Simonia, Russia in the Asia- Pacific: The Beginning of a New Era?

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by  Nodari A.

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Russia in the Asia–Pacific: The
beginning of a new era?
Nodari A. Simonia
Published online: 22 Aug 2006.
To cite this article: Nodari A. Simonia (2006) Russia in the Asia–Pacific: The beginning of a new
era?, Asia-Pacific Review, 13:1, 16-31, DOI: 10.1080/13439000600697092
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Asia-PacificReview,Vol.13,No.1,2006
Russia in the Asia–Pacific:
The Beginning of a
New Era?
NODARI A. SIMONIA
5
1
0
2
y This article discusses significant changes in Russia and the surrounding world
r
a
u during the last several years. The author argues that these changes created
n
a major preconditions for the beginning of a new era in relations between
J
01 Russia and Northeast Asian countries, which will boost a breakthrough in the
2 field of energy cooperation and might add a “second wing” to the idea of
1
0: regionalismin Northeast Asia.
0
at
]
s
e
c
vi
r
e
S
y Change in the general situation in Northeast
r
a
r
b Asia region
Li
E
S Anticipatingthings,Iwouldliketogiveaninstantanswertothequestionraised
L
[
y inthetitle:Iamfirmlyconvincedinapositiveanswertothegivenquestion,
b
d i.e.thatinthelast5–6yearsinRussiaitselfjustasinthesurroundingworldpre-
e
d
a requisites for the breakthrough in the latter’s relations and cooperation with Asia
o
nl Pacific(AP)countriesbegantoform.Naturally,thereisnochancetogointodetail
w
o about the above-mentioned historical (according to their significance) prerequi-
D
sites within the framework of the given article, so I shall confine myself to a
brief enumeration of the most important ones.
Firstly,inrecentyearsimportantchangesinthestructureofthemainforcesin
theworldarenahavebecomeespeciallymarked.Rightbeforeoureyesthemythof
theunipolarworldisdebunked.Yes,thereisthe“superpower,”butthereisnouni-
polarity around it. Another matter is that the United States persistently refuses to
comprehend (or to acknowledge) that their “superpowerness” is just survival,
heritage of the former international bipolar structure that sunk into oblivion, to
understand that the process of formation of a new multi-polar structure has long
ago begun and is gaining strength. Subjective urge of the US administration to
ISSN1343-9006print;1469-2937online/06=010016–16
RoutledgePublishing,TaylorandFrancis,http//www.tandf.co.uk/. 16
#InstituteforInternationalPolicyStudies,http://www.iips.org/.
DOI:10.1080=13439000600697092
RussiaintheAsia–Pacific:thebeginningofanewera?
artificially model a “unipolar world,” unilateral decisions it makes and one-sided
actions it undertakes without resolving a single large world problem are just
aggravating the situation in those regions where the USA is especially active,
which engenders more and more problems and crisis situations, a way out of
which the US alone is unable to find, and they already understand it themselves.
Herein lies the principal transformation of the world situation: formerly other
countries—USallies—neededsupportandpresenceoftheUnitedStatesas asta-
bilizing and balancing factor, while nowadays international authority and influ-
ence of the USA have so seriously weakened that they themselves need support
of their allies.
Secondly,all theaboveinfullmeasureconcernstheNortheastAsianregion.
Theprincipallynewphenomenonhereisimpetuousformationofanother(besides
5
1 Japan) center of influence represented by China. In the last years China not only
0
2 demonstrated high economic growth rates (about 9 percent), but also qualitative
y
ar changes in its foreign economic activity. In 2004–2005 China for the first time
u
n
a in history outstripped the US as the main trade partner of Japan and South
J
1 Korea, and for the very first time it surpassed Japan in use of hydrocarbon
0
12 resources and became one of the largest importers of the latter. For the first
00: time China became the best consumer of developing countries’ products: in
at 2003theshareofthisgroupofcountriesinChina’stotalannualimportamounting
]
s
e to US$400bln. was 45 percent. In 2003 alone, that import from developing
c
rvi countries grew by US$55bln. (which is quite comparable with the whole
e
y S volume of official development assistance rendered by developed countries).
r
a Four-fifthsofChina’simportfromAsiaamountstoindustrialproducts,including
r
b
Li officeandtelecommunicationequipment,electronicdevices,partsforassemblyin
E China (mainly it has to do with import from South Korea and Taiwan, as well as
S
[L from the Philippines, Thailand, and Indonesia).1 Finally, for the first time, China
y
b came out as an energetic investor abroad, acting on practically all the continents.
