Security Standardisation Research: 6th International Conference, SSR 2020, London, UK, November 30 – December 1, 2020, Proceedings PDF
Preview Security Standardisation Research: 6th International Conference, SSR 2020, London, UK, November 30 – December 1, 2020, Proceedings
Thyla van der Merwe Chris Mitchell Maryam Mehrnezhad (Eds.) Security 9 2 Standardisation 5 2 1 S Research C N L 6th International Conference, SSR 2020 London, UK, November 30 – December 1, 2020 Proceedings Lecture Notes in Computer Science 12529 Founding Editors Gerhard Goos Karlsruhe Institute of Technology, Karlsruhe, Germany Juris Hartmanis Cornell University, Ithaca, NY, USA Editorial Board Members Elisa Bertino Purdue University, West Lafayette, IN, USA Wen Gao Peking University, Beijing, China Bernhard Steffen TU Dortmund University, Dortmund, Germany Gerhard Woeginger RWTH Aachen, Aachen, Germany Moti Yung Columbia University, New York, NY, USA More information about this subseries at http://www.springer.com/series/7410 Thyla van der Merwe Chris Mitchell (cid:129) (cid:129) Maryam Mehrnezhad (Eds.) Security Standardisation Research 6th International Conference, SSR 2020 – London, UK, November 30 December 1, 2020 Proceedings 123 Editors ThylavanderMerwe Chris Mitchell Mozilla Information Security Department London,UK RoyalHolloway, University of London Egham,UK Maryam Mehrnezhad Schoolof Computing Newcastle University Newcastle uponTyne,UK ISSN 0302-9743 ISSN 1611-3349 (electronic) Lecture Notesin Computer Science ISBN 978-3-030-64356-0 ISBN978-3-030-64357-7 (eBook) https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-64357-7 LNCSSublibrary:SL4–SecurityandCryptology ©SpringerNatureSwitzerlandAG2020 Thisworkissubjecttocopyright.AllrightsarereservedbythePublisher,whetherthewholeorpartofthe material is concerned, specifically the rights of translation, reprinting, reuse of illustrations, recitation, broadcasting, reproduction on microfilms or in any other physical way, and transmission or information storageandretrieval,electronicadaptation,computersoftware,orbysimilarordissimilarmethodologynow knownorhereafterdeveloped. Theuseofgeneraldescriptivenames,registerednames,trademarks,servicemarks,etc.inthispublication doesnotimply,evenintheabsenceofaspecificstatement,thatsuchnamesareexemptfromtherelevant protectivelawsandregulationsandthereforefreeforgeneraluse. Thepublisher,theauthorsandtheeditorsaresafetoassumethattheadviceandinformationinthisbookare believedtobetrueandaccurateatthedateofpublication.Neitherthepublishernortheauthorsortheeditors give a warranty, expressed or implied, with respect to the material contained herein or for any errors or omissionsthatmayhavebeenmade.Thepublisherremainsneutralwithregardtojurisdictionalclaimsin publishedmapsandinstitutionalaffiliations. ThisSpringerimprintispublishedbytheregisteredcompanySpringerNatureSwitzerlandAG Theregisteredcompanyaddressis:Gewerbestrasse11,6330Cham,Switzerland Preface The 6th Conference on Security Standardisation Research (SSR 2020) was held as an onlineconferenceduringNovember30–December1,2020.Themainpurposeofthis conferencewastodiscussthemanyresearchproblemsderivingfromstudiesofexisting standards, the development of revisions to existing standards, and the exploration of completelynewareasofstandardization.Additionally,asinpreviousyears,SSR2020 aimedtobeaplatformforexchangingknowledgebetweenacademiaandindustry,with the goal of improving the security of standardized systems. Overall, there were 20 submissions to SSR 2020, of which 7 were accepted. Apart fromacoupleofpapersrejectedbecausetheydidnotobeythesubmissioninstructions, all submissions were reviewed by at least three Program Committee members. The acceptedpaperscoverarangeoftopicsinthefieldofsecuritystandardizationresearch, includinganalysis,evaluation,andcomparisonofstandardsandtheirimplementations, standards development, improving existing standards, and potential future areas of standardization. As an innovation, this year we encouraged submissions in the area of legal aspects of data protection and privacy. The focus on privacy was reflected in a number of our submissions and accepted papers. In addition to regular research papers, we also encouraged the submission of Systematization of Knowledge (SoK) papers relating to security standardization as well as Vision papers. The vision track was intended to report on work in progress or concrete ideas for work that has yet to begin. The diversityintypesofsubmissionswaswellreceivedbytheauthors.Thesetofaccepted papers is made up offive research papers, one SoK paper, and one vision paper. The SSR 2020 program included two invited keynote addresses to shed light on security standardization from both industrial and academic perspectives. – Professor Liqun Chen, University of Surrey, UK – Nick Sullivan, Cloudflare, USA WewouldliketothankallthepeoplewhocontributedtothesuccessofSSR2020. First, we thank the authors for submitting their work to our conference. We heartily thanktheProgramCommitteefortheircarefulandthoroughreviews.Thanksmustalso go to theshepherds for their expert guidance and helpfuladvice on improving papers. We are grateful to all the people at Mozilla, who supported hosting SSR 2020 as a virtual conference. Finally, we thank all the attendees of SSR 2020. October 2020 Maryam Mehrnezhad Thyla van der Merwe