Socialism and Saint-Simon

274 Pages·1958·36.254 MB·English

by  Emile Durkheim, Alvin W. Gouldner

EMILE DURKHEIM
Socialism
a n d Saint-Simon
{Le Socialisme)
Edited and with an Introduction by
ALVIN W. GOULDNER
Department of Sociology, University of Illinois
Translated by
CHARLOTTE SATTLER
From the edition originally edited, and with a
Preface by,
MARCEL MAUSS
THE ANTIOCH PRESS
Copyright 1958
T he Antioch Press
Library of Congress
Catalog Card Number
58-8736
Printed m the United States of America
by the Antioch Press, Yellow Springs, Ohio
To the memory of my friend
NATH ANIEL CANTOR

Introduction
Durkheim’s study of socialism is a document of exceptional
intellectual interest for several reasons. Not the least of these is
that it presents us with the now somewhat unusual case of a
truly first-rate thinker who had the inclination to contribute
to the history of sociological theory and to comment extensively
on the work of a key figure in that history, Henri Saint-Simon.
The core of this volume contains Durkheim’s presentation of
Saint-Simon’s ideas, their sources and their development.
Indeed, Durkheim so subordinates himself in these pages
that we might well wish that he had developed his own critical
reactions to Saint-Simon at greater length. This is somewhat
unusual in the annals of current sociological scholarship in
America, which has tended to leave “mere” exegesis and his­
torical commentary to text book writers, and which sometimes
unwittingly fosters the barbaric assumption that books and ideas
more than twenty years old are beyond scientific salvation. In
contrast to such current preoccupations with the modern, it is
noteworthy that at the time Durkheim (1858-1917) wrote these
lectures on socialism and Saint-Simon (1760-1825), the latter
was dead some seventy years.
In some quarters a concern for the history of sociological
theory is now regarded as misguided. Of course, it is easy to
understand how the usual trite chronicle of thinkers and ideas
could foster such a disillusioned appraisaL Yet this dim view of
the history of sociological theory may be prematurely pessimistic
about earlier theory and unduly optimistic about the state of
current theory.
Though current theoretical accomplishments in sociology are
frequently substantial and occasionally brilliant, nothing is to be
gained by short-circuiting this discipline’s sense of historical con­
tinuity. We may, of course, burnish our generation’s attainments
by neglecting the earlier sources from which they derive. But
VI Socialism and Saint-Simon
such a rupture of historical continuity may well undermine even
our own generation’s accomplishments. For it may set a precedent,
disposing later scholars to turn their back on our work.
There is, it would seem, some inconsistency between the
sociologist s growing recognition of the importance of deliber­
ately cultivated theoretical continuity—as a methodological
imperative—and a growing tendency to neglect the earlier
contributors to sociological theory. An awareness of the historical
development of sociology, of its past as well as its present state, is
the only firm basis for evaluating whether we have “progressed,
and, if so, how much and in what ways. Alfred North Whitehead
has said that “a science which hesitates to forget its founders is
lost.” But to forget something, one must have known it in the
first place. A science ignorant of its founders does not know how
far it has travelled not in what direction; it, too, is lost.
There is one basic justification for a social scientist’s neglect
of the history of his discipline: he must demonstrate that current
theory and research have substantially assimilated the problems
and perspectives formulated by the earlier thinkers. Failing in
this, he must demonstrate that these earlier problems and pers­
pectives are no longer to be regarded as a proper concern of his
discipline.1
1 To obviate possible misunderstandings, let me stress that I am in no way
suggesting that a distinction between the history of sociological theory and
current theory be obliterated. I concur entirely in Robert Merton’s judgement
that “although the history and the systematics of sociological theory should both
be of concern in training sociologists, this is no reason for merging and confusing
the two.” R. K. Merton, Social Theory and Social Structure, Free Press, rev.
ed., 1957, p. 5. I believe, too, that I am also cognizant of the extent to which
earlier theories are larded with false starts, archaic doctrines, and fruitless
errors. I more than doubt, however, that present systematic sociological theory
has come anywhere near assimilating the still viable parts of early theory.
