Shadow Flights: Americas Secret Air War Against the Soviet Union

326 Pages·2001·50.74 MB·English

by  Curtis Peebles

Curtis Peeblc
author of
PARK EAGLES and
WATCH THE SKIES!
SHADOW FLIGHTS
America's Secret Air War Against
the Soviet Union
Curtis Peebles
*
PRESIDIO
Copyright © 2000 by Curtis Peebles
Published by Presidio Press, Inc.
505 B San Marin Drive, Suite 160
Novato, CA 94945-1340
All rights reserved. No part of this book may be reproduced or utilized in any
form or by any means, electronic or mechanical, including photocopying,
recording, or by any information storage and retrieval systems, without per-
mission in writing from the publisher. Inquiries should be addressed to Pre-
sidio Press, Inc., 505 B San Marin Drive, Suite 160, Novato, CA 94945-1340.
V
Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data
Peebles, Curtis.
Shadow flights : America's secret air war against the Soviet Union /
Curtis Peebles,
p. cm.
Includes bibliographical references and index.
ISBN 0-89141-700-1
1. United States—Foreign relations—Soviet Union. 2. Soviet
Union—Foreign relations—United States. 3. United States—Foreign
relations—1945-1989. 4. United States—Military relations—Soviet
Union. 5. Soviet Union—Military relations—United States. 6. Air war-
fare—History. 7. Espionage, American—Soviet Union—History.
8. Cold War. I. Title.
E183.8.S65 P44 2000
327'.73047—dc21
Printed in the United States of America
Contents
Introduction 1
One: Early Covert Overflights 4
Two: Covert Overflights Under Eisenhower 40
Three: The Birth of the U-2 62
Four: Genetrix and Homerun 106
Five: Early U-2 Overflights 130
Six: Soft Touch 164
Seven: The Missile Gap 195
Eight: From Touchdown to Grand Slam 231
Nine: Reflections on a Secret War 278
Sources 290
Index 305
Introduction
At 10:04 A.M. Pacific standard time (PST) on December 20,1996, the roar
from the rocket engines of a Titan IV booster echoed across Vandenberg
Air Force Base. The booster lifted off Satellite Launch Complex 4-East
and climbed into the clear blue sky trailing a plume of white smoke and
orange flame. A few seconds later, the wall of sound reached the press
site. It was a loud, crackling noise that grew in volume and physical power
until one's chest vibrated. The rocket climbed vertically, then turned
south and headed toward polar orbit. The two solid-fuel boosters burned
out, then fell away. Soon after, the first-stage engines shut down. The sec-
ond stage then separated; its engine ignited and propelled the payload
toward orbit. Within a few minutes, confirmation was received that the
satellite was successfully placed into orbit.
Before the launch, each member of the small group of reporters was
given a blue folder. Inside was a single-page press release stating that the
payload aboard the rocket was "a satellite designed and built by the Na-
tional Reconnaissance Office (NRO)." It continued: "This event is the
first time the U.S. Government has acknowledged, in advance, the
launch of a reconnaissance satellite." Also in the press kit was a small
booklet explaining that "the NRO manages the research, development,
acquisition and operation of U.S. spy satellites. .. . NRO-gathered intel-
ligence is used to monitor arms control agreements, to support indica-
tions and warning requirements, and to help plan and conduct military
operations." Some of the NRO's successes included providing accurate
information on the Soviet Union's ICBM programs, exposing deception
operations such as North Korea's attempts to mask a nuclear weapons
facility, and detection of Iraqi violations of United Nations (UN) sanc-
tions as the Iraqis massed troops along the Kuwaiti border.
1
2 SHADOW FLIGHTS
But all of this did not spring into existence fully formed. The satellite
and the NRO both trace their existence back fifty years.
In May 1945, as Nazi Germany surrendered to the Allies, another war
was about to begin. The Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR) now
controlled occupation zones in the eastern half of Germany and part of
Austria and was pressing for substantial reparations from those defeated
nations. In Eastern Europe, the Soviets soon established effective con-
trol of Poland, Romania, Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, and Hungary via
coalition governments with communists in key positions. The amount
of noncommunist participation varied in each country. Communist gov-
ernments had also taken over in Yugoslavia and Albania.
Soviet dictator Josef Stalin was also attempting to extend his influence
beyond these boundaries into Western Europe, the Near East, and Asia.
