Small States and Alliances PDF
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Small States and Alliances Erich Reiter· Heinz Gartner (Editors) Small States and Alliances With 18 Figures Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg GmbH DDr. Erich Reiter Militărwissenschaftliches Buro des Bundesministeriums fUr Landesverteidigung Stiftgasse 2 a 1070 Vienna Austria E-mail: [email protected] Dr. Heinz Gărtner Osterreichisches Institut fUr Internationale Politik Operngasse 20 B 1040 Vienna Austria E-mail: [email protected] The publication of this book was made possible by a generous contribution from the Austrian Ministry of Defence / Institute for Military Studies. ISBN 978-3-7908-2492-6 Cataloging-in-Publication Data applied for Die Deutschen Bibliothek - CIP-Einheitsaufnahme Small states and alliances / Erich Reiter; Heinz Giirtner (ed.). ISBN 978-3-7908-2492-6 ISBN 978-3-662-13000-1 (eBook) DOI 10.1007/978-3-662-13000-1 This work is subject to copyright. 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Violations are liable for prosecution under tlie German Copyright Law. © Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2001 OriginaIly published by Physica-Verlag Heidelberg New York in 2001 Softcover reprint of the hardcover l st edition 200 l The use of general descriptive names, registered names, trademarks, etc. in this publication does not imply, even in the absence of a specific statement, that such names are exempt /Tom the relevant protective laws and regulations and therefore free for general use. Cover design; Erich Kirchner, Heidelberg SPIN 10835685 88/2202-5 4 3 2 1 O - Printed on acid-free paper Table of Contents Small States and Alliances. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .1 Heinz Gärtner Introductory Comments on the Objective of the Small States and Alliances Workshop. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .11 Erich Reiter Minor Powers, Alliances, and Armed Conflict: Some Preliminary Patterns . . .15 Volker Krause, J. David Singer The Concept of Military Alliance. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .25 Stefan Bergsmann Small States and European Security. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 39 Simon W. Duke Gaining Control . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 51 Christian Tuschhoff Engineering Influence: The Subtile Power of Small States in the CSCE/OSCE .63 Micheal W. Mosser Small States and International Operations. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 85 Erwin A. Schmidl The Danish Experience. Denmark in NATO, 1949–1999 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .89 Svend Aage Christensen Small States and Alliances – A Swedish Perspective . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .101 Gunnar Lassinantti Finland, the European Union and NATO – Implications for Security and Defence. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .113 Kari Möttöla Small States and Alliances: The Case of Slovenia . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .145 Anton Grizold, Vinko Vegiè Switzerland and Europe’s Security Architecture: The Rocky Road from Isolation to Cooperation. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .161 Heiko Borchert Austria. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .183 Heinz Gärtner, Otmar Höll Small States and Alliances Heinz Gärtner Introduction ThearticlesinthisvolumearetheresultofaworkshopinViennainNovember 1999.TheworkshopwasorganizedbytheAustrianInstituteforInternationalAf- fairs,theInstituteforMilitaryStudies,theAustrianDefenseAcademy,theDepart- mentforPoliticalScienceandtheUniversityofVienna.Thepapersarebasedon the following questions and arguments. The Cold War system was based on the concept of ”balance of power.” For HansMorgenthaualliancesarethe”mostimportantmanifestationofthebalance ofpower.”Inthisobservationmembersofallianceshavecommoninterestsbased onthefearofotherstates.StephenWalthassincemodifiedthisconcept.Forhim alliancesaretheresultofa”balanceofthreat.”Intheoldsystemtheexistenceof alliances and a potential threat were inseparable. Since1989,thepoliticallandscapeofEuropelooksquitedifferent.Themain