Source: Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Supplementary

36 Pages·2009·0.83 MB·English

Feminist Epistemology as a Local Epistemology
Author(s): Helen E. Longino and Kathleen Lennon
Source: Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Supplementary Volumes, Vol. 71 (1997), pp.
19-35+37-54
Published by: Blackwell Publishing on behalf of The Aristotelian Society
Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/4106954
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FEMINISTE PISTEMOLOGYA S A LOCAL
EPISTEMOLOGY
Helen E. Longino and KathleenL ennon
I-Helen E. Longino
I
ntroductorrye marksT. he very idea of feministe pistemology
throws some philosophers into near apoplexy. Partly this is
social and psychological:a n aversiont o the revisionistc hallenges
of feminism abettedb y a healthyi f residualm isogyny. Partlyt his
is intellectual: how could a politically and intellectually partial
form of inquiryh ave anythingt o say aboute pistemology,w hich is
or ought to be about very generalq uestionsc oncerningt he nature
of knowledge?T he formeri s worthn oting, but not discussing;t he
second, however, goes to the hearto f what feminist epistemology
is. This essay pursueso ne line of thoughti n feminist epistemology
with a view to sorting out the relation between it and general
epistemology, and between it and other approachesi n feminist
theory of knowledge.
FirstI shouldn ote whatf eministe pistemologyi s not. It is not the
study or defence of feminine intuition, of 'women's ways of
knowing', of subjectivism;i t is not an embraceo f irrationalityo r
of Protagoreanr elativism. Although feminist philosophers have
celebratedt he female subject,h ave arguedf or the constructiver ole
of emotion in knowledge, and have criticizeds tandarda ccountso f
objectivity and rationality,a ttackso n feminist epistemology tend
to ignore the argumentsf eminists offer and insteadg o after straw
women. As they misrepresentt he feminist work they purportt o
criticize, they do not deserve any kind of detailedr esponse,b ut do
impose on feminists a burdeny et again to say what we mean.A lso,
contraryt o the apparentv iew of many of its detractors,f eminist
epistemology encompasses a number of different directions of
analysis some of which are,o therso f which aren ot, mutuallyc om-
patible. In addition,t hemes andp ositions in feministe pistemology
20 I-HELEN E. LONGINO
overlap with themes and positions in philosophy generally.T hus
some of the tensions within feminist epistemological thought are
mirroredb y tensions in other areas of philosophy,w hile some are
peculiar to it. For example, many commentatorst ake feminist
epistemology to be a species of naturalizeda nd social epistem-
ology, but just as there are ways of naturalizinga nd ways of
socializing epistemology, so there are ways of doing feminist
epistemology.
Feminist epistemology has both critical and constructive
dimensions. Critical dimensions include the demonstration of
forms of masculine bias at the heart of philosophicala nalyses of
such topics as objectivity, reason, knowledge, and rationality.
Constructive dimensions include carving out a space for
specifically feminist programso f inquiry,i dentifyingo r defending
epistemic guidelines of feminist inquiry. Among constructive
programsf eminist standpointt heorya ndf eminist empiricismh ave
been the most visible, but feminist forms of pragmatisma re also
findingf avour.( See Lloyd 1984, Code 1991, 1995, Harding1 986,
1991, Rooney 1994, 1995, Anderson 1995, Solomon 1995, also
Alcoff and Potter 1993, Lennon and Whitford1 994.)
Most feminist epistemologies (those named above) have been
feminist adaptationso f extant philosophicalo rientations.A nother
way to start thinking about feminist epistemology is to consider
what feminists engagedi n inquiry,i n the productiono f knowledge,
have to say aboutk nowledge, to investigatew hethera nd how they
think feminist practices of inquiry might differ from standard
practices. Feminists standing back from and reflecting on their
practices have had quite a bit to say about moral dimensions of
practices of inquiry; about the development of mutual respect
among researchers, about the desirability of cooperation as
opposed to competitiona mong researchers,a bout the desirability
of respect for, even love of, the objects of one's research,b e these
social or natural,a bouti ssues of responsibility(. See Hubbard1 990,
Martin1 988, Birke 1984, Stanley 1990) Feministsi n the course of
working throughp articularr esearchp rograms,w hethere mpirical
or analytical,h ave also defended,e laborated,o r invoked a variety
of cognitive or theoreticalv alues, desirablec haracteristicso f the
outcomeso f inquiry.T hinkinga boutt hese values and the roles they
do or mightp lay in inquiry,c an initiatea chaino f reflectionsl eading
FEMINISTE PISTEMOLOGAYS A LOCALE PISTEMOLOGY 21
to a somewhaut northodoxb,u tu ltimatelyI, b elieve,q uitef ruitful,
characterizatioonf epistemologyI. w ill discusss omeo f thev alues
thath aveb een endorsedb y feministt hinkersa ndt heirr elationt o
traditionaelp istemicv aluesa nd move fromt his discussiont o a
consideratioonf ther elationb etweena n epistemologyfo cusedo n
feministc ognitivev aluesa ndg enerapl hilosophicaelp istemology
and betweent his formo f feministr eflectiono n knowledgea nd
otherp, erhapsm oref amiliard, irectionisn feministe pistemology.