d
de The last circumstance is the result of accumulated foreign currency reserves, by
a
o the size of which (taking into account Hong Kong) China surpassed Japan and
nl
w is now ranking first. It’s clear that China already has a claim for great power
o
D
status economically as well. In this connection there are talks about “two world
locomotives.” The question, however, is that there is a considerable difference
between the “locomotives:” in the US economy there is already established a
large post-industrial information-technology setup, acting as a “locomotive” of
globalization,whileChinaisforthemomentdevelopingmainlywithintheframe-
work of the industrial paradigm. Nevertheless, some experts and politicians state
thatevidentlyanewbipolarityphenomenonisunderway—Chinavs.theUSA—
and that Asian countries “must” nowadays choose between these two “super-
powers.”Suchastatementisaveryun-constructiveand,Iwouldsay,provocative
proposition,which containsenormousconflictpotential.Ithas thepotential(if to
ASIA-PACIFIC REVIEW VVOLUME 13, NUMBER 1 17
NodariA.Simonia
addittoone’sarmory)tostimulateescalationoftheexistingregionaltensionsup
tothelevelofopenarmedconflict.But,judgingfromeverything,theBushadmin-
istrationisnotscaredbysuchaprospect,anditisconstantlyseekingstrengthening
andrenovationofmilitaryallianceunderitsaegis,onthebasisofmutualsecurity
treatiesconcludedduringtheColdWaryears.Orientationatrenaissanceandfor-
tification of confrontation structures in NEA favours maintenance of the atmos-
phere in which the now existing regional tensions (between North and South on
the Korean peninsula, between mainland China and Taiwan; territorial and
other controversies among practically all the subjects of the region) may easily
develop into open armed conflicts, having destroyed the already achieved
considerable fruits of regional economic cooperation.
Thirdly, US allies in Northeast Asia face an extremely important option, but
5
1 nottheonebetweenChinaandtheUSA.Thequestionratherisaboutthechoiceof
0
2 awaytowardsstrengtheningtheirstatesovereignty.InJapan,andoutsideitthere
y
ar has long ago begun the discussion about necessity of its transformation into a
u
n
a “normal country.” If it all ends by formal changes in the Constitution, it will
J
1 not by all means turn Japan into a “normal country.” From my point of view, a
0
12 more important and complicated point in this case lies in overcoming the Amer-
00: icanpaternalismsyndrome.SouthKoreanleadershipforthelastseveralyearshas
at alsobeenputtingthequestionof“moreequalpartnership”totheUSA.However,
]
s
e one of the last manifestations of this kind of aspiration was the October 2005
c
rvi address of South Korean leaders to the USA with the proposal to return to
e
y S Seoul comprehensive control over the national army. The essence of the matter
r
a lies in the fact that South Korean generals have the right to command their own
r
b
Li armed forces exceptionally in peaceful times. In case of war the main
E command post passes under control of the American top brass.2 But the
S
L
[ problem of the unfavorable state of American–South Korean relations is much
y
b wider and deeper. At the present historical stage, Korea’s main national
d
de interest—building-up of efforts toward creation of prerequisites for a North–
a
o South peaceful unification prospect within the framework of engagement policy
nl
w carried out since 2000—came to the foreground, while the USA, especially
o
D
under the Bush Administration, turned into the main obstacle during realization
of this course. In fact, not North Korea, but the USA is now personifying the
potential threat of armed conflict on the Korean peninsula, which is baneful not
onlyforNorthKorea,butfortheRepublicofKorea(ROK)itself,foritseconomic
achievements and the welfare of its population. A natural consequence of this
Bush administration position was the growth of anti-American sentiments in
South Korean society, and closer relations of the ROK primarily with China,
but also with the Russian Federation. Against the given background, the realistic
position of Russian leadership interested in promoting formation of a multi-
polarity process in the world in general, and in Asia Pacific in particular, is
18 ASIA-PACIFIC REVIEW VMay 2006
RussiaintheAsia–Pacific:thebeginningofanewera?
capable of exerting positive influence upon strengthening stability and mainten-
ance of peace in Northeast Asia. Of course this objective opportunity should be
subjectively realized in practice. Until recently due to internal reasons Russia
was simply unable to execute this positive role of hers. Now the situation has
begun to change in principle.
