Smart Grid Security

138 Pages·2015·1.397 MB·English

by  Sanjay Goel, Yuan Hong, Vagelis Papakonstantinou, Dariusz Kloza (auth.)

SPRINGER BRIEFS IN CYBERSECURITY
Sanjay Goel
Yuan Hong
Vagelis Papakonstantinou
Dariusz Kloza
Smart Grid
Security
SpringerBriefs in Cybersecurity
Editor-in-chief
Sandro Gaycken, ESMT European School of Management and Technology,
Germany
Editorial Board
Sylvia Kierkegaard, International Association of IT Lawyers, Denmark
John Mallery, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, USA
Steven J. Murdoch, University of Cambridge, UK
Cybersecurity is a difficult and complex field. The technical, political and legal
questions surrounding it are complicated, often stretching a spectrum of diverse
technologies, varying legal bodies, different political ideas and responsibilities.
Cybersecurity is intrinsically interdisciplinary, and most activities in one field
immediatelyaffecttheothers.Technologiesandtechniques,strategiesandtactics,
motives and ideologies, rules and laws, institutions and industries, power and
money—allofthesetopicshavearoletoplayincybersecurity,andalloftheseare
tightly interwoven.
TheSpringerBriefsinCybersecurityseriesiscomprisedoftwotypesofbriefs:
topic- and country-specific briefs. Topic-specific briefs strive to provide a
comprehensive coverage of the whole range of topics surrounding cybersecurity,
combining whenever possible legal, ethical, social, political and technical issues.
Authors with diverse backgrounds explain their motivation, their mindset, and
their approach to the topic, to illuminate its theoretical foundations, the practical
nuts and bolts and its past, present and future. Country-specific briefs cover
national perceptions and strategies, with officials and national authorities
explaining the background, the leading thoughts and interests behind the official
statements, to foster a more informed international dialogue.
More information about this series at http://www.springer.com/series/10634
Sanjay Goel Yuan Hong
(cid:129) (cid:129)
Vagelis Papakonstantinou
(cid:129)
Dariusz Kloza
Smart Grid Security
123
SanjayGoel Vagelis Papakonstantinou
Department Information Technology Research GrouponLaw, Science,
Management Technology&Society (LSTS)
UniversityatAlbany Vrije Universiteit Brussel
Albany,NY Brussels
USA Belgium
YuanHong Dariusz Kloza
Department of InformationTechnology Research GrouponLaw, Science,
Management Technology&Society (LSTS)
UniversityatAlbany Vrije Universiteit Brussel
Albany,NY Brussels
USA Belgium
ISSN 2193-973X ISSN 2193-9748 (electronic)
SpringerBriefs inCybersecurity
ISBN 978-1-4471-6662-7 ISBN 978-1-4471-6663-4 (eBook)
DOI 10.1007/978-1-4471-6663-4
LibraryofCongressControlNumber:2015932438
SpringerLondonHeidelbergNewYorkDordrecht
©TheAuthor(s)2015
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Foreword
Anirrevocableprocesshasbeensetintomotion:Theworldisgrowingsmart.Every
kind of technology is presently reconsidered as transformable into an intelligent,
sensory and communicative, networked device. There are many good reasons for
thisreconsideration.Ashasbeenseeninthepast,suchtransformationshavemany
benefits. Technological processes can be of higher density, better synchronized, of
higher efficiency, less prone to human error, they can offer more functionally and
quite generally become more profitable. In sum, many stakeholders emerge to
design such technologies and initiate a market for products.
But as ever so often with technology in general and information technology in
particular, there are risks and side effects. In this current paradigm of “smartifica-
tion”ofourpreviously“dumb”technologies,therisksofthoseoldtechnologiesare
confronted with and infiltrated by the functionalities and risks of the new tech-
nologies.Thisfusionchallengesmanyinitialassumptionsandestablishedconcepts
forsafetyandsecurityinnovelways.Oldriskssuchasphysicaldamagesofmany
of our old technologies, previously forged into acceptable states by electrome-
chanical safety concepts, may reemerge in different shapes and sizes when chips
and logic replace single switches and valves, and when the net is slowly creeping
in. A smart car or a smart factory may be more efficient and more transparent to
someextent,butitwillalsobemoreopentooutsiders,moreaccessible,itmightbe
more prone to unwanted complex developments, as any kind of IT always adds
tremendous complexity, and it will most certainly require much more attention,
moremaintenanceandmoreexpertise.Also,entirelynewrisksmaycomeup,such
asprivacyconcernssimplybydrivingacarorheatingthehouse,giventhefactthat
“smart” technologies generate data—which can be information about people to
some extent.
