Social Activism and Practice Diffusion: How Activist Tactics Affect Non-targeted Organizations

33 Pages·2015·0.19 MB·English

AdministrativeScienceQuarterly
Social Activism and 2015,Vol.60(2)300–332
(cid:2)TheAuthor(s)2015
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How Activist Tactics DOI:10.1177/0001839215579235
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Affect Non-targeted
Organizations
Forrest Briscoe,1 Abhinav Gupta,2 and
Mark S. Anner3
Abstract
Thispaperexamineshowsocialactivisttacticsaffectthediffusionofsocial-
responsibilitypractices.Studyingcollegiateadoptionsofacontroversial
supplier-sanctionpracticechampionedbyanti-sweatshopactivists,wecom-
parehownon-targetedorganizationsareinfluencedbydifferenttypesofpractice
adoptionsintheirenvironment.Drawingoninterorganizationallearningtheory,
weargueandshowthatdisruption-linkedadoptions—thosethatoccurfollowing
activists’disruptiveprotestsagainsttheadoptingorganization—appeartobe
takenundercoercivepressureandthereforeprovidenon-targetedorganizations
withpoorinferencesaboutthemeritsofthepractice.Incontrast,stronginfer-
encesareprovidedbyevidence-linkedadoptions—thosethatoccurafteractivists
useevidence-basedtacticswiththeadoptingorganization—andbyindependent
adoptionsoccurringwithoutanyactivism.Hencethecontagiouseffectofinde-
pendentandevidence-basedadoptionsisgreaterthanthatofdisruption-linked
adoptions.Wefurtherexploredifferencesinreceptivitytocontagiousinfluence,
proposingthatfeaturesofanorganizationanditsproximalenvironmentthat
increaseissuesaliencealsoincreasesusceptibilitytodiffusion.Ourfindings
demonstratetheimportanceofincludingnon-targetedorganizationsinresearch
onsocialmovementsandcorporatesocialresponsibility.Theyalsoofferanew
vantageforinterorganizationaldiffusionresearch,basedonhowactivistsand
otherthirdpartiesshapeorganizationaldecisionmakers’inferences.
Keywords: socialmovements,diffusion,interorganizationallearning,social
activisttactics,corporatesocialresponsibility
Organizationalscholarshaverecentlyexploredhowsocialactiviststargetorga-
nizationstoincreasetheirsocialresponsibilityandhowinsomecasesthey
1SmealCollegeofBusiness,ThePennsylvaniaStateUniversity
2FosterSchoolofBusiness,UniversityofWashington
3SchoolofLaborandEmploymentRelations,ThePennsylvaniaStateUniversity
Briscoe,Gupta,andAnner 301
successfullypressurethoseorganizationstorevisepracticesandpoliciesinline
withactivists’social-responsibilitygoals(EesleyandLenox,2006;Walker,
Martin,andMcCarthy,2008;Soule,2009;KingandPearce,2010).Anemer-
gingthemeinthisresearchisthatthedifferentcampaigntacticsusedbyacti-
vistscaninfluencetheirsuccess.Forexample,researchershavefoundthat
activistscanbesuccessfulwhentheyengageindisruptivetactics,suchassit-
insandboycotts,whichaimtoimpedeanorganization’sroutinesorthreaten
itspublicreputation(Davisetal.,2005;Rojas,2006;King,2008;Bartleyand
Child,2011).Suchdisruptivetacticscanleadthedirectlytargetedorganizational
decisionmakerstoamendoradoptorganizationalpracticestomeetactivists’
demands,effectivelygrantingconcessionstotheactiviststoendthe
disruption.
Yetofalltheorganizationsinasectororindustrythatactivistshopetoinflu-
ence,onlyasmallsetareusuallytargetedforprotest(denHondandde
Bakker,2007).Henceasscholarsturntoconsiderhowactivisminfluences
changesbeyondthedirectsitesofcontestation(Lounsbury,Ventresca,and
Hirsch,2003;BriscoeandMurphy,2012;FligsteinandMcAdam,2012),an
importantquestioninvolvestheeffectivenessofdifferentactivisttacticsin
inducingpracticeadoptionbynon-targetedorganizations.Afewpriorstudies
haveconsideredtheeffectsofactivism(butnottactics)ondiffusion.Forexam-
ple,Haveman,Rao,andParuchuri(2007)arguedthatasocialmovement’ssuc-
cessescouldproducewiderchangebyspreadingthemovement’svalues,
BriscoeandSafford(2008)arguedthatactivist-targetedcompaniesbecome
moresusceptibletoadoptingcontroversialpractices,andSchneiberg(2013)
arguedthatsocialmovementssupportthediffusionofpracticesconsistent
withmovements’values.Yetthesystematicrelationshipbetweenactivism
againsttargetedorganizationsandchangesinnon-targetedorganizations
remainsunclear.