Fourthly, from 2000 the process of statehood consolidation in Russia, the
gradual overcoming of destructive and disintegrating consequences of Yeltsin’s
rule was increasing, accompanied by the process of building new relations
between state and business, bringing the oligarchic capital’s activity into a more
or less civilized channel, establishing the authoritarianism of development system
passed through in due time and each in its own way by Japan, South Korea, and
many other successfully developing Asian countries. In my many publications
5
1 and reports I happened to stand up for the idea that at the given stage of catching
0
2 up development, Northeast Asian countries’ experience is much more useful for
y
ar Russia (considering, of course, its national peculiarities) than blind compliance
u
n
a with Western liberalism’s models that doom the country to the role of the West’s
J
1 raw materials appendage, the role of weak and unequal minor partner. Eight years
0
12 of oligarchic capitalism’s destructive orgy, a wild spree of total corruption, which
00: actuallyturnedintowayoflife,exhaustivelyprovesthefairnessofthesejudgments.
at I would only note that contrary to Japanese zaibatsu andkeiretsu or South Korean
]
s
e chebol, which created modern industries of their countries, and today are urging
c
rvi establishment of postindustrial setup there, Russian oligarchs, having created
e
y S nothing, were exclusively parasitizing on those raw materials branches that
r
a remained from the Soviet times. More than that, profits from such businesses
r
b
Li were led out of the country via offshore schemes. The paradox, however, is that
E when it all took place during Yeltsin’s epoch, the West, as if being blind, “failed
S
L
[ to notice” all those vices, and was quite friendly towards a thoroughly corrupted
y
b regime, while today the more Russia strengthens its economy and policy, the
d
de larger is the displeasure the West expresses. Who knows, maybe there is no
a
o paradox at all. It may be merely that the West never wanted to see Russia as a
nl
w strongeconomiccompetitor andanothercenterofpoliticalinfluence.
o
D
Successes in home consolidation and economic development allowed
Russia’s leadership to pay serious attention to the country’s relations with its
closest Asian surroundings, namely with countries of Central and Northeastern
Asia.
Fifthly, soon after the tragic events of September 11 it became absolutely
obvious that struggling with terrorism, the Bush administration also used that
banner to fortify its geopolitical and geoeconomic positions not only in the “Big
Middle East,” but in Central Asia too. At the same time, contrary to Iraq, it
tried, although with much less success, to apply there the velvet revolution
tactics tested in Georgia and Ukraine. The USA did not take into account the
ASIA-PACIFIC REVIEW VVOLUME 13, NUMBER 1 19
NodariA.Simonia
whole number of important circumstances: firstly, the fact that the times of Yelt-
sin’sneglectof ourCentralAsianneighborshavegone;secondly,thattemporary
euphoriaandillusionsregardinglavishfinancial-economicaidfromtheUSAhave
vanished;and thirdly,that rulingelites in themajority of CentralAsian countries
alsolearnedlessonsfromeventsinGeorgiaandUkraine.AsaresultexcessiveUS
activity in Central Asia caused apprehensions that it might lead to emergence of
another “Afghanistan” in Central Asia. And those apprehensions stimulated new
integration tendencies with Russia’s participation. Let’s briefly recall how these
tendencies have been developing in recent years. At first Central Asian republics
offended by Russia tried to integrate independently reckoning to find a new pro-
tector. So, in 1998 Kazakhstan, Kirgizia, and Uzbekistan signed an agreement
on joint economic space. Soon they were joined by Tajikistan, and in 2002
5 those countries announced the creation of the Organization of Central Asian
1
0
2 Cooperation (OCAC). In the meantime, parallel to that another integration
y
r process started in 1995—an agreement on Customs Union between Russia,
a
u
n Belarus and Kazakhstan, later joined by Kirgizia and Tajikistan, and in 2001
a
J
1 that union was transformed into the Euro–Asian Economic Community
0
2 (EuAsEC). At that time Uzbekistan remained in GUUAM (in the community
1
0: formed by Georgia, Ukraine, Uzbekistan, Azerbaijan, and Moldova). However,
0
at as was mentioned above, since2003 thesituation in the post-Sovietspace impet-
]
es uouslybegantochange,andinOctober2004RussiajoinedOCAC.Afterthatand
c
vi followingtherecenteventsinUzbekistan,theOCACSummit’sdecisionaboutits
r
e
S mergerwithEuAsECwasquitelogicalifonlyfromthepointofviewoffinancial–
y
r economic suitability.3 In many aspects exactly the US hegemonic activity in
a
r
Lib Central Asia also stimulated transformation of another organization in Central
E Asia—ShOC (Shanghai Organization of Cooperation). Initially the “Shanghai
S
L Five” (Russia, China, Kirgizia, Kazakhstan and Tajikistan) was formed to settle
[
by border issues. In 2001 it was joined by Uzbekistan, while in 2003 ShOC
d
e adopted the Program of Multilateral Trade–Economic Cooperation. To balance
d
oa that organization Russia welcomed India, Pakistan, Iran, and Mongolia joining
nl
w the Organization as observers (for the time being) with possibility of becoming
o
D permanent members later. Thus, we witness formation of a new model of geopo-
litical integration on the basis of mutual confidence and building up of partner
relations without claims for someone’s monopoly or domination in international
affairs. At ShOC summit in Astana in July 2005 increase of member countries’
security from terrorist attacks was marked as the main goal of the organization.4
Accumulation of prerequisites for a breakthrough
ThemainpreconditionforthesuccessofthecomingRussianbreakthroughinthe
Asia-Pacificregion(APR)consists,frommypointofview,inthefactthatitstop
20 ASIA-PACIFIC REVIEW VMay 2006
RussiaintheAsia–Pacific:thebeginningofanewera?
