soviet invasion of afghanistan

119 Pages·2015·17.31 MB·English

by  Air University Review

The Professiona/ Journal of the United States Air Force
the objective and
the dimensions
of conflict
When Soviet invasion forces crossed the Afghan border in December of 1979, the reaction of
American commentators, following initial cries of shock and outrage, was nearly uniform: The
Soviets, it was argued, had made a "serious miscalculation"; they had reckoned without the forces of
reiigiousiy inspired nationalism; they had gravely underestimated the seriousness of their
transgression in the eyes of world opinion. The phrase "Russia's Vietnam" was repeated with
monotonous regularity, and an optimistic few perceived the Soviet Union as sliding inexorably and
helplessly into an unwinnable quicksand war.
The Vietnam analogy fails on at least two leveis. First, it would be difficuit to invent an economic
geography and military topography more unlike the rice paddies and jungles of Indochina than the
bare, arid valleys of the Hindu Kush and the Paropamisus mountains. Living in the midst of relative
agricultural abundance, small Vietcong and Vietminh units could generally steal, extort—or grow —
enough food for survival. Cover and concealment were abundant; water was almost never a
problem. The contrast with Afghanistan's fragile ecosystem is stark. Low rainfall and a short growing
season translate into endemic scarcity, and the disruption of a single planting or harvest season can
mean disaster. Concealment is sparse, and water sources are apt to be tactically exposed. The schools
of mufahiddin guerrillas have a very shallow sea in which to swim.
The second failing of the Vietnam analogy is more subtle: How can we evaluate Soviet chances
without an understanding of Soviet objectives? We cannot be definitive, but our lead author provides
the outlines.
From this observation flows another: Do Soviet means mesh with Soviet ends, or are they inherently
incompatible? Our second article, "The Grammar and Logic of Conflict," offers a disciplined
approach to these fundamental questions.
J. F. G.

The Soviet Invasion Of Afgha nl st a n......................................................................................... 2
Dr. Seth Singleton
Ira C. Ea ker Essay Co mpet it io n ........................................................................................................21
The Gr ammar And Logic: Of Co n fl ict .......................................................................................22
Col. Thomas A. Fabyanic. USAF
ICBM VULNERABILITY, MOBILITY, AND ARMS CONTROl..............................................................32
Dr. Donald M. Snow
Execut ive St r e s s ....................................................................................................................................43
Col. Raymond Ci. Troxler, LhSAI-
Lt. Col Harry P Wetzler, USAF
The Mil it ar y Cour t ier And The Il l usion Of Co m pet en c e.............................................53
Dr. Donald D. Ghipman
Et hics Theor y For The Mil it ar y Pr ofessiona i........................................................................63
Chaplain (Col.) Samuel D Maloney, Air National Guard
In My Opinion
Inside The Wa l l s............................................................................................................................72
Maj. FrankJ. Derfler, Jr.. USAF
Pa t r io t ism, Uncl e Sam Needs Yo u !.......................................................................................76
Maj. James Burkholder, USAF
Commentary
On St r a t egic Pl a n n in g ................................................................................................................79
Capt. Frederick C. Beisser. USAF
Lt. Col. Lawrencej. Hillebrand. USAF
Books and Ideas
Pr ofessiona i. Ideal s And Mil it ar y Beh a v io r ......................................................................84
Dr. James H. But k
Japan: The St u d en t Becomes The Tea cher ...........................!.........................................88
Dr. James H. Toner
Çooper a t ion And Co n fr o n t a t io n ...........................................................................................91
Lt. Col. Dallate L. Meehan, USAF
The Rig ht St ü ff: Embar r assed Her o Wo r s h ip..................................................................95
Capt. John M. Thomson, USAF
Thr ee St udies In Lea der ship.....................................................................................................98
Dr. Joseph O. Baylen
Potpourri.......................................................................................................................................|()()
Contribulors................................................................................................... III
THE SOVIET
INVASION OF
AFGHANISTAN
Dr . Set h Sin g l et o n
HE foreign policy of the Brczhnev
Politburo, consistent since 1965, has
four major interconnected elements:
détente with the West, defined as the pursuit
of mutually beneficiai trade and strategic
arms control; consolidation and coordination
ofthe Socialist community of communist na-
tions under Soviet leadership; military
growth of all types of forces; and expansion
of Soviet and allied Socialist influence and
presence in Asia and África as opportunity
allovvs.1
Popular American opinion to the contrary,
the first three elements have been considera-
bly more successful than the last. In the late
I970s, as evidence of the military and expan-
ÉLonist character of Soviet policy mounted,
sweral Soviet-connected Asian and African
Times have changed.