II
Feminist Values in Inquiry.I n a series of earlier papers, I have
exploreda set of values individuallya nd severallyi nvokedb y
feministr esearcher(sL ongino1 994, 1996).T heyp robablyd o not
exhaustt he valuest hatf eministr esearcherdso or coulde ndorse
but they do exhibita suitabler ange.T o simplifym attersI, treat
these as theoreticalv irtues,i .e. as characteristicosf theories,
models,o r hypothesest,h ata ret akena s countingp rimaf acie and
ceterisp aribusi n favouro f theira cceptanceT. he virtuesI have
discussedi n this capacityi ncludee mpiricala dequacyn, ovelty,
ontologicahl eterogeneityc,o mplexityo r mutualityo f interaction,
applicabilityto humann eeds, and decentralizatioonf power or
universale mpowermentW. hile empiricala dequacyi s held in
commonb y feminista ndn on-feminisrte searchersth, e remaining
five contrasti ntriguinglyw ith morec ommonlyt outedv alueso f
consistencyw itht heoriesin otherd omainss, implicitye,x planatory
powera ndg eneralityf,r uitfulnesosr r efutabilityI .s hallb rieflys ay
somethinga boute acho f thef eministv irtuese, xcludinge mpirical
adequacy.
Feministse ndorset he novelty of theoreticalo r explanatory
principlea s protectiona gainstu nconsciousp erpetuationof the
sexisma nda ndrocentrisomf traditionathl eorizingo ro f theorizing
constrainedb y a desiref or consistencyw itha cceptede xplanatory
models.T hen oveltye nvisionedis not then oveltyo f discoveryo f
new entities( like the top quarkp) redictedb y theoryb utr athero f
frameworkso f understandingF. or example, some feminist
scholarsh avec riticizedt he articulatioonf femalec entredm odels
of evolutionb y feministp rimatologistass remainingt oo much
withint hef rameworokf sociobiologya, ndt hus,p erpetuatinogt her
noxious values of that theoreticala pproach.N ovelty, thus
22 I-HELENE .L ONGINO
understooids ,c ontrartyo t hev alueo fc onservatisamsp ropounded
by Quineo r of consistencwy itht heoriesin otherd omainsa s
describebdy K uhnT. hee mbracoef n oveltym ayb ec onjoinewd ith
a hopeo f ultimatelsye eingo r engineerinagn o verturninogf the
theoriesw ithw hicha new viewi s inconsistenotr, withm erely
makings alient aspectso f experienceo r realityh iddeno r
marginalizbedy p resentlayc ceptetdh eory.
Feministws ho endorseh eterogeneitays a virtuei ndicatea
preferencfoe rt heorieasn dm odeltsh atp reservteh eh eterogeneity
int hed omainu ndeirn vestigatioonr,t hata, tl eastd, on ote liminate
it on principleA. n approactho inquiryth atr equireus niform
specimenms ayf acilitateg eneralizatiobnu, ti t runst he risko f
missingi mportandti fferences-so the maleo f a speciesc omest o
be takena s paradigmatfioc rt hes pecies( asi n 'Gorillaas res olitary
animals;a typicali ndividuatlr avelso nly with a femalea ndh er/
theiry oung').O r,v ia the concepto f male dominancem, ales are
treateda s the only causallye ffectivea gentsi n a populationT. he
embraceo f heterogeneitye xtends beyond humana nd animal
behaviourh, owevera, ndi s also invokedi n the contexto f genetic
and biochemicalp rocesses.F eministr esearcherhs ave resisted
unicausaal ccountso f developmenitn favouro f accountsin which
quite differentf actorsp lay causal roles. Heterogeneityis thus
opposedt o ontologicasli mplicitya ndt o thea ssociatedex planatory
virtueo f unificationU. ndert he guidanceo f these latterv irtues,
similaritiesb etween,r athert hand ifferencesi n, the phenomena
wouldb e stressed.
