Self and Other: Exploring Subjectivity, Empathy, and Shame

295 Pages·2015·1.61 MB·English

by  Dan Zahavi

Self and Other

Self and Other
Exploring Subjectivity,
Empathy, and Shame
Dan Zahavi
1
3
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Acknowledgements
This book was written at the Center for Subjectivity Research at the University of
Copenhagen. I have profited immensely from my daily interaction and discussion
with staff members and visitors. I am also grateful to a number of funding sources
andagencies,whosegeneroussupportovertheyearsmadetheresearchactivitiesof
the Center for Subjectivity Research possible and allowed me to complete different
partsofthebook:theDanishNationalResearchFoundation,theVeluxFoundation,
theDanishCouncilforIndependentResearch,theEuropeanScienceFoundation,the
EuropeanCommission,andtheUniversityofCopenhagen’sExcellenceProgramme
forInterdisciplinaryResearch.
Ihavehadtheopportunitytopresentmaterialfromthemanuscriptatmanyplaces
including:theUniversityofOsnabrück,Emory University(Atlanta),theUniversity
of Bern, the University of Edinburgh, Peking University, the University of Ports-
mouth, the University of Cardiff, Duquesne University (Pittsburgh), the University
ofLeiden,UniversityCollegeDublin,theUniversityofBarcelona,RadboudUniver-
sity Nijmegen, the University of Iceland (Reykjavik), the Bergische Universität
Wuppertal, the E´cole Normale Supe´rieure (Paris), Boston College, the University
of Pavia, Humboldt University (Berlin), the Chinese University of Hong Kong, the
College of Charleston, Rice University (Houston), the Katholieke Universiteit Leu-
ven,theUniversityofHeidelberg,theUniversityofOslo,theUniversityofFribourg,
theHebrewUniversity(Jerusalem),JadavpurUniversity(Kolkata),JawaharlalNehru
University (Delhi), Bog˘azic¸i University (Istanbul), the University of Vienna, Tokyo
University,theFreieUniversitätBerlin,theUniversityofAmsterdam,theUniversity
ofMilan,andtheRitsumeikanUniversity(Kyoto).Ihaveprofited,ineveryinstance,
fromtheensuingdiscussionsandthecommentsIhavereceived.
Ihavelearnedmuchfrommydiscussionwiththefollowingpeople,manyofwhom
havealsoreadandcommentedonpartsofthemanuscript:MiriAlbahari,StanKlein,
Anthony Rudd, Shaun Gallagher, Thor Grünbaum, Joel Krueger, Pierre Jacob,
Charles Siewert, Fabrice Teroni, Joe Neisser, Glenda Satne, John Michael, Julian
Kiverstein, Erik Rietveld, Sanneke de Haan, S(cid:1)ren Overgaard, Jay Garfield, Evan
Thompson, Rasmus Thybo Jensen, Josef Parnas, Barry Dainton, Philippe Rochat,
Chantal Bax, Mark Siderits, Adrian Alsmith, Hans Bernhard Schmid, Vittorio
Gallese, Vasudevi Reddy, Peter Hobson, Jean Decety, Andreas Roepstorff, Thomas
Fuchs, Matt MacKenzie, Thomas Szanto, Mark Steen, Michael Wallner, Sandy
Berkovski,andPhilippSchmidt.Manythankstothemall.
I am particularly grateful to Galen Strawson, Marya Schechtman, Uriah Kriegel,
Sophie Loidolt, and Wolfgang Fasching, whose incisive comments resulted in sub-
stantialchanges.SpecialthanksalsotoSophieLoidoltandMarkSteenfororganizing
vi ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS
workshopsinViennaandIstanbulrespectively,whereadvanceddraftsoftheentire
manuscriptwerediscussed.Letmefinallyacknowledgemydebttotwoanonymous
referees for Oxford University Press, who provided some exceptionally helpful and
incisivecomments.
