Scientific Progress: A Study Concerning the Nature of the Relation Between Successive Scientific Theories

189 Pages·1986·3.79 MB·English

by  Graig Dilworth (auth.)

SCIENTIFIC PROGRESS
SYNTHESE LIBRARY
STUDIES IN EPISTEMOLOGY.
LOGIC, METHODOLOGY. AND PHILOSOPHY OF SCIENCE
Managing Editor:
JAAKKO HINTIKKA, Florida State University, Tallahassee
Editors:
DONALD DAVIDSON, University ofCalifornia, Berkeley
GABRIELNUCHELMANS, University ofLeyden
WESLEYC. SALMON, University ofPittsburgh
VOLUME 153
CRAIG Dl LWORTH
DepartmentofPhilosophy, AhoAcademy,Aho. Fin/and
SCIENTIFIC PROGRESS
A Study Concerning the Nature ofthe Relation
Between Successive Scientific Theories
SECONDEDITION
Springer-Science+Business Media, B.Y.
LlbraryofCODgre81CataloginglnPubUaadonData
Dilworth,Craig,
Seientific progress.
(SyntheseIibrary ;v. 153)
Bibliography:p.
Ineludesindex.
1. Seience-Philosophy. 2. Science-Methodology.
I. Title.
Q175.D6342 1986 501 86-3870
ISBN 978-94-017-2968-0 ISBN 978-94-017-2966-6(eBook)
DOI 10.1007/978-94-017-2966-6
Firstpublished1981
Secondedition1986
All RightsReserved
Copyright©1981,1986by SpringerScience+BusinessMediaDordrecht
Originallypublishedby D.ReidelPublishingCompanyin 1981.
Softcoverreprintofthehardcover2ndedition 1981
No partofthematerialprotectedbythis copyrightnoticemay be reproducedor
utilizedinanyform or byany means,eleetronicor mechanical,
includingphotocopying, reeordingor byany informationstorageand
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TABLE OF CONTENTS
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS 9
PREFACE TO THE SECOND EDITION 10
INTRODUCTION 11
I. THE DEDUCTIVE MODEL
I. The Deductive Modelas a Modelof Explanation 14
2. ACriticism of the Model as a Modelof Explanation 16
2. THE BASIS OF THE LOGICAL EMPIRICIST
CONCEPTION OF SCIENCE
I. Verifiability 18
2. Induction and Confirmation 19
3. THE BASIS OF THE POPPERIAN CONCEPTION
OF SCIENCE
I. Falsifiability 22
2. Basic Statements and Background Knowledge 23
3. Corroboration, Severity ofTests, and
the Falsifiability of theEmpirical Basis 25
4. THE LOGICAL EMPIRICIST CONCEPTION OF
SCIENTIFIC PROGRESS
I. A Formal Criterion of Progress 30
2. The Problems ofTheoretical Terms and
Correspondence Rules 33
3. The Problems of Meaning Variance and Consistency 35
5. THE POPPERIAN CONCEPTION OF SCIENTIFIC
PROGRESS
I. Contradiction 37
2. Content 39
6 TADLE OF CONTENTS
3. Verisimilitude 46
4. The Problems of Meaning Variance and
the Nature ofScientificTheories 50
6. POPPER, LAKATOS, AND THE TRANSCENDENCE
OF THE DEDUCTIVE MODEL
I. Sophisticated Methodological Falsificationism 52
2. Popper's 'Three Requirements for the Growth
of Knowledge' 56
7. KUHN, FEYERABEND, AND INCOMMENSURABILITY
I. 'Incommensurability' inits Negative Sense 60
2. 'Incommensurability' inits Positive Sense 63
8. THE GESTALT MODEL
I. AModelofTheory Change vs. an Example of
Perceptual Change 66
2. The Duck-Rabbit as a ModelofTheory Succession
in Science 67
3. The Seeing ofan Aspect as the Application of
a Concept 69
4. Simultaneous Application 70
5. Aspectual Incompatibility 70
6. The Uniqueness ofthe Referent 72
7. Predicates ofthe Same Category 72
8. Relative Acceptability: Accuracy, Scope, and
Simplicity 73
9. THE PERSPECTIVIST CONCEPTION OF SCIENCE
I. The Perspectivist Conception as Based on the
Gestalt Model 77
2. ScientificTheories as Conceptual Perspectives 79
3. Logical Simultaneity 81
4. Perspectival Incompatibility 82
5. Incommensurable Theories Having the Same
Intended Domain 89
