Selling War as Obligation: Appeals to Obligation at Work in George W. Bush's Iraq Speeches

110 Pages·2015·0.39 MB·English

by  Mark F. Baseman

Florida State University Libraries
Electronic Theses, Treatises and Dissertations The Graduate School
2006
Selling War as Obligation: Appeals to
Obligation at Work in George W. Bush's
Iraq Speeches
Mark Baseman
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THE FLORIDA STATE UNIVERSITY

COLLEGE OF COMMUNICATION

SELLING WAR AS OBLIGATION:

APPEALS TO OBLIGATION AT WORK IN GEORGE W. BUSH’S
IRAQ SPEECHES

By

MARK BASEMAN

A Thesis submitted to the
Department of Communication
in partial fulfillment of the
requirements for the degree of
Master of Science

Degree Awarded:
Spring Semester, 2006
The members of the Committee approve the Thesis of Mark Baseman defended
on March 30, 2006.

_____________________
Danielle R. Wiese
Professor Directing Thesis

_____________________
Davis W. Houck
Committee Member

_____________________
Donna Marie Nudd
Committee Member

Approved:

__________________________________________________
Stephen D. McDowell, Chair, Department of Communication

__________________________________________________
John K. Mayo, Dean, College of Communication

The Office of Graduate Studies has verified and approved the above named
committee members.

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ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

Oh, where do I begin!?

Let me first thank Natasha Hinson-Turner for answering all of my questions and
for dealing with me and the other grad students. Sorry I lost your stapler.
Also, I need to thank Kristin Carlton who, despite spelling her name wrong,
always knew what forms needed to be turned in by what date. She was an excellent
person to follow around. And she brought me horseradish when I couldn’t figure out how
to buy it.
Next, I have to thank the amazing members of my committee, and Dr. Houck.
First, Dr. Donna Marie Nudd. Thanks for always being approachable and willing
to give advice. You taught me how to teach. You forced me to become friends with a
group of weirdoes—and my every enjoyable moment as a graduate student can be traced
back to you.
And thank you, Dr. Davis Houck. You were the one who got me into this mess so
many years ago. You opened my eyes to the rhetorical world around me, and now I can’t
enjoy anything ever again. You taught me to be a critic, and to work hard, and that it’s ok
to be creative in Academia. And, it goes without saying, but I will forever be in debt to
you and your frightening proofreading skills.
Finally, Dr. Danielle Wiese, who is the reason this thesis exists. There really is no
way I can express how grateful I am for all the help you gave me. I would thank you for
all of the sleep you must have lost over this project, but I’m not certain that you actually
do sleep. Seriously, you are an amazing person. One of these days I might even learn to
call you “Danielle.”
Lastly, I have to thank my family. Mom and Dad, thanks for all your support,
financial and otherwise. You made me who I am today and, while others may hold that
against you, I just want to let you know that I appreciate everything you’ve done for me.
And Matt, what can I say, you’re a poet.

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TABLE OF CONTENTS

Abstract ...................................................................................................... vi

1. INTRODUCTION.......................................................................................... 1

The March to War with Iraq....................................................................... 1
Bush’s Crisis............................................................................................... 9
Summary ................................................................................................ 10

2. LITERATURE REVIEW............................................................................... 11

The Emergence of Presidential Rhetoric.................................................... 11
Criticizing Presidential Rhetoric................................................................. 12
Presidential Crisis Rhetoric........................................................................ 14
Presidential War Rhetoric........................................................................... 16
Summary and Research Questions.............................................................. 23

3. METHODOLOGY......................................................................................... 25

Defining “Obligation Rhetoric”.................................................................. 25
Choosing the Relevant Texts...................................................................... 26
Addressing Research Questions Two and Three........................................ 27
Summary ................................................................................................ 36

4. ANALYSIS .............................................................................................. 38

President Bush’s Obligation Rhetoric......................................................... 38
Appeals to Obligation and Bush’s Credibility............................................ 48
Appeals to Obligation and Crisis Management.......................................... 53
Appeals to Obligation and the “Obligated Hero”....................................... 54

5. CONCLUSION .............................................................................................. 57

Guidelines for Effectively Using Obligation.............................................. 57
Further Considerations................................................................................ 60
Final Thoughts on Bush’s Rhetoric of Obligation...................................... 62

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APPENDICES ............................................................................................... 63

A. Bush’s Radio Address, October 5, 2002............................................... 63
B. Bush’s Speech at the Cincinnati Museum Center, October 7, 2002..... 66
C. Bush’s State of the Union Address, January 28, 2003.......................... 74
D. Bush’s Speech, March 17, 2003........................................................... 86
E. Bush’s Address to the Nation, March 19, 2003.................................... 91

REFERENCES ................................................................................................ 94

BIOGRAPHICAL SKETCH .............................................................................. 103

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ABSTRACT

This thesis examines the rhetoric employed by President George W. Bush in the
period leading up the American-led invasion of Iraq. Specifically, this thesis posits that
the appeals to obligation so prevalently featured in Bush’s oratory were well suited to his
particular rhetorical situation. In supporting this claim, a theoretical understanding of
how obligation rhetoric functions is created. By approaching appeals to obligation from
both a Neo-Aristotelian and Narrative criticism perspective, the conclusion emerges that
obligation rhetoric: 1) builds a speaker’s credibility, 2) limits a speaker’s liability with
regard to proposed action, and 3) allows a speaker to receive praise for future success.
The rhetorical work done by appealing to obligation is then applied to Bush’s particular
rhetorical situation to show how obligation rhetoric worked in his unique context.