In France and Italy, the local communist parties were part of coalition
governments. Greek communists launched an uprising against the
British-backed government. Stalin demanded the return of two districts
in eastern Turkey that had been transferred from the USSR in 1921; he
also demanded that Soviet bases be established in the Turkish Straits,
which connected the Black Sea and the Mediterranean. The USSR was
also trying to establish pro-Soviet separatist states in northern Iran. Fi-
nally, the USSR's brief war against Japan in August 1945 placed the Red
Army in northern China and Korea. Stalin sought repeatedly to gain an
occupation zone in Japan.
Within the USSR, Stalin sought to isolate the Soviet people from for-
eign ideas and contacts. The first sign of renewed repression came in
early 1946, when a campaign was started to purify Soviet culture of West-
ern or non-Soviet ideas. Stalin oversaw the demands for "socialist real-
ism" in all forms of art; he closed down magazines and banned numer-
ous artists, composers, and poets, many of whom were Jewish. He also
considered efforts to gain more direct control of the foreign communist
parties.
The uneasy wartime alliance began to break down under the pressures
of conflicting policies and goals. An observer of communism and the
USSR sensed the change in the air. His name was George Orwell, and in
October 1945 he coined a phrase to describe this new postwar situation:
"Cold War."
The Soviet actions were unacceptable to the United States and other
Western nations. As part of this struggle, a secret air war was fought be-
tween the United States and the Soviet Union and its allies. For more
Introduction 3
than a decade, U.S. and British pilots made covert overflights behind the
iron curtain. They were the pathfinders who flew into the unknown, seek-
ing information on Soviet military and industrial power and looking for
any indications that the USSR might be preparing an attack on the West.
This is also the story of a small number of farsighted and courageous
men: of a single individual who, in a 1946 speech, defined the role of
aerial reconnaissance in the nuclear age; of the designer who created the
aircraft—the U-2—that made that vision a reality; of the scientists and
engineers who created the cameras and electronic equipment necessary
for the missions; of the pilots who flew the tricky and demanding U-2 air-
craft over the USSR; and of the president who understood the need, who
approved the overflights, and who paid the political price when a U-2
was lost.
As this struggle began, the United States needed intelligence on all
aspects of the USSR's military and industrial strengths and weaknesses.
This posed difficulties for U.S. intelligence. It was disorganized and di-
vided, with limited resources compared to those of the World War II era.
The USSR, its opponent, was a huge land, a police state whose reach ex-
tended into every Soviet home and around the world.
The threat facing the United States had also been changed by tech-
nology. The A-bomb had altered the nature of warfare and the measure
of a nation's military power. Just as once the number of battleships in a
nation's navy was the yardstick by which its power was judged, now it was
the possession of A-bombs. The United States had a monopoly on the A-
bomb, but it was unknown what progress was being made by the USSR
in developing its own nuclear capability. Even, as relations between the
United States and the USSR were breaking down, the first ideas about
how to meet these emerging intelligence requirements were beginning
to take shape.
Chapter 1
Early Covert Overflights
From Stettin in the Baltic to Trieste in the Adriatic, an Iron Curtain has de-
scended across the continent.
—Winston S. Churchill, March 5, 1946
The beginnings of the early covert overflights of the USSR date to the
period immediately following the end of World War II. Among many U.S.
military leaders, there was a realization that the A-bomb had funda-
mentally changed the nature of warfare. These included the Army Air
Forces (AAF) commander, General of the Army H. H. "Hap" Arnold. In
November 1945, he warned Secretary of War Robert Patterson that in
the future, U.S. leaders would require "continuous knowledge of po-
tential enemies," including all aspects of their "political, social, industrial,
scientific and military life," if the United States were to have advanced
"warning of impending danger." General Arnold advised that this could
not be acquired using traditional methods, such as air attaches. How this
might be done, however, he did not say.
Richard S. Leghorn and the Birth of Cold War Reconnaissance
The first to articulate a vision of how the intelligence demands of this
new postwar era might be met was Richard S. Leghorn. He had gradu-
ated from the Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT) in 1939 with
a degree in physics and a reserve commission as an army second lieu-
tenant. In late 1940, Leghorn accepted an active-duty assignment at the
Aeronautical Photographic Laboratory at Wright Field. Arriving in
March 1941, Leghorn began working with such optical scientists and en-
gineers as James G. Baker, Amrom Katz, Richard Philbrick, and Dun-
can Macdonald. Leghorn remained at the Aeronautical Photographic
Laboratory until late 1942, when he received orders to report for pilot
training.