6. Systems Involving the Same Categories 92
7. Relative Acceptability: Accuracy, Scope, and
Simplicity 96
TABLE OFCONTENTS 7
10. DEVELOPMENT OF THE PERSPECTIVIST
CONCEPTION IN THE CONTEXT OF
THE KINETIC THEORY OF GASES
I. Parameters as Quantified Categories 100
2. Boyle's Law 101
3. The Ideal Gas Model 102
4. Van der Waals' Law 104
5. Explication ofthe Perspectivist Conception inthe Context
of the Example 105
6. Theories as Distinct from Laws 108
7. Idealization 112
8. Theoretical Terms and Correspondence Rules 113
9. Realism vs. Instrumentalism 116
11. THE SET-THEORETIC CONCEPTION OF SCIENCE
1. ANew Formal Approach to Science 118
2. Sneed's Problem ofTheoretical Terms 118
3. The Problem ofDelineating the Intended Domain 124
4. The Problem of Extension 126
5. The Problem of Progress 128
6. Concluding Remarks 131
12. APPLICATION OF THE PERSPECTIVIST CONCEPTION
TO THE VIEWS OF NEWTON, KEPLER, AND
GALILEO
I. Newton's Theory ofGravitation 133
2. Kepler's Laws ofPlanetary Motion 135
3. Galileo's Laws of Inertia and Free FalI 137
APPENDIX I: ON THEORETICAL TERMS 142
APPENDIX 11: THE GESTALT MODEL OF
SCIENTIFIC PROGRESS 157
REFERENCES 167
INDEX 174
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS
This study has been presented in a number of versions since its
central ideas first appeared ina shortessay "Incommensurabilityand
Scientific Progress" in 1975. Since that time it has received the
helpful criticism of very many people, and to all of them I here
express my thanks. Lennart Nordenfeit has discussed with me in
detail versions appearing in 1976 and 1977. Those whose contribu
tions are more recent include Rainer Carls, Paul Feyerabend, Mats
Furberg, Lars Hertzberg, and Dag Prawitz, each of whom has made
valuable suggestionsconcemingmy 1978paper"Onthe Natureofthe
Relation Between Successive Scientific Theories", from which the
last six chapters of the present work have been developed. More
specialized comments have been offered by Staffan Nilsson (Chap
ter 10), and by Peter Gärdenfors and Wlodzimierz Rabinowicz
(Chapter 11). And for reading and commenting on the whoie of this
work just before it went to press, I express my gratitude to Ingvar
Johansson and Giovanni Sommaruga.
Very special thanks are due to Prof. Stig Kanger, for his support
and guidance during my years as a graduate student at Uppsala, and
to Prof. Evandro Agazzi, who has done everything possible to help
see this work through to completion.
C.D.
PREFACE TO THE SECOND EDITION
Thiseditionhasbeensupplementedbytwoappendices.Thefirst,which
hasalsoappearedasanindependentessayinErkenntnis21(1984),isa
deepening of the discussion of theoretical terms which runs through
Chapters 4, 10, and 11of the book. The second is a paper written in
response to a number of comments on the book, and focusseson the
relation between the GestaltModelandthe Perspectivistconceptionof
science. Its content slightly overlaps that of the main text, but this
repetition mayitselfbe ofsomeuseinthat itinvolvesthe presentation
of the central ideas of the book in a somewhat different form. This
paperwasread atthe History andPhilosophyofScienceConference in
Veszprem, Hungary in 1984; and it will also appear separately in a
forthcomingvolume ofthe Boston Studies in the Philosophy ofScience
devoted to the proceedingsofthat conference.
Apart from these appendices, this edition has also benefitted from
some minorcorrections and anumber oftypographicalimprovements.
STOCKHOLM
January 1986 C.D.