Soviet Foreign Policy after Stalin

548 Pages·1961·11.814 MB·English

by  David J. Dallin

SOVIET

FOREIGN POLICY
AFTER
STALIN
D avid J. D a llin

PROFESSOR OF POLITICAL SCIENCE
UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA
1961
J. B. LIPPINCOTT COMPANY
COPYRIGHT © i960 BY DAVID J. DALLIN
FIRST EDITION
PRINTED IN THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
LIBRARY OF CONGRESS CATALOG CARD NUMBER: 60-14257
PREFACE
The Stalinist "cult of personality” was abundantly criticized by
Stalin s successors, but mainly in connection with Soviet home affairs.
Nikita Khrushchev has set forth how certain traits of the late ruler—
his ambition, his self-confidence, his claim of superiority, his cruelty,
his contempt for human life—affected the political system of the coun­
try and resulted in the assassination of leaders, massive purges, and a
personal rule uninhibited by legal or moral considerations. Attribut­
ing the tragic events solely to Stalin s personal traits—which was wrong
—neither Khrushchev, Mikoyan, nor any other of the prominent Soviet
figures answered the questions how the peculiar traits of the late dic­
tator were reflected in his foreign political course and whether a
"thaw” was due in foreign policies as well as in home affairs.
Among Stalin s most phenomenal ventures was the building up
of the huge Soviet empire and the addition of a hundred million non-
Russians to the basically Russian realm, a venture that was all the
more extravagant by reason of the fact that it was carried out in the
most advanced and enlightened part of the world, in the most neu­
ralgic areas of Europe. If Stalins huge purges were the result of an
aberration, his hope that the imperial Soviet structure, bom in the
mud and blood of a terrible war, was more than a passing phenome­
non and an episode in world history arose from an even greater aber­
ration. Stalin, in fact, expected that the empire would expand. But
the new superstate formation, the emergence of which was made pos­
sible by the postwar paralysis of the free nations of the continent,
met with obstacles and resistance. To maintain and develop the struc­
ture was a hard task, and all Soviet resources were devoted to it;
concentration on this goal was the essence of Stalin’s postwar foreign
policies.
Discussing Hitler with Anthony Eden in Moscow in December,
1941, when German armies were forty miles from the Soviet capital,
yj PfSj’flCC
Stalin made the comment that Hitler should not be underrated, that
he was a very able man who had made one mistake—he had not known
when to stop!
"I suppose I smiled,” Eden says. “At any rate. Marshal Stalin
turned to me and observed: Tou are smiling and I know why you
are smiling. You think that if we are victorious I shall not know when
to stop. You are wrong. I shall know!’”
Stalin considered himself, in this respect, different from and
superior to Hitler. As soon, however, as circumstances changed in his
favor, when he faced the great political vacuum in Europe at the end
of the war, he felt the strange and mighty lure—and he succumbed.
His Weltanschauung and his personal traits facilitated the develop­
ment. His comrade and eventual opponent, Lev Kamenev, once
called Stalin “a genius of dosage,” a master of gradualness and cir­
cumspection. How wrong he was! As if in proof of his error, Kamenev
lost his life in the avalanche of trials and assassinations that was the
extreme opposite of gradualness.
The reason why the present Soviet leadership, in its condem­
nation of the “cult of personality,” stopped short at the threshold of
foreign affairs was that it had itself taken over Stalin’s main ideas and
goals in foreign affairs. Nikita Khrushchev in particular remained
faithful to the magnificent imperial image of the growing and pros­
pering “socialist camp” as it had emerged out of Stalin’s phantasy
and ambition. And because the cohesion and progress, against heavy
odds, of the empire’s components require, as before, the straining
of all political, economic, and military forces, international tensions
of great magnitude are the constant element of the post-Stalin era,
as they were of the Stalin era.
This is not to say that in Soviet foreign affairs the period from
1953 on has been a period of Stalinism. Changes have taken place. A
change of leader—from Malenkov to Khrushchev—brought certain
