Shaping the Normative Landscape

271 Pages·2012·1.752 MB·English

by  David Owens

Shaping the Normative Landscape
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Shaping the Normative
Landscape
DAVID OWENS
1
3
GreatClarendonStreet,Oxford,ox26dp,
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Preface
Thisbookcontributestoatraditionofthoughtaccordingtowhichfactsaboutwhat
peoplehavearightto,orwhatobligationstheyhave,orwhattheyaretobeblamed
for,dependonfactsabouthumaninterests.Idepartfrom(ordevelop)thistradition
inpostulatingnormativeinterests.
Thephrase‘normativeinterest’canbegiveneitherabroadoranarrowconstrual.
Onthebroaderconstrualanormativeinterestisanyinterestwithnormativesignifi-
cance,anyinterestthataffectsthenormativesituation,anyinterestthatisnormative
forus,whichshouldguidehowwethink,feel,andact.Onthenarrowerconstruala
normative interest is an interest that takes normative phenomena as its object, an
interestinwhichthoughts,feelings,andactionsareobligatory,blameworthy,appro-
priate, or even intelligible. I’ll be using ‘normative interest’ in this second sense. In
particular,Ishallurgethatawiderangeofnormativephenomenacanbeexplained
onlybysupposingthathumanbeingshaveinterestsincontrollingthedistributionof
rightsandobligations, theappropriate objectsofblame,etc.,interestsdistinctfrom
their non-normative interests. Our interests in the normative are often normative
forus.
This book is concerned with what I call choice-dependent obligations, a varied
category which includes obligations of reciprocation and due care for expectations,
obligations implicated in relationships like friendship, obligations which can be
abolished by consent, as well as promissory obligations. The book also considers
forgiveness.Toexplainthesephenomena,Iconstructanddeployanaccountoftheir
value.Thesameapproachmaycastlightonaspectsofoursociallivesthatlieonthe
periphery of the present work such as property rights, political authority, positive
law,andlinguisticassertion.
Myaccountofthesematters differsfrom manyothers inthatitmakesnouse of
notions with a special moralized sense. I am thinking of ‘autonomy’, ‘respect’,
‘recognition’, and ‘equality’, as well ‘moral obligation ‘moral value’, ‘moral right’,
‘moralreason’,‘moralprinciple’,andsoforth.Iworrythat(atleastintheirintended
sense)thesenotionscannotbeunderstoodindependentlyofthedeonticphenomena
we are trying to explain. My own foundational notions—‘interest’, ‘value’, ‘habit’,
‘practice’,‘appropriate’,‘intelligible’,andsoforth—areofverybroadapplicationand
so offeranexplanatorypurchaseonthedeontic.Evenacompletescepticaboutthe
deonticwouldneedtoemploytheminotherdomains.
Tomymindrecentwritingaboutmoralitypresentsuswithafalsedilemma.Some
think ‘moral’ norms are to be established by practical reasoning and that our
adherencetothemisanexpressionofournatureasfreeandrationalbeings.Within
Preface vii
this camp there is a lively debate about what constitutes practical reasoning but
relatively little discussion of whether morality is generated by practical reasoning.
Others insist that ‘moral’ norms are the products of those drives, reflexes, and
instincts which enabled us to prevail in the evolutionary struggle, that they express
our animal nature. On this view, guilt, blame, and even conscientious agency are
moresophisticatedversionsofsomethingthatoccursthroughouttheanimalworld.
Perhapsthe rationalist and the naturalist approachare each suited toexplain some
aspect of what is generally called morality but I doubt they cover the field. Our
normativenicheismouldedbyhabits,customs,andpractices.Thesesocialphenom-
enaaretheproductsofrationalchoicesbuttosubscribetoapracticeortoactoutof
habitistoactneitheronreasonnoronimpulse.
Inthepastdecade,Ihaveacquiredmanydebtstopersonsandinstitutions.Asto
thelatter,IowethankstotheUniversityofSheffieldforgrantingmesabbaticalleave
in 2001 and again in 2005 and to the Arts and Humanities Research Council for
supportingmyworkonbothoccasionsthroughtheirResearchLeaveScheme.Ialso
thanktheSchoolofAdvancedStudyintheUniversityofLondonforenablingmeto
