Send a Gunboat! A Study of the Gunboat and its Role in British Policy, 1854–1904

208 Pages·1967·16.242 MB·English

by  Antony Preston, John Major

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THE VICTORIAN NAVY AND SUPREMAcy:.··. ·
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\ " ANTONY PRESTON··. ::: .. :·· ...
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JOHN MAJOR · ·.· ..
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Foreword by · ·
ANDREW LAMBERT
by··. ··
Afterword
ERIC GROVE·
Half title: Gunboats at Aden, on the route to India.
(Step!Jen Dent)
Frolltispiece: The composite sloop !cams (1885)
off Royal William Yard, Devon port.
{Con way Maritime Press)
TO OUR PARENTS
... to extend the protection and shield of England to her wandering sons,
who are carried by commerce, or by pleasure, or by necessity, to the vari
ous regions of the world-ro extend over them, as much as the rules of civ
ilized nations will permit, the great aegis of England's protection, that it
may follow them wherever they may go, into the despotism of Russia, or
into the bleak countries of America-whether they be within the limits of
ocean, or within the confines of any Power, great, insignificant, or almost
helpless.
John Roebuck, 1850
I often think ... that it is a good job no one called our bluff very often.
Ernest Bcvin, 1945
A Conway Maritime Book
© Antony Preston and John Major 1967
Revised edition © Antony Preston and John Major 2007
Originally published in 1967 by Longmans, Green and Co. Ltd.
This edition first published in Great Britain in 2007 by Conway,
an imprint of Anova Books Ltd, 151 Freston Road, London WI 0 GTH
www.anovabooks.com
All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced, stored in a retrieval system, or transmitted in
any form or by any means electronic, mechanical, photocopying, recording or otherwise, without the prior written
permission of the copyright owner.
British Library Cataloguing in Publication Data:
A catalogue record for this book is available from the British Library
Library of Congress Cataloguing in Publication Data Available
ISBN IO: 0 85I77 923 9
ISBN I 3: 9 78085 I 779232
Primed by WKT Co. Ltd, China Bayerlsche
Staatsbibliothdc
Munchen
CONTENTS
Preface to the Original Edition .. . ... 6
Preface by John Major ..... 6
Publisher's Note to the New Edition . . ... 6
Foreword by Andrew Lambert . . ... 7
Part 1 SEND A GUNBOAT . .12
Chapter 1 Introduction . . 14
Chapter 2 Crimean Debut. . 18
Chapter 3 The Gunboat Heyday. .36
Chapter 4 The Second China W.'lr . .40
Chapter 5 Pirates and Rebels . 52
Chapter 6 American Crises . .... 58
Chapter 7 The Second Generation .67
Chapter 8 Malaysian Confrontations .. . .. 82
Chapter 9 Pathfinders of Empire .. 91
Chapter 10 Suez . ... 100
Chapter 11 The Beginning of the End . . . 106
Chapter 12 The Scramble for Africa . .. 114
Chapter 13 The Fisher Axe .. . .. 118
Chapter 14 The Last of the Gunboats .. .. . 125
Chapter 15 Conclusion . . . 132
Afterword by Or Eric Grove . . . 135
Notes . ... 137
Part 2 THE GENEALOGY OF THE GUNBOAT NAVY ..... .. ..... 142
Appendices
Appendix A Ships lost otherwise than in action 1854-89 ...... . . . 189
Appendix B Gunvessels and gunboats afloat on 1 April 1867 ........... 190
Gunboats and gunvessels afloat on 1 April 1876
Sloops afloat on 1 April 1876
Ships afloat on 1 January 1889
Appendix C Applications made for ships of war to be sent to foreign stations, 1857-61 ... 191
Appendix 0 HMS Ga11net: survival and restoration . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 197
Bibliography. ... 204
Index of ships ... . . 206
General index .. 207
Preface to the Original Edition
This book could not have been written without a great War Museum, the Radio Times Hulton Picture Library
deal of help and encouragement. We would like to and the National Maritime Museum for providing illus
thank Or D. M. Schurman and Miss M. J. Rooncy for trations and plans, and to Mr J. Day for preparing the
allowing us to use their unpublished works on imperial drawings. We arc also indebted to the British Museum,
defence, and Mr G. Osbon of the National Maritime the Public Record Office and the London Library for
Museum, Greenwich, and Mr]. Collcdge for letting us the use of their f:1cilitics. We are very grateful to Mrs
draw on their incomparable knowledge of the Victorian Joan Kirwan for her work on typing this book. Finally,
Navy. We must also express our gratitude ro Miss E. we wish to thank Lieutenant Bcrridgc of Navy News,
Drus, Mr G. E. Mctcalfc and Dr D. K. Bassett, of the and those who provided us with first-hand recollections
History Department of the University of Hull, not only of their experience in sloops and gunboats sixty years
for their advice, but for their generosity in allowing us ago.