leadership in recent years finally and fully realized, firstly, the whole importance
of Asian countries for prospects of development in Russia’s foreign economic
activity and began carefully correcting the excessive distortion and one-sided
focus on the West typical of Yeltsin’s period, and, secondly, in this connection
it apprehended the long ago ripe necessity of serious development of the richest
natural resources of East Siberia and the Russian Far East, the need to overcome
socio-economic lag of that region and to settle its serious demographic problem.
This comprehension revealed, in particular, an intensification of Russia’s partici-
pationin variousAsian forums,and in regulartrips of Russia’s Presidenthimself
toAsiawithintheframeworkofbothbilateralsummitsandmultilateralforums.At
thesametimeit’stypicalthatallV.Putin’stripstoNortheastandSoutheastAsia
were invariably combined with visits to this or that subject of the Russian
5 Federation in East Siberia and the Far East. There he held operational meetings
1
0
2 and made important and precise decisions. Here, in particular, lies the difference
y
r ofPutin’sapproachfromthatofalltheformerrulersnotonlyofRussia,butofthe
a
u
n USSRtoo.Infact,it’sthisparticularcombinationofvisitstoAsiancountrieswith
a
J
1 heightenedattentionandvisitstoRussianregionsofEastSiberiaandtheFarEast
0
2 that serves as a kind of “litmus test” certifying the seriousness of the Russian
1
0: leadership’s intentions to integrate Russia into the APR, because development
0
at of these regions is of key importance, and without it all the intentions and
]
es declarations will just remain on paper, as frequently happened before.
c
rvi AparticularcharacteristicoftheEastSiberianandtheFarEasternregionsis
e
y S that development of their practically untouched riches demand integrated efforts
r
a and means from federal and regional authorities together with attraction of
r
b
Li foreign capital and even the labor force. Of note is that to the East of the Urals,
E an area of 15mln. square kilometers is inhabited by under 20 million people,
S
L
[ and here more than 75 percent of the country’s resource base is located.
y
b However, after the breakdown of the USSR and disappearance of its planned
d
de non-market economy, the region all of a sudden appeared practically outside
a
o thedomesticnationalmarket.So,ifduringtheSoviettimestheFarEastdelivered
nl
w morethan75percentofitsproductstothehomemarketofthecountry,todaydue
o
D
to its enormous distances and weak transport infrastructure it delivers a bit more
than4percent.5Thishasledtotheformationoflarge-scaleillegaltradeinwood,
fish and other products of the region with Northeast Asian countries. Thus, this
region presents an enormous “ground” for integration efforts of Russia and the
APR countries, and special decisions and programs are necessary here. In the
meantime,formerMoscowleaderscoveredtheirreluctancetodealwithdevelop-
mentofthisregionwithapreposterousexcuse,thatRussiahad89federationsub-
jects, and they could not single out any of them in particular. (I heard this said
several times by one of former ministers of economy in the 1990s). It was, of
course, an absolute lie. There were and still are certain regions in Russia which
ASIA-PACIFIC REVIEW VVOLUME 13, NUMBER 1 21
NodariA.Simonia
enjoyspecialprivileges.AccordingtotheGovernorofKhabarovskregionViktor
Ishayev, with the existing distribution of means from the regional development
fund, up to 81 percent of purpose-oriented federal programs went to socio-
economic development of two republics—Tatarstan and Bashkortostan
(18.5bln. rubles)—while “The Far East and Transbaikal” program received
only 4 percent (1bln. rubles). However, since last year the situation with
general budgetfinancingof the Far East began to improve noticeably.According
to the Minister of Economic Development and Trade German Gref, who pre-
viously was not notable for his special attention to problems of Siberia and the
Far East, the Far East was allocated 7.8bln. rubles (against 2.9bln. in 2004),
while in the budget project for 2006 already 17.4bln. rubles were built into the
budget for the development of this region. At the same time it is assumed that
5 in connection with the recently adopted law “On special economic zones in the
1
0
2 Russian Federation” the Far East will be among the top priority regions for the
ry location of such industrial-producing zones.6
a
u
n
a Theyear2005wasmarkedwithspecialintensityintheRussia’sleadership’s
J
1 visitstoAPRcountries,whichallowsmetoregardthisyearastheeveofRussia’s
0
12 breakthrough into this region. On November 3–4 the meeting of government
00: headsofthetwocountriestookplaceinBeijing,inthecourseofwhichimportant
at agreements on cooperation in the atomic energy sphere (including creation of
]
s
e a space nuclear energy facility, construction of a floating nuclear station in
c
rvi Severodvinsk), on expansion of trade-economic cooperation, etc. were signed.