ThankstoFelipeLeonforhelpingmewiththelistofreferences,toAdele-France
Jourdanforcompilingtheindex,toLaurienBerkeleyforherexcellentcopy-editing,
and a special thanks to Peter Momtchiloff for his impeccable editorship and for
havingoriginallyencouragedmetostartonthebook.
While I was working on the book, early versions of some of the material found
their way into stand-alone articles. Everything was then thoroughly revised and
rewrittenforthebook,sononeofthecurrentchaptershavealreadybeenpublished.
However, relevant previous publications include: ‘Self and Other: The Limits of
Narrative Understanding’, in D. D. Hutto (ed.), Narrative and Understanding
Persons, Royal Institute of Philosophy Supplement 60 (Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press, 2007); ‘Simulation, Projection and Empathy’, Consciousness and
Cognition,17(2008), 514–22;‘IstheSelf aSocial Construct?’, Inquiry,52/6(2009),
551–73; ‘Empathy, Embodiment and Interpersonal Understanding: From Lipps to
Schutz’,Inquiry,53/3(2010),285–306;‘UnityofConsciousnessandtheProblemof
Self’, in S. Gallagher (ed.), The Oxford Handbook of the Self (Oxford: Oxford
University Press, 2011); ‘The Experiential Self: Objections and Clarifications’, in
M. Siderits, E. Thompson, and D. Zahavi (eds.), Self, No Self? Perspectives from
Analytical, Phenomenological, and Indian Traditions (Oxford: Oxford University
Press,2011);‘EmpathyandDirectSocialPerception:APhenomenologicalProposal’,
Review of Philosophy and Psychology, 2/3 (2011), 541–58; ‘Faces and Ascriptions:
MappingMeasuresoftheSelf’(withA.Roepstorff),ConsciousnessandCognition,20
(2011),141–8;‘TheUncannyMirror:ARe-FramingofMirrorSelf-Experience’(with
P.Rochat),ConsciousnessandCognition,20(2011),204–13;‘ShameandtheExposed
Self’, in J. Webber (ed.), Reading Sartre: On Phenomenology and Existentialism
(London: Routledge, 2011); ‘The Complex Self: Empirical and Theoretical Perspec-
tives’, in J. McCurry and A. Pryor (eds.), Phenomenology, Cognition, and Neurosci-
ence (Pittsburgh: Simon Silverman Phenomenology Center, 2012); ‘Self,
Consciousness, and Shame’, in D. Zahavi (ed.), The Oxford Handbook of Contem-
porary Phenomenology (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012); ‘Empathy and
Mirroring: Husserl and Gallese’, in R. Breeur and U. Melle (eds.), Life, Subjectivity
andArt:EssaysinHonorofRudolfBernet(Dordrecht:Springer,2012);‘TheTimeof
the Self’, Grazer Philosophische Studien, 84 (2012), 143–59; ‘Vindicating Husserl’s
Primal I’, in N. de Warren and J. Bloechl (eds.), Phenomenology in a New Key:
BetweenAnalysisandHistory.EssaysinHonorofRichardCobb-Stevens(Dordrecht:
Springer, 2015);‘For-me-ness: What It Is and What It Is Not’ (with U. Kriegel), in
D. O. Dahlstrom, A. Elpidorou, and W. Hopp (eds.), Philosophy of Mind and
Phenomenology: Conceptual and Empirical Approaches (London: Routledge, 2015);
‘You,MeandWe:TheSharingofEmotionalExperiences’,JournalofConsciousness
Studies(2015).
