Security Strategies in the Asia-Pacific: The United States' "Second Front " in Southeast Asia

268 Pages·2011·2.15 MB·English

by  Andrew T H Tan

SECURITY STRATEGIES IN
THE ASIA-PACIFIC
SECURITY STRATEGIES IN
THE ASIA-PACIFIC
T U S ’ “S
HE NITED TATES ECOND
F S A
RONT” IN OUTHEAST SIA
Andrew T H Tan
SECURITY STRATEGIES IN THE ASIA-PACIFIC
Copyright © Andrew T H Tan, 2011.
All rights reserved.
First published in 2011 by
®
PALGRAVE MACMILLAN in the United States – a division of St. Martin’s Press LLC, 175 Fifth
Avenue, New York, NY 10010.
Where this book is distributed in the UK, Europe and the rest of the world, this is by Palgrave Macmillan, a
division of Macmillan Publishers Limited, registered in England, company number 785998, of Houndmills,
Basingstoke, Hampshire RG21 6XS.
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Palgrave and Macmillan are registered trademarks in the United States, the United Kingdom, Europe
and other countries.
ISBN: 978–0–230–11683–2
Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data Tan, Andrew T. H. (Andrew Tian Huat)
Security strategies in the Asia-Pacific : the United States’ “second front” in Southeast Asia / Andrew T H
Tan.
p. cm.
Includes bibliographical references and index.
ISBN 978–0–230–11683–2 (alk. paper)
1. Security, International—Southeast Asia. 2. Terrorism—Southeast Asia. 3. Insurgency—Southeast
Asia. 4. Southeast Asia—Politics and government—21st century. I. Title.
JZ6009.S644T36 2011
355'.0335730959—dc22 2011005268
A catalogue record of the book is available from the British Library.
Design by MPS Limited, A Macmillan Company First edition: August 2011
10 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1
Printed in the United States of America.
CONTENTS
List of Tables
Acknowledgments
1 Security and Terrorism in the Malay Archipelago
2 Terrorism
3 Insurgencies
4 Maritime Security
5 Great Power Rivalries
6 The Regional Arms Buildup
7 Conclusion
Notes
Bibliography
Index
LIST OF TABLES
6.1 Military expenditure in the Malay Archipelago states (US$) (1999–2008)
6.2 Military assets of the Malay Archipelago states (1990)
6.3 Military assets of the Malay Archipelago states (2009)
6.4 Military manpower of the Malay Archipelago states (1990 and 2009)
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS
The author wishes to thank Palgrave Macmillan, particularly Farideh Koohi-
Kamali and Robyn Curtis, for supporting this book. A special word of thanks
goes to the referee who had taken a great deal of effort to read the original
manuscript and offer a number of important and useful suggestions that have led
to this final product. A special word of acknowledgment is also appropriate for
the many individuals, too numerous to name here, who have been tremendous
peers and colleagues in the study of the region and from whom I have learnt
much.
The author also wishes to thank his wife, Angela, for her encouragement,
love, and support; his mother, Mary; and sister, Lily, for their many years of love
and perseverance. Truly, without God and family, we are nothing.
Andrew T H Tan
University of New South Wales
Australia
June 1, 2011
CHAPTER 1
S T M A
ECURITY AND ERRORISM IN THE ALAY RCHIPELAGO
THE MALAY ARCHIPELAGO AND THE GLOBAL WAR ON TERRORISM
The Encyclopaedia Britannica defines the Malay archipelago in terms of
physical geography. It describes the archipelago as the largest group of islands in
the world, consisting of more than 13,000 islands in Indonesia and about 7,000
islands in the Philippines. The islands of Indonesia include those of the Greater
Sundas (Sumatra, Java, Borneo, and the Celebes), the Lesser Sundas, the
Moluccas, and Irian Jaya (West New Guinea). The islands of the Philippines
include Luzon, the Visayans, and Mindanao. Other political units in the
archipelago are the East Malaysian states of Sabah and Sarawak, the sultanate of
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Brunei, and the state of Papua New Guinea. This region is also regarded as
maritime Southeast Asia, as opposed to mainland Southeast Asia, which is
connected by land to the rest of Asia. Although a narrow, geographical definition
of the archipelago excludes West Malaysia, which is geographically part of
mainland Southeast Asia, both Malaysia and Singapore are usually regarded in
discussions on politics as part of the archipelago, given their close political,
cultural, and social links with it. In addition, the provinces of Patani, Narathiwat,
Songkhla, and Yala in southern Thailand, which used to be part of Malay
sultanates and that have a large minority of Malay Muslims who share a cultural
and religious affinity with Malaysia as opposed to the Thai Buddhist majority in
Thailand, are also regarded as belonging to the broader Malay archipelago. On
the other hand, Papua New Guinea is usually excluded from discussions on
regional politics because of its greater political and cultural affinity with Pacific
2
Polynesia.
More significantly, the Malay archipelago has assumed enormous strategic
significance in the U.S.-led global war on terrorism following the seminal
terrorist attacks on September 11, 2001 (or 9-11), as it has the world’s largest
population of Muslims. Indeed, Indonesia is the largest Muslim country in the
world. Islam is also the dominant religion in Malaysia and Brunei, and there are