Mutuality or reciprocityo f interaction,s ometimes more
generallyc omplexityo f interactionis, somethingo f a processual
companiont o the virtue of ontologicalh eterogeneityW. hile
heterogeneitoyf ontologyt oleratetsh ee xistenceo f differenkt inds
of thing, complexity,m utualityr, eciprocityc haracterizeth eir
interactionsF. eministse ndorsingth is virtuee xpressa preference
fort heoriesr epresentinign teractionass complexa ndi nvolvingn ot
just joint, but also mutuala nd reciprocalr elationshipas mong
factorsT. heye xplicitlyr ejectt heorieso r explanatormy odelst hat
attemptto identifyo ne causalf actori n a process,w hethert hatb e
a dominanat nimalo r a 'masterm olecule'l ike DNA. This virtue
favoursa ccountso f fertilizationo, r gameticf usion,f or example,
FEMINISTE PISTEMOLOGYA S A LOCALE PISTEMOLOGY 23
whicht reatt he processa s an interactionbe tweene gg ands perm,
ratherth ant he actives perma ctingo n thep assivee gg.
Manyf eministsa lsoe ndorset hei deat hats ciences houldb e 'for
the people,'t hatr esearchth ata lleviatesh umann eeds,e specially
thoset raditionallayt tendedb y women,s ucha s careo f they oung,
weak,a ndi nfirmo r feedingt he hungrys, houldb e preferredo ver
researchfo r militaryp urposeso r fork nowledge'ss ake.W hilen ot
rejectingc uriositya ltogethera s an appropriataei m of research,
these feminists place a greater emphasis on the pragmatic
dimensiono f knowledge,b ut only in connectionw ith the final
virtuei n thisc ollection-decentralizatioonf powerT. husf ormso f
knowledgea nd its applicationin techndlogiesw hich empower
beneficiarieas re preferredto those whichp roduceo r reproduce
dependencree lationsB. otht hef eminispt ragmativci rtuesa ndt heir
traditionaclo ntrariesf,r uitfulnesasn dr efutabilityh,a vet o do with
the expansiono f a theoreticaal pproachin an empiricadl irection.
Butt her elevanceo f thee mpiricailn thet raditionavli ew is within
a self-enclosedr esearchc ontextA. pplicabilitayn de mpowerment,
by contrasta, red irectedt o the sociala ndp racticaml ilieuo utside
the researchc ontext.
III
Feminist and traditionalc ognitive values. One might ask why the
virtuesI 've just sketcheds houldb e given equals tatusw ith the
moret raditionaelp istemicv irtuesw ith whicht hey contrastB. ut
this questionb egs another-whati s the statuso f the traditional
epistemicv irtues?W hile these are quite frequentlyin vokeda s
factorsc losingt heg apb etweene videncea ndh ypothesers evealed
by underdeterminatiaorng umentsit, 's not at all evidentt hatt hey
arec apableo f discriminatinbge tweent hem orea ndl ess probable,
let aloneb etweent het ruea ndt hef alse.C onsistencyw itht heories
in otherd omains,f or example,o nly has epistemicv alue if we
supposet heseo thert heoriest o be true.W hilet heyp resumablayr e
empiricallya dequatea, dditionaclo nsiderationisn favouro f their
truthw ill have to consist of other assumptionso r theoretical
virtuesT. hep robativev alueo f consistencyt,h en,i s relativet o the
trutho f the theoriesw ithw hichc onsistencyis recommended.
Simplicitya nde xplanatorpyo werf aren o betterW. hilet herei s
anu nderstandabpler eferencfeo rs implert heoriesw henc ontrasted
24 I-HELEN E. LONGINO
with theories or models loaded with entities and processes and
relationshipst hat do not add to the predictive capacities of the
theory, it is not clear that simplicity generallyc an carrye pistemic
weight. As is well known, simplicityc an be interpretedin different
ways. The interpretationc ontrastingw ith the alternativev irtue of
heterogeneity is ontological-the fewer entities the better, or no
more entities than are requiredt o explain the phenomena.A s a
caution of prudence this has much to recommendi t, and it may
even be a useful heuristic. But for simplicity as an epistemic
standardt here are at least three problems:
i. This formulationb egs the question what counts as an adequate
explanation. Is an adequatee xplanation an account sufficient to
generatep redictionso r an accounto f underlyingp rocesses, and, if
explanation is just retrospective prediction, then must it be
successful at individualo r populationl evels? Eithert he meaning
of simplicity will be relative to one's accounto f explanation,t hus
undermining the capacity of simplicity to function as an
independente pistemic value, or the insistence on simplicity will
dictate what gets explaineda nd how.