changes in trends. The innovations in foreign policy were underpinned
by modifications of established theory which, though remaining strictly
within the framework of Communism, to a degree marked a deviation
from old tenets and precepts.
A review of the constants and variables in the Soviet interna­
tional course after Stalin is the purpose of this book. Part One deals
with the legacy of the late dictator inherited by his successors along
Preface vii
with all its implications. Part Two reviews the Soviet course during
the first period of transition, the Malenkov-Molotov-Khrushchev era.
Part Three reviews the great rumblings in the empire, the uprisings
in Europe, and the new Soviet course toward the “uncommitted na­
tions.” Parts Four and Five deal with Sino-Soviet relations, the eman­
cipation of Chinese Communism, the new ascent of Khrushchev in
1957-58, and the resumption by Khrushchev of control in the Euro­
pean part of the “camp.” The last chapter of Part Five reviews the stif­
fening of the Soviet course toward the West, the abortive “Summit” of
1960, the Cuba and Congo affairs. The author s general views and pro­
jections are briefly stated in the Conclusion.
One of the main tasks of the author was to unravel Soviet ideo­
logical innovations, slogans, and formulas and to translate them into
realistic, distinctive actions and trends. The meaning of “zone of
peace,” the actual substance of “relaxation of tensions,” the earthy
essence of “national roads to Communism” and international Com­
munism “under Soviet leadership,” the prerequisites of “coexistence,”
and the Soviet aims in connection with the “summit conference” of
the great powers are among the problems dealt with.
“Soviet empire” is used in this book as an historically objective
description without moral or political overtones; it appears more
exact than its synonyms “Soviet bloc,” “socialist camp,” etc., since
the formidable supemational Soviet formation belongs in the cate­
gory of the great empires from ancient times on. Almost all of these
empires were unique, and the Soviet formation, too, is unmatched
and inimitable. But the pattern of the rise and fall of empires—the
facts of life of great powers—applies also to contemporary formations.
While there is no doubt that the ideology that prevails in the Soviet
bloc has a particularly formidable consolidating and cohesive power,
it cannot bring about a departure from age-old historical patterns.
Russia was a multinational empire both before and after the
revolution. We here use the term “Soviet empire” in a conditional
sense, to indicate a new combination of Eurasian states with Russia
as the leader. The designations “Soviet Russia,” “Soviet Union,” and
“Russia” for the USSR are used interchangeably throughout the book
to reduce repetitiousness. For the same reason and also with no politi­
cal implications, Communist China is sometimes, when the meaning
is clear, called “China.”
viii Pvcfo.ce
The sources of information are cited throughout the book. As is
so often the case with discussions of current material involving living
persons in official positions, the identity of the sources of some of the
information in this book cannot be disclosed at the present time. In
these cases the source is indicated as a “D Paper.” Anyone who can
prove his legitimate interest may have access to the latter. Fifteen
years after publication of this book the “D Papers” will be deposited
with the New York Public Library.
Four years have been devoted to the preparation of this book, in
connection with which a number of trips to Europe and the Far East
had to be made. The work was made possible by the assistance of
numerous persons and organizations, particularly the Relm Founda­
tion of Ann Arbor, Michigan, the Foreign Policy Research Institute
of Philadelphia, and Mr. David S. Collier and Mr. Eugene Davidson
of the Foundation for Foreign Affairs, Chicago, to all of whom I
hereby express my thanks. I am grateful to all of the scholars, authori­
ties, and governmental agencies in this country and abroad who gave
advice and made available important documents, and to Mrs. Tillie
Klorman for editorial assistance.
David J. Dallin
CONTENTS
PART ONE: THE INTERNATIONAL SITUATION OF THE SOVIET
UNION AT THE END OF THE STALIN ERA . . . . 1
1. Stalin and His Lieutenants in Foreign Affairs . . . 3
2. Stalins Empire B uilding....................................................18