Accordingly, this new fusion of old technologies and new ones requires fore-
sight and wisdom. It may in fact already be a little to late to call for that. The
engineers and industries have started these paradigms a long time ago, and
approachimplementationandsalesfastnow.Toomuchmoneyandefforthasbeen
spent to pause and reconsider everything. This, by the way, is a very classical
v
vi Foreword
problemoftechnologyresearch.Aslongasatechnologyisinitsinfancy,itsactual
impact and its use models cannot be predicted with high certainty, so its risks and
side effects are difficult to pinpoint. The technology researcher can only guess and
hypothesize, which in turn renders much of her effort into an ivory tower per-
spective.Onlyoncetechnologiesreachafirststageofmaturity,withusemodelsin
actualimplementation,moreprecise,correctandrelevantassumptionscanbemade.
But then, too much money has been spent and too many paradigms are in imple-
mentation already to return to the drafting board and start over on some funda-
mentals.Atthatpoint,technicalandeconomicalpathdependenciesareestablished.
They can be reformed, to be sure. The widely known saying that you cannot stop
progress is a little imprecise to this end. Progress at large may be unstoppable
for many reasons. But any particular progress can always be shaped and directed,
evenreconsideredandrevokedentirely,ifitsbenefitsarenotnearlyinlinewithits
risks—especially as long as it is not too established yet.
Smart technologies, fortunately, are still comparatively young and could be
viewedwithakindof“designoptimism”.Theyaredangerous,tobesure,riskyand
difficult, as two highly complex types of technologies are melted into each other,
with a lot of difficult scenarios emerging. But they should also be considered
malleable and even an opportunity. Any fresh start in innovation is also a chance
to do things better this time. Information technology is so incredibly bad in its
security,soopentosabotageandespionage,tosurveillanceandmanipulationthata
reform within an environment with much higher concerns in safety and security
could force it to return to some of its fundamental issues and try harder.
A precondition for such an effort is a thorough understanding and a good and
causally well-defined structuring of the problems and their roots. They have to be
intelligible in their technical, economic, legal and societal dimensions, so options
andopportunities canbe developed andrecommendedfor implementation.To this
end, the whole process of “smartification” still requires a lot more literature,
especiallyinterdisciplinarywritings,connectingthetechnicalandthehumanworld
and reflecting the possible realities of smart worlds.
This SpringerBrief aims to fill this gap in the important field of smart power.
Smartpower(alsocalled“smartgrids”)isafirstlargertechnicalareaunderreform
by networked information technology. It is already in application and implemen-
tation and can be assessed in its processes and regulations, its technicalities and
risks.
Theauthorsofthisbriefhavedoneanexcellentandoutstandingjobilluminating
this new field and explaining the risks and benefits, the conditions and opportu-
nities, causalities and first actors of this field. As a result of their great work, this
briefwillserveasanexcellentguide—atruebriefing—notjusttosmartpower,but
to the whole emerging smart world and its core topics.