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CHAPTER ONE: INTRODUCTION

On February 28, 1991, President George H. W. Bush called for a cease fire—
officially signaling the end of Operation Desert Sabre and, in effect, bringing a close to
the short-lived yet highly successful Persian Gulf War (“Persian Gulf War,” 2006). With
combat that lasted less than two months, the American led coalition effectively forced
Iraqi President Saddam Hussein to cease his occupation of neighboring Kuwait; thus
halting his expansionist goals and bringing some stability to the otherwise volatile region.
A decade later, Bush’s son, George W. Bush, was elected the 43rd President of the
United States. Soon after, in almost perfect Hollywood sequel fashion, this second
President Bush turned his attention toward finishing what his father had started. This
thesis examines the rhetoric Bush used prior to launching his invasion of Iraq.
In this chapter, I first detail the events that preceded the U.S. invasion of Iraq. I
then describe Bush’s rhetorical position with regard to the discourse surrounding the
proposed invasion. Finally, I explain the ideas which guide the remainder of this thesis.

The March to War with Iraq

The United States and other nations did nothing to deserve or invite this threat.
But we will do everything to defeat it. Instead of drifting along toward tragedy,
we will set a course toward safety. Before the day of horror can come, before it is
too late to act, this danger will be removed.
- President George W. Bush, March 17, 2003

Hindsight suggests that war with Iraq was inevitable from the moment George W.
Bush stepped into the presidency. As early as January 22, 2001, a mere two days after
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President Bush took office, a spokesperson for the State Department was quoted as
saying “military force [towards Iraq] always remains an option for the United States”
(“Iraq-U.N. Talks Begin,” 2001). Shortly after that, an anonymous White House official
confirmed that the U.S. was funding the Iraqi National Congress—an Iraqi opposition
group. The group was financed in the hopes that they would find evidence that Saddam
Hussein was violating human rights and/or United Nations’ resolutions (“U.S.
Reportedly,” 2001). Despite administration arguments that this move represented only a
minor change in U.S. policy, as well as one that was advocated and supported by the
previous administration, in retrospect it appears to be evidence of more complex designs
anticipating the use of military force in Iraq.
On February 16, 2001—two weeks after Bush’s inauguration—a series of air
strikes were carried out on targets near Baghdad, Iraq’s capital city (Smyth and O’Clery,
2001). The operation was led by U.S. and British aircraft, and was said to be in response
to increased Iraqi threats on the U.S. and British planes which regularly patrolled the no-
fly zone. Bush later categorized the events as “essentially a self-defense measure,” adding
that it was a “routine mission” and part of America’s ongoing strategy toward Iraq
(“Allies,” 2001).
Yet, Congressional leaders were skeptical. Immediately following the air strikes,
several members of Congress publicly announced their disappointment with the White
House, specifically citing the Bush administration’s failure to inform the legislature
before the strikes occurred. Senator Jesse Helms, a Republican from North Carolina,
complained directly to the White House about his frustration. Other Republican Congress
members anonymously brought their displeasure to the media, telling reporters of their
desire to be “kept informed.” Many argued that the White House “should know better,”
referring to the fact that Republicans were often annoyed by the Clinton White House’s
tendency to keep them in the dark on similar matters. The Bush administration
downplayed the controversy and responded by noting that the attacks were “routine.”
Officials added that Congressional notification was unnecessary because the attacks were
part of an already pre-approved policy toward Iraq (Garrett, 2001).
Whether the Bush administration would have eventually used these attacks as
the jumping off point for a full scale war against Saddam Hussein quickly became a moot
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point. Osama bin Laden’s orchestrated attacks on the Pentagon and the World Trade
Center on September 11, 2001, amounted to such a drastic change in America’s political
climate that the air strikes prior to this time became almost irrelevant. To be clear,
because the environment changed so immensely after 9/11, Bush’s push for war in Iraq
was given a new starting point—one characterized, among other things, by Bush’s nearly
ninety percent approval rating (Torpy, 2001) and a frightened public seemingly willing to
write him a blank check regarding future military action. The new situation also meant
Bush would publicly set new priorities—including a war in Afghanistan against Osama
Bin Laden and the ruling Taliban—thus moving the issue of Iraq to the proverbial back-
burner.
The administration’s near silence on Iraq changed on January 28, 2002, with
Bush’s State of the Union Address. In it, Bush announced that the war on terrorism had
just begun and added that Iraq, along with Iran and North Korea, was part of an “axis of
evil.” Characterizing Iraq by its attempts to build “weapons of mass destruction,” Bush
made clear that his administration would eventually turn its focus toward Hussein
(Borger, 2002). Still benefiting from a public approval rating of 82 percent (Harwood,
2002), Bush likely saw his speech as an opportunity to get public backing for the future
war in Iraq.
Despite his momentum, Bush’s move toward war began with baby steps. Wary of
world opinion, Bush sought U.N. involvement in the conflict. A minor victory occurred
in May, 2002, when the U.N. Security Council agreed to replace the existing Iraqi
sanctions with updated “smart” sanctions. The original sanctions were placed on Iraq
eleven years prior at the end of the Gulf War. In contrast, the smart sanctions focused
specifically on preventing Iraq from gaining military and dual-use equipment. While Iraq
dismissed the modifications as “cosmetic,” U.S. and British officials applauded the move
as a significant change (MacAskill, 2002).
Shortly thereafter, in July 2002, talks between the United Nations and Iraq in
Vienna broke down without compromise. The two-day meeting involved U.N. Secretary
General Kofi Annan and Iraqi Foreign Minister Naji Sabri with Annan arguing for Iraq to
allow the resumption of weapons inspections. The session ended unsuccessfully though
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