Tounderstandthatrelationshipbetter,wedrawoninterorganizationallearn-
inganddiffusiontheorytoconceptualizeactivists’successesasanintegralpart
oftheinferentialinformationavailabletonon-targetedorganizationaldecision
makers.Viewedinthisway,activismcanaffecttherationalinferencesthat
shapeadoptiondecisionsamongthosenon-targetedorganizations.
Interorganizationaldiffusiontheoryhighlightsavicariouslearningdynamicin
whichorganizationaldecisionmakersfacinguncertaintyabouthowtorespond
toanewpracticewillimitatetherecentbehaviorofpeerorganizationsregard-
ingthatpractice(CyertandMarch,1963).Anincreaseinprioradoptionscan
provideastrengtheningsocialinferenceaboutthepractice’smerits,fuelingfur-
therdiffusion.Thisdiffusiondynamichasbeenfoundforawiderangeoforga-
nizationalpracticesinvolvingcorporatestructuresandpractices(Davisand
Greve,1997;SandersandTuschke,2007;Fiss,Kennedy,andDavis,2012),uni-
versitycurriculaandcareersystems(Kraatz,1998;Park,Sine,andTolbert,
2011),andhospitalandnon-profitmanagementpractices(Westphal,Gulati,
andShortell,1997;HwangandPowell,2009;KennedyandFiss,2009).
Whenactivisttacticsareconnectedwiththediffusionprocess,theycan
affectitbystrengtheningorweakeningthepositiveinferenceprovidedbypast
adoptions.Generallyspeaking,pastadoptionsprovideapositivebutambiguous
baselineinferencethatthepracticehasrationalmerit,asobservingdecision
makersinferthattheirpeersintheadoptingorganizationevaluatedinformation
aboutthepracticeandfounditcompelling(StrangandMacy,2001;Greve,
302 AdministrativeScienceQuarterly60(2015)
2005;StillandStrang,2009).Varioustraitsofprior-adoptingorganizationsmay
strengthenthepositiveinference;forexample,organizationswithhighstatus
maygeneratestrongerinferencesbecausetheyareassumedtohaveaccess
tobetterinformationandanalysis(StrangandStill,2004).Inexploringhowacti-
vismbecomespartofthisinferencematerialfordecisionmakers,weargue
thatinferencesaboutthemeritsofacontroversialpracticewillbeinfluenced
byhowpriorpracticeadoptionsarevisiblyassociatedwithdifferentactivisttac-
tics.Wetestedourargumentsinastrategicresearchsettinginvolvingthe
adoptionofsuppliersanctionsbyU.S.collegesanduniversitiesagainstapromi-
nentapparelmanufacturer,takingplaceduringanine-monthperiodin2009
whenanti-sweatshopcampusactivistswerecampaigningforthosesanctions.
CONTAGIOUSDIFFUSIONANDINFERENCESFROMPRIORADOPTIONS
Organizationaldecisionmakersfaceriskanduncertaintyindecidingtheir
responsetoaneworganizationalpracticethathasenteredtheirorganizational
field.Accordingtointerorganizationallearningtheory,managersareassumed
tobeboundedlyrational,suchthattheyintendtojustifytheirdecisionsusing
rationalcriteriabutarepronetousingshortcuts,givenuncertaintyandcognitive
limitations(MarchandSimon,1958;Greve,1998,2005).Formanagersconsid-
eringanewpractice,theirobservationsofpeerorganizationsdecidingtoadopt
providesuchacognitiveshortcutinlieuofthecostlygatheringofmoredetailed
informationaboutthepractice(March,1991;LevinthalandMarch,1993;
HaunschildandMiner,1997).Hencemanagersareunderstoodtouseprior
adoptionsassocialproofofthepractice’smerits,leadingtoapatternofinteror-
ganizationalimitationorlearningwhenorganizationsadoptinganewpractice
haveacontagiousinfluenceonotherorganizationsthatfollowsuit(Cyertand
March,1963;Rao,Greve,andDavis,2001).