threatonwhichthebalanceofpoweroftheColdWarwasbasedhasfadedaway. According to some analysts, alliances can hardly survive without a sufficient threat. Consequently, they concluded: ”NATO’s days are not numbered but its yearsare.”SevenyearsaftertheendoftheColdWar,NATOshowsnosignsofde- mise,however.Inthisrespect,thepredictionthatallianceswouldweakenwithout threatappearstobewrong.NATOlookslikeitwillbeanexceptiontotheserules and cornerstones of alliance theory. Thereisnosmallamountofallianceliteratureonthequestions:Whydostates formalliances?Whendotheyformalliances?Whatsizewillthealliancebewhenit isformed?Statisticallyorientedresearchtestedthecorrelationbetweenalliance commitmentsandinvolvementinwar.AftertheendoftheColdWar,thefocus shifted.Now,theliteratureonalliancestriestoexplorethequestions:Whydoalli- ancesdissolve?Whataretheforcesoreventsthatleadstatestoabandonsecurity tiesthattheyoncewelcomed?Whydosomealliancespersistinthefaceofsuch strains?Whydosomealliancessurviveevenaftertheiroriginalrationalehasevap- orated? Another interesting part of the alliance literature, however, relates to small states. It is on why, how, and under what conditions states engage in alliances. Whatarethebenefitsandcostsofalliance?Howarethebenefitsandcostsofalli- ancesallocatedamongtheirmembers?Whatdetermineswhoallieswithwhom? Cansmallstatesstillpursuetheirownsecurityinterestswithinanalliance?Can they even become an integral part of an alliance? 2 Heinz Gärtner In particular for small states, the decision to join alliances depends on the judgementwhethertheoverallbenefitsofdoingsoaregreaterthanthecosts.Does theperceivedthreatwarrantthecosts?Doestheincreasedsecurityresultingfrom thepartner’scommitmentoutweighthelossofautonomysacrificedinthecom- mitmenttothepartner?Underwhatconditionsandwhendoesasmallstateneed theenhanceddeterrenceofattackonitselfandtheenhanceddefensecapability?Is itpreparedtoaccepttheriskofhavingtocometotheaidoftheally,whenone wouldhavepreferrednottodosointheabsenceofcommitment?Andmember- ships, of course, do cost money that could arguably be better spent elsewhere. Whatarethealliance’sbenefitsforsmallstatesaftertheendoftheEast-Westcon- flict? Alliancescanbedefinedasformalassociationsofstatesboundbythemutual commitmenttousemilitaryforceagainstnon-memberstatestodefendmember states’ integrity. Alliances call for the commitment of all participating states to takeeffectiveandcoercivemeasures,inparticulartheuseofmilitaryforce,against anaggressor.Cansmallstatesbeconfidentthatthesystemwouldcometotheiraid intheeventualityofaggressionfromoutsidethealliance?Otherstatesinthesys- tem,inparticularthegreatpowers,mightnotconsiderthethreattoasmallstateor acivilwarasathreatworthyofcollectiveaction.Ontheotherhand,smallstates mightfindthemselvesobligatedtoparticipateinaconflictinwhichtheyhadno direct interest; this risk has been called ”entrapment”, the logical opposite of ”abandonment”. Aretheseanxieties–thatsmallstatescouldbedrawnunwillinglyintothewars ofbigstates–reasonable?Theresultsofempiricalresearcharemixed.Ontheone hand,datashowthattheonsetofwarisunrelatedtoallianceformationandcon- figuration.Ontheotherhand,themagnitude,duration,andseverityofwarare substantivelyconnectedtoallianceconfiguration,forthereasonthatwarspreads throughalliances.Alliancesturnsmallwarsintobigwars.Aresmallstatesdragged intothewarsofbigpowersoraretheyprotectedbybigpowers?Smallstatesare thusalwayscaughtinthetrapofbeing”entrapped”or”abandoned”.Thegreater one’sdependenceontheallianceandthestrongerone’scommitmenttotheally, thehighertheriskofentrapment.Theloosertheties,thelargertheriskofbeing abandonedinthecaseofwar.Onestrategytoescapethistrapinhistoryhasbeen to adopt ”neutrality” or ”hide.” Traditionalmilitaryalliances,asdefinedabove,havelosttheirmeaningafter theendoftheEast-Westconflict.HowcanNATOendureintheabsenceofaseri- ousopponent?NATOischanging.NATOisredevelopingitsstructure.Itwilldo both, include former members of the Warsaw Treaty organization and develop strongcooperationwithRussia.Mostimportantofall,thecoreoftheColdWar NATO, (nuclear) deterrence and collective defense (enshrined in Art. V of the WashingtonTreaty)isbecominglessandlessimportant.Thisconceptdefinesthe primarypurposeoftheallianceasdefenseofNATOterritoryagainstamajorat- tack. NATO’s