Small Unit Operations in Afghanistan Handbook: Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures - No 09-37

132 Pages·2009·3.706 MB·English

by  Mark Osterholm

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SMALL-UNITOPSINAFGHANISTANHANDBOOK
Foreword
ThishandbookwillassistSoldiersandsmall-unitleadersinpreparingforthe
difficultiesandchallengestheywillfacewhendeployedtoAfghanistanaspartof
OperationEnduringFreedom(OEF).Thehandbookspecificallyaddressesthe
uniquegeographicandculturalaspectssmallunitscanexpecttoencounterinthe
Afghantheaterofoperations.WhilecurrentU.S.formationshavebeensuccessfully
conductingcounterinsurgencyoperationsinIraq,theinfrastructure,terrain,culture,
andenemyareverydifferentinOEF.OperationsinmanypartsoftheAfghan
theaterarestillheavilyweightedinfavorofdirectlethalengagementsagainsta
hardenedanddeterminedenemyforce.
TheaverageenemyfighterinAfghanistanhasbeenfightingcontinuouslyforthe
last30years.Asanation,thepeopleofAfghanistanhavebeenfightingfor
thousandsofyears.Itshouldcomeasnosurprisethattheenemyhasdeveloped
veryeffectivetactics,techniques,andprocedurestocombatatechnologically
superiorenemythatreliesheavilyonvehiclesfortransportandsupply.Thisenemy
hasrepeatedlydemonstratedanadvancedunderstandingofU.S.tacticsandwill
exploitanymistakewithcatastrophicresults.
Keyconceptscoveredinthispublicationinclude:
(cid:129) Commandandcontrol
(cid:129) Soldierstaminaandfitness
(cid:129) Marksmanship
(cid:129) Medicalandcasualtyevacuation
(cid:129) Mountedanddismountedbattledrills
(cid:129) Protection
(cid:129) Interpreters
MichaelD.Barbero
MajorGeneral,USA
Commanding
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SMALL-UNITOPSINAFGHANISTANHANDBOOK
Small-Unit Operations in Afghanistan
TableofContents
Introduction 1
Chapter 1. Command and Control 5
Chapter 2. Individual Physical Fitness 33
Chapter 3. Marksmanship and Weapons Training 47
Chapter 4. First Responder Medical Training and Casualty
53
Evacuation
Chapter 5. Employment of Joint Fires, Organic Fires, and Close
65
Combat Attack
Chapter 6. Small-Unit Mounted and Dismounted Drills 77
Chapter 7. Protection 91
Chapter 8. Cultural Engagements 109
Center for Army Lessons Learned
Director Colonel Robert W. Forrester
Managing Editor George J. Mordica II
CALL Analyst Brice H. Johnson
Editor Kristine Bell
Graphic Artist Dan Neal
Distribution Manager Candice Miller
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SMALL-UNITOPSINAFGHANISTANHANDBOOK
Acknowledgments
ArmyPhysicalFitnessResearchInstitute,U.S.ArmyWarCollege.
ArmyTrainingandEvaluationProgram7-8Drill,“BattleDrillsfortheInfantry
RiflePlatoonandSquad,”Jun2002.
MartyBanks,AnthonyHoh,VinceLowery,ChipMezzaline,andRussellSwitzer,
“PreCombatInspections(PCIs)OrYouCan’tShootWhatYouDon’tHave,But
YouMightGetShotWishingYouDid!”CenterforArmyLessonsLearned
(CALL),NewsfromtheFront,May-Jun2004.
CALLCombatTrainingCenterQuarterlyBulletin08-22,BriceH.Johnson,“The
BestofBothWorlds:PickingTasksthatBridgetheGap,”Aug2008.
CALLHandbook05-11,RangerTactics,Techniques,andProcedures,Feb2005.
CALLHandbook05-24,ForwardOperatingBase,Jul2005.
CALLHandbook07-19,BaseDefense,Mar2007.
RobertD.Clements,“TheDesignatedMarksmanEquation,” InfantryMagazine,
Sep-Oct2008.
Commander’sHandbookforSecurityForceAssistance,JointCenterfor
InternationalSecurityForceAssistance,Leavenworth,KS,Jul2008.
“EnemyTactics,Techniques,andProceduresandAfterActionReview,”Force
ReconnaissancePlatoon,SpecialMarineAir/GroundTaskForce,Afghanistan.
FieldManual3-20.98, ReconnaissancePlatoon,Dec2002.
FM3-21.20(7-20), TheInfantryBattalion,Dec2006.
FM3-21.8, TheInfantryRiflePlatoonandSquad,Mar2007.
