South Africa and Nuclear Proliferation: South Africa’s Nuclear Capabilities and Intentions in the Context of International Non-Proliferation Policies

244 Pages·1987·22.59 MB·English

by  J. D. L. Moore (auth.)

SOUTH AFRICA AND NUCLEAR PROLIFERATION
South Africa and
Nuclear Proliferation
South Africa's Nuclear Capabilities and
Intentions in the Context of International
N on-Proliferation Policies
J. D. L. Moore
Palgrave Macmillan
ISBN 978-1-349-07830-1 ISBN 978-1-349-07828-8 (eBook)
DOI 10.1007/978-1-349-07828-8
©J. D. L. Moore 1987
Softcover reprint of the hardcover 1s t edition 1987
All rights reserved. For information write:
Scholarly & Reference Division,
St. Martin's Press, Inc., 175 Fifth Avenue, New York, NY 100 I 0
First published in the United States of America in 1987
ISBN 978-0-312-74698-8
Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data
Moore, J.D.L. (John Davey Lewis)
South Africa and Nuclear proliferation.
Bibliography: p.
Includes index.
I. Nuclear weapons - South Africa. 2. South
Africa - Military policy. I. Title.
U264.M66 1987 335.8'25119'0968 86~ 17693
ISBN 978-0-312-74698-8
Filmsetting by Vantage Photosetting Co. Ltd
Eastieigh and London
Contents
List of Tables and Figures viii
Preface IX
List of Abbreviations and Units XI
Introduction Xll
1 The Technology of Nuclear Weapons 1
Fissile material and the thermal reactor fuel cycle 1
Bomb assembly 6
Resources required 7
2 The International Non-proliferation Regime 10
From atomic secrecy to Atoms for Peace II
The IAEA and international safeguards 14
The Non-Proliferation Treaty 18
Sensitive nuclear exports to developing countries 22
The Nuclear Suppliers Group guidelines 25
The US Nuclear Non-Proliferation Act 29
The Anglo-Saxons' loss of nuclear leverage 33
Uranium oversupply: less concern about the plutonium
economy 37
Non-proliferation policy today: the emphasis on motivations 39
Conclusion 43
3 South Africa's International Relations 46
The outcast state 46
The campaign against apartheid 49
The military response 53
Relations with African states 57
Relations with the West 60
South Africa's strategic situation 62
Free market or siege economy? 64
The league of the desperate 66
4 Uranium Mining in Southern Africa 70
The development of South Africa's uranium resources 70
Uranium exports 74
VI Contents
Uranium exports and non-proliferation 77
The Rossing mine in Namibia 79
5 The Development of South Africa's Nuclear Capability 82
Early nuclear research and development 82
Mr Vorster's 1970 announcement 84
The nature of the South African enrichment process 85
The STEAG-UCOR relationship 88
Changing plans for enrichment capacity 90
Uranium hexafluoride conversion 93
The Koeberg power reactors 95
Problems with enriched uranium fuel supplies 97
The problem solved 100
Conclusion 102
6 South Africa and Nuclear Proliferation 105
South Africa and the IAEA 105
South Africa's non-proliferation policy and the NPT 108
The 1977 Kalahari incident III
Nuclear explosions over the southern oceans? 115
7 South Africa's Nuclear Weapons Capability 119
Fissile material 120
Financial and manpower resources 122
Delivery systems 124
8 South Africa's Nuclear Intentions 126
Black Africa and nuclear weapons 126
Military motivations 128
Economic and prestige considerations 131
The uranium export weapon 134
The politics of nuclear uncertainty 137
Changing nuclear motives 138
9 Conclusions for Western Policy 142
Intelligence, secrecy and uncertainty 142
The effect of non-proliferation policies on South Africa's
nuclear programme 144
Efforts to induce South Africa's signature of the NPT 148
Nuclear relations and Western foreign policy towards
South Africa 151
South African or Western leverage? 153
Contents Vll
Appendix Uranium Enrichment 157
The principles of uranium enrichment 157
Global development of commercial enrichment capacity 162
A comparison of enrichment technologies 167
Notes and References 176
Bibliography 208
Index 218
List of Tables and Figures
Table 1.1 Material masses needed for a nuclear explosive
device 2
Table 1.2 Critical masses for enriched uranium 5
Table 2.1 Nuclear facilities in non-nuclear weapon states not
subject to IAEA or bilateral safeguards 20
Table 3.1 South Africa's defence expenditure, 1955-80 54
Table 4.1 Western world uranium resources 71
Table 4.2 Western world uranium production 73
Table 5.1 Nuclear fuel cycle installations in South Africa 103
Table A.I SWU and natural uranium requirements for
enriched uranium products 160
Table A.2 Western world commercial enrichment
production and capacity 165
Table A.3 Comparison of enrichment technologies 172
Figure 1.1 Thermal reactor fuel cycles 4
Figure A.I Typical relationship between feed, tail and
product streams in an enrichment plant 159
Figure A.2 Cross-section of tubular separation element for
Becker nozzle process 170
viii
Preface
This book examines South Africa's nuclear capabilities and intentions in
the context of international non-proliferation policies aimed at prevent
ing the spread of nuclear weapons to more countries. From a brief
survey of the human, financial and material resources required to
produce a nuclear weapon it is seen that the production of such a weapon
is well within South Africa's capabilities. A tentative assessment is made
of the number of weapons South Africa could have produced. The
means by which South Africa has acquired her nuclear capability and
the incentives (and disincentives) the country may have for developing
nuclear weapons are discussed.
Although South Africa is arguably one of the nations most isolated
and shunned by the international community, Western non-prolifera
tion policies do not seem to have been applied any more rigorously to
that country than to other potential 'nth' nuclear weapon states. The
book concludes by looking at why this may be so, a major factor being
the considerable bargaining strength possessed by South Africa by
virtue of being one of the world's major producers of natural uranium
and now a producer of enriched uranium. Western non-proliferation
policy-makers may have been more concerned to obtain a cooperative
attitude on the part of South Africa in her exports of nuclear technology
and materials, principally uranium, than with the possible development
of a South African nuclear weapon for which there would seem to be
little or no military requirement. South Africa's tactic may thus be to use
uncertainty about her uranium export policy and possible possession of
nuclear weapons as a political or diplomatic bargaining card in order to
maintain close relations with, and extract political, economic and
strategic concessions from, the West.
This book is a revised version of a thesis submitted for a Master's
degree in the Department of Science and Technology Policy of the
University of Manchester. I would like to thank Roger Williams and
Philip Gummett of that department for originally sparking my interest
in the subject. Thanks are also due to Philip Gummett for his wise critical
comments on the draft copy of the thesis and to the Science Research
Council and the Social Science Research Council for jointly funding me
on the Master's course. I am very grateful to Professor Spence of
Leicester University for being kind enough to read the thesis and
encourage its publication. I would also like to express my gratitude to
IX
x Preface
Anne Akeroyd, Christopher Hill, Lan White and Harry Wilson, all of
York University's Centre for Southern African Studies, for their help,
patience and tolerance whilst this work was being completed. Thanks
are due to Liz and Patience for the typing. Of course, responsibility for
the content of the book is mine alone. Finally I would like to
acknowledge the loving support provided by my family, especially my
young sons, Jonathan and Richard, to whom this book is dedicated.
J.D.L.M.
York, January 1986