SILENT VICTORY THE US SUBMARINE WAR AGAINST JAPAN by Clay Blair, Jr. JB Lippincott ...

654 Pages·2012·10.98 MB·English

SILENT VICTORY

THE U.S. SUBMARINE WAR AGAINST JAPAN

by Clay Blair, Jr.

J. B. Lippincott Company Philadelphia and New York

To Joan—again
MAPS BY ELIZABETH NICOLL FELTON
All photographs courtesy United States Navy; Submarine Force Library and Museum; Rear Admiral
Lewis S. Parks, U.S.N. (Ret.); United States Naval Institute.
The schematic cutaway of a fleet boat is reproduced from United States Submarine Operations in
World War II by Theodore Roscoe by permission of Fred Freeman.
The excerpts from Submarine! by Commander Edward L. Beach, U.S.N., are reprinted By
permission of the publishers, Holt, Rinehart and Winston, Inc.
The excerpts from the article "Unlucky in June: Hiyo Meets Trigger," by Commander Edward L.
Beach, U.S.N., are reprinted by permission from Proceedings; copyright © 1957 U.S. Naval
Institute.
The excerpts from War Fish by George Grider and Lydel Sims (copyright © 1958 by George Grider
and Lydel Sims) are reprinted by permission of Little, Brown and Co.
The excerpts from The Codebreakers by David Kahn (copyright © 1967 by David Kahn) are
reprinted by permission of Macmillan Publishing Co., Inc.
The excerpts from Sink 'Em All by Charles A. Lockwood are reprinted by permission of Mrs. Charles
A. Lockwood.
The excerpts from Wake of the Wahoo by Forest J. Sterling (copyright © 1960 by the author) are
reprinted with the permission of the publisher, Chilton Book Company, Radnor, Pa.
Copyright © 1975 by Clay Blair, Jr.
Acknowledgments
Countless people contributed to this book in countless ways. I would like to thank:
My wife, Joan. She worked side by side with me in the archives and libraries for many months,
traveled around the United States helping to conduct the scores of interviews, transcribed the
tapes of those interviews and then indexed the material by subject matter, typed the manuscript
twice, drew up the patrol charts and other material listed in the appendix, and helped with the
correspondence, the endless filing and refiling, and a hundred other tasks. Without her cheerful
assistance and unwavering faith through three years, this book could not have been written.
Peg Cameron and Janet Baker, Lippincott editors, whose work was brilliant, persevering,
thoughtful, and to the point.
Many people in the U.S. Navy, beginning with the director of the division of history, Vice Admiral
Edwin Bichford Hooper, U.S.N. (Ret.). Particular thanks to Dr. Dean C. Allard, Head, Operational
Archives Branch, and his assistants, especially Mrs. Katherine Lloyd; W. B. Greenwood, Librarian,
Navy Library; and Commander R. E. Hurd, Head of Ships' Histories division. In addition, special
thanks to Thomas J. Stebbins, QMCM (SS), Director of the Submarine Force Library and Museum,
Naval Submarine Base, New London, Groton, Connecticut; and to Bernardine Kimmerling and
Betty W. Shirley and Judy L. Parker of the Biographies Branch, Office of Information, Department
of the Navy; and to Captain Roger Pineau, friend, naval historian, and Director of the Navy
Museum.
I am especially grateful to another friend, naval historian and distinguished submariner Captain
Edward L. Beach, U.S.N. (Ret). In the preparation of the book, Beach kindly granted two long and
helpful interviews, later responded to lengthy queries, and finally volunteered to read galleys on
the finished book, an enormous task which he carried out with dispatch and thoroughness. He
found errors, challenged many assertions, and suggested improvements.
In addition to Beach, I am indebted to the scores of World War II submarine skippers and staff
officers who granted interviews or responded to queries; without their cooperation, this book
would not have been possible. Particular thanks go to Vice Admiral Ralph W. Christie, U.S.N. (Ret.).
A description of his contributions and the names of the other staff officers and skippers who
helped appear in the section of Sources given at the back of the book.