spend theautumnof2005in Londonasa Visiting Professorial Fellow.During that
first phase ofworkImanaged towrite several papersonpromising and obligation.
That I was able to turn these papers into this book is down to the Leverhulme
Foundationwhoawardedmeatwo-yearMajorResearchFellowshipfor2008–9.Iam
deeply grateful for that opportunity. I spent the autumn of 2009 revising the
manuscript in Oxford, thanks to the award of a Visiting Fellowship at All Souls
College.Thefinalversionofthebookwaspreparedintheautumnof2011duringa
term of sabbatical leave from the University of Reading and whilst I was a Visiting
FellowattheNewYorkUniversityInstituteofPhilosophy.Iwasalsotherecipientof
a British Academy Research Development Award for a project on ‘Telling and
Trusting’between2009and2011.Thisawardfinancedanumberofworkshopsthat
aidedthedevelopmentoftheseideas.
My interest in many of the issues discussed here grew out of a seminar on
promissoryobligationrunbyLiamMurphybackin2001.DanielMarkovits,Joseph
Raz, Nishi Shah, and David Velleman all played an important role in bringing the
projecttocompletion,byreadingdraftsanddiscussingtheissuesaswellsupporting
myworkinotherways.JonathanAdler,whodiedwhilstthisbookwasinpress,wasa
constantsourceofhelpandencouragement.Iamalsogratefulforthecommentsof
Jody Azzouni, Ralph Bader, Chris Bennett, Curtis Bridgeman, Tim Clarke, Jules
Coleman, Troy Cross, Veronique Munoz-Darde, Stephen Darwall, Alex Gregory,
Matt Evans, Kati Farkas, John Gardner, Zoltan Szabo Gendler, Michael Gibb,
Andrew Gold, Pete Graham, Peter Goldie, Leslie Green, Edward Harcourt, Alison
Hills,BradHooker,ChrisHookway,RobertHopkins,UlrikeHeuer,MikeHuemer,
Shelly Kagan, Francis Kamm, Rosanna Keefe, Gregory Klass, Niko Kolodny, Jody
Kraus, Noa Leibowitz, Jimmy Lenman, Michael Martin, Mike Otsuka, Richard
viii Preface
Parkhill,IanPhillips,TomPink,MichaelPratt,AndrewSimester,JenniferSaul,Tim
Scanlon,SamScheffler,SeanaShiffrin,JonathanSmith,MattSmith,NicSouthwood,
MichaelStocker,GalenStrawson,SharonStreet,JohnTasioulas,RogerTeichmann,
PeterVallentyne,DanielViehoff,GaryWatson,RalphWedgwood,andLeifWenar.
IthankOxfordUniversityPressforpermissiontoquotefromHume’sTreatiseon
Human Nature, 2nd edn., ed. P. Nidditch. Parts of Chapter3 are taken from
‘Rationalism about Obligation’, European Journal of Philosophy 16(3) (December
2008):403–31.Chapter5isbasedon‘TheProblemwithPromising’,inH.Sheinman
(ed.): Understanding Promises: Philosophical Essays (Oxford: Oxford University
Press 2011): 58–79. Most of Chapter8 appears as ‘Promising Without Intending’,
Journal of Philosophy 105(12) (December 2008): 737–55, and parts of Chapter10
derive from ‘Duress, Deception and the Validity of a Promise’, Mind 116(462)
(April2007):293–315.InChapters6and9,Ireproducesectionsof‘ASimpleTheory
of Promising’, Philosophical Review 115(1) (January 2006): 51–77, and passages in
Chapters 1 and 4 appear in ‘The Value of Duty’, Proceedings of the Aristotelian
Society,SupplementaryVolumeLXXVI(July2010).Finally,anabbreviatedversionof
Chapter7 was published as ‘The Possibility of Consent’ Ratio 24 (December
2011): 402–21.
I am grateful to Sam Ishii-Gonzales for the front cover and for fifteen years of
supportandencouragement.
Contents
Introduction 1
1. Choice-dependentobligations 3
2. Normativeinterests 6
3. Makingsense 12
4. Deonticvalue 17
Part I: Interests
1. BlameandGuilt 25
5. Blameasanger 27
6. Aptnessandaccuracy 31
7. Blamewithoutanger? 34
8. Thescopeofblameandthenatureofguilt 40
2. Wronging 44
9. Wrongsandwrongings 45
10. Wrongingsandforgiveness 51
11. Remissiveinterests 58
12. Wrongingsandinterests 61
3. Obligation 68
13. Thesanctiontheory 70
14. Scanlononwrong 73
15. Policiesandhabits 76
16. Theconscientiousagent 85
17. Blame,exclusion,andconflictsofobligation 89
4. ObligationandInvolvement 96
18. Friendshipandotherformsofinvolvement 97
19. Custom,choice,andinvolvement 100
20. Friendshipandbenefaction 104
21. Involvementsanddeonticinterests 111
22. ConclusiontoPartI 117
Part II: Powers
5. TheProblemwithPromising 123
23. Theproblemofbarewronging 123
24. Theproblemofnormativepower 127