ii. We have no a priori reason to think the universe simple, i.e.
composed of very few kinds of thing (as few as the kinds of
elementary particles, for example) rathert han of many different
kinds of thing. Nor is thereo r could thereb e empiricale vidence for
such a view.
iii. The degreeo f simplicityo r varietyi n one's theoreticalo ntology
may be dependento n the degree of variety one admits into one's
description of the phenomena.I f one imposes uniformity on the
data by rejecting anomalies, then one is making a choice for a
certain kind of account. If the view that the boundaries of our
descriptivec ategories are conventionali s correct,t hen there is no
epistemological fault in this, but neitheri s there virtue.
Explanatoryp ower andg eneralitya lso lose theire pistemic allure
underc lose examination.I ndeedt he greatert he explanatoryp ower
and generalityo f a theory,i .e., the greatert he varietyo f phenomena
broughtu nder its explanatoryu mbrella,t he less likely it is to be
(literally) true. Its explanatorys trengthi s purchaseda t the cost of
truth, which lies in the details and may be capturedt hrough the
FEMINISTE PISTEMOLOGYA S A LOCALE PISTEMOLOGY 25
filling in of an indefinite series of ceteris paribus clauses.
(Cartwright 1983) Explanatory power and generality may
constitute good reasons for accepting a model or theory if one
places value on unifying theoreticalf rameworksb, ut this is a value
distinct from truth and has to be defended on other grounds.
Mutualityo r reciprocityo f influencei n an explanatorym odel is less
likely to be generalizablet han a linear or unicausalm odel which
permits the incorporationo f the explanationo f an effect into an
explanationo f its cause. The explanationso f multiple interacting
causal factors branch out rather than coalescing. Rather than a
vertically ordered hierarchy culminating in a master theory or
master science, one is confronted with a horizontally ordered
networko f models.
Finally,w hatK uhnc alled fruitfulnessa ndt he feministp ragmatic
virtues are not really contraries in their epistemic relevance.
Fruitfulness of a theory is its ability to generate problems for
research.T his can be given a somewhatn arroweri nterpretationa s
refutability,t hat is, having (falsifiable) empirical consequences.
This does not arguef or the trutho f a theory,b ut for its tractability,
that is for its capacity to have empiricald atab roughtt o bear on it.
Both refutabilitya nd fruitfulnessm ay be less intrinsicf eatureso f
a theory,t han a mattero f the instrumentsa vailablef or producing
relevant data, as well as other theoreticala nd empiricald evelop-
ments in associated fields that make articulationo f the theory
possible. The feminist pragmatic virtues do not reject the
importanceo f empirical consequences but seek them in certain
areas:i n the world of humanl ife as well as in the laboratoryT. he
most politically loaded of the feminist virtuesr equiresi n addition
that the mode of applicabilityi nvolve empowermento f the many
rather than the concentration of power among the few. Some
thinkersa boutt he sciences have rejecteda ltogethert he distinction
between pure and applied science that lies behindt he treatmento f
refutabilityo r fruitfulnessa s a virtue, i.e. as a criteriono f theory
evaluation or selection. (Cf. Latour 1989) Contemporarys cience,
on this view, is better understooda s technoscience, inquiry into
naturet hati s inseparablef rom its technologicali nfrastructureas nd
outcomes. Within this framework,t he feminist pragmaticv irtues
could be understoodn ot as a rejectiono f 'pure science' but as a
recognition of the technologically driven natureo f science and a
26 I-HELEN E. LONGINO
call for certaint echnologicailn frastructuraesn d outcomeso ver
others.R ejectingt he conventionadl istinctionb etweenp urea nd
applieds ciencef acilitatest he rejectiono f the idea thats cientists
bearn o responsibilitfyo rh owt heirw orki s used.T hust hef eminist
pragmativc irtuesc an be a vehiclef or bringingc onsiderationosf
socialr esponsibilitbya cki ntot hec entreo f scientificin quiry.