to use some of their own original material. We acknowl
edge a special debt to the Parker Gallery, the Imperial Antony Preston and John Major
Preface
I first met Anrony Preston at a drinks party in Bayswater as his co-author it gives me the greatest pleasure to sec his
one summer evening in the early 1960s. Against the sur plan for a re-launch glide down the slipway. It is a trib
rounding bibulous chatter he outlined his project for an ute to one of the foremost naval historians of his genera
account of the small ships of the Royal Navy in the tion, and all those who knew Antony will only wish he
Victorian era. I gladly came on board the venture and, could have lived to sec it.
better still, embarked on a friendship that lasted forty
years. Smtl a Gunboat was very much Antony's idea, and John Major, August 2006
Publisher's Note to the New Edition
The central part of this volume consists of a faithful Director of the Centre for International Security and
presentation of Antony Preston's and John Major's orig War Studies at the University of Salford; and an appen
inal work of 1967. However, a few changes have had to dix on the restoration of HMS Grmnet by Lindsay
be made - in particular one or two of the captions and Doulton, Curator of Maritime Technology at The
headings have been changed-to take into account both Historic Dockyard, Chatham.
the passage of time and the different way that this edi Particular thanks arc due to Stuart Roberrson, Stephen
tion has been put together. Nevertheless, readers should Dent and David K Brown. In addition many other people
keep in mind that there arc occasions when terms such have helped in various ways, including John Brooks;
as 'the present day' in fact refer to the late 1960s. One Andrew Connor and Hclen Taylor at Heriot Watt
major structural change from the original book is that University; Debbic Corner at the Royal Navy Submarine
the notes and references arc now gathered together in Museum; Geolfrey Dennison; Andy Field; Mark Frost at
one section, on pages 137- lit I, rather than as footnotes Dover Museum; Katy Goodwin of Portsmouth Museums
on individual pages. and Records Service; Sara Grove at the National Maritime
As well as the numerous new illustrations and photo Museum; Jean I-lood; Vie Jeffrey, Regional Manager,
graphs (almost all the original illustrations have been Public AII1irs, Royal Australian Navy; John Jordan, editor
retained), this edition features a new foreword by of V0trship; Mr Pound and Pound's Yard, Portsmouth;
Andrew Lambert, Laughton Professor of Naval History Gerry Rendle of Plymouth Naval Base Museum; and Dr
at Kings College, London; a postscript by Dr Eric Grove, Duncan Veasey of the Naval Photographic Club.
----~--- ------------------- ~~~~~~ 6 ------------------
Foreword
FORTY YEARS ON
Andrew Lambert
Laughton Professor of Naval History
Kings College, London
Sm d a Grmborlt was a pioneering book. Nor only did happened is merely the starting point fill· an examination
it draw together in compact, accessible f(mn the of why and to what purpose.
naval highlights of many Victorian colonial cam The British Empire was not a classic imperial model,
paigns, bur it did so in combination with a development seizing land to control people and markets by military
history of the ships that conducted these missions, and power. Instead it relied on capital and commerce to
an examination of the underlying political and econom develop a system ofinfiHmal empire, in which the cost of
ic issues that impelled Britain to use force across the local administration was borne by nation states which
globe. While these strands of thought reflected the inter were beneficially owned by British institutions. The liter
ests of the two au rhors, the result was a seamless work ature on this subject is large, and interlocks with that on
that has remained the standard text to this day. Despite foreign policy and regional activity." Gunboats were med
the emergence of much new work since 1967, addressing to support British policy in three distinct categories.
almost every aspect of the subject, from the aims and
strategies of the British Empire to technology of the I. Wars with major powers, either actual or planned.
