Soviet military intelligence

130 Pages·19.062 MB·English

by  Viktor Suvorov

Viktor Suvorov is in his mid-thirties and now lives in the
West with his family. He was a Soviet army officer' and
served in the GRU; he tann the world outside the Soviet
Union for the first time in 1968 when Czechoslovakia was
invaded. He writes under a pseudonym to protect his
relations and friends who remain in the Soviet Union'
He is the author of. The Liberators, described by Vladimir
go[ou.Ly as 'brilliant . . . this unique document' and by
Edward Crankshaw as 'unique and invaluable'' His book
iirii, tn Soviet Army has alio been published iri paperback
by Panther Books.
I INSTDE THE SOVIET ARMY
;; 'This important book reveals the system by which "the
tttiting force of world revolution'? is organized ' ' ' a dire
warning to the West'
t,
Publishers WeeklY
'Worrying for the West, particularly his message that Soviet
grnrr.lt io not believe in graduated nuclear deterrence'
-Financial
WeeklY
.Thebookasawholeringstruelitcertainlymakesinteresting
ffid very Pertinent reading'
lrlsh Times
I
'Much useful information'
Edward Crankshaw
!
rA revealing anatomy of the Sovigt army'
Elrmingham Post
By the same author
The Liberators
Inside the Soviet Army
VIKTOR SUVOROV
MilitatY
Soviet
Intelligence
GRAFTON BOOKS
A Division of the Collins Publishing Group
l.On*DON GLASGOW
TORONTO SYDNEY AUCKLAND
To the memory
of Oleg Vladimirovich
PenkovskY
Grafton Books
A Division of the Collins publishing Group
8 Grafton Street, London W1X3LA
Published by Grafton Books 19g6
Reprinted 1986
fint
pub-lishedin Great Britain by
Hamish Hamilton Ltd 1984
Copyright @ 1984 by Viktor Suvorov
ISBN 0-58ffi5962
Printed and bound in Great Britain by
Collins, Glasgow
SetinTimes
AII rights reserved. No part of this publication
may be reproduced, stored in a retrieval system,
or transmitted, in any form, or by any meins,
electronic, mechanical, photocopying, recordinc or
otherwise, without the prior permission of
the publishers
This book is sold subject to the condition that
it shall not, by way of trade or otherwise, be
lent, re-sold, hired out or otherwise circulated
without.the publisher's priorconsent in any
form of bindingorcovei other.than that
in which it is published and without a similar
conditior including this condition being
imposed on the subsequent purchaser.-
Contents
Introduction
PART ONE
1 17
The Triumvirate
N
2
History
3 51
The PYramid
4 The GnU anO the Military Industrial
Commission (VPK) 56
5 But WhY Is Nothing Known About It? 60
6 The GRU and the 'Younger Brothers' 63
ffi
7 The GRU and the KGB
, 8 The Centre ,7873
9 The Procurement Organs
10 Fleet Intelligence 83
'11 The GRU Processing organs 85
12 Support Services 94
PART TWO
t 101
t Illegals
2 The Undercover ResidencY 111
3 131
Agents
4 Agent Recruiting 139
5 155
Agent Communications
6 The Practice of Agent Work 167
7 t77
OPerational Intelligence
8 2N
TacticalReconnaissance
9 The Training and Privileges of Personnel 203
,li,
ftu,,,
.
Contents
Conclusion 217
For.GRU Officers Only 223
Introduction
Appendix A: kaders of Soviet Military
lntelligence
225
Appendix B: The GRU High Command and
Leading GRU Officers 237
Appendix C: Some Case Histories of GRU There is but one opinion as to which country in the world
Activities 242 possesses the most powerful secret intelligence service' With-
Index 247 lrirfi" slightest doubt that country is the Soviet Union' and
the name- of the monstrous secret organization without
pi"*J"r, in the history of mankind is the KGB' But on the
q;;;d; as to which country possesses. the second most
powerful secret organization, ihe opinions of specialists
'OnLi. S,t.rge as ii may seem' the country to which this
;;;;ilt"""b.long, is also the Soviet Union''and the
oiiunirution itself iJcalled the Chief Intelligence Directorate
o-f- ithliet LGe*nte ral Staff.
was written in order to confirm this simple facl'
rr At first it was conceived as an instructional manual for a
:tiiit naffOw .cilrJcl"g oorf ssPpEecuitaaulisDtrss.' SeuuubrsweqYusevn'rtrlJy irt wa*s" r:e:v"isged ybyi
il.tl.;-;;d.io, u *i0". public'.d: fYi:io'
li'fi *tiJt-i" ,f,e excision of certain definitions and technical
:ili ;;r;iil wtrictr woutd be of little interest'.Even "TllHl
i'',, ii"t"-t"..i".A in the book many details of a technical
,',,1 ,utui", which may sometimes make for difficult reading.