e
y S OnNovember18–19V.PutinparticipatedintheAPEC(Asia–PacificEconomic
r
a Cooperation) summit in Busan city in South Korea. Following its conclusion,
r
b
Li President Putin flew to Seoul for a working meeting with Korea’s President Roh
E Moo-hyun, and on November 20 he arrived in Tokyo to participate in the long-
S
L
[ awaited summit with Prime Minister Koizumi. On December 13 the first ever
y
b Russia–ASEAN summit in Kuala Lumpur took place, as a result of which the
d
de Joint Declaration on Development and Enhanced Partnership between Russia
a
o and ASEAN was adopted. The integral part of this Declaration was the wide-
nl
w ranging programs of action aimed at development of cooperation for 2005–
o
D
2015(includingthoseinthespheresofnon-proliferationofnucleararms,struggle
withterrorismandtransnationalcrime,cooperationintheoilandgassectorandin
transport,etc.).ItwasdecidedtocreatetheRussia–ASEANDialoguePartnership
Fund, out of which joint economic projects could be formulated. A number of
agreements were reached on a bilateral basis (including those on a visa-free
exchange between Thailand and Russia).7
Immediately after that summit, V. Putin was invited to the constituent
meeting of the first East Asian Community (as an observer) in Malaysia’s
capital. The idea of that summit was nurtured from the mid 1990s. Then it was
initiated by former Prime Minister of Malaysia Mohathir Mohammad known
22 ASIA-PACIFIC REVIEW VMay 2006
RussiaintheAsia–Pacific:thebeginningofanewera?
for (and disliked by the West) being against values and ideas of Westernization
imposed on Asia. The Forum might become a personification of Asian identity
and solidarity. That’s why the USA and the EC were not invited. Perhaps for
greaterbalanceandstabilityoftheEastAsiancommunity’smultifariousstructure
India, Australia, and New Zealand were added to ASEANþ3 formula (Japan,
China, South Korea). Australia and New Zealand have long ago appreciated the
benefits of “co-participation” in the Asian community, and in recent years have
been endeavoring to demonstrate their involvement in the “Asian identity.”
However, at the opening of the summit, several minutes before V. Putin’s
speech,asapurelyWesterncountry,Australiamadeastatementthatnegotiations
withRussiaoughttobeheldinthealreadyestablishedformatofthecommunity—
as with a guest, but not a full member.8 However, the fact remains—Russia was
5 favorably received by the majority of the newly created East Asian Community
1
0
2 members. That event was quite momentous bearing in mind that just several
y
r years ago Russia was far from Southeast Asian countries.
a
u
n
a Thus, the question is not only that Russia itself began to express the wish to
J
1 integrate into the Asian community, but that the latter also expressed a general
0
12 readiness to see the former in its ranks. It appears that this phenomenon has a
00: more fundamental basis. I beg to express my supposition regarding the fact why
at this change in the situation happened so easily and comparatively fast.