Finally, I wish to thank many who contributed to this book in ways other than research or editorial:
The Honorable William R. Anderson, former Congressman from Tennessee, and his staff,
especially Al Wise and Judy Miller; Julie and Ted Drury, Linda and George Henshaw, lola and Elmer
Hintz, DuBos and Trevor Arm-brister of Washington, D.C.; Marybelle and Don Schanche of
Larchmont, New York; Barbara and Zen Yonkovig of Greenwich, Connecticut; Rust Hills of
Stonington, Connecticut; Susie and Tad Rutledge of Lake Bluff, Illinois; Dr. John Shields and Anne
Rut-ledge Shields of Springfield, Illinois; Captain William Cauldwell, U.S.A.F., and Jean Cauldwell,
Yuba City, California; Eleanor and Frederic Sherman and Ms. Evelyn Watt, Key Biscayne, Florida;
and Hank Walker of Miami.
Clay Blair, Jr.
Washington-Key Biscayne
1970-74
Contents
VOLUME 1
Introduction
Part I
1. Background for War
Early Developments—Progress in Europe—Submarines in World War I—Submarines and Politics
I—Secret Enterprises—Submarines and Politics II —New Deal for the Navy—War in Europe—The
Main Enemy—Plans in the Far East—Intercepted Mail
Part II
2. Pearl Harbor, December 1941
The Japanese Attacks on Pearl Harbor and Midway—First Patrols to Empire Waters—First Patrols
to the Marshalls—The Sinking of I-173—Results of the First Patrols—The Japanese Attack on Wake
Island
3. Manila, December 1941
The Japanese Attack on Clark Field—The Japanese Attacks on Cavité and Manila—The First Patrols
from Manila—The "Battle" of Lingayen Gulf—The Loss of Manila
Part III
4. Java and Australia, January through April 1942
The Japanese Drive to the Malay Barrier—Special Submarine Missions—The "Defense" of Java—
Retreat to Australia—Evaluation ana Decision
5. Pearl Harbor, January through March 1942
January Departures—February Departures—March Departures
6. Brisbane, April and May 1942
Arrival of More S-Boats—The Battle of the Coral Sea
7. Pearl Harbor, April through June 1942
April Departures—The Hunt for "Wounded Bear" —The Battle of Midway—June Departures
8. Washington, June and July 1942
The Midway Security Leak—Changes in the Codebreaking Operation—H.O.R. Engine Problems
9. Alaska, 1942
Japanese Landings on Kiska and Attu—SubmarinePatrols in Alaskan Waters
10. Fremantle, April through August 1942
Torpedo Tests and Experiments—PersonnelChanges—Departing Patrols
11. Brisbane, May through September 1942
The Battle of Savo Island—May, June, and July Departures—Battle of the Eastern Solomons —
August and September Departures
12. Pearl Harbor, July through December 1942
July, August, and September Patrols to Truk—Patrols to Empire, East China Sea, and Alaskan
Waters, July through October—Subversive Literature—Battles of Espérance and Santa Cruz —
October, November, ana December Patrols to Truk—November and December Patrols to Empire
and East China Sea Waters
13. Brisbane, October through December 1942
The Battle of Guadalcanal—Submarine Patrols-Changes in Personnel
14. Fremantle, September through December 1942
15. Summary, 1942
Part IV
16. Submarine Command, January 1943
17. Brisbane, January through May 1943
The Death of Admiral Yamamoto—"Playing Checkers" with Submarines—Wahoo's January
Patrol—The Palau-Rabaul Convoy Route
18. Fremantle, January through July 1943
Experiment at Exmouth Gulf—Patrols and Losses
19. Pearl Harbor, January through March 1943
The Casablanca Conference—Submarine Command Credits and Debits—Departing Patrols
20. Alaska, 1943
The U.S. Invasions of Attu and Kiska—Patrolsfrom Dutch Harbor
21. Pearl Harbor, April through August 1943
Additions to the Pacific Fleet—Ultra-directed Patrols—Final Isolation of the Mark XIV Torpedo