'i ,,-iu itr,ough I may apologize, there-is. nothing to be done' In
I ., ,1 der to inderstind a Oi;ase (and the desire to understand
.'Ji*"ut. implies a desire to fight against i0' one must know
liii' its pathology as well as its symptoms'
For one of their very first chosen myths, the communists
O".iO.a to record thai the organs of enforcement of the new
State were not created until the nineteenth of December
igii. mit falsehood was circulated in order to prove that
mri.t power, in the first forty'one days of its existence'
rl
ffi
10 Introduction Introduction tl
dtrcoeaov yulosold louw dtkhiio siacnphets n .t shsTeheh o eweo dkiftai httli sohtehnehes.ow mooodafr sltsidhs . ee efx afBesrcoi.luyi st Oiho.*neipgs;iou ;s;nr'opl.O afaa.pn meIdtri sliissa u rfbs ostuoref f qitochutioeehsnneettr hdoaor'dTsw ehnbre e ttoeaon n ts rhuuwesle eepr, dr ii Lsns ecuvincepcirlneye :sd ss'iidmfvuiivpdllyilede def. o Tearh vnteehd ro ymruutsheleaitnhn'.god d Isni n iost hR fa euyn seb soaeilgradsi n.to hnIntiane tgb aw,o niaildnss
lttmahl:ave]si n,sfi gres xta enicnnufoatiunontniclsee edw xtiaosi rlt.ehodef - ftwhrgiosfr lSdtho "tvh ifeei.t s fpti ;ohh*;";;;r ,. ttfhhfreeu ftmi rfosirtss tm t bnilnoiguohtde_t,, chgaarepvaeat b cflooeun ontindf uebere doi nff gath idteh ivffuiirdlsleyt d pt,or o alcenatdarr ryeia voneu rst tstahitneec. ien sthtruec ctioomnsm ounf itshtes
Amongd itcntaetmor swhiaps icno imtsr ahdiseto Ary., II..* iRni k,opvp,o tirhree dh eitasd le oadf etrhse. redEuapclhic astyesdt.e mSo ovife tg poovwerenri nitgs etlhf eis Sdtuaptelic iast eddu. pIlfic oanteed v iasnitds
hliPaniesnteotoorpc rlsueyho'.soou fstC , t ohibnmeu timOt snir sogastaba nbbrisear eftco vefrioaertrt a ihoIinenn t ,eib rraNlnodaKo l,dV natuO fpnf.au 6iCrg;sJo; -mwtworthra iciwdchehr i stRteohi uekinn odStvoso vwlteihaesesst aEsAenxepyeaa cAireuaigntteiigvo e oni rdagClia nocntmoiizcmmaatmiilto tinpettsereo ehbo alonevfemi n tghsi5 e an slePmtvaroeursrtcytthk ie adblneeydns tsittc hhateeal n ksf eatthr cuectco tRtumhrepeaglstei o ttaenwnlayodl
prefer to forget iuir?. rit..n
le-a-!-ershin.would men have contradictory decisions. Neither one of these organizations
itoghenreeonem aiwnpype.or emO tnheeod udtnoied dteh daet ophouisst t poooffs Htt.h eOea dS; *oo;fv ;ite hie-sg 'Ooecvrrgeearunnym gd eeonsft t rwowhyieicthdh ri rGhaoTsv htehisren smaaumetnhet o.s ryIitfsy twe-tmoe ldeoxeoicskitds ae at att hnaeyllt hrseitnaagglle yisn idmaenppdoe arnttda aenlntl tlldeyev.ceilssi oonf st hoef
by members of the Soviet government f^ *u, later publicly i the Soviet leadenhip, those which are published in the
taudremdit tweidth). gSreeavte nre cfionmemraedneti bwefeorree sthtoetir ooif fhiacniagiepdr," airnfd,r "torir.- ii,'pup"r", we will find that any one g{them.,is Pry, "ily^:l
1[;: :1ai rye.Tno lh agvoein ogc tcou pgiuee{s sth ea bpooustt .t hTeh efu tfuarrees o of ft nther eAee psuttilyl {f1';," ' ijCoooiinnuttn crseiels sosoilfou nMtiso inno ifs ottnhe enr a.C isIei nhngatr vathel e Ci nqo ufmraomlnitiytt t oeafen m do ewf tiadhsee In Piwnagrri ttyeth aethn reda nltaghseet-
neaos naSs btaeelnin e.q ually violent, even after the death oi , of production of children's toys. Neither the Council of
comrade .'