activities are therefore less concentrated on collective defense. NATOwillnotfocusonasinglemission–collectivedefense–anymore,asitdid Small States and Alliances 3 duringtheColdWar.Nolongerpreparingonlyorprimarilyforacoalitionwaron itsagenda,itnowfocusesoncrisismanagement,peacekeeping,humanitarianac- tion,andalsopeaceenforcement.The”newNATO”looksandactsinpartquite differentlyfromtheoldNATO.ThePartnershipforPeace(PfP)programhasal- readybeendesignedaccordingtothenewrequirements.CooperationofthePart- nerswithNATOcanbeorganizedonanindividuallevelthroughpeace-keeping exercises, military-to-military contacts, and similar activities. The new Euro-AtlanticPartnershipCouncil(EAPC)providesamechanismforproductive consultation and more meaningful communication among Partners and in- creaseddecision-makingopportunitiesforpartnersrelatingtoactivitiesinwhich theyparticipate.IsthissufficientforthesecurityneedsaftertheendoftheCold War?Howmuchinfluencedosmallstateshavewithinthealliance,andonwhatis- sues?Whataretheadvantagesofstayingoutside,whatarethoseofbeingamem- ber? Some of the small states of Europe look to NATO as the primary mili- tary-securityalliance,althoughwithvariousdegreesofenthusiasm.Themosten- thusiastic small state supporters of NATO are former members of the Warsaw Treaty Organization, seeking full membership not only for the security NATO would provide but to demonstrate their full membership in post-Cold War Eu- rope.SomesmallstatesinNATOaremoreenthusiasticabouttheprospectsfora EuropeansecurityorganizationintheframeworkoftheEUthanothers.Thestates notparticipatinginanalliance(Sweden,AustriaandFinland)arewaryoflinking themselvestoocloselytotheAlliance,findingthesecuritypostureoftheEUmore acceptable.ThePfPprogramalsodevelopedapowerfulalternativeforthosesmall states that do not want to or cannot join NATO. Scholars,practitioners,policy-makersandadvisorsfromseveralcountrieswill beinvitedtodiscusstheseissues.Theywilladdresshistorical,empirical,andtheo- retical topics. They will also be asked to give policy recommendations. ThepurposeofDavidSinger’sandVolkerKrause’sarticleistoreviewresearch onformalalliances,withafocusonalliancepoliciesofso-called”minorpowers,” oftenalsoreferredtoas”smallstates.”Specifically,theyaddressthefollowingtwo questions:First,whataresomesourcesofminor-poweralliancecommitments? Or, what are some benefits minor powers can expect from formal alliance ties? Second, what are some consequences of minor-power alliance commitments in termsofarmedconflict?Or,areminorpowerswithformalallianceconnections moreorlesslikelythanthosewithoutsuchbondstobecomeinvolvedinmilita- rizeddisputesandwars?Theauthorsarguethatminorpowers,giventheirrather limitedcapabilities,mayhaveastronginterestinalliancecommitmentsnotonly toenhancetheirmilitarysecuritybutalsotoobtainavarietyofnon-militarybene- fits,suchasincreasedtradeorsupportfordomesticpoliticalregimes.Oneofthe problemswithalliancebondsis,however,thatalliedsupportoftenrequiresminor powerstomakesignificantautonomyconcessions,allowingallies,mostnotably major-power allies, to gain influence over their minor-power alliance partners. Additionally,alliancetiesmayreduceminorpowers’diplomaticflexibilitytopre- ventforeignpolicycrisesfromescalatingtoall-outwarfarewhileleavingituncer- 4 Heinz Gärtner tain whether allies will honor their pledges of military support in the event of armed conflict or war. StefanBergsmanntriestodevelopatheoreticallyusefuldefinitionofthecon- cept of military alliance. He argues that all definitions developed so far are not clear,conciseandnarrowenoughtobeausefulbasisforfurthertheorizing.He proposestodefineanallianceas”anexplicitagreementamongstatesintherealm ofnationalsecurityinwhichthepartnerspromisemutualassistanceintheformof a substantial contribution of resources in the case of a certain contingency the arising of which is uncertain.” SimonDukeconcludesthatthebehaviorofsmallstatesintheEuropeanSecu- rityandDefenseIdentity(ESDI)andmoregeneralEuropeansecuritycontextsis distinguishedbydiversityasmuchasbysimilarities.Itisdifficulttoascertainany specific type of behavior that distinguishes larger from smaller state behavior. Eventhepresenceoffourneutralandnon-alignedstates(NNA’s)intheEU,which