Chris Mitchell Organization General Chair Thyla van der Merwe Mozilla, UK Program Committee Chairs Chris Mitchell Royal Holloway, University of London, UK Maryam Mehrnezhad Newcastle University, UK Steering Committee Liqun Chen University of Surrey, UK Shin’ichiro Matsuo Georgetown University, USA Thyla van der Merwe Mozilla, UK Chris Mitchell Royal Holloway, University of London, UK Bart Preneel Katholieke Universiteit Leuven, Belgium Program Committee Steve Babbage Vodafone, UK Richard Barnes Cisco, USA Benjamin Beurdouche Mozilla, France Lily Lidong Chen NIST, USA Liqun Chen University of Surrey, UK Zhaohui Cheng Olym Information Security Technology Ltd., China Benjamin Dowling ETH Zürich, Switzerland Felix Günther ETH Zürich, Switzerland Feng Hao University of Warwick, UK Matt Henricksen Huawei, Singapore Jonathan Hoyland Cloudflare, UK Saqib A. Kakvi Bergische Universität Wuppertal, Germany Mohsin Khan University of Helsinki, Finland Markulf Kohlweiss The University of Edinburgh and IOHK, UK Stephan Krenn AIT, Austrian Institute of Technology, Austria Thalia Laing HP, UK Wanpeng Li University of Aberdeen, UK Catherine Meadows Naval Research Laboratory, USA David Naccache ENS Paris, France Kenny Paterson ETH Zürich, Switzerland Christopher Patton Cloudflare, USA Andrew Paverd Microsoft Research Cambridge, UK viii Organization Gaëtan Pradel INCERT, Luxembourg Raphael Spreitzer SGS Digital Trust Services GmbH, Austria Ehsan Toreini Durham University, UK Christopher Wood Cloudflare, USA Joanne Woodage Microsoft Research Cambridge, UK Kazuki Yoneyama Ibaraki University, Japan External Reviewers Dustin Moody NIST, USA Ray Perlner NIST, USA Contents On the Memory Fault Resilience of TLS 1.3 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1 Lukas Brandstetter, Marc Fischlin, Robin Leander Schröder, and Michael Yonli On Internal Re-keying. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23 Liliya Akhmetzyanova, Evgeny Alekseev, Stanislav Smyshlyaev, and Igor Oshkin A Systematic Appraisal of Side Channel Evaluation Strategies . . . . . . . . . . . 46 Melissa Azouaoui, Davide Bellizia, Ileana Buhan, Nicolas Debande, SèbastienDuval,ChristopheGiraud,ÈlianeJaulmes,FrançoisKoeune, Elisabeth Oswald, François-Xavier Standaert, and Carolyn Whitnall Taming the Many EdDSAs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 67 Konstantinos Chalkias, François Garillot, and Valeria Nikolaenko SoK: Comparison of the Security of Real World RSA Hash-and-Sign Signatures. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 91 Saqib A. Kakvi The Vacuity of the Open Source Security Testing Methodology Manual . . . . 114 Martin R. Albrecht and Rikke Bjerg Jensen Vision: A Critique of Immunity Passports and W3C Decentralized Identifiers. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 148 Harry Halpin Author Index . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 169 On the Memory Fault Resilience of TLS 1.3 B Lukas Brandstetter, Marc Fischlin( ), Robin Leander Schro¨der, and Michael Yonli Technische Universit¨at Darmstadt, Darmstadt, Germany [email protected] Abstract. Recently, Aranha et al. (Eurocrypt 2020) as well as Fis- chlinandGu¨nther(CT-RSA2020)investigatedthepossibilitytomodel memoryfaultattackslikeRowhammerinsecuritygames,andtodeduce statementsaboutthe(in)securityofschemesagainstsuchattacks.They looked into the fault-resistance of signature and AEAD schemes. Here, we extend the approach to the TLS 1.3 key exchange protocol. OurresultsgiveamixedpictureaboutthefaultresistanceofTLS 1.3. Full fault attacks on the handshake protocol, where the adversary can modify the content of variables arbitrarily, render the protocol com- pletely insecure. On the positive side we argue that differential faults, where the adversary can flip selected memory cells, do not seem to be harmful to key derivation in the pre-shared-key mode for the hand- shake.Theweakerrandomfaultattacks,wheresomebitsinmemoryare flippedrandomly,stillenablesuccessfulattacksagainsttherecordlayer. We therefore present a slight modification for the nonce generation in TLS 1.3 which withstands such attacks. · · · Keywords: Memory faults TLS 1.3 Protocol Security model 1 Introduction The advent of Rowhammer [21], an attack enabling memory faults at run time, notonlyposesthreatstocomputersecurityasawhole,butalsotocryptographic protocols in particular. The applicability of fault attacks against cryptographic primitives has been successfully demonstrated against derandomized signature schemes like EdDSA in [25] (using Rowhammer specifically) and in [31] (with othertechniques).Yet,attacksoncryptographicprimitivesundermemoryfaults have been treated earlier, attracting a first bigger attention with the work by Boneh et al. [6] and timely follow-up works like [4,20]. Rowhammer in this regard is one additional technical mean to introduce faults in the cryptographic computations, on a hardware level. The question in how far faults in cryptographic computations influence the security, and in particular the security models and statements, has been inves- tigated in several aspects. The most prominent areas are hedging against bad (cid:2)c SpringerNatureSwitzerlandAG2020 T.vanderMerweetal.(Eds.):SSR2020,LNCS12529,pp.1–22,2020. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-64357-7_1
The list of books you might like
