Securing the Surrender: Marines in the Occupation of Japan

49 Pages·1997·8.8 MB·English

by  Smith, Charles R. (Charles Richard), 1943-

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20 JUN 2002
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SECURING THE SURRENDER
MARINES IN THE OCCUPATION OF JAPAN (SFT)
Change the distribution PCN read 190003 14200"vice 190003143000.
DISTRIBUTION: PCN 19000314280
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Securing the Surrender:
Marines in the Occupation of Japan
by Charles R. Smith
t noon on 15 August Great Britain, China and the General of the Army Douglas
A
1945, people gath- Soviet Union that Our Em- MacArthur in Manila and Fleet
ered near radios and pire accepts the terms of their Admiral Chester W. Nimitz on
hastily setup loud- Joint Declaration. Guam. Staff studies, based on the
speakers in homes, Although the word "surrender" possibility of the sudden collapse
offices, factories, and on city was not mentioned and few knew or surrender of the Japanese
streets throughout Japan. Even of the Joint Declaration of the Government and High Command,
though many felt that defeat was Allied Powers calling for uncondi- were prepared and distributed at
not far off, the vast majority tional surrender of Japan, they army and fleet level for planning
expected to hear new exhortations quickly understood that the purposes. In early summer, as
to fight to the death or the official Emperor was announcing the ter- fighting still raged on Okinawa
announcement of a declaration of mination of hostilities on terms and in the Philippines, dual-plan-
war on the Soviet Union. laid down by the enemy. After ning went forward for both the
The muted strains of the nation- more than three and a half years of subjugation of Japan by force in
al anthem immediately followed fighting and sacrifice, Japan was Operations Olympic and Coronet,
the noon time-signal. Listeners accepting defeat. and its peaceful occupation in
then heard State Minister Hiroshi On Guam, 1,363 nautical miles Operations Blacklist and Campus.
Shimomura announce that the
to the south, the men of the 6th Many essential elements of
next voice they would hear would Marine Division had turned in MacArthur's Olympic and Black-
be that of His Imperial Majesty the early the night before after a long list plans were similar. The Sixth
Emperor. In a solemn voice, day of combat training. At 2200, Army, which was slated to make
Emperor Hirohito read the first lights on the island suddenly came the attack on the southern island
fateful words of the Imperial
on. Radio reports had confirmed of Kyushu under Olympic, was
Rescript: rumors circulating for days given the contingent task of occu-
After pondering deeply throughout the division's camp on pying southern Japan under
the general trend of the the high ground overlooking Pago Operation Blacklist. Likewise, the
world situation and the actu- Bay: the Japanese had surrendered Eighth Army, using the wealth of
al state of Our Empire, We and there would be an immediate information it had accumulated
have decided to effect a set- ceasefire. As some Marines clad regarding the island of Honshu in
tlement of the present crisis only in towels or skivvies danced planning for Coronet, was desig-
by resort to an extraordinary in the streets and members of the nated the occupying force for
measure. To Our good and 22d Marines band conducted an northern Japan. The Tenth Army,
loyal subjects, we hereby con- impromptu parade, most of the a component of the Honshu inva-
vey Our will. We have com- 4th Marine Regimental Combat sion force, was given the mission
manded Our Government to Team was on board ship, ready to of occupying Korea. Admiral
communicate to the Govern- leave for "occupational and possi- Nimitz's plan envisioned the ini-
ments of the United States, ble light combat duty in Japanese - tial occupation of Tokyo Bay and
held territory." No less happy other strategic areas by the Third
On the Cover: Passing a black-uni- than their fellow Marines ashore, Fleet and Marine forces, pending
formed Japanese policeman, the 26th they remained cynical. The the arrival of formal occupation
Marines move into the heart of Sasebo. Japanese had used subterfuge forces under General MacArthur's
National Archives Photo 127-N-
before. Who could say they were command.