FM3-21.9, TheSBCTInfantryRiflePlatoonandSquad,Dec2002.
FM6-30, Tactics,Techniques,andProceduresforObservedFire,Jul1991.
FM7-7J, MechanizedInfantryPlatoonandSquad(Bradley), May1993.
FM7-8, InfantryRiflePlatoonandSquad,Apr1992.
PatrickGarret,“PlatoonCasualtyCollectionPoint/CasualtyEvacuationProcedures,
CALL,NewsfromtheFront,Jul-Aug2003.
KellyW.IvanoffandDanielA,Pinnell.“ForwardObserverBattleDrills—the
TimeIsNow––JointReadinessTrainingCenter,” FieldArtilleryJournal,Mar-Apr
2003.
JointFiresIntegrationandInteroperabilityTeam(JFIIT), TacticalLeaders’
Handbook,JFIIT,Nov2008(Version5).
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AndrewJ.Knight,“TacticalIOinAfghanistan—WhattheFSONeedstoKnow
(InformationOperations,FireSupportOfficers),” Fires,May2007.
NateKrick,“CulturalPreparationoftheEnvironment,”MarineCorpsIntelligence
School.
DavidLiwanag,“SmallUnitLeaderDMNotes,” InfantryMagazine,Jan-Feb2007.
JosephPaschall,“IOforJOE:ApplyingStrategicIOattheTacticalLevel,” Field
Artillery,Jul-Aug2005.
RobertW.Stanley,MasterofScience,CertifiedStrengthandConditioning
Specialist,HealthFitnessSpecialist,ExercisePhysiologist.
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Introduction
Thepurposeofthishandbookistoassistsmall-unitleadersandSoldiersasthey
preparetodeploytoandconductactualoperationsinAfghanistan.Theseoperations
aredifferentfromoperationsinIraqinseveralways.Soldiersandsmall-unit
leaderswillfaceuniquedifficultiesandchallengeswhenoperatinginthevery
distinctanddisparateprovincesofAfghanistan.Theaverageenemyfighterin
Afghanistanhasbeenfightingcontinuouslyforthelast30years.Asanation,the
peopleofAfghanistanhavebeenfightingforthousandsofyears.Itshouldcomeas
nosurprisethattheenemyhasdevelopedveryeffectivetactics,techniques,and
procedures(TTP)tocombatatechnologicallysuperiorenemythatrelieson
armoredvehiclesandhelicoptersfortransportandlogisticalsupport.Thesituation
isfurtherexacerbatedbyseparateanddistinctethnicgroups,highratesofilliteracy,
micro-societieswithuniquelanguagesandcultures,andtribal/warlordallegiances
thathavenodirectlinkstonationalpoliciesorinternationalagreements.Eachsmall
unitanditsleadersmustbepreparedtoconductoperationsuniquetoitsassigned
missionandareaofoperations(AO).
Ananalysisofcommentsandinsightsfromsmall-unitleaderswhohaveservedin
OperationEnduringFreedomconsistentlyhighlightsseveralareasofemphasisand
twocentralandrecurringthemes.Theareasofemphasisincludecommandand
control(C2),Soldierphysicalfitness,marksmanship,front-linemedicalprocedures,
integrationandemploymentoffiresandjointfires,mountedanddismountedbattle
drills,protection,andengagement.Thecentralandrecurringthemesinsmall-unit
operationsinAfghanistanaresimple.Unitsandleadersmustgetbacktothebasics;
basicdoctrinalfundamentalsmustbeappliedtoalloperations,andstandardsmust
berigidlyenforced.
Soldiersandsmall-unitleadersmustbepreparedtoprovideeffectiveC2.Atthe
small-unitlevel,leadersmustthoroughly,deliberately,andpreciselyplanand
rehearseC2proceduresandsystemstheywillemploy.Duetogreatdistances,
ruggedandvariableterrain,andextremealtitudesandweather,C2mustbe
proactive,reliable,andredundant.Small-unitleadersmustestablish,conduct,and
enforcedetailedtroop-leadingproceduresandprecombatchecksandinspectionsof
personnelandequipmentpriortoeverymission.
EverySoldierandleadermustbephysicallyfitandmentallytough.Theextremes
ofoperatinginAfghanistan(theclimate,terrain,combattasks,andstress)demand
evengreateremphasisonbeinginthebestphysicalshapepossible.Soldiersingood
shapearebetterabletohandlethefatigueandstressbroughtonbytherigorsof
dailytasks.FatigueisalsoamajorreasonSoldiersbecomecomplacentinacombat
zone;complacencysignificantlyincreasesaSoldier’sriskofbecomingacasualty.