Victorian warship, the book remains the baseline for any While the Crimean War was the only serious conflict of
study of naval force in British Imperial diplomacy the period there were significant crises with the United
between the Crimean War of 1854-56 and the Entente States, Russia and France between 186 I and 1898.
Cordiale of 1904. Gunboats were assigned critical roles in projected opera
Rather than revisit the original text, and trifle with the tions in every case.
details, it seems more appropriate and more useful to
address broader themes that will enlarge the story. 2. In defence of British commerce, either against piracy
The term 'gunboat diplomacy' was developed and which caused a rise in insurance rates, or defaulting
given strong twentieth-century flavour by retired diplo regimes that threatened the security of the capital
mat Sir James Cable in his classic book Gunboat market.
Diplomr~cy of 1971.1 Daniel 1-leadrick placed the gun
boat among the 'tools of imperialism' that enabled the 3. TC:> persuade powers to alter their tarifT regime to open
west to subdue and dominate the non-European world.2 hitherro closed markets to British trade, be they Imperial
The key to any serious appreciation of what this term China or minor West African kingdoms.
means in the nineteenth century is sophisticated under
standing of what acwally constituted the British Empire. Design
Here Headrick's work benefited from the pioneering The gunboat was one of the first purpose-built warship
work of scholars like Gerald Graham, Donald Schurman, designs to exploit the potential of the screw steam
Ronald Robinson and Jack Gallagher, Nicholas 'Euling machinery. The new propeller allowed designers to create
and others.-' Without this political framework the events a small, shallow-draft warship that could operate effec
recorded might easily be dismissed as a random collec tively close inshore. From the start the gunboat was
tion of stories, but the in-depth analysis of the context of designed for offensive operations. The first Admiralty
the engagements ensures they make sense to a modern design was prepared in IS'i 5, the basis for the iron
audience, and strike a chord with contemporary naval hulled screw propeller Royal Yacht HMS Frtiry as a
ofllccrs. This is an example for all naval historians: what mobilisation prototype and test bed." A small, steam-
. -- 7 --------- --------
--------------------------------Send a Gunboat-------------------------------
powered warship could attack a naval base at any state of assailed in a similar manner, the necessary preparations
wind or tide, exploiting the limited arcs of fire provided for which would be neither extensive nor expensive, if
for batteries that were only intended to engage large sail the experiments now in project should realise my expec
ing ships in rhe main navigable channel. While there tations.H
were many foreign naval bases and port cities which
might be targets for such operations, the focus of British The experiments with the heavy 68-pounder gun of 95
concern in the mid-1840s was the expanding french cwt soon had shells reaching out to 6,500 yards. This
base at Cherbourg, only 200 miles from the south coast gun was mounted on all naval steamers.~ In addition the
of England. If warships could rake up position off such promising eccentric-bore Lancaster-rifled 68-pounder
bases they could bombard the dockyard facilities, the offered greater range and precision, at a price. 10
fleets that they harboured and anything else in range. If Improved rockets would complement the guns.11 A year
they were small, and could fire at very long range, the later Chads concluded:
chance of being hit by return fire was minimal. All the
gunboat needed to be effective in this role was a long That this port may be successfully assailed by a naval
range, heavy calibre gun. force having the superiority in the Channel, I trust will he
During his nine-year term (184 5-185tl) as Captain of considered satish!ctorily esrahlished from these recent
the Gunnery 'Ji·aining and Experimental ship HMS experiments.