Ministers of the gigantic State structure nor the Central
th. iTsh. eW phayra ddooexs otfh teh ims oensdt lpesosw ebrlofuold y;r iomrg'iy; awl oourlgda sneizeamti oton bine Cpoowmemr itatened oafu tthheo rrituyl,in tgo Ptaarktey iasn a binled,e psienncdee nnet itdheecr ishiaosn thoen
ttohe p wieocerlsd? sHo oewa siisly tahned p forileitlbyu grii vaeU utep tioi, Jie.uuaf e*rsit tto t hbeem to srno saubcohu ta Mn iinmisptoerrtsa natn dm Faitrtsetr .S eBcurte twareie as.r eA nt oatl lt alolkwinegr lehveerels juthset
unceremoniously, clearly not experiencing the slightest fear same procedure is to be observed. For example, only a joint
oPrgfa*n:i zatthioensse hseeeamdeindg btyy- tahiel-mp?o wHlrofwur iip eiti lottnraat litttirees p oalnitdb uthroe doefc ais iorenp oufb tlhice aCnedn ttrhael CCoomumncititle oe fo Mf tihneis tCeorsm mofu nthiset Psaamrtey
has practically no difficulties in displacinfnot onty individual republic, or the Provincial Committee and the Provincial
om1f, o.trsh9ti s:i n "lfijml uSiettlneattsieas lS pSeotcwauteerir t Syo efb ctuuhtre iit nyp oOolfif.tibrctueiorrosy??in ffu *rirort.e l ieflso cthkse osef ctrheet 'I sEuxcehc uctriuvcei aCl opmrombliettmees, aiss tvhael idq.u aAlitt yt hoefs ec hleildvreelsn 'so ft ocyosu rsaere,
t:: not decided; but the principle remains that no separate and
)'
ffi
12
Introduction Introduction
independent decisions can be taken. In shape and form, ' stagnation of all walks of life in Soviet society' It is also the
IS*o!v"iej t ploawunecr hisin egvse rinywtoh esrpea dcuep tloic attheed , ofrrogman tihzea tpillnan fnoinr g-t hoei rdruu-pSliocna tfinogr tthhee Ourngparnesc, etdheen Pteodli tsbtuarboi liwtya so af btlhee'to r engeiumtrea'l izIne
burial of Soviet citizens, from the managernent of diplomatic any .tt.*it by thJm to raise the standard of revolt against
missions abroad to iunatic asylums, froil the construction of their creators, and thus it has always been'
sewers to atomic ice-breakers. : tt" creation of a, system of parallel institutions began
In.addition to the goveming organs which give orders and ' with the creation of itri tcnefa, an organization called into
see that they'are carried out, there also exist central control r; existence to counter-balance the already growing powers of
Organs which are independent to the local authority. The , itre People's Commissariat {or Internal Affairs'.D"d:.g l:
basic one of these is of course the KGB, but independently lf ii .oorr" lr.the whole of the civil war these two bloody
of the KGB other powerful organs are also aitive: the i organizations existed independently, and as rivals, of each
innocent:sounding People's Contiol for example, a secret j),, ;ffi;;. Their influence grew to immense proportions, and
police organization subordinated to a politburo member who rcnin suggested the creation of yet another independelt
exercises almost as much influence as the Chief of the KGB. i,organto-.-u.tyoutthetaskofcontrolandretribution'the
ln addition to the People's Control, the Ministry of the I Rabkrin. This organ, known today as the People's Conti'ol'
Interior is also active and this is subordinated niither to is still waiting forlomebody to research into its history' The
the KGB nor to Control. There is also the Central Organ of i, Rabkrin was-Lenin's love'child, remembered by him even
the press, a visit of which to a factory or workshop iuur., lii ;n f,ir deathbed. The Rabkrin or, more formally, the Wor-
hardly less anger than a visit of the bBHSS, the socialist ii,. *"rr' and peasants' Inspectorate was not created as an organ
efrsasuednt isaql uthaadt. eOacnh tphoew ienriftuial toivrega on fo Lr eonrgina,n iizta twioans wseheicnh aiss ;',1;' ;i;i;; ;i;t;". i.oonntr oiol io tfh eth we hroullein pgo -pBuolalsthioenv,i kb u6tl itaes aann do,r gaabnoizvaet iaolnl'
capable of taking independent decisions bi counter-baranced l, itre f.U"ka and thg People's Commissariat for Internal
by the existence of another no less powerful bureaucratic ',;ri Affairs.
