Secure state-estimation for dynamical systems under active adversaries Hamza Fawzi Joint work with Paulo Tabuada and Suhas Diggavi 1/16 Why security for control systems? (cid:73) Control systems are physical processes (chemical plants, power grid, mechanical system, etc.) (cid:73) Control systems becoming larger (large sensor networks) and increasingly open to the cyber-world (e.g., internet) ⇒ increased vulnerability to attacks (cid:73) Examples of real attacks: Sewage control system (Queensland, Australia, 2000), Natural gas pipelines (Russia, 2000), Stuxnet (2010), ... (cid:73) Need efficient ways to detect attacks on control systems... Formoreinfoonsecurityforcontrolsystemssee[Cardenas,Amin,Sastry,2008] 2/16 Security for control systems (cid:73) (Some of the) existing works on adversarial, malicious attacks: • Optimal control in the presence of intelligent jammer (cf. Gupta, Langbort and Basar, 2010) (cid:73) game-theoreticapproach;attacker’sobjectiveistomaximizecostfunction • Secure state-estimation for power network against malicious attacks (cf. Pasqualetti, Dorfler, Bullo (2011)) (cid:73) attack-detectionfilterisproposed,butcomputationallyexpensive (combinatorial,testallpossibleattacksets) (cid:73) This talk: efficient algorithm to estimate the state of a linear dynamical system when sensors are attacked 3/16 + e(t) (cid:124)(cid:123)(cid:122)(cid:125) attack vector • Ifsensori isattacked,e(t) canbearbitrary (noboundednessassumption,no i stochastic model, etc.) (cid:73) A total of p sensors monitor state of plant: (y(t) ∈Rp) y(t) =Cx(t) (cid:73) Some sensors are attacked • e(t) (cid:54)=0 −→ sensor i is attacked at time t i (cid:73) Set of attacked sensors (unknown) is denoted by K ⊂{1,...,p}: support(e(t))=K ∀t =0,1,... (cid:73) Number of attacked sensors will be denoted by q: |K|=q (cid:73) Objective: Given observations y(0),...,y(T−1): recover state x(0) of physical plant from observations (attack set K is unknown) The setup (cid:73) Physical process modeled as a linear dynamical system x(t+1) =Ax(t) 4/16 • Ifsensori isattacked,e(t) canbearbitrary (noboundednessassumption,no i stochastic model, etc.) + e(t) (cid:124)(cid:123)(cid:122)(cid:125) attack vector (cid:73) Some sensors are attacked • e(t) (cid:54)=0 −→ sensor i is attacked at time t i (cid:73) Set of attacked sensors (unknown) is denoted by K ⊂{1,...,p}: support(e(t))=K ∀t =0,1,... (cid:73) Number of attacked sensors will be denoted by q: |K|=q (cid:73) Objective: Given observations y(0),...,y(T−1): recover state x(0) of physical plant from observations (attack set K is unknown) The setup (cid:73) Physical process modeled as a linear dynamical system x(t+1) =Ax(t) (cid:73) A total of p sensors monitor state of plant: (y(t) ∈Rp) y(t) =Cx(t) 4/16 • Ifsensori isattacked,e(t) canbearbitrary (noboundednessassumption,no i stochastic model, etc.) (cid:73) Set of attacked sensors (unknown) is denoted by K ⊂{1,...,p}: support(e(t))=K ∀t =0,1,... (cid:73) Number of attacked sensors will be denoted by q: |K|=q (cid:73) Objective: Given observations y(0),...,y(T−1): recover state x(0) of physical plant from observations (attack set K is unknown) The setup (cid:73) Physical process modeled as a linear dynamical system x(t+1) =Ax(t) (cid:73) A total of p sensors monitor state of plant: (y(t) ∈Rp) y(t) =Cx(t)+ e(t) (cid:124)(cid:123)(cid:122)(cid:125) attack vector (cid:73) Some sensors are attacked • e(t) (cid:54)=0 −→ sensor i is attacked at time t i 4/16 (cid:73) Set of attacked sensors (unknown) is denoted by K ⊂{1,...,p}: support(e(t))=K ∀t =0,1,... (cid:73) Number of attacked sensors will be denoted by q: |K|=q (cid:73) Objective: Given observations y(0),...,y(T−1): recover state x(0) of physical plant from observations (attack set K is unknown) The setup (cid:73) Physical process modeled as a linear dynamical system x(t+1) =Ax(t) (cid:73) A total of p sensors monitor state of plant: (y(t) ∈Rp) y(t) =Cx(t)+ e(t) (cid:124)(cid:123)(cid:122)(cid:125) attack vector (cid:73) Some sensors are attacked • e(t) (cid:54)=0 −→ sensor i is attacked at time t i • Ifsensori isattacked,e(t) canbearbitrary (noboundednessassumption,no i stochastic model, etc.) 4/16 (cid:73) Number of attacked sensors will be denoted by q: |K|=q (cid:73) Objective: Given observations y(0),...,y(T−1): recover state x(0) of physical plant from observations (attack set K is unknown) The setup (cid:73) Physical process modeled as a linear dynamical system x(t+1) =Ax(t) (cid:73) A total of p sensors monitor state of plant: (y(t) ∈Rp) y(t) =Cx(t)+ e(t) (cid:124)(cid:123)(cid:122)(cid:125) attack vector (cid:73) Some sensors are attacked • e(t) (cid:54)=0 −→ sensor i is attacked at time t i • Ifsensori isattacked,e(t) canbearbitrary (noboundednessassumption,no i stochastic model, etc.) (cid:73) Set of attacked sensors (unknown) is denoted by K ⊂{1,...,p}: support(e(t))=K ∀t =0,1,... 4/16 (cid:73) Objective: Given observations y(0),...,y(T−1): recover state x(0) of physical plant from observations (attack set K is unknown) The setup (cid:73) Physical process modeled as a linear dynamical system x(t+1) =Ax(t) (cid:73) A total of p sensors monitor state of plant: (y(t) ∈Rp) y(t) =Cx(t)+ e(t) (cid:124)(cid:123)(cid:122)(cid:125) attack vector (cid:73) Some sensors are attacked • e(t) (cid:54)=0 −→ sensor i is attacked at time t i • Ifsensori isattacked,e(t) canbearbitrary (noboundednessassumption,no i stochastic model, etc.) (cid:73) Set of attacked sensors (unknown) is denoted by K ⊂{1,...,p}: support(e(t))=K ∀t =0,1,... (cid:73) Number of attacked sensors will be denoted by q: |K|=q 4/16 The setup (cid:73) Physical process modeled as a linear dynamical system x(t+1) =Ax(t) (cid:73) A total of p sensors monitor state of plant: (y(t) ∈Rp) y(t) =Cx(t)+ e(t) (cid:124)(cid:123)(cid:122)(cid:125) attack vector (cid:73) Some sensors are attacked • e(t) (cid:54)=0 −→ sensor i is attacked at time t i • Ifsensori isattacked,e(t) canbearbitrary (noboundednessassumption,no i stochastic model, etc.) (cid:73) Set of attacked sensors (unknown) is denoted by K ⊂{1,...,p}: support(e(t))=K ∀t =0,1,... (cid:73) Number of attacked sensors will be denoted by q: |K|=q (cid:73) Objective: Given observations y(0),...,y(T−1): recover state x(0) of physical plant from observations (attack set K is unknown) 4/16
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