139167
not being deceptive now? When the Japanese government
At Left: Japanese children, seeing a
In May 1945, months before the made its momentous decision to
Marine for the first time, eagerly reach
fighting ended, preliminary plans surrender in the wake of atomic
for chocolates offered them by SSgt Henry
A. Weaver, III. National Archives for the occupation of Japan were bombings and the Soviet Union's
Photo 127-N-139887 prepared at the headquarters of (Continued on page 3)
I
The Invasion That Never Was
y May 1945, as bitter fighting continued on
Okinawa and Americans celebrated Germany's
surrender, Pacific strategists had developed
detailed plans for Operation Downfall, the two-phased
invasion of the Japanese home islands to begin on 1 • Saga
November. More than 5 million Allied troops would
4Omuta
conduct the two largest planned amphibious assaults in
history. As planned, all six Marine divisions and three
•Kamamata
1NadkikI KYU$HU
Marine aircraft wings would play major combat roles. -i
Operation Olympic, the first phase of Operation Noosoka.>
Downfall, would involve the seizure of southern
1
Kyushu by 14 divisions of the U.S. Sixth Army. Their
Tsunc.
objectives were to seize airfields, harbors, and staging -•Mlnamota
areas for the subsequent buildup and launching of WY flWA lEA
-.
Operation Coronet, the amphibious assault by 23 divi- Yamaxaku
Miyazaki
sions of the U. S. First and Eighth Armies on 1 March Matsuzaki
• Sandai
1946 against the industrial and political heart of Japan, Kashikino
Li
the Kanto Plain on Honshu. The Marine ground com- Kagoatlima.
hibuahif
ponent for Olympic was V Amphibious Corps, com- a. /
'Kaminojiawa Ka•noya
posed of the 2d, 3d, and 5th Marine Divisions, under Kstiiwab•arU- • i *A
the command of Major General Harry Schmidt. For
Coronet it was III Amphibious Corps (1st, 4th, and 6th
Marine Divisions) under Major General Keller E.
Rockey. C. a
On 1 November, three corps of three divisions each
would conduct simultaneous amphibious assaults
against three separate locations on southern Kyushu.
General Schmidt's V Amphibious Corps would seize a
beachhead near Kushikino and then clear the Satsuma
Sendai in the west to Tsuno in the east, effectively block-
Peninsula, bordering the west side of Kagoshima Bay. ing Japanese reinforcements from moving south
The Army's XI Corps would land at Ariake Bay and through the central mountains. If needed, a fourth
take the eastern peninsula. I Corps would land further corps and two additional divisions would reinforce the
up the island's east coast. The three corps would move three assault corps.
north and establish a defensive line, stretching from The Japanese defensive plan for Kyushu encom-
passed three phases. First, thousands of suicide aircraft
If peace had not come, scores of suicide motorboats were ready
and boats would attack the American fleet, targeting
for use against American invasion troops.
troop transports in an effort to disrupt the landings.
National Archives Photo 127-N-140564 Second, newly organized defense divisions occupying
-i* ., heavy fortifications overlooking the beaches, would
attempt to prevent the landing force from gaining a
foothold. Finally, mobile divisions based inland would
counterattack toward threatened positions. In August
1945, Japanese ground forces on Kyushu consisted of 14
divisions and several independent brigades, about
600,000 die-hard troops, most of whom were deployed
near the invasion area.
Ideally, an attacking force should have at least a
three-to-one superiority in numbers over the defenders.
On Kyushu, American and Japanese ground forces
would be of almost equal strength. In addition to regu-
lar military units, Allied forces would also face a large
citizen militia, armed with whatever was at hand. The
battle was expected to be bloody and costly. Lieutenant
General Thomas A. Wornham, who commanded the
2
27th Marines and would have taken part in the assault, Sagami Bay and seize the vital Yokohama-Yokosuka
later noted that when he commanded the 3d Marine port complex. In subsequent operations, the First Army
Division he would often commute between Japan and would advance on Tokyo from the east while the Eighth
Okinawa and "we'd fly right over Kagoshima, and you Army would attack the capital from the southwest.
could see the beaches where Operation Olympic was to Facing Allied troops would be nine divisions totalling
be. Every time I flew over I'd say: Thank God that some 300,000 men, with an additional 27 to 35 divisions
. . .
the Japanese decided to call the war off when they did, available as reinforcement.
because I don't think any of us would have made it.' It The dropping of the atomic bombs ended the war
was pretty wild country down there." and the need for an invasion of the Japanese home
With Kyushu-based fighters furnishing air support, islands. If the invasion had proceeded, it would have
Operation Coronet would be launched in March 1946. been costly. While there is no way to accurately predict
First Army would land two corps abreast at Katakai casualities, there is no doubt that the Japanese would
and Chosbi on the Pacific Coast east of Tokyo. The have suffered immense losses, both military and civil-
XXIV Corps (three divisions) and General Rockey's III ian, dwarfing those inflicted by the atomic bombs. And
Amphibious Corps would seize the peninsula flanking American casualties certainly would have been in the
Tokyo Bay. The Eighth Army's two corps would land at hundreds of thousands.