organization. The thinking goes: we have a newspaper .,.' fn the meantime the tentacles of the Tcheka had spread
Pravda,let's have another on a similar scare - Izvestia. Tass ; ,r' srior.r the frontiers and the Bolshevik leaders were forced
created, as a counter-balance to it, ApN. Not for competition : . to create yet another parallel organization to the Tcheka'
but.simply for duplication. In this way the comradei in tl,e lcapable of counter-balancing its external activities. Neither
Politburo are able to live a quieter life. To control everybody ir,i i.opre,s commissariat nor the Rabkrin was able to fulfil
and everything is absolutely impossible, and this ii why thisrole.onthepersonalorderoftheindefatigableLeninon
idnu pgliocoadtio tnim eexi sintsf.o Ermvesr ywbhodoye vjeear lohues ljyh opuurlsdu eins fohirsm ri voafl aanndy ,,;,,,1, . iinTdOep.ernud.etn t1 9o1f 8t,h aen T ecxhteerknaa, l winatse lclirgeeantecde usnedrveirc eth, ec ommepalneitnegly-
flashes of inspiration, of any deviation from the established ,t i*r ii,f" of the Registered Directorate of the Workers' and
lnyodrmq,o ailnt yo ef fafo hret atotth lyo.corkiti caatl wmhinadt .i sD guopilniJga toionn firno emv etrhye- ,", Pbte ai.sfa nIntst'e R,igeedn Acerm dyir.e cAtot rtahtee poref stehnet Gtimenee riat l isS tcaaffl leodf tthhee
thing is the prime principle and reason Ue'trina the terrifying , Soviet A*y; and also known by its military classification as
14
Intoducrion
'unit 44388'. In history there is a number of examples of
similar organizations within repressive regimes. The most
,obvious of these is of course Hitler's Gerniany. The SS and
the SA and, on lhe front, the Wehrmacht Divisions and the
Divisions of the SS, all existed under the same duplication Part I
principle, as did the two Intelligence Services, the'Gestapo
and the Abwehr.
- This multiplication of institutions can only be explained
by the desire of the ruling class to guarantee the stability of
its regime. It is important to clarily this, so that one can
understand the role of soviet miritary intefiigence in Soviet
society and in the international areni, and, i-n addition, the
reason why thisorganization has remained throughout Soviet
history largely independent from the KGB, inipite of the
many ordeals it has been subjected to.
t
The Triumvirate
The Party, the KGB and the Army form.the triumvirate
*hi.t ,oi.. the Soviet Union. All other institutions and
organizations, including those which appear officially to
wi-etd State power, occupy a subordinate position' But no
single one oi tt it t.. liolds aUsotute power' They are all
"
intirAepenAent and have to share power with their rivals'
There ii a constant underlying struggle between these three
forces, with attacks and retreats, bloody skirmishes, victor-
'ies, defeats, armistices, secret alliances and permanent
treachery.
The Party cannot exist without a continuous represslon 9f
the people, in other words without the KGB' The KGB in
turn cannoi exist without a continuous fanning of the flames
' oi.orrnonist fanaticism and the deception of the people' in
.otherwordswithouttheParty.Eachofthetwoconsidersits
lown function to be the important one and the function of its
;;;i ;;;;t'supplementary. Thus the.Partv and the KGB
, aie strivini for'undivided rule, but with this in mind each
that it is not possible to kill off its rival' Too
'understand's
, muctr depends on the continued existence of that rival' Both
the Party and the KGB need the Army, which plays the part
of a periorming crocodile, ensuring a quiet life for the other
two.in the triulmvirate system the Army is the most powerful
'' element but it is also the most deprived as regards its rights'
Unlike the Party and the KCB, the Army has never played
the leading roli in the trio. Should this ever happen' the
,ti" irrty unaine KGB would be swiftly destroyed' The fact.is
Jl, that'this crocodile does not need either the Party or the
l' KGB. Its natural state is a free life in a swamp, enjoying the
,:1,
fr,