Moreover, I am not confident that current theory has a smaller proportion
of false starts, archaic doctrines, and fruitless errors. If this is true, then these
same deficiencies in earlier theories cannot justify their neglect. The decisive
question is, of course, whether there is reason to believe that there is still
something scientifically promising in the early work. By far the best indication
that there is, can be found in the work of two of the most creative of con­
temporary sociological theorists, Robert Merton and Talcott Parsons. In the
case of Parsons there can be little doubt that his immersal in the earlier theorists,
as evidenced by his Structure oj Social Action, provided an indispensable basis
Introduction
Vil
Since Durkheim’s time, however, academic sociologists have
increasingly neglected some of the central social problems of our
time. (Your editor is no exception to this statement.) For example,
there are few sociological researches into the sources, growth, and
diffusion of modern socialism, however numerous studies of the
Soviet Union have become. While there have been careful studies
of various marginal sects and cults, there are few detailed socio­
logical analyses of a socialist or communist party.
Related to this lacuna, is the common neglect of property
institutions by sociologists, apparently on the assumption that
this is tlie economist’s job alone. If this is reasonable, however,
one wonders why sociologists have not also left studies of in­
dustrial relations to economists, and studies of political parties
and elections to political scientists. Furthermore, since the decline
of the “culture lag” school, which for a period flourished at the
University of Chicago, there has been little systematic analysis
of the role of modern science and technology,* 2 and these institu­
tions now find only a peripheral place in the sociological theories
current today. Finally, although there are numerous sociological
studies of family discord and even some of industrial tensions,
there are few sociological studies of international relations, of
war and peace.3
for his own systematic theory. More specifically, as Parsons himself has explicitly
acknowledged, his “pattern variables” schema is a direct outgrowth of his work
on Ferdinand Tonnies’ theory of Gemeinschaft and Gesellschaft. See T. Parsons
and N. J. Smelser, Economy and Society, Free Press, J956, p. 33. One may
similarly note the extremely fruitful uses to which Robert K. Merton has put
such classic theorists as C. H. Cooley, H. Spencer, W. G. Sumner, and, above
all, G. Simmel, in his recent essay on “Continuities in the Theory of Reference
Groups and Social Structure,” Ibid,, pp. 281-386.
2 That the exceptions to be found in the work of Bernard Barber, W. F. Cottrell,
Gerard de Gré, and Robert Merton are notable, does not make them any the
less exceptions. Note the similar discussion by Robert Merton concerning current
deficiencies in the sociological study of science in his “Priorities in Scientific
Discovery,” American Sociological Review, Dec. 1957, p. 635.
3 1 have, previously, had occasion to examine a set of twenty-five text books in
introductory sociology, published between 1945-1954, to determine what they
had to say about the causes and effects of war. I found that in the 17,000 pages
which these volumes contained, there were only some 275 pages which dealt
with war in any of its manifestations. More than half of the texts dealt with
this single most important problem of the modern w'orld in less than 10 pages.
Socialism and Saint-Simon
Vtll
Durkheim’s study of socialism and Saint-Simon assumes im­
portance today precisely because, at various points, it considers
all of these major questions and, in some measure, does so in
their interrelationship to each other. Because it has something
to say about these problems, it may be expected that educated
laymen as well as professional sociologists will lind much of
interest in these pages.
One way in which this study is of peculiar value to sociologists,
and others interested in the development of sociological theory,
is that it provides us with a basis for a fuller understanding of
Durkheim’s own contribution as a sociologist, producing greater
clarity concerning some of the intellectual forces which shaped
it, and, in particular, of its links to Saint-Simon, to the latter’s
disciple, Auguste Comte, and to Karl Marx. Some recent analyses
of Durkheim’s work have viewed it too much in terms of what
it presumably became, and too little in terms of what it came
from. There has also been a tendency to over-emphasize Durk­
heim’s Comteian heritage and the induence which this had upon
him,4 to the neglect of other influences.
Without doubt Durkheim’s theory and research was much
influenced by Comte’s. But if Durkheim’s work comes out of
Comte’s, it does not come only from this source; if there was
continuity between Durkheim and Comte, there was also dis­
continuity. In Durkheim, we see a man who sometimes found
himself constrained to oppose his own intellectual mentor. Durk­
heim, we may say, was an uneasy Comteian.
