SINGLE ANTENNA NULL-STEERING FOR GPS & GNSS AERIAL APPLICATIONS A DISSERTATION SUBMITTED TO THE DEPARTMENT OF ELECTRICAL ENGINEERING AND THE COMMITTEE ON GRADUATE STUDIES OF STANFORD UNIVERSITY IN PARTIAL FULFILLMENT OF THE REQUIREMENTS FOR THE DEGREE OF DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY Emily McMilin March 2016 © 2016 by Emily Beth McMilin. All Rights Reserved. Re-distributed by Stanford University under license with the author. This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution- Noncommercial 3.0 United States License. http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/3.0/us/ This dissertation is online at: http://purl.stanford.edu/cf484ht3939 ii I certify that I have read this dissertation and that, in my opinion, it is fully adequate in scope and quality as a dissertation for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy. Per Enge, Primary Adviser I certify that I have read this dissertation and that, in my opinion, it is fully adequate in scope and quality as a dissertation for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy. Thomas Lee I certify that I have read this dissertation and that, in my opinion, it is fully adequate in scope and quality as a dissertation for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy. Todd Walter Approved for the Stanford University Committee on Graduate Studies. Patricia J. Gumport, Vice Provost for Graduate Education This signature page was generated electronically upon submission of this dissertation in electronic format. An original signed hard copy of the signature page is on file in University Archives. iii Abstract As the utility of the Global Positioning System (GPS) and other Global Navigation Satellite Systems (GNSS) continue to pervade -and upgrade- our daily activities, our increased reliance makes us more vulnerable to the inherent weaknesses of GPS. The incredible faintness and unencrypted nature of the GNSS signal exposes it to both unintentional and intentional overwhelming, via mechanisms such as interference, jamming and spoofing (the broadcast of counterfeit GNSS signals intended to deceive aGNSSreceiver). Howeversomemayarguethatdespitethegreatrisk,theprobability of a jamming or spoofing event is thankfully low. The argument may continue, that correspondinglyfewresourcesshouldbededicatedtoprotectagainstalowprobability event. I attempt to resolve the tension between these high risk yet low probability scenarios by establishing antenna designs that provide protection while exploiting existing infrastructure and equipment, thus requiring minimal additional resource dedication. This thesis will start with an introduction of a low complexity mechanism for generating radiation pattern nulls and beams with a singleantenna, without requiring any additional hardware or signal processing blocks beyond those already inherent to GNSS receiver systems. I will describe the basic mathematical model that underlies this mechanism and share simulation results. I will then introduce two applications of this mechanism: single antenna interference/jam suppression and single antenna spoof detection. Results from simulations and two field trials will be presented: one with a software implementation using a software defined radio, and the other with a hardware prototype implemented in o↵-the-shelf components using a standard GPS receiver. Results show about 15 dB of interference/jam suppression and robust spoof iv detection, when the threatening signals originate from below the horizon of the GNSS antenna, making aerial platforms an ideal application. v Acknowledgements I would like to express my immense gratitude to my advisor Professor Per Enge, who has so generously provided me support, mentorship and intellectual guidance while helping me navigate the sometimes turbulent PhD waters. My most sincere thanks goes to my dissertation committee: Professor Tom Lee who has mastered wireless power transfer when he shares his intellectual energy with those lucky enough to be in the room, and Dr. Todd Walter who kept my ideas well grounded in practice and measurement, despite our aerial application. My great appreciation goes out to my oral exam committee members Professor Leo Hollberg and Professor Dan Boneh for their generous advice and guidance both before and after the examination. I also want to thank my friends and colleagues in the GPS Lab, who fostered a stimulating, productive and fun lab environment. My most warm appreciation goes to Dr. Yu-Hsuan Chen and Dr. Dave De Lorenzo for their essential contributions in the lab, on the roof, and in the field, often under the hot, hot sun. Professor Dennis Akos kindly provided numerous sanity checks (and perhaps the occasional not-sane check) despite the last-minute nature of my requests. My great appreciation goes out to Chris Hoeber and the antenna team at Space Systems Loral, for the kind access to their anechoic chamber and antenna lab re- sources. Our field test results would never have been possible without the support of Abiud Jimenez, David Rohret, and their colleagues at JVAB who provided the jamming and spoofing signals. My heart-felt appreciation to John and Judy Doyle who generously supported me during my first year of research and continue to o↵er kind words of support, encouragement and friendship. vi Finally I am honored to thank my family for their unconditional and unending supportofallmypursuits. Iamsoincrediblyluckytospeakwithbothmymotherand father almost daily, as they accommodate their schedule and sometimes dinner, to my availability. My grandma Florence’s exuberance for live and adventure continues to motivate me, and my grandma Barbara’s perseverance lives on in my memory. Never ending thanks to my Uncle Lloyd who opened his home and life to me during my Masters degree and to my aunt Natalie and cousin Rachel who open their minds to me and my research ideas. My sister and her family have and will drop everything to support me when I need them, and this warm safety-net always embraces me. Finally my husband whose dedication, selflessness, and intellectual creativity has inspired me to try and become the best person that I can be. This research is in loving memory of our daughter, Zoe Lee Schlub McMilin, who was stillborn on Saturday July 11th 2015 at 28 weeks old. She was only 2 lbs 3 oz and 15 inches tall, but she leaves a much larger hole in our souls. She also leaves our hearts full of love and hope that we may continue to grow and learn from all she taught us during her short beautiful life. vii Contents Abstract iv Acknowledgements vi 1 Introduction 1 1.1 Global Navigation Satellite Systems . