Social Perception and Social Reality: Why Accuracy Dominates Bias and Self-Fulfilling Prophecy

485 Pages·2012·2.37 MB·English

by  Lee Jussim

social perception and social reality
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Social Perception and Social Reality
WHY ACCURACY DOMINATES BIAS AND
SELF-FULFILLING PROPHECY
Lee Jussim
1

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1

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Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data
Jussim, Lee J.
Social perception and social reality : why accuracy dominates bias and self-fulfi lling prophecy/Lee Jussim.
p. cm.
Includes bibliographical references and index.
ISBN 978-0-19-536660-0 (hardcover)
1. Social perception. 2. Stereotypes (Social psychology) I. Title.
BF323.S63J87 2012
302.’12 — dc23 2011020796
________________________________________________________________________________
9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1
Printed in the United States of America on acid-free paper
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Th is book is dedicated to my family: my wife, Lisa Baum, who has not merely been supportive,
but with whom conversations about multiculturalism in her practice infl uenced my thinking
about stereotypes; my daughter Rachel, whose righteous indignation at social scientists’
resistance to scientifi c evidence right in fr ont of their noses has been an ongoing inspiration for
me; my daughter Kayla, whose spunk and resilience in the face of extraordinary diffi culties is
its own constant source of inspiration for me; and to my son Josh, for giving me numerous
opportunities to discover that his very multi-cultural set of fr iends are not remotely threatened
by talking about ethnic and cultural diff erences between groups and, in fact, generally enjoy
such discussions.
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Acknowledgments
m any of the ideas in the book are so outside the mainstream of “normal” social science
claims, that it is perhaps more obvious than usual that any errors, misinterpretations, misrep-
resentations, and the like are entirely my own. For example, this book spends 6 chapters
arguing that the eff ects of expectations are typically overstated and, rather than being power-
ful and pervasive, are weak, fragile, and fl eeting. It spends 3 chapters arguing that there is far
more evidence of accuracy than most social psychologists acknowledge. It spends 5 chapters
arguing that stereotypes are typically quite accurate, typically used in a manner that is rea-
sonable and more or less rational, and that it is social psychological perspectives emphasizing
stereotype inaccuracy that are exaggerated, unjustifi ed, and irrationally resistant to change.
One can fi nd vanishingly few psychologists of any stripes presenting such claims, so that one
can be assured that any errors in making or justifying them are entirely my own.
A lthough they bear no responsibility whatsoever for any of the claims that appear through-
out the book, several people have been immensely helpful in preventing me from making
claims that even I would consider unjustifi ed. I am deeply grateful for critiques and com-
mentary received on one or more chapters from David Funder, Bill von Hippel, David
Kenny, Joachim Krueger, Clark McCauley, Richard Nisbett, Charles Stangor, and Bill
Swann. I (and this book) have also benefi tted from correspondences with Alice Eagly, Sam
Gosling, Judy Hall, C. Neil Macrae, Beth Morling, Michael Norton, Stephen Raudenbush,
Carey Ryan, and Sam Sommers.
Th is book took so long to write that, while still in progress, I extracted core ideas from
and have published them elsewhere (A dvances in Experimental Social Psychology,
Persona lity and Social Psychology Review, and the H andbook of Stereotypes, Prejudice, and
Discrimination) . Th e critical comments provided by anonymous reviews, and by Bill Ickes,
Todd Nelson, and Mark Zanna regarding those published pieces were then fed back
to improve the chapters in this book. I am very grateful for those thoughtful and cogent
comments.
Th is book is, in part, a scholarly and intellectual (rather than political) polemic. Th e dic-
tionary defi nition of polemic is: a controversial argument, as one against some opinion, doc-
trine, etc. Th is book defi nitely argues against the pervasive view among social cognition
scholars that human social judgment is dominated by bias; and it even argues against the
pervasive doctrine in psychology and other social sciences that stereotypes are inaccurate
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viii Acknowledgments
and irrational. As such, I must also thank all those scholars who have promoted and
advocated the view of human social cognition as deeply fl awed and steeped in error and
bias—without them, I would have had no reason to write this book.
Of course, the book does not mostly “argue against” anything—it mostly argues for a view
of human social thinking as generally nicely in touch with social reality and, generally, sub-
ject to biases that, though real, are readily reduced or eliminated. Although my own original
research constitutes a tiny fraction of that reported in this book, much of that research was
conducted with Jacque Eccles and Stephanie Madon, collaborations for which I am deeply
grateful. Last, I must thank the Hillsborough Diner in NJ, where I wrote most of this book,
for allowing me to sit and write for many hours at a time, despite only spending a few bucks
at a pop for breakfast or lunch.
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Contents
part one | introduction: this book, basic ideas, and
the early research
1 Introduction: How Might Social Beliefs Relate to Social Reality? 3
2 Social Reality Is Not Always What It Appears To Be: Th e Scientifi c Roots of
Research on Interpersonal Expectancies 13
3 Th e Once Raging and Still Smoldering Pygmalion Controversy 30
part two | the awesome power of expectations to
create reality and distort perceptions
4 Th e Extraordinary Power of Self-Fulfi lling Prophecies 49
5 Th e Extraordinary Power of Expectancies to Bias Perception,
Memory, and Information-Seeking 64
part three | the less than awesome power of expectations
to create reality and distort perceptions
6 Th e Less Th an Extraordinary Power of Self-Fulfi lling Prophecies:
Considerations Based on Common Sense, Daily Life, and a
Critical Evaluation of the Early Classic Experiments 83
7 You Better Change Your Expectations Because I Will Not Change (Much) to
Fit Your Expectations: Self-Verifi cation as a Limit to Self-Fulfi lling Prophecies 100
8 Th e Less Th an Awesome Power of Expectations to Distort Information-Seeking 112
9 Th e Less Th an Awesome Power of Expectations to Bias Perception, Memory,
and Judgment 122
part four | accuracy: controversies, criticisms, criteria,
components, and cognitive processes
10 Accuracy: Historical, Political, and Conceptual Objections 145
11 Accuracy: Criteria 170
12 Accuracy: Components and Processes 194
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