Insomeformsofinterorganizationallearning,organizationsimitateaspread-
ingnewpracticewithoutdeliberatingmuchabouttheparticularcircumstances
surroundingprioradoptions(AbrahamsonandRosenkopf,1993;Burnsand
Wholey,1993).Often,however,organizationslearnselectivelydependingon
thecharacteristicsofprioradoptingorganizationsorotherinferencesthatare
indicativeofthepractice’smerits(e.g.,Greve,1998;StrangandStill,2004;
Rhee,Kim,andHan,2006).Forexample,referentorganizationsmaybemore
influentialiftheyhavehighstatus,visibility,orotherattributesthatincreasethe
perceivedrationalvalueorsociopoliticallegitimacyofthepractice(DiMaggio
andPowell,1983;Haveman,1993;MinerandRaghavan,1999;Baum,Li,and
Usher,2000;TerlaakandGong,2008).
Positiveorganizationalperformanceeffectsthatappeartobeassociated
withadoptionscanalsostrengthenafavorableinferenceaboutthepractice,
contributingtodiffusion(HaunschildandMiner,1997).Conversely,negative
outcomesassociatedwithadoptions,suchasnegativemediacoverage,may
contributeinferencesofmoremixedbenefitsandcostsfromprioradoptions,
slowingdiffusion(BriscoeandMurphy,2012).Theconsistencyorvariancein
informationassociatedwithprioradoptionsmayalsoaffectinferences,such
thatinconsistentorcontradictoryevidenceontheeffectsofpracticeadoptions
mayinhibitdiffusion(Rhee,Kim,andHan,2006;GabaandTerlaak,2013).The
patternoforganizationsthatdonotadoptcanalsocontributetoforminginfer-
ences(TerlaakandGong,2008).Thevisibleinformationassociatedwithprior
Briscoe,Gupta,andAnner 303
adoptionscanthusstrengthenorweakeninferencesaboutthemeritsofthe
practice,inturnamplifyingorsuppressingsubsequentdiffusiontoother
organizations.
EffectofActivistTacticsonInferencesfromPriorAdoptions
Giventheresearchoninterorganizationallearning,thetacticsthatactivistsuse
andthatareassociatedwithpracticeadoptionwillbecomepartoftheinference
materialavailabletoobservingdecisionmakers.Althoughdiffusionresearchers
havenotgenerallyconsideredtheroleofactivistsininterorganizationallearn-
ing,afewscholarshavesuggestedthatactivistscanbeseenaspartisanadvo-
cates,likemanagementconsultants,whoactivelypromote(oroppose)the
spreadofpracticesbytheorizingandpublicizingthepracticealongwithadop-
tionsbyexemplarorganizations(StrangandMacy,2001;Raeburn,2004;
SchneibergandLounsbury,2008).Whenapriororganizationalpracticeadop-
tionisvisiblyassociatedwiththeinfluenceofoutsideactivists,thisassociation
willnaturallybecomeanelementoftheinferencematerialavailabletoobser-
vingdecisionmakersinotherorganizations.Althoughcertainformsofquiet
activismmaynotbecomevisibletoobservingnon-targetdecisionmakers,acti-
vismisoftendesignedtogainattention,thussparkingdiscussionamongorga-
nizationaladministrators,activists,andotherobserversacrossthe
organizationalfield(Polletta,1998;BartleyandChild,2011;EarlandKimport,
2011).
Activisttacticsassociatedwithprioradoptionscancomplicatetheinfer-
encesthatobserversmakebecausetheycreateambiguityaboutwhetherthe
prioradoptionwastheresultofautonomousdecisionmakingorwasinstead
influencedbypressurefromoutsidetheorganization.Activisttacticsthatare
disruptivemaycreatemorequestionsabouttheroleofoutsideinfluenceon
practiceadoption.Asaresult,disruptivetacticsmayhaveanegativeeffecton
inferencesabouttheorganizationalpractice’sintrinsicmerit—theperceived
valuefororganizationstoadoptthepractice,independentofconsiderations
relatedtoactivistpressure.1Observersarelikelytobelievethatdisruptivepro-
testtacticsplayedatleastapartialroleincompellinganorganizationaladoption
decisionthatfollowedsoonaftertheprotesttacticwasdeployed.Althoughthis
observationdoesnotnecessarilynegatethepossibilitythatthepracticewould
havebeenadoptedindependently,itshiftsperceptionstowardthepossibility
thatthepracticeadoptionwasmoreforcedthanautonomous.Forexample,ifa
givenuniversityadoptedanewsocial-responsibilitypracticeshortlyafterstu-
dentsadvocatingforthatpracticeoccupiedanadministrativebuildingforsev-
eraldays,observersmayinferthatthepracticewasinfluencedbyadecision
maker’sdesiretoendthatdisruptivetactic.Thislineofthinkingisconsistent
withcognitivedecision-makingstudiesthatshowthatinformationhasagreater
effectonpeers’behaviorwhenitisseentobeindependentratherthanaresult
ofnormativepressure(Turner,1991;MummendeyandWenzel,1999).