4 Such an overemphasis is to be found, I believe, in Parsons’ interpretation of
Durkheim. For example, “Insofar as any influence is needed to account for his
[Durkheim’s] ideas, the most important one is certainly to be found in a source
which is both authentically French and authentically positivistic—Auguste
Comte, who was Durkheim's acknowledged master. Durkheim is the spiritual
heir of Comte and all the principal elements of his earlier thought are to be
found fore-shadowed in Comte’s writings. . . . Every element in his thinking
is rooted deeply in the problems immanent in the system of thought of which
Comte was so eminent an exponent.” Talcott Parsons, The Structure of Social
Action, McGraw-Hill Co., 1937, p. 307. One might say exactly the same thing
about the relationship between Durkheim’s and Saint-Simon’s thought, and,
quite understandably so, since Comte derived practically all of his main ideas
from Saint-Simon. (But more on this later.) It is therefore extremely difficult
to distinguish between the Saint-Simonian and the Comteian influence on
Durkheim.
Introduction ix
One striking demonstration that Durkheim was not simply
the devoted disciple of Comte can be seen in this study of social­
ism. Here, Durkheim firmly denies to Comte, and bestows on
Saint-Simon, the “honor” of having founded both positivist
philosophy and sociology.0 It should be clear from this alone
5 Despite Durkheim’s yeoman-like efforts to dispel the conception that Comte
was the “father” of sociology, the belief in “Comte the father” persists, even
among sociologists, as an almost indestructible myth. Contemporary sociologists,
of course, no longer lend credence to such ebullient fantasies as Chugerman’s,
who held that, “. . . shutting himself in his room for a day and a night, he
[Comte] evolved the general conception of social science and the project of
the positive philosophy . . .” S. Chugerman, Lester F. Ward, Duke University
Press, 1939, p. 174. Nonetheless, one still finds fundamentally erroneous state­
ments concerning Comte’s significance in relation to Saint-Simon’s. N. S.
Timasheff, for example, has recently reaffirmed this myth in maintaining that
“Auguste Comte . . . was the first major figure to assert and then prove by
deed that a science of society, both empiric and theoretical, was possible and
desirable.” N. S. Timasheff, Sociological Theory: Its Nature and Growth,
Doubleday and Co., 1955, p. 15. Similarly erroneous judgements are to be
found in Jacques Barzun and Henry Graff, The Modern Researcher, Harcourt,
Brace and Co., 1957, p. 203. Such judgements might have been understandable
had they been made prior to 1859, when Saint-Simon’s Mémoire sur la Science
de l’homme, originally written in 1813, was first published. This essay definitely
establishes that Saint-Simon’s formulation of positivist philosophy, and of
sociology, clearly preceded his association with Comte. This is also borne out
by Durkheim, Halevy, Bury, and Saint-Simon’s recent biographers, Frank
Manuel, Mathurin Dondo, and F. M. H. Markham. If the myth of “Comte
the founder of sociology” still persists in American sociology, despite long­
standing evidence to the contrary, this suggests that it performs certain ongoing
social functions for those holding it. There is an interesting problem here for a
study in the sociology of knowledge. One hypothesis for such a study might
be that acknowledgement of Comte as the putative father of sociology is less
professionally damaging than acknowledgement of Saint-Simon who, as Durk­
heim points out, was also one of the founders of modern socialism. If sociologists
acknowledge descent from Saint-Simon rather than Comte they are not only
acquiring a father, but a blacksheep brother, socialism, thus reinforcing lay
opinions to the effect that socialism and sociology must be similar because they
have the same prefix. Needless to say, such an hypothesis would not premise
that there is a “plot” afoot to do Saint-Simon out of his rightful heritage! While
it may make no difference to the substance of a science concerning who, in
fact, its “founding father” was, nonetheless, shared professional beliejs concern­
ing this may be significant for a discipline’s professional organization and its
practioners’ self-images. A “founding father” is a professional symbol which
can be treated as a trivial detail by no one who wishes to understand the
profession as a social organization. Where there are conflicts, by later genera­
tions, concerning who their “founding father” was, w'e suspect that this may
be a serious question essentially reflecting a dispute over the character of the
profession.