1. No Second Communist Empire
2. The Yugoslav Rebellion
3. The “People’s Democracies”
3. Germany: The Big Issu e ....................................................45
4. The Far E a s t.................................................. . . 60
1. The Korean War
2. China
Stalins Course in China
Who Is Leader in Asia?
3. Japan
5. The D eadlock................................... 101
1. Stalin’s Legacy in the Middle East
The Balkans
The Arab Nations
The Mediterranean
Eastern Turkey
Iran
2. Conflicts Everywhere
PART TWO: THE MALENKOV-MOLOTOV ERA . . . . . 1 1 5
1. The Death of the L ead er.................... . . 117
2. R elaxation............................... 125
ix
Contents
x
3. The Course in Respect to the W e s t ..............................135
4. Conferences and Crises.................... . . . . 141
1. The Berlin Conference
2. The Geneva Conference
3. Crisis in the Western Bloc
4. The Anti-NATO Alignment
5. The “People’s Democracies” .............................................166
1. Rumblings in the East
2. Conformity with Moscow
3. Police and Internal Affairs
4. The National Economies
5. Abolition of Mixed Companies
6. The Middle E ast..................................................................198
1. The Balkan and the Baghdad Pacts
2. Failure in Iran
7. The Ascendancy of Nikita Khrushchev.........................218
PART THREE: THE FIRST KHRUSHCHEV E R A ..............................225
1. The Session of the Central Committee of July, 1955 . 227
2. The Thaw and Its L im its..................................................234
1. No Success in London
2. The French in Moscow
3. The Western Socialists
3. “Relaxation of Tensions” ..................................................247
1. The Austrian State Treaty
2. Relations with the Bonn Government
3. Finland: Hesitation and Concessions
4. The First Summit Conference
4. The Uncommitted Nations.................................................286
1. No Neutrals?
2. The Bandung Conference
3. India and Burma
4. Khrushchev and Bulganin in South Asia
5. Afghanistan and the Drive to the Sea
6. Indonesia and Pakistan
Contents xi
5. The Twentieth Party Congress and Foreign Affairs . 322
1. Wars Are Not Inevitable
2. Violent Revolutions Are Not Inevitable
3. Overtures to the Socialist Parties of the West
4. America Is the Enemy
5. Partial Revision of Stalinism in Foreign Affairs
6. The Communist Opposition
6. Ferment in Eastern Europe . . . . . . 335
1. Away from Moscow!
2. Tito's Short-lived Triumph
3. The Polish Rebellion
4. National Communism: Its Significance for the
Soviet Union
5. The Hungarian Uprising
part four: the new course in the middle and far east . 383
1. The Middle E a s t.................................................................385
1. The Old Path
2. A New Course and the Arms Deal
3. Close Ties with Egypt
4. The Suez Crisis
2. Moscow and Peking............................................................422
1. The Soviet Retreat
2. China's Growing Aspirations
3. Peking Support of Moscow against the Satellite
Rebels
443
PART FIVE: KHRUSHCHEV IN COMMAND
1. The Year of Troubles 445
1. Heavy Going
2. The New Ascent
3. The New Setup
2. The Crisis of Neutralism . 464
1. The Arab Nations
xii Contents
2. No Strings Attached
3. The Imperfect Monolith
3. New Impetus in China.......................................................489
4. Germany.................................................................................501
1. Unstable Stability
2. Neutrality and Disengagement
3. Berlin, the Abortive Summit, and New Militancy
.....................................................................................521
conclusion
...............................................................................................531
in d e x
MAPS
Map 1. The Soviet Bloc in E u ro p e...............................................35
Map 2. Stalin’s Designs for the Middle E a st...............................102
Map 3. Postwar Designs for Iran (1 9 4 6 )................................ 205
Map 4. The Drive to the South, Asia.............................................315
Map 5. Kurdistan.............................................................................475
Map 6. The Geopolitical Significance of National Communism 482
Map 7. Disengagement....................................................................505