(Continued from page 1) sufficient power "to take Japan 6th Marine Division to furnish a
entry into the war, MacArthur's into custody at short notice and regimental combat team to the
and Nimitz's staffs quickly shifted enforce the Allies' will until occu- Third Fleet for possible occupa-
their focus from Operation pation troops arrived" was tion duty. Major General Keller E.
Olympic to Blacklist and Campus, Admiral William F. Halsey's Third Rockey, Commanding General, III
their respective plans for the occu- Fleet, then at sea 250 miles south- Amphibious Corps, on the recom-
pation. In the process of coordi- east of Tokyo, conducting carrier mendation of Major General
natmg the two plans, MacArthur's air strikes against Hokkaido and Lemuel C. Shepherd, Jr., nominat-
staff notified Nimitz's representa- northern Honshu. On 8 August, ed Brigadier General William T.
tives that "any landing whatsoev- advance copies of Halsey's Clement, the division's assistant
er by naval or marine elements Operation Plan 10-45 for the occu- commander, to head the combined
prior to CINCAFPAC's [Mac- pation of Japan setting up Task Fleet landing force.
Arthur's] personal landing is Force 31 (TF 31), the Yokosuka The decision of which of the
emphatically unacceptable to Occupation Force, were distrib- division's three regiments would
him." MacArthur's objections to uted. The task force's mission, participate was an easy one for
an initial landing by naval and based on Nimitz's basic concept, General Shepherd. "Without hesi-
accompanying Marine forces was was to clear the entrance to Tokyo tation [he] selected the 4th
based upon his belief that they Bay and anchorages, occupy and Marines," Brigadier General Louis
would be unable to cope with any secure the Yokosuka Naval Base, Metzger, Clement's former chief of
Japanese military opposition and, seize and operate Yokosuka staff, later wrote. "This was a
more importantly, because "it Airfield, support the release of symbolic gesture on his part, as
would be psychologically offen- Allied prisoners, demilitarize all the old 4th Marine Regiment had
sive to ground and air forces of the enemy ships and defenses, and participated in the Philippine
Pacific Theater to be relegated assist U.S. Army troops in prepar- Campaign in 1942 and had been
from their proper missions at the ing for the landing of additional captured along with other U.S.
hour of victory." forces. forces in the Philippines. Now the
Despite apparent disagree- Three days later, Rear Admiral new 4th Marines would be the
ments, MacArthur's plan for the Oscar C. Badger, Commander, main combat formation taking
occupation, Blacklist, was accept- Battleship Division 7, was desig- part in the initial landing and
ed. But with at least a two-week nated by Halsey to be commander, occupation of Japan."
lag predicted between the surren- TF 31. The carriers, battleships, Preliminary plans for the activa-
der and a landing in force, both and cruisers of Vice Admiral John tion of Task Force Able were pre-
MacArthur and Nimitz agreed S. McCain's Task Force 38 also pared by III Amphibious Corps.
that the immediate occupation of were alerted to organize and The task force was to consist of a
Japan was paramount and should equip naval and Marine landing skeletal headquarters of 19 officers
be given the highest priority. The forces. At the same time, Fleet and 44 enlisted men, which was
only military unit available with Marine Force, Pacific, directed the later augmented, and the 4th
3
Marines, Reinforced, with a Amphibious Corps issued warn- of the task force which were
strength of 5,156. An amphibian ing orders to the division's trans- undergoing rehabilitation follow-
tractor company and a medical port quartermaster section direct- ing the Okinawa campaign.