Fxccllmt, Henry Chads considered that 'the real question
of the day was how to destroy ships and arsenals with At such long ranges rhe chances of the bombarding craft
shells, and render such forts as Cherbourg useless to their being hit were 'extremely remote'. He recommended that
possessors'. His solution was to focus development on rhis information be kept strictly confidential, to ensure
increased range, through rifled weapons and larger the French did not throw out advanced works beyond
charges.6 In 1850 a group of British officers visited the breakwater.12
Cherbourg. Chads reported that the base would be at the
mercy of long-range guns, and rhar an early attack on it The Crimean W.'lr, 1854-1856
was essemial, because a substantial French fleet based at The combination of improved guns and experimental
Cherbourg would paralyse British naval operations.? In screw gunboats meant rhar when the Crimean War broke
consequence of his observations at Cherbourg, Chads our in 1854 rhe Royal Navy was ready to begin series
devoted his eff{>rts to increasing the extreme range of production of well designed and highly effective gun ves
British guns. He saw in the latest gun designs, and the sels and gunboats. The whole package had been built to
use of eccentrically cast shot for longer ranges: bombard Cherbourg, bur the shift of foe required little
more than redirecting the focus towards Kronstadt and
that Cherbourg was not secure against a bombardment, Sevastopol. This would be a maritime war, projecting
that most assuredly a large fleet could not lie securely in power from the sea against the vast, but inflexible and
the roadstcad within the breakwater, and that even the antiquated land mass of Imperial Russia.13
Arsenal might be assailed by a enterprising enemy, having Gun vessels and gunboats took part in most of the sig
command of the sea. nificant naval operations after they reached service in
mid-1854. The astonishing rise in orders reflected the
The results exceeded his hopes. In 1851 eccentrically cast success of the gunboat design, and failure of the Russians
I 0-inch shells ranged out to 5,700 yards, 34 degrees ele to contest command of the sea. The only targets for the
vation, although the gun burst at rhe 54th round. Chads allied fleets were ashore, and in the rocky waters of the
reduced the range to 5,000 yards, so that ships lying Baltic, and rhe shallows of the Sea of Azov, only gunboats
2,500 yards beyond the breakwater could bombard at could get close enough to project power ashore. The f..1il
night. Even at 28 degrees elevation rhe projected results ure of an attack on Kokkola in the Gulf of Finland in
were impressive. The arsenal would be badly damaged, June 1854 was caused by the lack of shallow-draft war
and the anchorage rendered untenable. ships with heavy guns. 11 Once the Admiralty had accept
ed that it would have to build steam gunboats to fight
I have also reason to believe not only Chcrhourg, but Russia effectively, which it did in October 1854, the
most of the other French Ports on the Channel inside Royal Navy quickly applied 'Cherbourg Strategy' and
Ushant, Sr Malo, I Iavre, lloulogne, Calais etc. might he commenced the mass production of flotilla craft, after
--------------------------------------------------
Gunboat prototypes ordered 1844-1845
!.rrllllll"·rl !lull l.mgtf, llmtr/11; !Jcptf; 1(JJI11flgl' Arnll/mtlll
htiry IH1(, iron 111' H" 21' 11'" ')' 10" 317 unarmed
ll1flm11111 IH11l wood ISO' 2(,' (," 15' (," 62/J 2x I 0" & iJ x 32 pdrs
'f('tiZt'J' IH1H wood 130' 22' <)' 2" 1')2 I X I 0"15
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8
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-------- Foreword ------------
the initial half dozen ArroUJ class gun vessels proved too assembled at Spithead on St George's Day, 23 April 1856
large, the first twenty classic Crimean gunboats were for a Grand Review to celebrate Britain's victory. No one
ordered in October 1854. was left in any doubt of the purpose: the flotilla craft
The initial flotilla of six gun vessels and twenty gun staged a mock attack on Southsea Castle, which bravely
boats were employed to remarkable effect in the Black stood in for Kronstadt, Cherbourg, or New York. As 7/Jc
Sea and Baltic in 1855. In the Black Sea they opened the Times observed:
Sea of Azov and crippled the logistics of the Russian
army in the Crimea, and bombarded the fortress of 1\ new system of naval warf:ue had been created ... We
Kin burn. In the Baltic they opened up the coastal waters have now the means of waging really offensive war, not
of the Russian Empire before incinerating the dockyard only against fleets, but harbours, fortresses and rivers, not
and gunboat sheds at Sveaborg. The gunboats and mor merely of blockading, but of invading, and carrying the
tar bombardment of Sveaborg was so similar to the warf:m.~ of the sea to the very heart of' the land.1'J
planned attack on Cherbourg as to make the presence of
French forces alongside the British bizarre. In a little It was the humble gunboat that allowed machine-age
under three days the whole dockyard complex was seapower to move into coastal waters with confidence,