Leaderscannotfunctioneffectivelyiftheyarenotphysicallyreadyto“keepup”
withtheirSoldiers.
SmallunitsoperatingintheAfghantheatercontinuetostresstheimportanceof
individualmarksmanshipskills. EverySoldier,regardlessofrankordutyposition,
mustbeabletoplacewell-aimed,sustained,effective,andlethalfiresusinghis
individualweaponoranyindividualorcrew-servedweaponassignedtotheunit.
ManysmallunitsareidentifyingandtrainingSoldiersaslong-rangeor
squad-designatedmarksmen.Finally,becauseofthepossibilityofengagingthe
enemyinvillagesorotherdevelopedareas,unitsmustbepreparedtoconduct
close-quartersmarksmanshipandreflexivefire.
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Small-unitleadersinAfghanistanwillberequiredtoemployseveralmedical
treatmentassetsandoptions.Leadersmustknowwhatassetsareavailable,what
trainingandequipmentisrequired,andhowtoplanforandintegratetheseassets
intoallmissionsandoperations.AsmanySoldiersaspossiblemustbequalifiedas
combatlifesaversor,ifpossible,emergencymedicaltechnicians.Immediate
medicalattentionsaveslivesandpreservescombatpower.Theterrainanddistances
involvedinsmall-unitoperationsinAfghanistancancomplicateandprotract
medicalevacuation(MEDEVAC).Smallunitsmustbeskilledincasualtycareto
compensateforthepossiblelongertimeperiodsbetweentherequestforandthe
arrivalofMEDEVACassets.Additionally,allSoldiersmustunderstandandbe
preparedtoconductbothcasualtyevacuationsandMEDEVACstoincludecalling
foraircraft.
SmallunitsconductingcombatoperationsinAfghanistanfaceuniquechallengesin
theareaoffires.Thevariedandruggedgeographycombinedwiththeverylimited
andcircuitousgroundtransportationnetworkandextremelyexperiencedand
adaptiveenemynecessitatethedispersionofsmallunitsoverlargeareas.Thesame
conditionsthatnecessitatethisdispersionmakeprotectionofthedispersedunits
difficult.Weatherandterraincannegativelyinfluencequickreactionforcesfires,
aerialfires,andairresupply.Thedecentralizedanddispersednatureofongoing
operationsmakestheemploymentoffiresacriticalcomponentthatsmallunits
mustcarefullyplan,integrate,rehearse,andexecuteinalloperations.
InAfghanistan,smallunitsaresubjecttoalmostconstantcontactandengagement
withhostileforces.Whetherconductingoperationsfromaforwardoperationsbase,
acombatoutpost,ajointsecuritystation,avillageorurbanarea,orwhilemoving,
thesmallunitmustbepreparedandreadytoencounter,engage,defeat,ordestroy
hostileforces.Therefore,smallunitsmustdevelopstandingoperatingproceduresor
battledrillsforbothmountedanddismountedengagementswiththeenemy.Units
mustbeabletoreacttohostilefire,ambushes,andimprovisedexplosivedevices
(IEDs)frombothmountedanddismountedformations.Additionally,dueto
possibleengagementsinvillagesanddevelopedareas,smallunitsmustbeableto
conductclose-quarterscombatandroom-clearingdrillsasnecessary.
Enhancedtacticalprotectionisanabsolutenecessitytoconserveandprotect
Soldiers,operationsbases,andequipment.Theenormousstrainthatemerging
securityrequirementsareplacingonavailableforcesmakesitimperativethat
small-unitleadersunderstandprotectionasitappliesatthetacticalleveland
leverageavailabletechnologiestoenhanceprotection.Leadersmustunderstandand
incorporatethefundamentalsofprotectionintoallstaticandmovingoperations.All
unitsmustbeproficientinthefundamentalsofpatrolling.Aterrainandhistorical
analysisofeachAOwillincreaseprotection,astheenemyoftenusesthesame
locationsandtacticsforrepetitiveambushandIEDattacks.
Small-unitleadersmustweighandunderstandkeyprinciplesinplanningand
conductingengagements.Keyconceptsincludeunderstandingtherelationship
betweenthepatrolandthecommander’spriorityintelligencerequirements,talking
points,interpreteruse,andstayingintheunit’sandleader’slane.Small-unit
commandersandleadersinanengagementareoftentheonesmostinneedof
interpreters,buttheyoftendonotknowhowtousethemeffectively.
Thecentral,recurringthemesofgettingbacktobasicsandenforcingstandardsare
criticaltosmall-unitmissionsuccessesinAfghanistan.Thishandbookis
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