company were added bringing the ing that the regimental combat Requirements for clothing, ord-
total task force strength up to team, with attached units, be nance, and equipment and sup-
5,400. Officers designated to form ready to embark 48 hours prior to plies had to be determined and
General Clement's staff were alert- the expected time of the ships' arranged for from the 5th Field
ed and immediately began plan- arrival. This required the com- Service Depot. Initially, this
fling to load out the task force. III plete re-outfitting of all elements proved to be difficult due to the
Brigadier General William T. Clement
eading the 4th Marines ashore at Yokosuka on 30 joined the 6th Marine Division in November 1944 as
August was a memorable event in Brigadier assistant division commander and took part in the
General William T. Clement's life and career. Okinawa campaign. Less than two months after the
Clement was 48 and had been a Marine Corps officer Yokosuka landing, he rejoined the division in Northern
for 27 years at the time he was given command of the China. When the division was redesignated the 3d
Fleet Landing Force that would make the first landing Marine Brigade, Clement became commanding general
on the Japanese home islands following the nation's and in June 1946 was named Commanding General,
unconditional surrender. He was born in Lynchburg, Marine Forces, Tsingtao Area.
Virginia, and graduated from Virginia Military Returning to the United States in September, he was
Institute. Less than a month after reporting for active appointed President, Naval Retiring Board, and then
duty in 1917, Clement sailed for Haiti where he joined Director, Marine Corps Reserve. In September 1949, he
the 2d Marine Regiment and its operations against rebel assumed command of Marine Corps Recruit Depot, San
bandits. Diego, holding that post until his retirement in 1952.
Upon his return to the United States in 1919, he Lieutenant General Clement died in 1955.
r
reported for duty at Marine Barracks, Quantico, where
he remained until 1923, when he became post adjutant
of the Marine Detachment at the American Legation in
Peking, China. In 1926, he was assigned to the 4th
Marine Regiment at San Diego as adjutant and in
October of the same year was given command of a com-
pany of Marines on mail guard duty in Denver,
Colorado, where he remained for three months until
rejoining the 4th Marines. Clement sailed with the reg-
iment for duty in China in 1927 and was successively a
company commander and regimental operations and
training officer. Following his return to the United
States in 1929, he became the executive officer of the
Marine Recruit Depot, San Diego, and then command-
ing officer of the Marine Detachment on board the West
Virginia. Clement spent most of the 1930s at Quantico,
first as a student, then an as instructor, and finally as a
battalion commander with the 5th Marines.
The outbreak of World War II found Clement serving
on the staff of the Commander-in-Chief, Asiatic Fleet in
the Philippines. Although quartered at Corregidor, he
served as a liaison among the Commandant, 16th Naval
District; the Commanding General, U.S. Armed Forces
in the Far East; and particularly with the forces engaged
on Bataan until ordered to leave on board the U.S. sub-
marine Snapper for Australia in April 1942. For his han-
dling of the diversified units engaged at Cavite Navy
Yard and on Bataan, he was awarded the Navy Cross.
Following tours in Europe and at Quantico, Clement
4
that evening, the transport divi-
sion was ready to sail for its ren-
dezvous at sea with the Third
Fleet. Within approximately 96
hours, the regimental combat
team, it was reported, "had been
completely re-outfitted, all equip-
ment deficiencies corrected, all
elements provided with an initial
allowance to bring them up to
T/ 0 and T/ A levels, and a thirty
day re-supply procured for ship-
ment."
Two days prior to the departure
of the main body of Task Force
Able, General Clement and the
nucleus of his headquarters staff
left Guam on the landing ship,
vehicle Ozark (LSV 2), accompa-
National Archives Photo 80-G-332828
BGen William T. Clement, Fleet Landing Force commander, meets with Adm Halsey's nied by the Shadwell (LSV 15) and
chiefof staff, RAdm Robert B. Carney, on board the Missouri to discuss plans for the two destroyers, to join the Third
landings in Tokyo Bay and the securing of Yokosuka Naval Base.. Fleet. As no definite mission had
secret nature of the operation and would arrive in port on 14 August, been assigned to the force, little
that all requisitions for support 24 hours later than originally preliminary planning had taken
from supply agencies and the scheduled. On the evening of the place so time enroute was spent
Island Command on Guam had to 13th, however, "all loading plans studying intelligence summaries
be processed through III for supplies were thrown into of the Tokyo area. Few maps were
Amphibious Corps. At 0900 on 12 chaos" by information that the available and those that were
August, the veil of secrecy sur- large transport, Harris (APA 2), proved to be inadequate. The trip
rounding the proposed operation had been deleted from the group to the rendezvous point was
was lifted so that task force units of ships assigned and that the uneventful except for a reported
could deal directly with all neces- Grimes (APA 172), a smaller trans- torpedo wake across the Ozark's
sary service and supply agencies. port with 50 percent less capacity bow. Several depth charges were
All elements of the task force and would be substituted. The resul- dropped by the destroyer escorts
the 5th Field Service Depot then tant reduction of shipping space with unknown results.