destroyed by long-range fire from mortars, heavy guns using long-range artillery to attack the most powerful sea
and rockets to which the Russian forts could make no forts. The object of the Review was, in large measure, to
effective reply. The allies did not lose a single man.1r' demonstrate this new power to the assembled diplomat
Following these successes gunboats were mass-produced, ic corps. The 'Crimean' War demonstrated that the
so that there were almost three hundred gunboats built 'Cherbourg Strategy' developed by British planners in
or building when the war ended in March 1856. Along the 1840s could he applied equally well elsewhere.20 By
with over one hundred mortar vessels and rafts, eleven the late 1850s it was widely believed that naval blockades
armoured batteries, mortar frigates and a host of factory, were no longer required; a superior fleet could always call
store and depot ships, the gunboats were central to the up enough firepower to destroy a naval base. Operations
'Great Armament', designed for a full-scale assault on at Sveaborg and Kin burn had shown that maritime sieges
Kronstadt, using an advanced base selected in 1855, and were now possible.21
relying on sustained firepower at long range, protected
by armoured batteries, to demolish the most powerful The Gunboat and Grand Strategy
collection of sea forts in the world. The viability of this In 1859 General Sir Howard Douglas, the godfather of
operation remains unknown, but the threat was too modern naval gunnery, stressed that this new possibility
much for the Russians, who were quick to make peace. would change the strategic needs of the British Empire:
The 'Great Armament' was the first mass-mobilisation
of national shipbuilding resources of the industrial age. It Amongst the changes which steam propulsion for ships of
demonstrated the depth of Britain's resources, should the war will introduce in naval operations, may be included
war be prolonged, resources that would hardly be the abandonment of the blockade system. For a steam
touched for the rest of the century. Quite simply Britain fleet superior in strength to the fleet blockaded - if well
could out-build the world in warship tonnage, in quan supplied with Annstrong's incomparable gun ... will he
tity and quality. To power the gunboat armada the able to destroy from abr the fleet, or the arsenal in which
Admiralty turned to their two preferred marine engine the ships arc crowded, and probably both at the same
suppliers, Maudslay, Sons & Field, and John Penn & time. Thus it will not he necessary to keep a steam fleet
Sons. The two great Thamesside firms divided the con before an enemy's port during long intervals of time, as
tracts, and called in their smaller competitors to produce was the case limncrly with our blockading flcets.22
many of the cast and forged parts, assembling the engines
in-house. So successful were these engines that several If Cherbomg and any rrench fleet within could be
sets were re-used in new hulls a decade later.17 Although destroyed by bombardment, there was no prospect of
the gunboats were built in private yards, along with their France making war on Britain. Small and simple they may
machinery, they were fitted out and commissioned at the have been, but the screw steam gunboats of' the 1850s
Royal Dockyards. This led to a serious shortage of skilled effected a profound change in the balance of strategic
engineers, and increased costs.1H At the same time battle power between the land and the sea, by enabling a domi
ship and large frigate programmes went on unabated, nant navy to destroy any hostile forces, even if they
keeping the Royal dockyards fully engaged constructing remained in port. The response of the other major pow
huge ocean-going types, which would be needed for war ers demonstrated that this threat was very real, and very
with France, not Russia. difficult to counter. France, Russia and the United States
To ensure the rest of the world understood the nature all added millions to their coast defence budgets, and
of' British power, and thereby to deter future aggression, developed coast defence warships to counter the offensive
the Baltic Fleet planned for the 1856 campaign was threat posed by the Royal Navy's new flotillas. Because the
9 ·------ --·---··
··---···------~---------------·--
--------------------------------Send a
Gunboat------------------------------~-
British had a superior battlefleet they would always be the impulse, merging into the sloop class. It has been argu~.:d
attacking force, and would like nothing better than for an that after the 'Crimean' war the British armed servi<::es
inferior enemy fleet to come to sea and give battle in 'remained chiefly specialists in colonial warftre'.25 While
defence of their base. States that went to war with Britain this argument may gain some credence from a list uf
would lose their fleets, either at sea, or in harbour. what the Royal Navy did between I 856 and I 900 it fails
After the war many of the gunboats were taken ashore when confronted with a dimension missing from Send a
and laid up under cover at Haslar using a marine railway Gunboat.
