Sharing Responsibility

220 Pages·1996·4.047 MB·English

by  Larry May

I s moral responsibility limited only to the con­
sequences of overt individual actions? Or are
individuals also responsible for attitudes, inac­
tion, and the consequences of actions taken by
their communities?
In this original work, Larry May argues that
even when they do not directly participate,
people share responsibility for various harms
perpetrated by their communities. A robust
theory of responsibility, May holds, must pay
heed to the makeup of the self as well as to
actions: not only "what we do," but in a larger
sense, "who we are."
Taking as its point of departure some of the
insights of Hannah Arendt, May's analysis con­
fronts mainstream theories of responsibility
with the ideas of continental philosophers who
demanded that specific human experience pro­
vide the grounding for philosophy. May relies
here on the work of Karl Jaspers and the later
Sartre concerning the self as a social construct—
an interplay of history, social conditioning, and
the chosen behavior of the individual. Arguing
against "the retreat from responsibility" es­
poused by many continental and analytic moral
theorists, he contrasts his views both with those
(continued on back flap)

The University of Chicago Press
Chicago and London
Larry May is professor of philosophy at Washington University in St. Louis.
The University of Chicago Press, Chicago 60637
The University of Chicago Press, Ltd., London
© 1992 by The University of Chicago
All rights reserved. Published 1992
Printed in the United States of America
01 00 99 98 97 96 95 94 93 92 5 4 3 2 1
ISBN (cloth): 0-226-51168-5
Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data
May, Larry.
Sharing responsibility / Larry May. ,
p. cm.
Includes bibliographical references and index.
ISBN 0-226-51168-5 (alk. paper)
1. Responsibility. 2. Social ethics. 3. Social groups—Moral and
ethical aspects. 4. Existential ethics. I. Title.
BJ1451.M36 1992
170—dc20 92-12658
CIP
© The paper used in this publication meets the
minimum requirements of the American National Standard
for Information Sciences— Permanence of Paper for
Printed Library Materials, ANSI Z39.48-1984.
For Marilyn
Digitized by the Internet Archive
in 2017 with funding from
Kahle/Austin Foundation
https://archive.org/details/sharingresponsibOOmayl
Contents
Acknowledgments
Introduction
1. Social Existentialism 2
2. Shared Attitudes 5
3. Omissions and Responsibility in Groups 7® '
4. Communities and Shared Values 9
Part One: Attitudes, Agency, and Responsibility
1 Existentialism, Self, and Voluntariness
1. Responsibility and Agency 15
2. Existentialism and the Self 18
3. An Underground Movement in Ethics 25
4. Voluntariness and Involuntariness 27
2 Shared Responsibility and Racist Attitudes
1. The Concept of Shared Responsibility 37 *
2. Joint Ventures and Conspiracies 40
3. Omissions and Risks 42*
4. Racist Attitudes and Risks 46
5. Agency and Attitudes 52
3 Insensitivity and Moral Responsibility
1. The Concept of Sensitivity 56
2. Sense and Sensitivity 59
3. Insensitivity and Culpable Ignorance 62
4. The Influence of Stereotypes 64
5. Habits and One's Future Self 67
Part Two: Omission, Inaction, and Groups »
4 Groups and Personal Value Transformation
1. Personal and Group Values 74
2. Risking Harm and Institutional Desensitization
3. Responsibility and Omission in Groups 83
Contents
5 Negligence and Professional Responsibility 87
1. Negligence and Due Care 88
2. Integrity and Omissions 93
3. Personal Guilt and Negligence 95
4. Moral Integrity and Professional Negligence 98
"“^6 Collective Inaction and Responsibility 105
1. Collective Action and Collective Inaction 106
2. Collective Responsibility and Putative Groups 109
3. Sharing Responsibility for Collective Inaction 112
4. Practical and Ontological Objections 116
5. Tragedy and Inactivity 122
Part Three: Communities, Roles, and Responsibilities
7 Philosophers and Political Responsibility 127
1. The Philosopher as Gadfly 128
2. The Philosopher as Seeker of Wisdom 133
3. The Special Responsibilities of Philosophers 137
4. The Responsibilities of Philosophers as a Group 141
8 Metaphysical Guilt and Moral Taint 146
1. The Concept of Metaphysical Guilt 147
2. Guilt and Community Membership 152
3. The Case of South African Divestment 155
4. Expanding the Domain of Moral Responsibility 160
9 Role Conflicts, Community, and Shared Agency 163
1. Roles and Conscientiousness 164
2. Conflicts of Responsibility 168
3. Shared Agency and the Problem of Difference 172
4. Communitarianism and Discriminatory Traditions 176
Notes 184
Index 199