also a significant number of adherents in southern Thailand, the southern
Philippines, and Singapore. Apart from the geographical definition of the region
as somewhat distinct on account of geography, culture, and politics, a key
defining feature of this region is its adherence to Islam. Thus, after 9-11, it was
no surprise that the region achieved prominence in regional and global security,
emerging as a strategic battleground in the context of the U.S.-led global war on
terrorism (now referred to under the Obama administration as “the Long War”)
3
in which radical Islamists are trying to gain support for the global jihad. In the
post 9-11 context, therefore, the Malay archipelago has become synonymous
with the Malay Muslim world in maritime Southeast Asia.
After 9-11, the region was designated by the Bush administration as the
“Second Front” in the global war on terrorism. This tag could also be attributed
in part to the existence of armed Muslim separatist rebellions throughout the
Malay archipelago. Although they predated Al Qaeda and the events of 9-11,
they came under much greater scrutiny in the context of the global war on
terrorism, given the alleged linkages between local Muslim rebels and Al Qaeda.
Indeed, Al Qaeda had been seeking to establish such linkages in the hope of co-
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opting disaffected local Muslims into its global jihad against the West. Al
Qaeda hoped to profit from the presence of fundamental political, economic, and
social grievances that underlie the resort to armed rebellion by some Muslims in
the region. Thus, prior to 9-11, Al Qaeda had actively sought to establish ties
5
with various local militant and separatist groups in the Malay archipelago.
The region is also important strategically because it is the location of the
busiest and most important waterway in the world, namely, the Straits of
Malacca, which has been the subject of growing concern in recent years over
maritime security on account of the many piracy attacks taking place against
commercial shipping. Following 9-11, these concerns coalesced into fears of a
possible piracy-terrorism nexus that could lead to acts of maritime terrorism in
the Straits, severely disrupting global commerce. The possibility of maritime
terrorist strikes is taken seriously by security agencies, given the attacks on ships
carried out by Al Qaeda, for instance, in Yemen against a U.S. warship, the USS
Cole, in 2000, which killed 17 U.S. sailors, and the bombing of a French tanker,
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the Lindberg, off the coast of Yemen, in 2002. Given the rising trend in piracy
attacks in the environs of the vital Straits of Malacca in the 1990s, the presence
of fundamental economic problems in Indonesia that have led to the resort to
piracy, and the existence of local radical Islamist as well as Muslim separatist
groups, apprehensions over the safety of commercial shipping through these
waters have heightened. The importance of the Straits to global commerce stems
from the fact that a quarter of the world’s trade, half the world’s oil, and two-
7
thirds of its natural gas trade pass through its waters. Apprehensions over
maritime security stem also from possible threats to U.S. navy warships
traversing the region to and from the Indian Ocean. Indeed, the failed terrorist
bomb plots in Singapore in late 2001, which had targeted U.S. warships at
Changi Naval Base, served to highlight the emerging challenges to maritime
8
security in the region.
The heightened concerns over maritime security, in turn, have attracted the
attention of the great powers. Growing concern over maritime security as a result
of the threat of terrorism has led the United States to invest attention and
resources in managing the problem, thus inadvertently raising its profile, role,
and presence in the region. However, the United States is not the only external
great power with an interest in regional security. Indeed, 70 percent of Japan’s
oil traverses the Straits of Malacca, as does 80 percent of China’s trade, making
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it a waterway of great strategic importance to other great powers. After 9-11,
however, the enhanced security roles of the United States and its allies in the
region, such as Japan and Australia, have led China to openly express concern
over the ability of the United States to disrupt its access to energy supplies
through the Straits of Malacca in a crisis, on which it has increasingly come to
rely on to fuel its enormous economic growth. This has been dubbed China’s
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“Malacca Dilemma.” China’s growing assertiveness in the region’s waters, as
well as its diplomatic offensive to woo regional states, have meant that the
region is being increasingly caught up in emerging great-power rivalries between
China and the United States.
However, the growing unease in the region over maritime security and great-
power rivalries have provided an impetus toward enhancing self-reliant defence
capabilities that could improve maritime security against piracy and terrorism,
protect maritime borders, and bolster local capacity to thwart a greater role and
presence by external great powers. The regional arms buildup has been ongoing