Contributingtothisnegativeeffectoninferences,activistsoftencelebrate
disruption-linkedpracticeadoptionsassuccessesspecificallycausedbytheir
1Wedonotmeanthatdecisionmakersarenecessarilyinterestedintheabstractintellectualor
moralmeritofthepracticeortheactivistcampaignadvancingitbutratherthattheyareinterested
intheorganizationalrationalityofpracticeadoption(MeyerandRowan,1977).
304 AdministrativeScienceQuarterly60(2015)
disruptivetactics.Theydothisinhopesthatsuccesseswillencourageothers
toparticipateinthemovement(MeyerandWhittier,1994),butparadoxicallyit
maylimitobservingdecisionmakers’perceptionsofthepractice’sindependent
merits.Evenwhenorganizationaldecisionmakersmakepublicorprivatecom-
mentsdenouncingthedisruptivetactics,thismayraisethevisibilityoftheacti-
vists’tacticsandincreasetheircognitiveassociationwiththeorganizational
adoptiondecisioninthemindsofobservers.
Incontrast,adoptionsofacontroversialpracticethatarenotlinkedtodisrup-
tivetacticsprovideaclearerinferencethatothersinthefieldareacceptingthe
practiceonitsownmerits.ThislineofreasoningisconsistentwithStrangand
Meyer’s(1993)argumentsthatacontextinwhichadoptersareviewedas
autonomousandempoweredwillfueldiffusion,becausetheseactorsare
believedtohaveactedoutofself-interesttogenerateoptimaloutcomesfor
themselves—suggestingtoothersthatfollowingsuitbyreplicatingthose
actionsshouldgeneratefavorableoutcomesforthemaswell.Thusweoffer
thefollowinghypothesis:
Hypothesis1(H1):Comparedwithdisruption-linkedadoptions,independentadop-
tionswillbemorecontagiousintheinterorganizationaldiffusionofacontroversial
practice.
Othertypesofprotesttacticsmayprovidedifferentinferencesforobserving
decisionmakersrespondingtoadiffusingcontroversialpractice,inparticular,
protesttacticsthatareexplicitlynon-disruptiveandnon-confrontationalintheir
approach.Non-disruptivetacticsseektobringaboutachangeintheorienta-
tionsofaudiences,includingtargeteddecisionmakers,byconveyingtheneed
orvalueinadoptingtheproposedpractice(Gamson,1968).Acommonformof
non-disruptivetacticisanevidence-basedtactic:theprovisionofinformation
and/ormaterialevidencetoenhancethecredibilityofactivistsandthepractices
theyseektobringabout(BenfordandSnow,2000).
Theeffectivenessofevidence-basedtacticsdoesnotdependondisruption
butinsteadappearstooperatethroughpersuasion.Evidence-basedtacticsare
designedtoprovideorsupportajustifyingaccountforpracticeadoptionthat
positivelyinfluencesthetargeteddecisionmakers.Forexample,evidence-
basedtacticsmayinvolvetestimonialsfrompeopleadverselyaffectedbyexist-
ingpracticesorpositivelyaffectedbynewpractices(e.g.,McCarthy,Wolfson,
andHarvey,1987;BenfordandHunt,1992;Tayloretal.,2009).Othertypesof
evidence-basedtacticsincludeeventsthatpublicizescientificinformationabout
thecostsandbenefitsofchangingpractices(e.g.,SineandLee,2009;Hiatt,
Sine,andTolbert,2009).Thecommonthreadisthatevidence-basedtacticsare
aimedatcreatingpressurebycontributinginformationthatisdirectlyrelevant
tothedecision-makingprocessesofthetargetedorganization.Though
evidence-basedtacticsarenotalwayseffectiveintheirintendedgoalofdirectly
influencingtargeteddecisionmakers,toourknowledge,nostudieshavebeen
conductedthatempiricallyassesstheirefficacy.
Yetwhenevidence-basedtacticsareeffectiveindirectlyinfluencingtargeted
decisionmakerstoadoptnewpractices,itfollowsthattheythenbecomepart
oftheinferentialmaterialavailabletoobservers.Henceourinterestisinthe
influencethatsuccessfulevidence-basedtacticshaveondiffusiontonon-
targetedorganizations.Whennon-targeteddecisionmakersobserveadoption
Briscoe,Gupta,andAnner 305
linkedtoevidence-basedtactics,theymaystillbeuncertainabouttheroleof
activismininfluencingadoption,butbecausethetacticinvolvedthetransmis-
sionofpractice-relatedinformation,theyshouldinferthatinformationconveyed
throughthetactichelpedpersuadethetargeteddecisionmakerstoadopt.