and shed complex designed and engineered by Isambard While the colonial gunboats and sloops saw muc:h
Kingdom Brunel.23 They could easily be mobilised. active service on the imperial margins, the defence uf
Little wonder the decision to fit out the support craft for empire and the maintenance of British influence in
the flotilla was enough to deter the United States in Europe required a very different type of vessel. The
December I 861.24 When a Federal cruiser stopped a Crimean coast-assault function was taken to new lev~.:Js
British mail steamer on the high seas and seized two with the 'Flatiron' gunboat of the 1870s. Based on a sm~ll
Southern agents, Britain demanded an apolot,'Y. New craft used by the Armstrong l'lctory to test heavy guns,
York, Boston and the approaches to Washington DC Georgc Rcndcl's design, developed with the assistance ~f
were all vulnerable to flotilla attack, and with the support Admiral Sir Astley Cooper-Key, a leading gunnery expctr,
of armoured warships British planners were confident was an ideal weapons system for a power largely focuss~.:d
that they could break into New York harbour. Already on coastal offensive operations as the basis of deterren<.:e
waging war on the Southern Confederacy, the Federal and war-fighting. Armed with a single very heavy gutl,
Government was quick to apologise and retreat. initially a I 2-ton 9-inch muzzle-loading rifle, entirely
Other gunboats and gun vessels were sent out to worked by Armstrong hydraulic machinery, the
China, to force open the trade of the Celestial Empire. 'Flatirons' would have operated on the flanks of a British
As Preston and Major demonstrated, these campaigns assault on Cherbourg, Kronstadt or New York, support
were the longest running gunboat operations of the peri ing the larger ironclad turret ships. The order dares f()f
od, but the gunboats made it possible to coerce the the Ant class tic in with concern for the security ~f
largest, and most inward-looking empire on Earth, with Belgium during the Franco-Prussian war, the Grtdj{y
relatively little loss. Thirty years before, this would have group to the Russian war scare of 1878. This design
been impossible. would have been turned out in large numbers, had a
When the Crimean gunboats wore out, the Admiralty major war broken out. The hull was deliberately designed
built two divergent, specialist types. The first, which fea to facilitate rowing at a f.'lr higher speed than their
tures strongly in Send a Gunboat, was an improved colo engines could attain. These gunboats would, like the
nial police vessel, a sea-worthy craft, equipped with a full Crimean \Var gun and mortar boats, have operated fro111
rig and armed with small quick-firing guns. (One of coastal shallows, where they could find good opportuni
these sloops, the Gannet, survives and is being restored at ties to bombard hostile forts, suppress defensive fire and
Chatham dockyard.) In the process the gunboat had bcilitatc a direct assault by heavy turret ironclads. 'I\venty
grown rather large, and moved away from the initial 'Flatirons' were built between 1870 and 1880. In Smd rt
HMS Staunch, one of the two prototypes of the 'flatiron'
gunboats. This photograph was probably taken on trials -
note the clothing being worn by the men on deck, their
headgear in particular. (Private collection)
-------------
----------------------~-------~----10
Foreword
Gunboat they are simply described as 'Coast Defence' 'free hand' the Royal Navy provided the power to deter
types, and condemned as failures.21' In truth the France and Russia, and by protecting Italy, to hold
Tlatirons' were more accurately described on the confi together the Triple Alliance. It alone gave Britain the sta
dential Pink List of the Royal Navy as 'Gunboats for the tus of a first-class power.:n
Attack and Defence of Coasts'. They formed an integral The gunboat era came to an end because other powers
part of the naval capability to assault forts, and could be finally decided to challenge Britain's naval mastery. The
mass-produced in wartime. So durable were these little combined naval building programmes of France, Russia,
craft that more than one survived to fight, as originally the United States and finally Germany forced Britain to
intended, on the Belgian coast in the First World WarY temporarily re-deploy naval manpower fi-om gunboats at
Far from being a gunboat force, the Royal Navy the colonial margins to a battlefleet at the Imperial cen
between 1860 and 1900 was dominated by European tre. This was neither unprecedented, nor a retreat sig
concerns and spent the bulk of the construction budget nalling the end of British power. It was merely a strategic
on first class warships for operations against major pow adjustment ro meet prevailing circumstances. After 19 I 8
ers. It employed obsolete and economical types for colo the navy shifted back to the Empire, until Hitler and
nial police work and imperial suasion, but only because Mussolini once again shifted the f(JCus.
