions 181
Preparing for War 187
XI. Three Conferences and the Soviet-Japanese War 190
Yalta 193
The Sino-Soviet Conference 198
The Potsdam Conference 206
The War on Japan 210
XII. China and Russia in Wartime 216
The Communist Tide 222
American Misconceptions 230
PART IV.
THE SPOILS OF VICTORY
XIII. The War Is Over 236
Ousted from Japan? 239
Long-range Plans for Manchuria 241
Korea Reappears 2jj
The Moscow Conference 262
XIV. New Antagonism Toward Japan 268
Repatriation from Russia 272
Contents vii
Peace Treaty with Japan? 276
Communism in Postwar Japan 27$
XV. Trusteeship over Korea 284
Soviet North Korea 284
The Soviet Union and South Korea 293
Russian-Amcrican Negotiations 300
Two Koreas 308
XVI. No Peace for China 314
Soviet Assistance to the Chinese Communists 323
De Facto Recognition 331
Entanglement over Dairen 333
Chinese Communism after the War 338
XVII. Expansion in Mongolia and Sinkiang 333
Mongolia 353
Toward Inner Mongolia 358
Satkkag jrfr
XVIII. Facing the Pacific 369
The Balance Sheet 373
Sources 385
Index 391
Maps
Manchuria during the Semiwar 40
The Long March “ 4
The Port-Arthur Base 200-201
Manchuria after the War 253
The Communist Plan 340
China, 1947-1948 348-9
Sinkiang and Mongolia 362
The Soviet Sphere, 1939 and 1948 End Papers
Part I. Japan in the Thirties
i
Militant Japan
September, 1931, marked a turning point in the history of the Far
East. With the Japanese invasion of Manchuria a distinct period
had ended—the nine years of circumspect Japanese policy after
Japan’s setbacks at the Washington Conference of 1922. The new
era that now began was destined to last 14 years—down to the sign­
ing of the armistice aboard the Missouri on September 2,1945. *
Japan was conscious of her new and strong position. From the
events in the late ’twenties she had arrived at the conclusion that the
time was propitious for a new advance onto the mainland of Asia
and the islands of the Pacific. She had drawn all the consequences
from the happenings that surrounded the brief but illuminating
Sino-Soviet war of 1929 when China made an attempt to regain
control of northern Manchuria by seizing the Chinese Eastern^
Railway. Japan’s policy aimed at the maintenance of the status quo;
Tokyo gave the green light to the Red Army’s operations against
China, while Moscow rejected all efforts of the United States to
mediate the conflict.
The armed conflict of 1929 had revealed to the world the actual
relationship between the powers in the Far East, the weakness of
some and the strength of others. It had again revealed the utter im­
potence of China and her inability to resist foreign pressure; the
Soviets’ violent opposition to any interference of the Western
Powers in Far Eastern affairs, and their inclination to cooperate
with Japan; the reluctance of Britain and the United States to re­
sort to force in the face of joint Japanese-Soviet opposition. Only
now did it become clear how swiftly Japan’s power had grown
since her misfortunes of 192 2-2 3. The Soviet Union had been the
victor in the struggle with China, but the fruits of Soviet victory
were reaped by Japan.;
A direct line«Jeads from the Sino-Soviet conflict of 1929 to^
JapanVumsion of Manchuria in 1931, to the dislodging of Russia
2 Soviet Russia and the Far East
from the Northeastern Provinces of China, to the outbreak of war
with China in 1937, to Pearl Harbor in 1941. It is not too mucli toJ
say that the experiences of 1929 encouraged Japan to risk an at­
tempt at grand-scale conquest on the Chinese mainland and in the
western Pacific. These invasions and wars, detrimental to both
Russia and the United States in the Far East, could have been
averted in the initial phases of the process. Effective resistance to
Japan was possible only through cooperation of Russia and the
United States in Manchuria.
“American intervention” in 1929 was more than once rejected
by the Soviet Government, which clearly foresaw that the simple
“mediation and conciliation” which the Western Powers advo­
cated would have led to far-reaching changes if accepted. The
Soviet Government expected that a settlement reached with the
aid of the United States might lead to eventual internationaliza­
tion of the Chinese Eastern Railway and probably of a great
number of other Manchurian enterprises as well. In general pene­
tration by other powers into Manchuria would not be limited
to economic activities, but would deprive Russia (and Japan) either
partially or completely of control and supremacy over the Chinese
province.
The creation of some form of international supervision in Man­
churia was probably the only alternative to Japan’s conquests,
China’s defeats, and the retreat and humiliation of Russia during
the 1930’s. Russian interest demanded cooperation with Japan’s
antagonists, but such a policy, for a number of reasons, ran counter
to Stalin’s general outlook. In Communist ideology and emotions,
the United States and Great Britain always appeared as the purest
embodiment of capitalism and imperialism, and cooperation with
the United States would be considered only as a last resort in any
difficult situation. Moscow’s animosity toward the American and
British Governments had led more than once to a Soviet rap­
prochement with Germany and Japan—even with Nazi Germany
and saber-rattling Japan—in opposition to London and Washing­
ton. Out of these ideological and emotional barriers to cooperation
with America there emerged political misconceptions and predic­
tions, concepts that were not only erroneous but sometimes fatal.
Stalin still anticipated that the antagonism between Britain and the
United States would lead to a war between them, that Japan would