Suchaninferenceshouldcontributepositivelytothediffusionprocesstothe
extentthatittiltsobservingnon-targeteddecisionmakerstowardthepercep-
tionthatthepracticehasmeritswithinarationaldecision-makingframework
sharedacrossorganizations.Byobservingevidence-basedtacticsinconnection
withpriorpracticeadoption,otherdecisionmakerscaninferthattheeviden-
tiaryinformationfitintothatprioradopter’snormaldecision-makingprocess—
thestylizedprocessofchoosingamongalternativeactionstomaximizenet
organizationalbenefits(MarchandSimon,1958;StrangandStill,2006).
Adoptionslinkedtoevidence-basedtacticsneednotsignalfullyautonomous
decisionmaking,asactivismisstillpresent.Butintheabsenceofdisruptive
pressure,observersmayinferthattheinformationgeneratedbythetacticcon-
tributedtotheperceivedrationalityofpracticeadoptionasanorganizationally
appropriatebehavior.
Thepositiveinferenceeffectofevidence-basedtacticsmaysubsequentlybe
reinforcedasadoptingdecisionmakersexplaintheirbehavior.Althoughorgani-
zationaldecisionmakersgenerallydistancethemselvesfromactivistsandtheir
claims,informationsuppliedthroughnon-disruptiveevidence-basedtacticsmay
beviewedlessskeptically.Aslongastheinformationwasprovidedinalegiti-
matemanner,adoptingdecisionmakersmayopenlydiscussthecontentthat
influencedthem,forexample,bysharingpersonaltestimonialsorscientificsta-
tisticsthatsupportandexplaintheirpracticeadoption.Suchdevelopments
wouldreinforcetheinferencethatthepracticewasadoptedbyinformeddeci-
sionmakerswhosawitsmerits,thusreducingtheamountoflocalpromotion
requiredofotherdecisionmakersconsideringadoption(StrangandMeyer,
1993)andfacilitatingcontagiousdiffusion.Theseargumentsleadtothefollow-
inghypothesis:
Hypothesis2(H2):Comparedwithdisruption-linkedadoptions,evidence-linkedadop-
tionswillbemorecontagiousintheinterorganizationaldiffusionofacontroversial
practice.
InfluenceofIssueSalienceonContagiousDiffusion
Controversialorganizationalpracticesarelinkedtobroadersocietalissuesthat
varyintheirsaliencetodecisionmakers.Whenthebroaderissuebecomes
moresalient,thiscanaffectorganizationalresponsestopracticediffusionby
directingstakeholders’attentionandpressuringdecisionmakerstomonitorthe
issueandensuretheyareactingappropriately.Hereweconsidertwogeneral
sourcesofissuesaliencethatarerelatedtoactivismandcontroversialpractice
diffusion,involvingconditionswithinthefocalorganizationandconditionsinits
proximalenvironment:priorcommitmentsthatareinaccordwithapractice
anddisruptiveprotestsinanorganization’sproximity.
First,withinthefocalorganization,priorcommitmentsthatareconsonant
withthecontroversialpracticewillhavetheeffectofincreasingtheissue’ssal-
ience.Consonantcommitmentsmaytaketheformofearlierofficialproclama-
tionsregardingtheorganization’svalues,goals,orinterests,whichnow
306 AdministrativeScienceQuarterly60(2015)
implicatetheorganization’sbehaviorinrelationtothecontroversialpractice.
Forexample,anorganizationthatreleasedacorporatesocialresponsibility
(CSR)reportstatingitsstrongemphasisongenderequalitymaybeimplicated
whenactivistscampaigntoincreasefemalerepresentationintopmanage-
ment.Anincreasinglycommonformofconsonantcommitmentisorganiza-
tionalparticipationinprivateregulation,whichinvolvesvoluntarybodiesthat
defineandsometimesmonitortheapplicationofstandardsforresponsiblecon-
duct(Bartley,2007;Locke,Qin,andBrause,2007;ZietsmaandMcKnight,
2009;TimmermansandEpstein,2010;MenaandWaeger,2014).Examples
includetheRainforestAlliance,theGlobalBusinessInitiativeonHumanRights,
andtheFairLaborAssociation(Baron,2003;Bartley,2005;Schneibergand
Bartley,2008).Organizationswithsuchpriorcommitmentswillexperience
heightenedsaliencewhenthecontroversialpracticeenterstheirenvironment.