such minor vessels were backed up by the armed might Ultimately the function of navies is to exert influence
of the ironclad banlcfleer. In 1882 the Mediterranean ashore, where men live and work, a point succinctly and
Fleet was used to coerce Egypt, with gunboats support skilfully made by the brilliant maritime strategist Sir
ing the ironclads. In fact between 1860 and 1890 the Julian Corberr in I 9 I I:
Royal Navy was incomparably superior to any rival fleet
in the number of warships and the efficiency of the men. Since men live upon the land and not upon the sea, great
Consequently, therefore, it could afford the luxury of issues between nations at war have always been decided -
preparing for offensive operations, with 'Flatirons' as part except in the rarest cases-either by what your army can
of a sophisticated, layered approach to the tactical prob do against your enemy's territory and national life, or else
lems of defeating large-scale coastal defence systems. 2x by what the fear of what the fleet makes it possible for your
This capability was well understood in Paris and St army to do. Men do not live at sea, and thercfi>l-c it is what
Petersburg.2~ By adopting an offensive strategy Britain your navy can enable your army to do that is important:l·i
could take the initiative in war, attacking hostile naval
assets and bases, to deny them any offensive options at Context
sea. The 'Flatiron' was a key asset to this strategy, which Send tl Gunbotlt was written at a time when the Royal
underpinned the British reliance on deterrence to secure Navy was in decline, the Empire was disappearing, and
their interests without the economically dislocating busi the ability of the British state to act alone outside the
ness of waging war. NATO area, or even within it, was in serious doubt. The
Deterrence continued to work, as part of the process Cold War had seen the very term gunboat take on a per
whereby Britain constrained the dynamic elements that jorative, dismissive meaning. Little wonder the original
threatened her vital interests. In 1878 Britain met conclusions were downbeat, although defiant. For those
Russian advances into Turkey by assembling a coast serv who like their history symmetrical, with rise followed by
ice fleet at Portland. Russian pressure on Afghanistan fall, the last forty years have been most annoying. Britain
repeated that response. In both cases Russia backed was not finished in 1967, and while the flag was hauled
down. Her naval exercises between 1879 and 1884 down around the globe, the underlying British Empire,
revealed that Kronstadt was still vulnerable to superior world trade and invisible exports, was largely undam
naval forces, while her fleet was incapable of meeting the aged. In 1982 the failure to keep a gunboat on station
British at sea. The Russian economy remained as vulner laid the Palklands open, but that failure was swiftly
able as it had been in 1854. While Britain could not redeemed by a highly successful demonstration of naval
overthrow Russia she was quite invulnerable to any capability. At the end of the 1980s the Soviet Union col
Russian action, and could wage a long war of limited lapsed, allowing naval forces to recover their interven
commitment, relying on economic damage to under tionist role. The function of modern navies is to deliver
mine the very fabric of the Tsarist state.-10 In 1898 the power from the sea, just as it was 150 years ago. There is
Royal Navy responded to the Fashoda crisis by preparing a very striking parallel between those Victorian marvels
to bombard Cherbourg. The French hurriedly moved of technology - a weapons system that opened up the
their fleet to Brest and backed down, convinced the arro non-European world, in concert with quinine and the
gant British would be only too pleased to finish what quick-firing gun -and the latest American concept, the
they had begun at Trafalgar.-11 '1\vo years later the Littoral Combat Ship, a small, heavily armed platform
Germans were convinced that the British fleet had the with the ability to enter and leave coastal battle spaces at
power to steam past all their fortifications, enter the speed, and outrange existing defeJJCes.-15 The contempo
River Elbe and sink their fleer.J2 In the diplomacy of the rary relevance of Scnrl t1 Gunbotlt has never been greater.
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