]
s
e
c The world has always been developing unevenly, and as a result some
vi
r countries conquered others. But in a majority of cases, when conquerors came
e
S
y from the East, they demanded from the conquered tribute and acknowledgement
r
ra of vassalic relations, in general without interfering in the lifestyle of subjugated
b
Li peoples. Western capitalism, in its turn, was all the time seeking to transform
E
S the conquered colonies and semi-colonies after its own fashion. Even after liber-
L
y [ ation of the “Third World countries” the West tried to thrust on them the neoco-
b
d lonial relations framework of the “Westernization” model of modernization.
e
d Meanwhile exactly those Asian countries that managed in the course of their
a
o
nl modernization to implement the synthesis of their traditional values with
w
o modern technological achievements of the West scored special successes.
D
Precisely there lay the secret of the Japanese, South Korean, and Singaporean
economic “miracles,” and that of some other countries. After 1992 Russia also
passed through a destructive negative experience when formal copying of
Westernmodelswasimposedonit,withouttakingintoconsiderationthecountry’s
national peculiarities. And, perhaps, it was one of the main reasons for the com-
parativeeasewithwhichtoday,havinggotridofWesternpsychologicalpressure
and poorly hidden diktat, Russia began to fit into the Asian community. It hap-
penedexactlyafterinthemindsofthecountry’sleadershipandtheoverwhelming
part of Russian society illusions of Yeltsin’s period regarding Western readiness
for equal cooperation and partnership with Russia began to disperse. It’s true
ASIA-PACIFIC REVIEW VVOLUME 13, NUMBER 1 23
NodariA.Simonia
thattheUSAandtheEUnolongerregardRussiaastheiropponentandantagonist
asitwasduringtheperiodofbipolarity,butneverthelessRussiaisstill“alien”to
them and is not an equal partner; that’s why with such an outright malevolence
they meet every move towards consolidation of statehood and every step aimed
at least at partial limitation of the corruption scale which enfeebles the country.
However, accumulation of prerequisites for Russia’s breakthrough in the
APR,ofcourse,doesnotboildowntotheincreasedpolitical-diplomaticactivity.
Asaresultofthisstirringup,considerablegrowthintradeturnoverandeconomic
cooperation between Russia and Northeast Asian countries began to come into
outline. Some people, however, point out that compared to the trade turnover
and cooperation between other countries in the region the above mentioned suc-
cesses look quite modest, but comparing them with what was quite recently the
5
1 picture will be impressive enough.
0
2
y Let’stake,forexample,Japan.AsaresultofPrimeMinisterKoizumi’svisit
r
ua toMoscowinJanuary2003,andsigningoftheRussian–Japaneseplanof action,
n
Ja tradeturnoverbetweenthetwocountriesinthenexttwoyearsincreasedstraight-
1
0 away by two thirds, and in 2004 amounted to US$8.8bln.—a record figure in
2
1 Russia’s recent history. According to preliminary estimations in the course of
0:
0 2005 this figure increased to US$10bln. And the question is not in price growth
at
] for hydrocarbon raw materials delivered from Russia to Japan. The thing is that
s
e
c since 2003 Japanese export to Russia (cars and equipment, household electrical
vi
r appliances, state-of-the-art technology, new materials etc.) was growing two to
e
S
y three times faster than Russia’s export to Japan. Besides, according to Russia’s
r
ra trade representative in Japan Mr. Alexandr Lavrentiev, at least $2 billion of
b
Li Japanese goods annually enter Russia via third countries or are manufactured in
E
S thirdcountriesbyJapanandthentransportedtoRussia.9Asaresultofsustainable
L
y [ growthofimportofJapanesecarsin2004Russiawasreckonedamongtenlargest
b
d importersofdifferentmodelsofJapanesecars.MeanwhileinJune2005anemble-
e
d matic event occurred: in the presence of Russia’s President Vladimir Putin and
a
o
nl Toyota Corporation Board of Directors Chairman Hiroshi Okuda there took
w
o place a ceremony of laying of the new Japanese company’s plant’s first stone in
D
the suburbs of St. Petersburg. The estimated capacity of the plant will amount
to 50 thousand cars a year, and production will begin around the end of 2007.10
According to the available information, management of some other corpor-
ations—Nissan, Honda, Mitsubishi—is examining possibilities to follow suit.
JapanesecorporationsalsointendtoactivelyparticipateinotherlargeRussian
projects.InSeptemberof2005GazpromconcludedagreementwithMitsuiO.S.K.
Lines andItochu Corporationfor cooperationin transportationof 15mln. tonsof
liquefied natural gas (LNG) from the Shtokmanovsky deposit to the USA (which
is equivalent to about 10 percent of world trade in this product). Within the
framework of this project Japanese corporations will have to build up to ten gas
24 ASIA-PACIFIC REVIEW VMay 2006