Vladimir Gtmcharov
TASS commcntary. January 1980
Soviet-Afghan relaiions are a vivid example of relaiions of the new type
among equal and independent States.
Babrak Karmal, January 1980
There is no colonial power today which is capable of adopting the only form
of contest which has a chance of succeeding, namely, the prolonged establish-
ment of large forces of occupation.
Frantz Fanon, The Wretched of lhe Earth
The danger of communist powers is not less than that of America. I hope the
Muslim people of Afghanistan will soon achieve victory and real indepen­
dente and get rid of these so-called supporters of the working class.
Avatollah Ruhollah Khomeini, Marth 1980
nations have cooled toward the Soviets or aid and political support for their own ends
defected outright. China, the most importanl and then rejected it when convenient.
developing nation,.now leads the anti-Soviet Stronger policies binding Asian and African
crusade. In the Islamic world the list of States to a permanent Soviet orientation
former Soviet friends is long and growing: would have to be developed. At the same
Sudan, Egypt. Eritrea, Somalia, Guinea, time, Soviet military power made a Soviet
Nigéria, Iraq, Bangladesh, and now connection highly desirable for governments
Afghanistan.2 and movements needing military' protection
or the resources to win civil or local wars.
Soviet emphasis on military intervention
Times Have Changed:
began with Soviet aid to Cuba and Vietnam.
The Militarization of Soviet Policy
Both countries faced confrontations against
Since Lenin and the first Congress of the the United States. Military' aid to Egypt,
Peoples of the East in August 1920, Soviet Syria, and Iraq was directed at Israel, con-
political and ideological appeal has assumed sidered an outpost of American imperialism.
a mutual interest against Western imperial- The Angolan intervention of 1975 began to
ism between Third World peoples and the blur the anti-imperialist justification. While
Soviet Union. But as Asian and African na­ the Angolan opponents of the Popular Move-
tions achieve independente and gradually ment for the Liberation of Angola (MPLA)
consolidate control over their national were supported by the United States, China,
economies, internai and local conflicts and South África, they were also African
emerge to replace anti-imperialism as the liberation movements in their own right, as
dominant issues.3 By the I970s, Soviet the Organization of African Unity
policies relying on community of interest acknowledged. The next intervention, in
against the West and bolstered by Soviet aid Ethiopia, brought Soviet power into a local
had assured no permanent Socialist gains; war. Ethiopia was fighting Soviet-aided
nationalist such as Gamai Nasser, Ben Bella, Somalia and a Marxist Eritrean secessionist
Sékou Touré, and Mao Zedong used Soviet movement, and Soviet betrayal of the
3
4 MR UNIVERSITY REVIEW
Moslem Somalis and the Moslem Eritreans African national leaders, including national
did their image little good in the Middle East. Marxists or communists, continue to seek in-
Fidel Castro tried and failed to mediate the dependence of foreign control when their
conflict and promote a Marxist revolutionary need for protection diminishes.8 Soviet
federation among Ethiopia, Somalia, and proclamations about the tighter bonds of
South Yemen. The Vietnamese invasion of “socialist orientation” do not change that
Kampuchea, in January 1979, showed Soviet unless the tighter bonds are somehow en-
military support against communist allies of forced.
China, and Soviet commentary at the time Soviet policy has been increasingly
left no doubt that China itself might become squeezed into a narrow military mold
a legitimate (in Soviet eyes) victim of Soviet because, as military capabilities grow and
attack.4 Finally, in Afghanistan in December grow, other capabilities diminish. The Soviet
1979 the Soviet army was sent to repress a economy is in consistent, long-term. and
popular revolt against a revolutionary perhaps accelerating decline,9 and one of the
government without immediate invitation. many ramifications of this overwhelmingly
The only remaining escalation of the con- important fact is that the Soviets are limited
texts of Soviet military intervention would be in providing economic or even military aid to
direct attack against a noncommunist coun- their friends on concessional terms. Even the
try that had never invited a Soviet presence. poorest “socialist orientation” countries such
The Soviets now claim that their military as Ethiopia are pushed to repay Socialist aid
power is the necessary condition for the with hard currency earned by exports to the
liberation of anyone else.5 “The changing West. Soviet subsidies to Cuba (perhaps S3
correlation of forces” has become almost a billion a year) and Vietnam (perhaps Sl
synonym for Soviet military superiority, and billion a year) in support of counterinsurgen-
in the Soviet view this shift in the world cy wars reduce the amounts available for
balance of power is all-important. Unlike other, more peaceful purposes.