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1 1.1.1 The Nature of the GNSS Signal . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2 1.1.2 Modern-Day Threats to GNSS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6 1.2 Prior Work . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8 1.2.1 Antenna Techniques . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9 1.3 Research in this Thesis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15 1.3.1 Contributions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16 1.3.2 Outline of Remainder of Thesis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17 2 Antenna Fundamentals 18 2.1 Important Metrics and Definitions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18 2.1.1 Cross Polarization Discrimination (XPD) Ratio . . . . . . . . 18 2.1.2 Multi-path Rejection (MPR) Ratio . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20 2.1.3 Coordinate System . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21 2.2 Standard GNSS Antennas . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24 2.2.1 Typical Radiation Patterns . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25 2.2.2 Typical Radiation Patterns on Large Ground-planes . . . . . . 27 2.2.3 Typical Schematic Diagram . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 28 viii 3 Antenna Measurements and Simulations 32 3.1 Patch Antenna in Free-space . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 32 3.1.1 Prototype Construction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 33 3.1.2 Magnitude Response . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 33 3.2 Patch Antenna on Ground-plane . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 37 3.2.1 Simulation Set-up . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 37 3.2.2 Magnitude Response . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 39 3.2.3 Phase Response . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 41 3.2.4 Even Larger Ground-planes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 44 4 Theoretical Models 46 4.1 Single Element Dynamic Antenna . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 47 4.1.1 Dynamic Antenna Schematic Diagram . . . . . . . . . . . . . 47 4.2 S-parameters Analysis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 49 4.2.1 Right Hand Circularly Polarized (RHCP) signals . . . . . . . 50 4.2.2 Left Hand Circularly Polarized (LHCP) signals . . . . . . . . 53 4.2.3 Linearly Polarized (LP) signals . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 54 4.3 Null-Steering Mechanism . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 60 4.4 Angle Dependency . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 63 4.4.1 Azimuth Angle Dependency . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 63 4.4.2 Elevation Angle Dependency . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 64 4.5 Building Blocks . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 68 5 Implementation 71 5.1 Software Implementation (SWI) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 73 5.1.1 SWI Antenna Subsystem . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 73 5.1.2 SWI Circuit Subsystem . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 73 5.2 Hybrid Implementation (HyI) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 76 5.2.1 HyI Antenna Subsystem . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 77 5.2.2 HyI Circuit Subsystem . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 78 5.3 Hardware Implementation (HWI) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 81 5.3.1 HWI Antenna Subsystem . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 82 ix 5.3.2 HWI Circuit Subsystem . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 82 6 Single Antenna Anti-jam 87 6.1 Jam Suppression Mechanism . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 87 6.2 SWI Test . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 90 6.2.1 SWI Simulation Results and Analysis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 90 6.2.2 SWI Model Agreement . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 92 6.2.3 SWI Phase Shift Determination . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 93 6.3 HyI Field Trial . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 94 6.3.1 HyI Field Trial Setup . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 95 6.3.2 HyI Field Trial Measurement . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 96 6.3.3 HyI Field Trial Post-processing . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 100 6.3.4 HyI Field Trial Results and Analysis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 101 6.4 HWI Field Trial . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 106 6.4.1 HWI Field Trial Setup and Measurement . . . . . . . . . . . . 107 6.4.2 HWI Field Trial Post-processing . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 108 6.4.3 HWI Field Trial Results and Analysis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 108 7 Single Antenna Spoof Detection 113 7.1 Spoof Detection Mechanism . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 114 7.2 HyI Field Trial . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 117 7.2.1 HyI Field Trial Setup . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 118 7.2.2 HyI Field Trial Measurement . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 118 7.2.3 HyI Field Trial Post-processing . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 120 7.2.4 HyI Field Trial Results and Analysis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 122 7.3 HWI Rooftop Test . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 125 7.3.1 HWI Rooftop Test Setup and Measurement . . . . . . . . . . 126 7.3.2 HWI Rooftop Test Post-processing . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 126 7.3.3 HWI Rooftop Test Results and Analysis . . . . . . . . . . . . 129 7.4 HWI Field Trial . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 132 7.4.1 HWI Field Trial Setup and Measurement . . . . . . . . . . . . 133 7.4.2 HWI Field Trial Post-processing . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 134 x
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