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SEVEN MYTHS of MILITARY HISTORY By John D. Hosler Seven Myths of Military History Myths of History: A Hackett Series Seven Myths of Military History Edited by John D. Hosler Series Editors Alfred J. Andrea and Andrew Holt Hackett Publishing Company, Inc. Indianapolis/Cambridge Copyright © 2022 by Hackett Publishing Company, Inc. All rights reserved Printed in the United States of America 25 24 23 22 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 For further information, please address Hackett Publishing Company, Inc. P.O. Box 44937 Indianapolis, Indiana 46244-0937 www.hackettpublishing.com Cover design by Rick Todhunter and Brian Rak Interior design by E. L. Wilson Composition by Aptara, Inc. Library of Congress Control Number: 2021944433 ISBN-13: 978-1-64792-043-2 (pbk.) ISBN-13: 978-1-64792-044-9 (cloth) ISBN-13: 978-1-64792-045-6 (PDF ebook) The paper used in this publication meets the minimum requirements of American National Standard for Information Sciences—Permanence of Paper for Printed Library Materials, ANSI Z39.48–1984. Contents About This Series vii Series Editors’ Foreword viii Editor’s Preface x Introduction: Myths Too Convenient to Fade Away xi 1. War and the Divine: Is Religion the Cause of Most Wars? 1 Andrew Holt 2. The Western Way of War: Battle, Imperialism, and Ethnocentrism 19 Everett L. Wheeler 3. The Myths of Feudalism and the Feudal Knight 45 Richard P. Abels 4. Military Revolutions: An Academic Party Game 74 John France 5. Strategic Air Power: An Elegant Idea Fallen Short 96 John Curatola 6. New Asymmetric Warfare: Something Old, Something New, Something Borrowed 132 William Kautt 7. Technological Determinism: Explaining Success and Failure in War 152 Rob Johnson Epilogue: To Bravely Go . . . 173 Suggested Reading 177 Contributor Biographies 181 Index 183 v About This Series The Myths of History series is dedicated to exposing and correcting some of the misconceptions, misjudgments, distortions, exaggerations, outdated interpretations, fallacies, seductive canards, and blatant lies that stick like super-glued Post-it notes to so many of history’s most significant events and actors. The series editors and the authors involved in this work do not believe that they are presenting pure truth or claim they are rendering the final word on the issues under examination. The craft of history does not allow its practitioners to speak with the voice of unquestionable authority, and the study of history does not produce immu- table laws and timeless narratives that will never be revised in the light of further investigation. Rather, each historian involved in this series offers a counter-narrative that reflects the best, most up-to-date scholarship on some important element of the past that has become encrusted with misconceptions that wither when tested against the available evidence and the general consensus of the profession. The reason for engaging such “myths” is simple. The past is neither dead nor for- gotten. Carefully honed knowledge of our shared past informs our understanding of who we are and our place in the here and now, and it also allows us to place our current concerns into a broad perspective. This never-ending dialogue between the present and the past—a process we term “history”—is vital to our lives, our societies, our cultures, our world, and it is incumbent upon us to understand that past as correctly as the evidence and our fallible intellects allow. Because of the value inherent in such an investigation and understanding of the past, each book in this series speaks to a general readership, namely students and the larger reading public. For that reason, no matter how complex a topic might be, the editors and authors are committed to presenting it clearly and without recourse to technical gymnastics and jargon. This is possible without sacrificing nuance and without any “dumbing down.” Many readers will note our debt to Matthew Restall’s groundbreaking Seven Myths of the Spanish Conquest, which serves as a model for the series. Indeed, this series—to which Restall has granted his imprimatur—is an homage to his pioneering work. Alfred J. Andrea Andrew Holt vii Series Editors’ Foreword It is with great pleasure that we present the fifth volume in Hackett Publishing Com- pany’s Myths of History series, Seven Myths of Military History. It is a worthy com- panion to earlier volumes that have dealt with myths surrounding the crusades, Africa in world history, the American Civil War, and Native American history. One thread binds all four predecessors together—conflict. The conflicts of holy and civil wars are obvious. Less obvious but just as real have been the conflicts of racist-driven colonial- ism and attempts at cultural genocide in Africa and North America. Clearly a book that deconstructs myths surrounding the interpretative study of military engagements is equally centered on the history of conflict. Conflict is also at the heart of all historical myths and myth-busting—conflicts between evidence and misperception, between critical analysis and passionately held beliefs. In the case of military history, the potential for conflicts is vast and, perhaps, overwhelming. This is due in large part to the popularity of military history. A survey of bookstores and websites reveals to even the most casual observer that no other area of history produces and sells as many books and journals. Added to that are numerous made-for-television documentaries and docudramas. What would television producers do without World War II or the American Civil War? And what about the legions of military reenactors and the popularity of their encampments and mock battles? The drive for “authenticity” in the dress, modes of maneuver and fighting, and general lifestyle of the soldiers and their associates whom the reenactors portray can reach the level of obsession. Such popularity inevitably engenders con- troversy among persons who find outlets for their fascination with military history in reading, viewing, and acting. If so-called amateur historians are so passionate, imagine the heat generated by professionals. Military historians regularly debate and argue, quite energetically and sometimes sharply, the finer points of long-ago strategies and tactics, the conse- quences of various battles or wars, and the impact of social or cultural movements and new technologies on warfare and vice versa. They have much to ponder, yet through such internal debates they also often come to a general consensus about the eviden- tiary limits for certain issues and judgments. In those instances, their strength is not in declaring with absolute assurance what actually happened or the significance of something, but rather highlighting what the evidence will allow. Yet such discussions are all too often held exclusively within the scholarly commu- nity of military historians. Although most military historians are exceedingly gener- ous with their time and insights, giving public lectures in a wide variety of venues, all too often the latest advances in their scholarship fail to find an immediate audience viii Series Editors’ Foreword and readership in popular media. This book is an attempt, and a successful one at that, to bridge the schism by communicating to a broader public how current scholarly interpretations are at odds with widespread perceptions of our military past. Moreover, the men and women who train for and fight wars, especially they who hold high ranks, are avid students of military history. The military branches of many countries promote reading lists among their officers and enlisted personnel, and the scholarly works of the editor and contributors to this present volume prominently fill those lists. Former Marine Corps general James Mattis reportedly did not own a television set but kept a personal library of more than seven thousand books, from which he sometimes carried select titles with him into battle. The reasons for the interest of military leaders in military history are obvious. As strategists, tacticians, and persons intimately involved with intelligence, operations, and logistics, they want the most reliable and up-to-date scholarship to inspire their efforts. They cannot afford to base their battlefield decisions on myths. It is sometimes said that the debates in academia are so heated because the stakes are so small, but the stakes for military historians are conceivably much higher. It is for these many reasons that we are pleased to welcome this addition to the Myths of History series. Andrew Holt Alfred J. Andrea ix