Decisionmakersintheseorganizationsmaybemoreopentopersuasionin
relationtothepractice,astheyhavealreadyacceptedpartofthevaluesand
agendaofthemovement(dellaPortaandRucht,2002;HernesandMikalsen,
2002).Inaddition,theymaybeawareofstakeholderswhoarescrutinizingthe
organization’sbehaviorinrelationtothenewpracticeinlightoftheconsonant
commitments(ChristensenandLanger,2009;MenaandWaeger,2014).
Inthewakeofheightenedissuesalience,organizationaldecisionmakerswill
monitoreventsrelatedtotheissueandconsiderthepossiblemeritsandmeth-
odsofrespondingtotheissue(Getz,1997;Baron,2001;BonardiandKeim,
2005).Thismonitoringandconsiderationwillinvolvegivinggreaterattentionto
relevantinformationandsignalsregardingthemeritsandrisksofacontrover-
sialpracticethathasenteredtheorganization’senvironment.Forexample,
decisionmakerswillattendtootherrecentproximalpracticeadoptionsandthe
informationcascadethatsuchadoptionsrepresent(Rao,Greve,andDavis,
2001).
Althoughanissue’ssaliencewillincreaseattentiontopriorpracticeadop-
tionsofalltypes,itwillnotnecessarilymakedecisionmakersmoresusceptible
toalladoptionsuniformly.Disruption-linkedadoptionswillstillprovideamuddy
signalastotherationalmeritsofthepractice,despiteincreasedsalience.But
theissue’ssalienceshouldincreaseresponsivenesstoindependentand
evidence-linkedadoptions,astheseformsofadoptionprovidepositiveinfer-
encesabouttherationalmeritsofthepractice.Henceweofferthefollowing
hypothesesinvolvingthemoderatingeffectsofconsonantcommitmentson
thecontagiousnessofindependentandevidence-linkedadoptions:
Hypothesis3a(H3a):Thecontagiousnessofindependentadoptionswillbegreater
amongorganizationsthatholdconsonantcommitmentsrelatedtothecontrover-
sialpractice.
Hypothesis3b(H3b):Thecontagiousnessofevidence-linkedadoptionswillbe
greateramongorganizationsthatholdconsonantcommitmentsrelatedtothecon-
troversialpractice.
Thesecondsourceofissuesalienceinvolvesdisruptiveproteststhatoccur
inanorganization’sproximalenvironment.Socialactivistsoftenpursuedisrup-
tiveproteststoraiseawarenessandmobilizepublicopinion(Oberschall,1973;
Gusfield,1981).Regardlessofwhetherthosedisruptiveprotestsdrivepractice
adoptionorachieveanyothergoals,theirnewsworthinessislikelytobring
Briscoe,Gupta,andAnner 307
attentiontotheissue(Lipsky,1968).Disruptionsthatareleviedatcompetitive
rivalsgermanetoafocalorganization’sstrategyandidentitywillincreasethe
salienceoftheissueandtheassociatedpracticeforthefocalorganization
(Bundy,Shropshire,andBuchholtz,2013).
Inadditiontofocusingtheattentionofdecisionmakerswhoregularlyscan
eventsrelatedtotheirorganizationalrivals(BriscoeandMurphy,2012),news
ofproximaldisruptionswillbringgreaterawarenessofthepracticetothefocal
organization’sstakeholders,whoseinterestsandidentitiesareconnectedto
thefocalorganizationandwhothereforeperceivethepotentialrelevanceof
eventsandnewsrelatedtoitsrivals(RowleyandMoldoveanu,2003;Bundy,
Shropshire,andBuchholtz,2013).Forexample,whenaconsumerproduct
firm’scompetitorexperiencesadisruptiveboycott,thefocalfirm’semployees
andsuppliersmaytakenoticeandconsiderhowtheyareimplicatedinthe
issuethatinspiredtheboycott.Inauniversitycontext,oneschool’sstudents
andalumnimaybecomemoreattentivetoanissueadvancedbycampusacti-
vistswhentheylearnofdisruptiveprotestsoccurringatrivalschools.
Aswithconsonantcommitments,proximaldisruptionwillheightendecision
makers’attentiontothecontroversialpracticeandtoitsadoptionbypeerorga-
nizations.Whilethisheightenedattentionmaynotyieldanincreasedresponse
totheambiguoussignalofdisruption-linkedadoptions,followingourarguments
above,itshouldincreasesusceptibilitytoindependentandevidence-linked
adoptions:
Hypothesis4a(H4a):Thecontagiousnessofindependentadoptionswillriseasorga-
nizationswitnessproximaldisruptionrelatedtothecontroversialpractice.