Contents
Introduction:GenesisandStructure ix
Part I. The Experiential Self
1. ConflictingPerspectivesonSelf 3
2. Consciousness,Self-Consciousness,andSelfhood 10
3. TransparencyandAnonymity 25
4. SubjectivityorSelfhood 42
4.1 Theillusoryself 42
4.2 Normativityandnarrativity 51
5. SelfandDiachronicUnity 63
6. PureandPoor 78
6.1 Privacyandanonymity 78
6.2 ThepersonalI,thepureI,andtheprimalI 80
6.3 Thesolipsismoflivedexperience 86
7. AMultidimensionalAccount 88
Part II. Empathic Understanding
8. SubjectivityandIntersubjectivity 95
9. EmpathyandProjection 99
10. PhenomenologyofEmpathy 112
10.1 Phenomenologicalmisgivings 112
10.2 Scheler 115
10.3 HusserlandStein 123
10.3.1 Thepreoccupationofalifetime 123
10.3.2 Empathyandperception 125
10.3.3 Couplingandanalogicaltransference 132
10.3.4 Theobjectsandlevelsofempathy 137
10.4 Schutz 141
10.5 Thephenomenologicalproposal 146
11. EmpathyandSocialCognition 153
11.1 Mirrorneuronsandembodiedsimulation 153
11.2 Theroleofcontext 163
11.3 Theinvisibilityclaim 170
11.4 Thespectreofbehaviourism 180
12. SubjectivityandOtherness 188
viii CONTENTS
Part III. The Interpersonal Self
13. TheSelfasSocialObject 197
13.1 Neuroscientificcomplications 197
13.2 Facialself-recognitionandmirrors 198
14. Shame 208
14.1 Shameandself-consciousness 208
14.2 Varietiesofshame 212
14.3 Othersinmind 216
14.4 Standardsandevaluations 223
14.5 Developmentalconsiderations 228
14.6 Theshamedself 235
15. You,Me,andWe 241
References 251
IndexofNames 275
IndexofSubjects 278
Introduction: Genesis and Structure
Ihavebeenworkingonthetopicsofselfandotherformorethantwentyyears.Inmy
doctoral dissertation, Husserl und die transzendentale Intersubjektivität, which
Ibeganin1992,IofferedanewinterpretationofHusserl’stheoryofintersubjectivity.
IarguedthatoneofHusserl’scentralmotivationsfordevotingsomuchattentionto
intersubjectivity was his concern with the transcendental philosophical questions
aboutwhatitmeansforsomethingtoberealandhowwecanexperienceitassuch.
According to Husserl, an elucidation of these questions necessitates a turn towards
transcendental intersubjectivity. I also discussed the contributions of Sartre,
Merleau-Ponty, and Heidegger to a phenomenological theory of intersubjectivity,
andstressedthecommonfeaturesandvirtuesofsuchanalyseswhencomparedtothe
language-orientedapproachtointersubjectivitythatwastobefoundintheworkof
HabermasandApel.
In my habilitation thesis, Self-Awareness and Alterity, which was published in
1999, I went on to examine the notion of pre-reflective self-consciousness, and
defended the view that our experiential life is characterized by a form of self-
consciousness that is more primitive and more fundamental than the reflective
form of self-consciousness that one finds exemplified in introspection. I presented
a new interpretation of Husserl’s analysis of self-consciousness and inner time-
consciousness, and by also drawing on the writings of Merleau-Ponty, Sartre,
Henry,andDerrida,Idemonstratedhowcentralandfundamentalaroletheconcept
ofself-consciousnessplaysinphenomenologicalphilosophy.Phenomenologyhasn’t
merely been interested in the question of how consciousness is involved in the
manifestationofobjects,buthasalsohadtotackletheproblemofhowtounderstand
theself-manifestationofconsciousness.
Myresearchsincethenhascontinuedtomovebackandforthbetweenthesebasic
topics.Ontheonehand,Ihaveworkedontherelationshipbetweenexperience,self,
andself-consciousness.Ihavearguedthatallthreeconceptsareinterconnected,and
that a theory of consciousness that wishes to take the subjective dimension of our
experiential life seriously also needs to operate with a (minimal) notion of self. An
earlyeffortalongtheselinescanbefoundinmyarticle‘SelfandConsciousness’from
2000.Ontheotherhand,Ihavecontinuedtowriteonintersubjectivity,empathy,and