ESMT Berlin, January 2015 Dr. Sandro Gaycken
Contents
1 Security Challenges in Smart Grid Implementation . . . . . . . . . . . 1
Sanjay Goel and Yuan Hong
1.1 Smart Grid Architecture. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1
1.1.1 Introduction. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1
1.1.2 Communication Technologies. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
1.1.3 Sensors and Devices. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
1.2 Smart Grid Security Concerns and Threats. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
1.2.1 Reported Attacks on Electric Grids. . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
1.2.2 Security Concerns. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
1.2.3 Impact of Threats on Smart Grid . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
1.3 Ensuring Security in Smart Grids . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
1.3.1 Standards and Architectures. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
1.3.2 Sensors and Devices. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
1.3.3 Network Security Threats. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
1.4 Mitigating Cyber-Physical Threats. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
1.4.1 Risks at Cyber-Physical Interface . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
1.4.2 Mitigating Cyber-Physical Threats. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18
1.5 Mitigating Smart Meter Threats . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19
1.5.1 Threats and Vulnerabilities in Meter Infrastructure . . . 19
1.5.2 Security Breach on Smart Meter. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21
1.6 Mitigating Data Manipulation Threats . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22
1.6.1 Introduction. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22
1.6.2 Resolving Data Integrity Violation in State
Estimation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23
1.6.3 Resolving Other Data Manipulation Threats. . . . . . . . 26
1.7 Mitigating Privacy Threats. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 28
1.7.1 Introduction. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 28
1.7.2 Privacy Threats in Smart Grid Infrastructure. . . . . . . . 29
vii
viii Contents
1.7.3 Privacy Laws w.r.t. Smart Grid. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 31
1.7.4 Embedding Privacy Protection into the Design
and Implementation of “Smart Grid”. . . . . . . . . . . . . 32
References. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 36
2 Legal Protection of Personal Data in Smart Grid and Smart
Metering Systems from the European Perspective . . . . . . . . . . . . 41
Vagelis Papakonstantinou and Dariusz Kloza
2.1 Introduction. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 41
2.2 The Rationale and Modus Operandi for the EU Action
Concerning Smart Grid and Smart Metering Systems . . . . . . . 43
2.3 The EU Regulatory Framework for Smart Grid
and Smart Metering Systems . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 46
2.3.1 The Legally Binding Framework . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 46
2.3.2 The Non-binding Framework . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 53
2.4 Actors in the Field of Energy Regulation in the EU . . . . . . . . 58
2.4.1 European Commission—Directorate-General
for Energy (DG ENER). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 58
2.4.2 Smart Grids Task Force (SGTF). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 59
2.4.3 Agency for the Cooperation of Energy Regulators
(ACER). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 59
2.4.4 National Regulatory Authorities in the EU/EEA . . . . . 60
2.4.5 Selected European Organizations and Associations
of Industry. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 62
2.4.6 Selected European Standardization Bodies. . . . . . . . . 63
2.5 Legal Framework for Personal Data Protection in the EU . . . . 63
2.5.1 Context and Background of the Data Protection
Law in Europe. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 63
2.5.2 Basic Data Protection Terminology. . . . . . . . . . . . . . 67
2.5.3 Data Protection Principles . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 67
2.5.4 The Rights of the Individuals with Regard
to Processing Their Personal Data. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 70
2.5.5 The Reform of the EU Data Protection Framework. . . 71
2.6 The Interaction of Smart Grid and Smart Metering
Systems with Data Protection Law . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 73
2.6.1 Application of the Data Protection Law
for Smart Grid and Smart Metering Systems . . . . . . . 73
2.6.2 Distinction Between Data Processors and Data
Controllers. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 74
2.6.3 The Purpose Limitation Principle . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 76
2.6.4 Data Storage . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 77
2.6.5 Fair and Lawful Processing of Personal
Information . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 77
Contents ix
2.6.6 The Principle of Proportionality . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 77
2.6.7 Data Quality. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 78
2.6.8 Monitoring and Oversight of Smart Grid
Data Controllers. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 78
2.6.9 The Scope and Exercise of the Data Subject’s
Rights. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 79
2.6.10 Legal Basis for Processing—Subscribers’ Consent . . . 83
2.6.11 Security and Confidentiality of Data Processing . . . . . 84
2.7 The Non-binding EU Regulatory Framework for Personal
Data Protection in Smart Grid and Smart Metering Systems. . . 86
2.7.1 Opinions and Recommendations. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 86
2.7.2 Data Protection Impact Assessment Template
for Smart Grid and Smart Metering Systems . . . . . . . 101
2.8 Tools for the Protection of Privacy and Personal Data. . . . . . . 107
2.8.1 Privacy by Default . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 107
2.8.2 Privacy by Design (PbD). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 108
2.8.3 Privacy Enhancing Technologies (PET). . . . . . . . . . . 110
2.8.4 Transparency Enhancing Tools (TET) . . . . . . . . . . . . 111
2.8.5 Privacy Impact Assessment (PIA). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 112
2.8.6 Legal Protection by Design (LPbD). . . . . . . . . . . . . . 114
2.8.7 Privacy Certification . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 114
2.8.8 Overview of Applicable Privacy-Friendly
Algorithms for Smart Metering. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 116
2.8.9 Going Beyond Mere Privacy: Technology
Assessment (TA) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 121
2.9 Consumer Empowerment. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 122
2.10 Case Studies . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 124
2.10.1 The Netherlands. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 124
2.10.2 The United Kingdom . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 126
2.11 Observations: Key Points. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 126
References. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 127