Hypothesis4b(H4b):Thecontagiousnessofevidence-linkedadoptionswillriseas
organizationswitnessproximaldisruptionrelatedtothecontroversialpractice.
METHOD
Toexplorethediffusioneffectsoftacticsusedbysocialactivists,westudied
therapidadoptionofasupplier-sanctionpracticeacrossU.S.collegesanduni-
versities.Activistscalledforthissanctioninresponsetothesupplier’snon-
compliancewithitscodeofconduct.Thissettingallowedustoholdkeyfactors
constantwhilestudyingtheeffectsofdifferenttacticsondiffusion.Different
typesoftacticsweredeployedbyactivistsatdifferentschoolsaspartofthe
sameissuecampaign;adoptionsoccurredatawiderangeofschools,including
schoolswhereeachtacticoccurred,aswellasschoolsthatdidnotexperience
tactics;andtheentirecampaignandsanctionbehaviortookplaceinarelatively
rapidtimeframeduringwhichacommonissueframingwasarticulatedbythe
wideranti-sweatshopumbrellamovement.
Ourstudyofthecampaignandsanctiondiffusionprocessdrawson27inter-
viewswithactivistsandcollegeanduniversityadministrators(licensingdirec-
torsandstudentaffairsvicepresidents).Interviewslastedbetween30and90
minutesandfollowedasemi-structuredprotocol.Interviewswithactivists
focusedontargetandtacticchoices,perceptionsoftheadministration’sdeci-
sionmaking,andtheroleofdifferentcommunicationandinfluencechannelsin
diffusion.Interviewswithadministratorsfocusedonperceptionsofactivism
andtactics,decision-makingstructuresandoutcomes,andcommunication
308 AdministrativeScienceQuarterly60(2015)
channelsacrossschools.Tomaximizevarianceonthetopicsoftheoretical
interest,weselectedadministratorsandactivistsassociatedwithbothadop-
tionandnon-adoptionandwithdifferenttactics.Inaddition,wecollectedand
reviewedover200archivaldocuments,includingcollegeanduniversitypro-
curementpoliciesandannouncements,meetingminutes,campaignmaterials,
supplierpressreleasesandcustomercommunications,andmediastories
relatedtothecampaign.
ResearchContext:CollegiateAnti-sweatshopActivism
TheRein-in-RussellcampaignwasorganizedbyUnitedStudentsAgainst
Sweatshops(USAS)campusactivistsduringthewinterandspringof2009.
Thiscampaignaimedtoconvincelargenumbersofcollegesanduniversitiesto
adoptsuppliersanctionsagainstRussellAthleticbasedonworker-rightsviola-
tionsatitsmanufacturingplantsinHonduras.Thesanctionsconsistedoftermi-
natingapparel-licensingcontractswithRusselluntiltheviolationswere
resolved.Afterninemonths,enoughschoolshadagreedtoadoptsupplier
sanctionsthatRussellagreedtomakechangesadvocatedbyUSAS.Thesuc-
cessofthiscampaignmarkedthefirsttimethatalargenumberofschoolscon-
cededthatviolationsoftheirCSRprocurementstandardsshouldresultin
contractsuspension,asespousedbyactivists—animportantprecedentinthe
viewsofbothactivistsandadministratorsweinterviewed.
USASfocusesonfactoryconditionsforworkerswhomakegarments,
includingsweatshirtsandotherclothingmarketedoncampuseswithuniversity
brandingprintedonthem.Itsspecificconcernsarefactoryconditionsinvolving
longhours,lowwages,andlackofrespectforworkers’basicrighttoorganize.
By2009,USASwasanestablishednationalstudentorganizationwithchapters
on158U.S.universityandcollegecampuses.Foroveradecade,USAScam-
paignstargeteduniversityadministratorswiththegoalofensuringthat
university-brandedapparelwassweatshop-free,throughsuppliercodesofcon-
ductcoupledwithstrongsanctionandenforcementmechanisms(Ross,1997;
BonacichandAppelbaum,2000;Rosen,2002;Esbenshade,2004;Bartleyand
Child,2011).