Whilea ll of thesep ointsc ouldb e furtherd evelopedI, have,f or
eacho f them orem ainstreamep istemicv alues,i ndicatedw hyt heir
epistemics tatusis no greaterth ant hato f thea lternativeasd vocated
by feministr esearcherasn dp hilosophersT. hisr aisest he question
why,i n spiteo f repeatedd emonstrationosf the weaknesso f their
probativev alue,p hilosopherpse rsisti n invokingt hem.A lthoughI
have elsewherea rguedt hatt he standardv irtuesh ave in certain
contextso f theiru se bothm ateriaal ndi deologicals ocio-political
consequencesI, am inclinedt o thinkt hatt hese are (for the most
part)u nintendedb y mosta dvocateso f the traditionavli rtuesa nd
thatt heira ttractionli es elsewhereO. nem ights tartb y notingt hat
the traditionalv irtues do characterizec lassical Newtonian
mechanics.T hey may have acquiredt heirn ormatives tatusb y
associationi n a frameworkth at took physics as the model of
science.I don'tt hink,h owevert,h att his,e veni f on ther ightt rack,
canb e the wholeo f the story.
One mightw ell ask of the alternativve irtuesI have described
whatm akest hemf eministI. thinkt hisi s thew rongq uestionT. hey
are,a ftera ll, not advocatede xclusivelyb y feministsb, ut also by
othero ppositionaslc ientistsT. heys ervea s alternativefso ra larger
(or different)s cientificc ommunityt han the feministo ne. The
questiono ughtt o be: whatr ecommendtsh e alternativvei rtuest o
feminists?A s I have suggestede lsewherew, hato ughtt o recom-
mendt hese virtuest o feministsi s thatt hey (do or could) serve
feministc ognitiveg oals. Whatm akesf eministsf eministi s the
desiret o dismantlet he oppressiona nd subordinatioonf women.
This requiresid entificatioonf the mechanismas ndi nstitutionos f
femaleo ppressiona nds ubordinatiotnh, ati s, them echanismas nd
institutionos f genderT. he cognitiveg oal of feministr esearchers
thereforei,s to revealt he operationo f genderb, y makingv isible
both the activitieso f those genderedf emale and the processes
whereby they are made invisible, and by identifying the
mechanismsw herebyf emaleg endereda gentsa re subordinated.
FEMINISTE PISTEMOLOGYA S A LOCALE PISTEMOLOGY 27
Whato ughtt o recommendth esev irtuest o feministst, hen,i s that
inquiryr egulatedb y these valuesa nd theoriesc haracterizebdy
thesev irtuesa rem orel ikelyt o revealg endert hani nquiryg uided
by them ainstreamvi rtues(. Fora ccounto f howt hism ightw orki n
particularc ontexts, see Longino (1994, 1996).) There is
undoubtedlmy oret o be saidh erea s well, includingc onsideration
of otherp ossiblet heoreticavl irtueso, therc ognitivea ims,a ndt he
relationso f thesev irtuest o other( non-cognitivev)a luese ndorsed
by feministsa nd to values endorsedb y other communitieso f
inquiry.
IV
Epistemological Reflections.W hat can these virtues tell us about
the prospectsf or a normativef eministe pistemologyb ased on
them?F irst of all, althought he virtuesh ave been endorsedb y
feminists( althoughn ot by all feminists)a ndc an be discerneda t
work in feminist appraisal,t heir subordinationto a broader
cognitive goal means that they are not in and of themselves
feminist theoreticalv irtues, or to put it anotherw ay, such
subordinationm eans that these alternativev irtues will not
necessarilyb e a parto f a feministe pistemologicakl it. Theyh ave
no intrinsics tandinga s feministt heoreticavl irtueso r virtuesf or
feminists,b ut only a provisionaol ne. For as long as and to the
extentt hatt heirr egulativer olec anp romotet he goal of revealing
gender,a nda s long as revealingg enderr emainst hep rimaryg oal
of feministi nquiryt,h eyc ans ervea s normso rs tandardosf feminist
inquiry.I t is possible,h owever,t hat in differentc ontextst hey
wouldn ot promotef eministc ognitiveg oals, or thatt hose goals
themselvesm ight changei n such a way that otherc ognitively
regulativen ormsw ouldb e calledf or. Indeed,t o the extentt hat
feministsd issentf rom the virtues,t hey may eitherb e urginga
changeo f feministc ognitiveg oals or claimingt hatt he goals are
not servedb y the virtuesd iscussedh ere.T herec ouldb e multiple
sets of feminist cognitive virtues correspondingto different
conceptionos f whatf eministc ognitiveg oalsa reo r shouldb e. The
concepto f genderh as itselfc hangeda s a consequencoe f feminist
inquiryR. ecognizingth e disunityb otho f gendera ndo f formso f
genders ubordinatiomn ightr equiree ithera changei n cognitive
aimo r a changei n the virtues.