4
Early Covert Overflights 5
In April 1943, Leghorn was assigned as commander of the 30th Pho-
tographic Reconnaissance Squadron. He and the unit arrived in England
in January 1944 and began flying missions over northern France, pho-
tographing German forces, transport networks, and communications fa-
cilities, in preparation for the D-day invasion. After the landings on June
6, 1944, Leghorn's unit flew in support of the U.S. First Army as it ad-
vanced through France, during the Battle of the Bulge at year's end, and
finally for its drive into Germany during the spring of 1945.
In the fall of 1945, Leghorn, now a reserve lieutenant colonel, was of-
fered the position of deputy commander of Task Unit 1.52, which was
assigned to photograph the Crossroads A-bomb tests. Leghorn returned
to active duty and was again working with his former colleagues from the
Aeronautical Photographic Laboratory days. During the long trip from
the staging base at Roswell Army Air Field to Kwajalein, Leghorn read a
copy of the United States Strategic Bombing Survey (Europe), which examined
the results and lessons of the air campaign against Nazi Germany.
Leghorn was struck by the conclusions reached by the study's authors.
They noted, for example, that "in the field of strategic intelligence, there
was an important need for further and more accurate information, es-
pecially before and during the early phases of the war." The report's con-
clusions ended with a look to a dark future: "The combination of the
atomic bomb with remote-control projectiles of ocean-spanning range
stands as a possibility which is awesome and frightful to contemplate."
Leghorn continued to mull over the report, as well as his own expe-
riences with photoreconnaissance, after reaching Kwajalein. The mis-
sions that he and his squadron had flown before D day had been able to
monitor the activities of German forces, and Leghorn became convinced
that high-altitude reconnaissance could detect in advance any threat-
ening moves by a foreign power. Leghorn saw the power of the A-bomb
during the Crossroads tests. Capital ships were sunk or were reduced to
"radioactive ovens." Leghorn's ideas about what he now called "pre-D-
day photography" were crystallized in conversations with the other op-
tical scientists that lasted long into the evening.
What would be required was a whole new philosophy of reconnais-
sance that would look for warning indicators, force levels, and an enemy's
capability to launch an attack rather than traditional targeting and dam-
age assessment. In the nightly discussions in the makeshift officers' club,
Leghorn argued that this was the only way to protect the United States
against an atomic Pearl Harbor. One of the earliest converts to Leghorn's
6 SHADOW FLIGHTS
ideas was Dr. Duncan Macdonald, who had been named head of the new
Boston University Optical Research Laboratory (BUORL). It was also
Macdonald who gave Leghorn the chance to present his ideas to an in-
fluential audience as keynote speaker at the December 13, 1946, dedi-
cation of BUORL.
Before representatives from the major film and camera companies,
as well as senior AAF officers, Leghorn described his vision of pre-D-day
photography. He began by saying that although efforts were under way
to create an international political structure to ensure peace, "should an
adequate poliucal structure not be established, or if a suitable one is
formed which should break down at any time in the future, then mili-
tary intelligence becomes the most important guardian of our national
security."
Having seen the Crossroads tests, Leghorn understood how the power
of atomic weapons had changed the ways in which wars would be fought.
He continued: "The nature of atomic warfare is such that once attacks
are launched against us, it will be extremely difficult, if not impossible,
to recover from them and counterattack successfully. Therefore, it ob-
viously becomes essential that we have prior knowledge of the possibil-
ity of an attack, for defensive actions against it must be taken before it is
launched. Military intelligence is the agency for providing this informa-
tion, and our national security rests upon its effectiveness, next to a sound
international political structure."
Leghorn then noted: "Aerial reconnaissance, as one of the principal
information collecting agencies of military intelligence, can play an ex-
ceedingly important role in this period prior to the outbreak of hostili-
ties. This situation is particularly true in the case of potential enemies of
a totalitarian, police-state nature where the acquisition of information
by the older means of military intelligence is more successfully blocked."
These nations were unlikely to give permission for an overflight, how-
ever, and without this authorization such a flight "would be considered
an act of military aggression." Leghorn found it unfortunate that al-
though "peacetime spying is considered a normal function between na-
tion-states, military aerial reconnaissance—which is simply another
method of spying—is given more weight as an act of military aggression."
Because any peacetime overflights of police states would have to be
done covertly, Leghorn added: "It is extraordinarily important that
means of long-range aerial reconnaissance be devised which cannot be
detected. . . . The accomplishment of this objective is not as technically