isoftentakenasanexemplarofsmallstatebehavior,showsconsiderablediffer- ences between their outlooks. Their respective NNA positions may be substan- tiallymodifiedbydecisionsofothersmallstatestojoin,ornot,alliancessuchas Estonia’s potential membership of NATO. Amongst the small states there may alsobesignificantdifferencesofopinionsuchasthepro-EuropeanstanceofBel- giumandthepro-AtlanticstanceoftheNetherlands,inspiteoftheirveryclosere- lationsinotherfields.Theargumentthatthesmallstatesshouldadoptacoherent positionsothattheymaymaketheirvoiceheardbythelargerstatessuffersfrom the false assumption that there is a sufficient identity of interests amongst the smallerstatesorlargerstates.Smallerstatesmaywellbemosteffectivewhenthey engagethelargerstatesfrompositionsofrelativeinfluence,suchastheEUPresi- dency,wheretheycanmodifyorshapeagendas.Withtheoverallthemeofsmall statesandalliancesinmind,itwouldappearthattheabsenceofanyovertthreatto thesecurityofmostsmallstatesinEuropehasdecreasedtherelevanceofalliances forsmallerstates.Asaconsequence,smallstateshaveshownfarmorewillingness todevelopspecificlinkstosecurityorganisationsthatreflectonlytheirimmediate concerns.Alliances,inthetraditionalsense,weredesignedtoaddressthreatsfrom withoutandthereisnoguaranteethatlargerstateswillwishtoinvolvethemselves inintra-staterivalries.UnliketheColdWar,smallerstatesmaynowchoosetoin- volvethemselvesonan àlacartebasisinawiderangeofsecuritycommitments withanemphasisupontheirownsecurityrequirementsandthoseintheimmedi- atevicinity.Alliancemembershipornon-membershipforsmallerstatesnowcar- riesdifferentcostsandbenefitsthanintheColdWareraandthisisinpartbecause theverynatureofsecurityandallianceshaschanged.Onefactorthathasnotap- preciablychanged,however,isthatsmallerstatesstillhavetheabilitytoupsetthe designs for stability promoted by the larger states. Smallstatesformanalliancetobalanceagainstarisinghegemon.Followingon thisargumentsomescholarsarguedthatstatesmustalsoperceivethechanging balance of power as a threat to their security before they form an alliance with otherstates.ChristianTuschhoffarguesthatthechangingbalanceofpoweramong Small States and Alliances 5 statesnolongermeansanewmilitarythreat,however.Tuschhofffurtherargues thatGermanyincreaseditspowerrelativetoitsNATOalliesduringtheseyears. Further,thechangingbalanceofpowerwasmadepossiblebythemechanismsof militaryintegrationthataredistinctivetoNATO.Thisisanimportantinstanceof how a small state gained control at the expense of its originally more powerful partners.Andstillsuchchangedidnotaffectthestabilityoftheallianceasawhole. The institution of military integration allowed for a changing balance of power amongallies,i.e.peacefulchangethatcouldhavebrokenNATOapartifinstitu- tions had failed to mediate among allies. MichaelMosser attemptstoshowthroughthestoryofsmallstatesembedded withinoneinternationalorganization,theConferenceonSecurityandCoopera- tioninEurope(CSCE),thattheimportanceofsmallstatestointernationalorgani- zations and to international relations more generally has been understated and misunderstood.Thefocusonpowerratherthaninfluence,andonstatesontheir ownintheinternationalstatessystemratherthanwithininternationalorganiza- tions,hasledthefieldtodismissoutofhandthepossibilitythatsmallstatescan actstrategicallytopreservetheirsecuritywhileatthesametimecontributingto the stability and efficacy of international organizations. He mostly deals with a brieftheoreticalexplorationoftherolesmallstatesmightbeexpectedtoplayin internationalorganizations,andahistoricaltreatmentoftherolethesmallNNA statesdidplayintheCSCE.Heattemptstoshowthatdespitetheirsize,smallstates wereabletoengineerinfluenceintheorganization,butnotwithoututilizingthe built-inrulesanddecision-makingproceduresundergirdedbystrongnormsfa- voringequalityandnegotiationoverconfrontation.Muchmorethananegative use(orthreatofuse,asthecasemaybe)oftheconsensusdecision-makingrule wasatplayingivingsmallstatesavoiceintheoperationsoftheCSCE.Infact,he stateswithouttoomuchexaggerationthattheoperationalmodalitiesoftheCSCE itselfgavetheopportunityforanystate,regardlessofsize,toengineerinfluence, butthatthesmallNNAstatesweretheoneswhohadoneofthelargeststakesin