went on a 24-hour work day to was partially made up by the Halsey's ships were sighted on
18 August, and next morning,
complete the resupply task. The assignment of a landing ship, tank
regiment not only lacked supplies, (LST) to the transport group. III Clement and key members of his
but it also was understrength. Six Amphibious Corps informed the staff transferred to the battleship
hundred enlisted replacements task force that no additional ship Missouri (BB 63) for the first of sev-
were obtained from the FMFPac would be allocated. Later, after eral rounds of conferences on the
Transient Center, Marianas, to fill the task force departed Guam, a upcoming operation. At the con-
gaps in its ranks left by combat second LST was allotted to lift a ference, Task Force 31 was tenta-
attrition and rotation to the United portion of the remaining supplies tively established and Clement
States. and equipment, including the learned, for the first time, that the
Dump areas and dock space amphibian tractors of Company Third Fleet Landing Force would
were allotted by the Island A, 4th Amphibian Tractor Batt- play an active part in the occupa-
Command to accommodate the alion. tion of Japan by landing on Miura
five transports, a cargo ship, and a On the afternoon of 14 August, Peninsula, 30 miles southwest of
dock landing ship of Transport loading began and continued Tokyo. The primary task assigned
Division 60 assigned to carry Task throughout the night. The troops by Admiral Halsey to Clement's
Force Able. The mounting-out boarded between 1000 and 1200 forces was seizure and occupation
process was considerably aided by the following day, and by 1600 all of Yokosuka airfield and naval
the announcement that all ships transports were loaded. By 1900 base in preparation for initial
5
landings by air of the 11th beaches near Zushi, followed by a Force 31 was officially organized
Airborne Division. Located south five-mile drive east across the and Admiral Badger formed the
of Yokohama, 22 miles from peninsula in two columns over the ships assigned to the force into a
Tokyo, the sprawling base con- two good roads to secure the naval separate tactical group, the trans-
tained two airfields, a seaplane base for the landing of supplies ports and large amphibious ships
base, aeronautical research center, and reinforcements. The second in column, with circular screens
optical laboratory, gun factory and plan involved simultaneous land- composed of destroyers and high
ordnance depot, torpedo factory, ings from within Tokyo Bay on the speed transports. In addition,
munitions and aircraft storage, beaches and docks of Yokosuka three subordinate task units were
tank farms, supply depot, ship- naval base and air station, to be formed: Third Fleet Marine
yard, and training schools and followed by the occupation of the Landing Force; Third Fleet Naval
hospitals. During the war approx- Zushi area, thus sealing off and Landing Force; and a landing
imately 70,000 civilians and 50,000 then demilitarizing the entire force of sailors and Royal Marines
naval ratings worked or trained at peninsula. The Zushi landing from Vice Admiral Sir Bernard
the base. plan was preferred since it did not Rawling's British Carrier Task
Collateral missions included involve bringing ships into the Force. To facilitate organization
the demilitarization of the entire restricted waters south of Tokyo and establish control over the
Miura Peninsula, which formed Bay until assault troops had dealt three provisional commands, the
the western arm of the headlands with "the possibility of Japanese transfer of American and British
enclosing Tokyo Bay, and the treachery." Following the confer- sailors and Marines and their
seizure of the Zushi area, includ- ence, Admiral Halsey recom- equipment to designated trans-
ing Hayama Imperial Palace, mended to Lieutenant General ports by means of breeches buoys
General MacArthur's tentative Robert L. Eichelberger, comman- and cargo slings began immedi-
headquarters, on the southwest der of the Eighth Army, whom ately. Carriers, battleships, and
coast of the peninsula. Two alter- MacArthur had appointed to com- cruisers were brought along both
native schemes of maneuver were mand forces ashore in the occupa- sides of a transport to expedite the
proposed to accomplish these mis- tion of northern Japan, that the operation. In addition to the land-
sions. The first contemplated a Zushi plan be adopted. ing battalions of sailors and
landing by assault troops on the At 1400 on 19 August, Task Marines, fleet units formed base
maintenance companies, a naval
Somewhere at sea off the coast of Japan, the carrier Yorktown maintains a course with-
air activities organization to oper-
in 75 feet of the landing ship Ozark, as a breeches buoy is strung between the two ships
ate Yokosuka airfield, and nucleus
and a sea-going Marine is hauled across to the Ozark.
