Security Force Assistance in Afghanistan: Identifying Lessons for Future Efforts

160 Pages·2012·3.09 MB·English

by  Terrence K. Kelly

Security Force
Assistance
in Afghanistan
Identifying Lessons for Future Efforts
Terrence K. Kelly, Nora Bensahel, Olga Oliker
Prepared for the United States Army
Approved for public release; distribution unlimited
ARROYO CENTER
The research described in this report was sponsored by the United States
Army under Contract No. W74V8H-06-C-0001.
Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data
Kelly, Terrence K.
Security force assistance in Afghanistan : identifying lessons for future efforts /
Terrence K. Kelly, Nora Bensahel, Olga Oliker.
p. cm.
Includes bibliographical references.
eISBN 978-0-8330-5224-7
1. Afghanistan. Afghan National Army. 2. Military assistance, American—
Afghanistan. 3. National security—Afghanistan. 4. Internal security—Afghanistan.
I. Bensahel, Nora, 1971- II. Oliker, Olga. III. Title.
UA853.A3K45 2011
355'.0325810973—dc23
2011019199
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Preface
Security force assistance (SFA) is a central pillar of the counterinsur-
gency campaign being waged by U.S. and coalition forces in Afghani-
stan. The outcome of the campaign hinges, in large measure, on the
effectiveness of the assistance provided to the Afghan National Army,
Afghan National Police, and other security forces, and the extent
to which the armed elements of tribes, sub-tribes, and clans can be
brought under government control. Yet senior U.S. military and civil-
ian officials have posed many questions about the effectiveness of SFA
in Afghanistan, and few empirically rigorous assessments exist to help
answer these questions.
This monograph analyzes SFA efforts in Afghanistan over time.
It documents the U.S. and international approaches to building the
Afghan National Security Forces from 2001 to 2009, focusing primar-
ily on the lessons and themes that emerged from extensive fieldwork in
Afghanistan in 2009 and their implications for the U.S. Army. As part
of our research, we also examined Soviet approaches to SFA in Afghan-
istan from the 1920s until 1989. That research will be published sepa-
rately in a forthcoming companion document by Olga Oliker entitled
Building Afghanistan’s Security Forces in Wartime: The Soviet Experience,
MG-1078-A.
The findings of this monograph should be of interest to U.S. mili-
tary and civilian officials involved in preparing and executing secu-
rity force assistance, both in Afghanistan and beyond. It should also
interest those both inside and outside the U.S. government who seek
iii
iv Security Force Assistance in Afghanistan
a deeper understanding of U.S. reconstruction efforts in Afghanistan
and the key challenges that those efforts face.
This research was sponsored by the Director of Strategy, Plans,
and Policy, Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff, G-3/5/7, and was con-
ducted within the RAND Arroyo Center’s Strategy, Doctrine, and
Resources Program. RAND Arroyo Center, part of the RAND Cor-
poration, is a federally funded research and development center spon-
sored by the United States Army. For comments or further information,
please contact Terrence Kelly (412-683-2300, x4905; [email protected]).
The Project Unique Identification Code (PUIC) for the project
that produced this document is ASPMO09157.
For more information on RAND Arroyo Center, contact the
Director of Operations (telephone [phone], extension 6419; fax
310-451-6952; email [email protected]), or visit Arroyo’s web-
site at http://www.rand.org/ard.html.
Contents
Preface ............................................................................. iii
Figures ............................................................................. ix
Tables .............................................................................. xi
Summary .........................................................................xiii
Acknowledgments ............................................................ xxiii
Abbreviations ................................................................... xxv
CHAPTER ONE
Introduction ....................................................................... 1
The Challenges of Security Force Assistance
in Afghanistan ................................................................. 1
Afghanistan in Context ......................................................... 2
The Threat ........................................................................ 5
Reasonable Expectations for the ANSF ......................................... 7
Research Approach ................................................................10
Initial Research Approach .....................................................10
Data Availability ................................................................12
Revised Research Approach ...................................................15
Organization of This Monograph ...............................................15
CHAPTER TWO
Overview of Security Force Assistance During the Coalition Era,
2001–2009 ...................................................................17
The Bonn Agreement and the Establishment of the ANSF ..................17
Relative Security, 2002–2003 ...................................................19
The Afghan National Army .................................................. 20
v
vi Security Force Assistance in Afghanistan
The Afghan National Police .................................................. 27
Rapid Buildup, 2004–2005 ......................................................32
The Afghan National Army ...................................................32
The Afghan National Police ...................................................35
Worsening Security, 2005–2007 ................................................39
The Afghan National Army .................................................. 40
The Afghan National Police ...................................................47
Crisis, 2007–2009................................................................ 54
The Afghan National Army .................................................. 56
The Afghan National Police .................................................. 60
CHAPTER THREE
Observations About Recent SFA Efforts in Afghanistan .................67
SFA Scope and Context in Afghanistan ........................................67
Assistance to Afghan Ministries and Generating Forces .....................74
Advisors and Partners in Afghanistan ..........................................79
The Afghan National Army ...................................................79
The Afghan National Police .................................................. 84
Concluding Observations ....................................................... 86
CHAPTER FOUR
A Framework for SFA and Assessing SFA During Conflict ..............89
Conclusions ...................................................................... 103
CHAPTER FIVE
Implications of SFA in Afghanistan for the U.S. Army ................. 105
U.S. Army Doctrine and Lessons from Afghanistan ....................... 105
U.S. Army Doctrine .......................................................... 105
Synthesis of Observations from Afghanistan .............................. 107
Implications for the U.S. Army ................................................ 113
A Final Word on Assessments ................................................. 116
Contents vii
APPENDIXES
A. Selected Literature and Documents Reviewed........................ 119
B. Selected Interviews ......................................................... 121
References ....................................................................... 125

Figures
1.1. Elements of Security Sector Framework ..........................11
2.1. U.S. ETT Personnel Required and Assigned, 2007–2013 ..... 43
2.2. ISAF OMLTs Required and Assigned, 2007–2013 ............. 44
2.3. U.S. Funding for the ANA, Fiscal Years 2002–2008 .......... 46
2.4. U.S. Personnel Required and Assigned to PMTs, June
2007–November 2008 ..............................................49
2.5. U.S. Funding for the ANP, Fiscal Years 2002–2008 ............51
4.1. Protecting the Population in Afghanistan ....................... 98
4.2. SFA Feedback Loop in Counterinsurgency ..................... 100
4.3. Contents of the Feedback Loop: Mapping MOEs, MOPs,
and Input Measures to Institution Building in SFA ........... 102
ix