keepingtheprocessaliveandthusweremostkeeninhavingtheirvoiceheard.Itis nosurprise,then,thattheNNAswereabletogettheirinterestsacrossintheCSCE. What is surprising, however, is the way they were able to go about it. Erwin A. Schmidl collects together advantages and disadvantages of smaller statesininternationalpeaceoperations.Ontheonehand,becauseoftheirstruc- ture–“smallisbeautiful”–theyaresometimesbetterorganised,andbenefitfrom the“everybodyknowseverybody”-syndrome.Beingsmaller,theytendtobemore flexible.Anotherpositivequalificationonemightrightfullyexpectofpersonnel– military,policeorcivilian–fromasmallercountry:becausebeingforcedtowork withlimitedbudgets,theyareusedtoimprovise,andtrainedtothinkflexibly:an obviousrequirementinpeaceoperations(“corporal’swars”);unfortunately,Aus- triahasthedubioushonortoserveasaprimeexample.Ontheotherhandthey havelessweight–or”punch.”Becauseoftheirbackground(andlackof“back-up”), contingentsfromsmallercountriesareingeneralbettersuitedforcivilian,police, orlimitedmilitary–esp.“specialist”–tasksthanforfightingunits.This,justas theirsometimeslessaggressiveimagecanbeanadvantageaswell,dependenton 6 Heinz Gaertner thecharacterofaparticularmission.Despitethesedeficienciesthereisatendency toincludesmallstatesinpeaceoperations–partlybecausethepresenceofmany contingentshelpsthe“international”imageofthesemissions,andbecauseitcor- respondstotheprincipleof(atleastintheory)equalitybetweenthestatesasem- bodiedintheUNCharter(“onecountry–onevote”).Italsomeetsthe(usually erroneous) self-image of international organisations of being actors themselves ratherthanjustastage.Anditfitstheambitionsofsmallercountries(andtheir politicians,civilservants,andmilitaryofficers)whooftenseek“toplayarole,too” (the “we-too” phenomenon). SvendAageChristensen discussesthecostsandbenefitsofalliancemember- shipforsmallstatesonthebasisofGlennSnyder’stheoryofalliancebehavior.Ac- cordingtothistheory,alliancepoliticsareplayedoutintwogames,thealliance gameandtheadversarygame.Thealliancegamereferstopoliticswithinthealli- ance,whiletheadversarygameconcernspoliticsbetweenopposingalliancesand nations.Christensendevelopsfouradaptivemodesofbehaviorinadaptationthe- oryandtheircharacteristics:dominance,balancing,acquiescenceandquiescence. Followingadaptationtheory,Danishpolicyconcerningthedefensedimensionof EU seems to be very close to a policy of quiescence. DanishpolicyconcerningthedefensedimensionoftheEUisdeterminedby theso-callednationalcompromiseof1992,accordingtowhichDenmarkremains outside the defense dimension of the EU, including membership of the WEU, commondefensepolicyandcommondefense.AccordingtotheEdinburghDeci- sionadoptedbytheHeadsofStateorGovernment,12December1992,Denmark doesnotparticipateintheelaborationandtheimplementationofdecisionsand actionsoftheUnionwhichhavedefenseimplications,butwillnotpreventthede- velopmentofclosercooperationbetweenMemberStatesinthisarea(Protocolon the position of Denmark). TheothersideofthecoinisanextraordinaryDanishactivisminNATO.This aspectofDanishsecurityanddefensepolicyratherqualifiesasapolicyofbalance, characterisedbyahighdegreeofparticipation,anoffensivepowerpriorityanda highdegreeofsensitivitytotheeventualityofbeingleftoutofthefora,inwhich decisions concerning the future security landscape of Europe are being made. GunnarLassinanttitakesthediscussion’spointofdepartureinthreecircum- stances:1.Thegeopoliticallocationofthestatesinquestion,2.Thehistory,tradi- tions,politicalandotherdomesticcircumstancesofthosestates,3.Thealliances availableandtheirrelationshiptodifferentstates.Helooksatthecase-studySwe- den.Sweden’spolicyofneutralityevolvedgraduallystartingaround1840.Swe- den’s neutrality policy has rested on unilateral decisions taken by the Swedish GovernmentandtheSwedishRiksdag(parliament).Thus,itdoesnotbuildonin- ternationalagreementsinthesamewayastheneutralitypoliciesofFinland,Swit- zerlandandAustria.ImmediatelyaftertheSecondWorldWar,Swedishneutrality policywasbasedonmaintainingastrongdefenseforce.Infact,attheendofthe 1940sandduringthe1950sSweden’sdefenseforcewasoneofthestrongestinEu- ropeandthiswasalsotrueinpartinlaterdecades.Untilthe1990s,Sweden’sneu-
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