earlier eras, the Soviet Union claims to de- In undertaking military interventions in-
fend local revolutions against externai Africa, Indochina, and now Afghanistan, the
enemies (always assumed to be some form of Soviets wished to create the image of over-
“imperialist aggression”) and internai op- whelming clout and victory. They have
position—even against the vast majority of gambled that demonstrating “the changing
the people if necessary, as Soviet sources correlation of forces” might encourage more
acknowledge.6 In addition to externai and in­ regimes “of socialist orientation,” and the
ternai defense, the Soviet Union and its creation of new allied military forces capable
Socialist allies are to provide direct assistance of undertaking “defense of the gains of
in party-building and in ideological develop- Socialism” on a broader and broader scale.10
ment, toward the transition from military What actually has happened is that the
rule to government by a vanguard party.7 Cubans are bogged down in Angolan gar-
Nothing so far indicates that where they risons against the Union for the Total Inde-
have undertaken a strong internai presence pendence of Angola (UNITA), and in Ethio-
(Cuban troops, East German security police pian garrisons against the Eritreans and the
training, Soviet advisers) the Soviets and their Somali guerrillas of the Ogaden. The V iet-
allies have found some magic key which namese have some 200,000 troops in Kam­
transforms Thircl World friends into com­ puchea and are continuing to maintain, even
munist members of the Socialist community. intensify, a militarized garrison State to sus-
Cuba may be the model, but other Asian and tain the conquest of Indochina.11 Now
SOVIET INVASION OF AFGHANISTAN 5
Afghanistan caps the image of Soviet policy The Soviet citizenry is increasingly restless.
as imperialism against growing people’s Everyone from dissidents to the Politburo
resistance. an image increasingly shared by cites laziness and apathy among the workers
Africans, Southeast Asians, and Islamic na- as an overwhelming problem; workers have
tions of the Middle East. This vvas not what recently begun to form iIlegal unions and
the Soviets had in mind. But the Afghanistan mount strikes.13 National tensions persist,
invasion was necessary to preserve any hope although they should not be overemphasized
of success for the policy of world prestige as an imminent danger to Soviet stability.14
based on victory and “the changing correla- The intelligentsia persist in refusing to be in-
tion of forces." spired by shopworn Soviet Marxism. None of
Militarization of policy must include the these circumstances can be quickly or easily
home front. and the domestic policies of the changed without basic reforms that the pres-
later vears of the Brezhnev Politburo provide ent leadership is unwilling to consider. So the
ample evidence that the economy, the regime increasingly relies on patriotism and
legitimization of the regime, and the very national security for its legitimacy. Since
concept of Soviet citizenship are taking a 1976, when Brezhnev called for glorification
more military cast. In spite of economic of Soviet military exploits in the Great
difficulties, and obviously in response to Patriotic War against the Nazis, propaganda
domestic critics of military spending, celebrating the military “guardians of
Brezhnev and his colleagues have remained peaceful labor" has proliferated. Soviet world
adamant that the Soviet military budget is not prestige linked to military prowess has been
to be touched. .As Brezhnev put it in 1976: emphasized: Soviet citizens are told, simply,
that their country cannot be pushed around
Nor should there be any doubi in anyone’s mind that
any more.
our Party will do everything to have the splendid
The constitution of 1977 proclaims mili­
Armed Forces of the Soviet Union provided. in the
future as well, with all the necessan, means for fill- tary Service as a “sacred duty” of all citizens.
ing their responsible task of standing on guard over The constitution also mentions Soviet
the Soviet people s peaceful labor and acting as the patriotism in a way that indicates its function
bulwark of world peace.12
of integrating the nationalities. General Alek-
Politburo spokesmen have since constantly sandr Altunin's civil defense program seems
reiterated the sanctity of the military budget, more another means of inculcating national
citing NATO rearrnamenl and nuclear security consciousness among citizens than a
missiles for Europe, Chinese aggressive prelude to nuclear attack. Other measures,
designs, and now the world outcry over such as oath-taking at military induction
Alghanistan. Massive diversion of resources ceremonies and the activities of military
to military production accelerates Soviet reservists in the schools, reinforce the mili­
economic decline; opportunity costs include tar}’ flavor of Soviet patriotism and com-
the diversion of technical manpower and munist legitimacy.
creativity as well as resources away from lhe The internai prestige of the Communist
civilian economy, and lhe disruption which Party and its leadership would suffer,
occurs when civilian production is arbitrarily perhaps severely, if in its first campaign since
interrupted to fili shortfalis in defense indus- World War II lhe Soviet Army were to fail to
try. Soviet leaders take pride in the efficiency subdue ill-armed and disorganized Afghan
of the militar^’ economy, which has become tribesmen. That the Soviet people are told
lhe leading example of the economic that the Afghan people are really on the
capability of social ism.
Soviet side just compounds the problem; vic-