Withincollegesanduniversities,thetargeteddecisionmakersforUSAS
wererelativelysenioradministrators.Inmostcases,theheadoftheuniver-
sity’slicensingandtrademarkofficewasthepersonresponsiblefordealing
withandremediatinganyallegationsofmisconductfromthelicenseeapparel
firms.Issuescouldoftenescalatetothepresidentorprovost’sofficewhen
externalstakeholders,includingmonitoringgroupsandactivists,foundthenor-
malcourseofremediationtobeunsatisfactory.Mostuniversitylicenseoffices
hadtieswithlicensingfirmssuchastheCollegiateLicensingCorporation,and
manyalsosubscribedtotheprivateregulatorygroupFairLaborAssociation
(FLA)and/ortheindependentWorkerRightsConsortium(WRC),whichmoni-
toredandevaluatedlicensees’conduct.
Inmanyrespects,the2009Rein-in-Russellcampaignresembledearlier
USAScampaigns:USASactivistsclaimedthatuniversitieswereresponsible,
throughtheirprocurementpractices,forensuringthatworkers’rightswere
upheldbytheirapparelsuppliers.Theyarguedthatthesufferingoffactory-
workervictimscouldberemediedifuniversitiesappliedsanctionsonsuppliers
withworkers’rightsviolationsbyterminatingtheircontractswiththose
Briscoe,Gupta,andAnner 309
suppliersuntilthegrievancewasredressed.ThespecificconcernintheRussell
campaigninvolvedtwoRussell-ownedfactoriesinHondurasinwhichlegal
unionizationtoimprovewagesandconditionswasfollowedbymassfirings
andplansforplantclosure(USAS,2011).USASdemandedthatuniversities
adoptsanctionsonRusselluntilthefirmreinstatedworkersandresumedunion
recognition.
Themovement’sdemandforuniversitiestoterminatetheircontractswith
Russellwascontroversialfromadministrators’pointofview.Collegiateapparel
licensingisa$4.5billionindustry,andmanyuniversitiesrelyonaportionofthis
revenuestreamcomingtothemeachyearthroughlicensingagreements
(McCarthy,2011).Collegiateathleticsdriveasignificantportionoftheindustry,
withschool-logoapparelbeingpurchasedbystudents,alumni,andotherfans.
USASconsistentlyframedtheissueasaviolationofworkerandhuman
rightsandthepressingneedforcorporationstoengageinresponsiblebehavior
towardtheiremployees.AtthetimeoftheRein-in-Russellcampaign,although
administratorsendorsedthebroadgoalsofthemovement,theyquestioned
thecredibilityofthemovement’sspecificclaimsandthecorrespondinglegiti-
macyoftheirspecificdemands.Theyraisedquestionsaboutwhetherworkers
werereallysufferingfromcurrentconditionsandwhetherproposedsanctions
andchangesinprocurementpracticeswouldreallyimproveworkers’lives.
OneofthepersistentchallengesforUSASwastoconvinceadministratorsand
othersthatUSASunderstoodandcouldeffectivelyrepresentvictims—i.e.,
poorandvulnerablegarmentworkerslivinginculturallyandgeographicallydis-
tantcountries.
Deploymentofactivisttactics. Inlinewiththeirusualtacticalefforts,
USASactivistsintheRussellcampaignpursueddisruption-basedtacticson
manycampuses,suchassit-ins,demonstrationsshuttingdownadministrative
buildings,andpicketlinesatcampusornear-campusapparelstores.Thesetac-
ticswereaimedatapplyingpressureonuniversityadministratorsbyincurring
costsfortheuniversityorganization;theywerealsointendedtoincreaseatten-
tiontotheanti-sweatshopissueamongstudentsandothercommunitymem-
bers.Notsurprisingly,thesedisruptivetacticswerenotreceivedwellby
universityadministrators.Thefollowingcommentisrepresentativeof
responsesamongtheadministratorsweinterviewed:
[With]moreaggressiveformsofactivism,wearenotgoingtoreactinthewayyou
wantustoreact,becausewearejustnotgoingtoencouragethatsortofbehavior—
andconcedingtodemandswillbeencouragingthatsortofbehavior.Soitisless
abouttheissueinvolved—lessaboutRussellandwhatishappeningwithworkers
aroundtheglobe—thanitisaboutthetacticitselfandhowwedon’twanttoencour-
ageotherswhomaybeactiveonsomeotherfrontstousethattactic.Wededicate
resourcestoaddressit,wearegoingtocutitoffatthebeginning.Wearegoingto
makeastatementaboutwhatourexpectationsare,abouthowwewanttointeract.
Aspartofthecampaign,USASalsoincorporatedanon-disruptiveevidence-
basedtacticintheformofworker-testimonialvisitstoseveralcampuses:
USASbroughtaggrievedworkers—individualswhocouldlegitimatelyexpress
thegrievanceasafunctionoftheirownpersonalexperience—intodirectcon-
tactwithmembersoftheorganizationalcommunitywhosepracticestheywere