Defects—The H.O.R. Boats—Some Good Patrols, and Some Bad Ones—First Forays into the Sea of
Japan
22. Brisbane, June through December 1943
Surface-Force Engagements in the Solomons —More Boats for Australia—Single Patrols—
Cooperative Efforts
23. Fremantle, August through December 1943
Tankers as Targets—More Cooperative Efforts— Crevalle's First Two Patrols—Mixed Bags and
Special Missions—Puffer's First Patrol—Loss of Capelin and Cisco—Final Deactivation of the Mark
VI Exploder
24. Pearl Harbor, September through December 1943
The U.S. Invasion of the Gilbert Islands-Improvements in Submarine Weapons and Strategies—
Wahoo'sLost Patrol—Ultra-directed Patrols —Davenport, Dornin, and Cutter—Special Missions—
More Ultra Information—Patrols Good andNot So Good-The First Three Wolf Packs-Changes in
Command
25. Summary, 1943 521
VOLUME 2
Part V
26. Pearl Harbor, January through April 1944
The U.S. Invasion of the Marshall Islands—Interceptions in the Marshalls and Other Missions—
Action During the Palaus Air Strike—Transfers to Fremantle—Empire and East China Sea Patrols—
The Polar Circuit—Wolf Packs Four and Five-Patrols to the Marianas—Patrols to Okinawa
27. Australia, January through March 1944
Codebreaking and the New Guinea Campaign-Patrols from Fremantle
28. Australia, April through June 1944
Showdown in the Marianas—The Joint Strike on Surabaya—Patrols to Tawi Tawi and Davao—The
Japanese Reinforcement of Biak
29. Pearl Harbor, May and June 1944
Patrols to the Marianas—The Battle of the Philippine Sea
30. Pearl Harbor and Australia, June to July 1944
The Fight for Saipan—Patrols from Pearl Harbor— Search for the Nickel Ship—Wolf Packs in Luzon
Strait—Patrols in the East and South China Seas
31. Washington, Summer 1944
32. Pearl Harbor and Australia, July and August 1944
Debate over Pacific Strategy—Patrols from Pearl Harbor—Four Wolf Packs in Luzon Strait—Patrols
from Australia—The Loss of Harder
33. Pearl Harbor and Australia, September to October 1944
The U.S. Invasions of the Palaus and Morotai— Pearl Harbor Support of the Landings—Wolf Packs
from Pearl Harbor—Single Patrols from Pearl Harbor—Australian Support of the Landings
34. Pearl Harbor and Australia, October to November 1944
Air Strikes on Formosa and the Philippines—The U.S. Invasion of Leyte—The Battle of Leyte Gulf—
Patrols from Pearl Harbor—Patrols from Australia
35. Pearl Harbor and Australia, November and December 1944
NewInventions for U.S. Boats—Burt's Brooms— 'The U.S. Invasions of Mindoro and Luzon-Patrols
from Australia—Patrols from Pearl Harbor
36. Submarine Command, December 1944
37. Summary, 1944
Part VI
38. Pearl Harbor and Guam, January through March 1945
The U.S. Invasions of Iwo Jima and Okinawa—Patrols from Guam—Attacks from the Air—Tirante's
First Patrol
39. Fremantle and Subic Bay, January through August 1945
The Move to Subic Bay—Pursuit of Ise and Hyuga —The Remaining Targets: Isuzu, Haguro,
Ashigara, and Takao
40. Pearl Harbor and Guam, April through August 1945
New Forays in the Sea of Japan—Rescues andTargets—The Japanese Surrender
Part VII
41. After the War
Appendixes
A. World War II Submarine Squadron Commanders, Pacific
B. World War II Submarine Skippers Selected to Flag Rank
C. Postwar Commanders of Submarines Atlantic Fleet
D. Postwar Commanders of Submarines Pacific Fleet
E. Submarine War Patrols, Atlantic
F. Submarine War Patrols, Pacific
G. Top Skippers of World War II
H. Best War Patrols by Numbers of Ships Sunk
I. Best War Patrols by Tonnage of Ships Sunk
J. Top Submarines by Number of Ships Sunk
K. Top Submarines by Tonnage of Ships Sunk
L. Submarine Losses in World War II
Sources
About the Author
Photograph sections follow pages 174 and 706.
