Secure Access Control to Personal Sensor Information in Federations of Personal Networks

236 Pages·2012·6.66 MB·English

Thesis submitted to the
University of Twente
Faculty of Electrical Engineering, Mathematics and Computer Science
chair for Design and Analysis of Communication Systems
in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of
Master of Science
in
Telematics
Secure Access Control to Personal Sensor
Information in Federations of Personal Networks
J.W.C. Beusink
July 12, 2012
Supervising committee
⋆
Dr. Ir. G. Karagiannis
⋆
Dr. Ir. G.J. Heijenk
⋆⋆
Dr. H. Benz
⋆⋆
Prof. Dr. Ir. S. Heemstra de Groot
⋆ ⋆⋆
University of Twente, Twente Institute for
Faculty of EEMCS, Wireless and Mobile Communications B.V.,
DACS chair, Business & Science Park,
P.O. Box 217, Institutenweg 30,
7500 AE Enschede, 7521 PK Enschede,
The Netherlands. The Netherlands.
Any intelligent fool can make things
bigger and more complex. . . It takes a
touch of genius - and a lot of courage
to move in the opposite direction.
— Albert Einstein (1879-1955)
Abstract
This thesis provides a secure access control architecture for personal sensor
information in Federated Personal Networks (FedNets) applied to the context
of the VITRUVIUS project. To that end suitable authentication protocols,
cipher suites, credential providers and policy languages are analyzed. We
provide and test a prototype of our proposed architecture.
Security in this context entails more than the usual suspects being au-
thentication, authorization, non-repudiation, data integrity and confidential-
ity. Due to the nature of a PN, confidentiality is notably complex. Privacy
in this context consists of user and component identity confidentiality, user
location confidentiality and user untraceability. Mobile devices are also sus-
ceptible to depletion attacks, aimed at draining the battery.
We found EAP-IKEv2 the best suitable authentication protocol based
applicable security requirements we adopted from several fields of study.
We recommend a ciphersuite consisting of ECDH, ECDSA, AES and
SHA-2 based upon keystrength, governmental and institutional recommen-
dations and the wireless nature of PNs and FedNets.
We recommend WebDAV as credential provider as its usage allows for
more efficient revocation checking.
We recommend PERMIS as reasoning engine along with its policy lan-
guage.
Our prototype shows that the suggested security framework can be run
on a resource constrained device though further performance improvements
to the authentication and the authorization engine are needed.
iii
Dedication
This thesis is dedicated, in loving memory, to my father Johan Willem (Joop)
Beusink, who passed away on June 7, 2012, during the final stages of my
thesis. I know you were worried about me graduating and wanted to be there
at my graduation. Thank you for everything you have shown me, done for
me, and inspiring me to be a better man.
v
Acknowledgements
I would like to express gratitude to my supervisors, Dr. Ir. G. Karagiannis,
Dr. Ir. G.J. Heijenk, Dr. H. Benz and Prof. Dr. Ir. S. Heemstra de Groot,
without whom this thesis would not have been made possible.
I would also like to thank experts in the field for creating and making the
software available that is the basis on which our prototype was developed
and for providing answers to questions on the inner workings of this software.
For strongSwan they are Tobias Brunner; Martin Willi; and Prof. Andreas
Steffen, HSR University of Applied Sciences Rapperswil, Switzerland. For
PrivilEge and Role Management Infrastructure Standards (PERMIS) they
are Prof. BSc. PhD. David W. Chadwick, University of Kent, United King-
dom; Dr. Stijn Lievens, University of Kent, United Kingdom.
For their patience and financial support I thank Everett NL B.V.
Special thanks to Dr. Ing. Bianca Beusink and BSc. Achiel van der
Mandele for reviewing drafts and providing usefull feedback.
Last but not least I would like to thank my friends and family for their
support and giving me the strength to finish this thesis.
vii
Contents
Abstract iii
Dedication v
Acknowledgements vii
1 Introduction 1
1.1 Context/Motivation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1
1.2 Specific Problem . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
1.3 Research Questions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
1.4 Approach . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
1.5 Structure . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
2 Personal Networks 5
2.1 Requirements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
2.2 Overall Architecture . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
2.2.1 Connectivity Level Abstraction . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
2.2.2 Network Level Abstraction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
2.2.3 Service Abstraction Level . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
2.3 Network Components . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
2.3.1 Personalization . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
2.3.2 Cluster Formation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
2.3.3 Intra-Cluster Routing . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
2.3.4 Inter-Cluster Routing and Tunneling . . . . . . . . . . 14
2.3.5 Foreign Communication . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
2.3.6 Radio Resource Management and Link Layers . . . . . 15
2.4 Service Components . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
2.4.1 PN Administration Integrity Service . . . . . . . . . . 16
2.4.2 User Agent & Authentication . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
2.4.3 Service & Content Discovery . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
2.4.4 Access Control . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
ix
x Contents.
2.4.5 Service Context Service . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
2.4.6 Federation Management . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
2.4.7 Service & Content Management . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
2.4.8 Management Consoles . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18
2.5 Summary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18
3 FedNets 19
3.1 FedNet Types . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20
3.2 The FedNet Lifecycle . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22
3.2.1 Initial Phase . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22
3.2.2 Formation Phase . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23
3.2.3 Operation Phase . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23
3.2.4 Dissolution Phase . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25
3.3 Architecture . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26
3.3.1 Architectural Components . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26
3.3.2 FedNet Manager . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27
3.3.3 FedNet Agent . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 28
3.3.4 Gateway . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 29
3.3.5 Service Proxy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 29
3.3.6 Service Management Node . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 30
3.3.7 A FedNet Service . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 30
3.3.8 A FedNet Client . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 30
3.3.9 Service Discovery . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 30
3.3.10 FedNet Access Control Policies . . . . . . . . . . . . . 30
3.3.11 Service Access Control Policies . . . . . . . . . . . . . 30
3.3.12 FedNet Services . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 31
3.4 Summary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 31
4 Access Control Architectures 33
4.1 Security Threats . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 33
4.2 Security Definitions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 36
4.3 Security Access Control Architectures That Can Be Applied
in FedNets . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 38
4.3.1 AAA . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 39
4.3.2 IEEE 802.1X . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 45
4.3.3 IMS Security ACA . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 46
4.3.4 Kerberos . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 48
4.3.5 Security Architectures That Are Described in Virtual
Organizations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 49
4.3.6 Security Access Control Architectures (ACAs) That
Are Described in Past or Ongoing FedNet Projects. . . 51
4.4 Selection Criteria . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 55
4.4.1 Use Case . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 55
4.4.2 Assumptions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 55