crews to seize and secure Japanese
National Archives Photo 127-N-133346 vessels. In less than three days,
the task of transferring at sea some
'a 'L-4
3,500 men and hundreds of tons of
weapons, equipment, and ammu-
nition was accomplished without
accident. As soon as they reported
on board their transports, the
newly organized units began an
intensive program of training for
ground combat operations and
occupation duties.
On 20 August, the ships carry-
r
ing the 4th Marine Regimental
Combat Team joined the burgeon-
ing task force and General
Clement and his staff transferred
from the Ozark to the Grimes.
Clement's command now includ-
ed the 5,400 men of the reinforced
4th Marines; a three-battalion reg-
iment of approximately 2,000
6
Marines from the ships of Task
Force 38; 1,000 sailors from Task
Force 38 organized into two land-
ing battalions; a battalion of nucle-
us crews for captured shipping;
and a British battalion of 200 sea-
men and 250 Royal Marines. To
act as a floating reserve, five addi-
tional battalions of partially
equipped sailors were organized
from within Admiral McCain's
carrier battle group.
The next day, General Eichel-
berger, who had been informed of
the alternative plans formulated
by Admirals Halsey and Badger,
directed that the landing be made
at the naval base rather than in the
Zushi area. Although there was
mounting evidence that the
enemy would cooperate fully with
the occupying forces, the Zushi
area, Eichelberger pointed out,
had been selected by MacArthur
as his headquarters area and was
therefore restricted. His primary
reason, however, for selecting
Yokosuka rather than Zushi as the
landing site involved the overland
movement of the landing force.
"This overland movement [from
Zushi to Yokosuka]," Brigadier
General Metzger later noted,
"would have exposed the landing
force to possible enemy attack
while its movement was restricted
over narrow roads and through a
series of tunnels which were easi-
ly susceptible to sabotage. Fur- provide for a simultaneous Army- the British Landing Force to occu-
ther, it would have delayed the Navy landing. A tentative area of py and demilitarize three small
early seizure of the major Japanese responsibility, including the cities island forts in the Uraga Strait at
naval base." of Uraga, Kubiri, Yokosuka, and the entrance to Tokyo Bay. To
Eichelberger's dispatch also Funakoshi, was assigned to erase the threat of shore batteries
included information that the 11th Clement's force. The remainder of and coastal forts, the 2d Battalion,
Airborne Division would make its the peninsula was assigned to 4th Marines, supported by an
initial landing at Atsugi airfield, a Major General Joseph M. Swing's underwater demolition team and
few miles northwest of the north- 11th Airborne Division. While a team of 10 Navy gunner's mates
ern end of the Miura Peninsula, Ecihelberger's directive affected to demilitarize the heavy coastal
instead of at Yokosuka. The origi- the employment of the Fleet defense guns, was given the mis-
nal plans, which were prepared on Landing Force it did not place the sion of landing on Futtsu Saki, a
the assumption that General force under Eighth Army control. long, narrow peninsula which jut-
Clement's men would seize To insure the safety of allied ted from the eastern shore into
Yokosuka airfield for the airborne warships entering Tokyo Bay, Uraga Strait at the mouth of Tokyo
operation, had to be changed to Clement's operation plan detailed Bay After completing its mission,
7