Maps
By Elizabeth Nicoll Felton
(Surface-force tracks and submarine positions are approximate)
VOLUME 1
Japanese Approaches to Pearl Harbor, Midway, and Wake Island
Japanese Attacks on Pearl Harbor and Midway
Japanese Invasion of Wake Island
Japanese Invasion of Luzon
U.S. Submarine Deployment, December 8-15, 1941
"Battle" of Lingayen Gulf
Japanese Invasion of Borneo and Celebes
Japanese Invasion of Java
Battle of die Coral Sea
Retreat of "Wounded Bear"
Movements Against Midway and the Aleutians
Battle of Midway
Blockade of Truk
Recapture of Attu and Kiska
Sea of Japan I, Summer 1943
Allied Counteroffensive, Summer-Fall 1943
Invasion of the Gilberts
VOLUME 2
Invasion of the Marshalls
Air Strike on Truk
Air Strike on the Marianas
Air Strikes on the Palaus
Reconquest of New Guinea
Strike on Surabaya
Invasion of Biak
Invasion of the Marianas
Battle of the Philippine Sea
Ozawa's Retreat, June 20-24, 1944
Invasions of the Palaus and Morotai
Invasion of Leyte
Battle for Leyte Gulf
Ozawa's Retreat, October 25-29, 1944
Invasions of Mindoro and Luzon
Invasion of Iwo Jima
Invasion of Okinawa
YamatoSortie
Escape ofIseandHyuga
Sea of Japan II, June 1945
Introduction
During the naval conflict in the Pacific between the United States and Japan, 1941-1945, there was
a little-known war-within-a-war: the U.S. submarine offensive against Japanese merchant shipping
and naval forces. A mere handful of submariners, taking a small force of boats on 1,600-odd war
patrols, sank more than 1,000 Japanese merchant ships and a significant portion of the Japanese
navy, including one battleship, eight aircraft carriers, three heavy cruisers, and eight light cruisers.
A strong merchant marine was vital to the economy and warmaking potential of the island nation
of Japan. Its ships imported oil, iron ore, coal, bauxite, rubber, and foodstuffs; they exported arms,
ammunition, aircraft, and soldiers to reinforce captured possessions. When submarines
succeeded in stopping this commerce, Japan was doomed.
After the United States recaptured Guam and Saipan in the summer of 1944, U.S. submarines
basing from those two islands imposed a virtual blockade against Japan. Few ships entered or left
Japanese waters without being attacked by submarine; most that attempted it were sunk. Japan
ran out of oil for her navy; gasoline for her aircraft, trucks, and automobiles; steel, aluminum, and
other metal for her industry; and food for her teeming population. After the war, when the full
impact of the submarine blockade became known, many experts concluded that the invasions of
the Palaus, the Philippines, Iwo Jima, and Okinawa, and the dropping of fire bombs and atomic
bombs on Japanese cities, were unnecessary. They reasoned that despite the fanatical desire of
some Japanese to hang on and fight to the last man, the submarine blockade alone would have
ultimately defeated that suicidal impulse.
In the prosecution of the undersea war, the U.S. submarine force took a secret weapon into battle:
from 1941 to 1945 U.S. Navy code-breakers "read the Japanese mail" with comparative ease.
Because codebreakers supplied the submarine force with precise information on the sailing dates,
course, speed, and routing of most Japanese convoys and naval formations, U.S. submarine force
commanders could direct their boats to the proper intercept positions to lie in wait for the
oncoming enemy forces. Although no precise accounting has ever been made, the codebreakers
assisted, directly or indirectly, in the sinking of perhaps half of all Japanese vessels destroyed by
U.S. submarines. The Japanese were unaware of this weapon.
Even so, it was no easy victory. Before the attack on Pearl Harbor, the United States had sworn in
various international treaties never to engage in "unrestricted submarine warfare," that is,
submarine surprise attacks against merchant vessels. During peacetime years, U.S. submariners
who hoped to become part of the U.S. battle fleet mostly concentrated their training on tactics
aimed at sinking important enemy men-of-war—carriers, battleships, cruisers—and their boats,
known as fleet submarines, were designed with this goal in mind. After December 7, 1941,
however, the United States abandoned its high-minded moral position and ordered unrestricted
submarine warfare against Japan. By an accident of history, the fleet submarine proved to be the
ideal weapon for war against the Japanese merchant marine. However, the shift in missions
caught the submarine force flat-footed. It required new strategy and tactics. Many months went
by before the submarine force got the hang of this new role.
There were other problems. Peacetime exercises, most of them unrealistic and artificial, had led
submariners to believe that aircraft, sonar gear, and powerful depth charges made the submarine
highly vulnerable to enemy counterattack. This belief in turn had led to extreme caution in the
submarine force. The best way to survive, the peacetime submarine commanders believed, was to
make an attack from deep submergence, using sonar apparatus. The daylight periscope attack, the
night periscope attack, and the night surface attack were considered hazardous, and for a
submarine to operate on the surface within 500 miles of an enemy air base was considered fatal.
Too many months went by before submariners discovered these preconceptions to be wide of the
mark.
The cautious peacetime training led to serious personnel problems in wartime. In peacetime bold,
reckless, innovative skippers who were "caught" in war game maneuvers were reprimanded, and
older, conservative, "by-the-book" officers, who were strict disciplinarians and conscientious with
paperwork, rose to command. When war came, too many of these older men failed as skippers.
During the first year and a half of the war, dozens had to be relieved for "lack of aggressiveness" (a
disaster, both professionally and emotionally, for the men involved) and replaced by brash devil-
may-care younger officers, some of whom would never have attained command in peacetime.
This general changeover took months to accomplish, and many valuable opportunities were lost
before it became effective.
The failure in leadership extended to the highest levels of the submarine force. When the war
began, the forces were commanded by officers who had risen to the top by the safest and most
cautious routes, who did not understand the potential of the submarine. They placed a premium
on caution; bring the boat back. Yielding to higher authority, they allowed their forces to be
fragmented and employed in marginal, fruitless diversions. At least a year and a half went by
before these command problems were ironed out and men with a good grasp of how submarines
could be most profitably employed took over the top jobs.
The product of codebreaking turned out to be a two-edged sword. On the one hand, it provided
marvelous intelligence on enemy naval and merchant marine movements. On the other hand, its
secret nature and glamour led submarine force commanders to divert far too many boats from
the war against merchant shipping to pursue the dramatic "big kill" that would look good in the
dispatches—Japanese battleships, carriers, and cruisers. Countless times, U.S. submarine captains
were vectored to such targets only to find that, because of navigational errors on the part of the
Japanese or themselves, these high-speed prizes passed just beyond attack range and could not
be overtaken. Months went by before it dawned on the force commanders that a Japanese
tanker—easier to find and sink—was as valuable to the overall war effort as a light cruiser.
Last—but by no means least—the submarine force was hobbled by defective torpedoes.
Developed in peacetime but never realistically tested against targets, the U.S. submarine torpedo
was believed to be one of the most lethal weapons in the history of naval warfare. It had two
exploders, a regular one that detonated it on contact with the side of an enemy ship and a very
secret "magnetic exploder" that would detonate it beneath the keel of a ship without contact.
After the war began, submariners discovered the hard way that the torpedo did not run steadily at
the depth set into its controls and often went much deeper than designed, too deep for the
magnetic exploder to work. When this was corrected, they discovered that the magnetic exploder
itself was defective under certain circumstances, often detonating before the torpedo reached the
target. And when the magnetic exploder was deactivated, the contact exploder was found to be
faulty. Each of these flaws tended to conceal the others, and it was not until September 1943,
twenty-one months after the attack on Pearl Harbor, that all the torpedo defects were corrected.
Had it not been for these command weaknesses, misconceptions, and technical defects, the naval
war in the Pacific might have taken a far different course. Intelligently employed, with a workable
torpedo, submarines might have entirely prevented the Japanese invasion of the Philippines and
the Netherland East Indies. Skippers emboldened by swift and certain torpedo success, instead of
puzzled and dismayed by obvious torpedo failure, might have inflicted crippling damage on the
Japanese navy much earlier. The war in the Pacific might have been shortened by many, many
months.
Part I

1 Background for War
Early Developments