Scientific Epistemology: An Introduction

181 Pages·2021·3.9 MB·English

by  Hilary Kornblith

Scientific Epistemology

Scientific
Epistemology
An Introduction
HILARY KORNBLITH
1
3
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Library of Congress Cataloging-i n- Publication Data
Names: Kornblith, Hilary, author.
Title: Scientific epistemology : an introduction / Hilary Kornblith.
Description: New York, NY, United States of America :
Oxford University Press, [2021] |
Includes bibliographical references and index.
Identifiers: LCCN 2021016356 (print) | LCCN2021016357 (ebook) |
ISBN 9780197609552 (hb) | ISBN 9780197609569 (paperback) |
ISBN9780197609583 (epub) | ISBN 9780197609590
Subjects: LCSH: Philosophy and science. | Science—P hilosophy. | Knowledge, Theory of.
Classification: LCC B67 .K67 2021 (print) | LCC B67(ebook) | DDC 121—d c23
LC record available at https://l ccn.loc.gov/ 2021016356
LC ebook record available at https://l ccn.loc.gov/ 2021016357
DOI: 10.1093/ oso/ 9780197609552.001.0001
1 3 5 7 9 8 6 4 2
Paperback printed by Marquis, Canada
Hardback printed by Bridgeport National Bindery, Inc., United States of America

To my students
Contents
Preface ix
Acknowledgments xiii
1. The Threat of Skepticism 1
1.1. What Is a Theory of Knowledge and Why Do We
Need One? 1
1.2. The Argument from Illusion 3
1.3. Convincing the Skeptic 10
1.4. Reflective and Unreflective Belief Acquisition 14
1.5. A Natural Starting Place 19
1.6. Conclusion 21
Suggestions for Further Reading 22
2. The Phenomenon of Knowledge 23
2.1. The Beginning of an Inquiry 23
2.2. Children and Nonhuman Animals 26
2.3. Adult Humans: Unreflective Knowledge 28
2.4. Adult Humans: Reflective Knowledge 31
2.5. Social Dimensions of Knowledge 34
2.6. Conclusion 37
Suggestions for Further Reading 38
3. Knowledge from the Outside: The Third-P erson
Perspective 40
3.1. What the Third-P erson Perspective Has to Offer 40
3.2. Perception 42
3.3. Inference 52
3.4. Conclusion 77
Suggestions for Further Reading 78
4. Knowledge from the Inside: The First-P erson Perspective 80
4.1. What the First-P erson Perspective Has to Offer 80
4.2. Deliberation from the Perspective of the Deliberator 82
viii Contents
4.3. Some Factors Involved in Reflective Checking on
Beliefs One Already Holds 86
4.4. Reflection on What to Believe in the Absence of
Preexisting Belief 94
4.5. Conclusion 103
Suggestions for Further Reading 105
5. From the Individual to the Social 107
5.1. Beyond Individual Cognition 107
5.2. A Puzzle about the Human Capacity to Reflect on
Our Beliefs 109
5.3. An Adaptationist Hypothesis 111
5.4. What Reason Is There to Think That This Hypothesis
Is Correct? 114
5.5. A Problem Case 119
5.6. Conclusion 126
Suggestions for Further Reading 127
6. Conclusion: Born to Know 129
6.1. How Is Knowledge Possible? 129
6.2. What Is Knowledge? 137
6.3. Conclusion 149
Suggestions for Further Reading 149
Notes 151
References 157
Index 163
Preface
When I was first approached about the possibility of writing an in-
troductory book on the theory of knowledge, I immediately thought
of a certain standard format for such books. One attempts to pro-
vide an overview of the field, surveying the different issues which
are addressed by current theories, providing a guide to the strengths
and weaknesses of the available approaches. Such an overview can be
presented in a way which attempts to be as neutral as possible between
the various competing positions, or it can take a stand, straightfor-
wardly attempting to defend the merits of one particular view rather
than others. Books of this sort, whether avowedly neutral or frankly
partisan, are exceptionally useful. They introduce readers to the lay of
the land, and readers come away with an understanding of the current
state of the art.
The more I thought about this, the more clear it was to me that I didn’t
want to write such a book. There is a simple reason for this: there are
already a great many such books introducing the theory of knowledge
both to philosophy students and to interested readers outside a univer-
sity setting, and, in my view, there are very many such books which do
this extremely well.1 There’s little point then in writing another such
book when I would merely be reinventing the wheel.
It occurred to me, however, that there is room for a very different
sort of introduction to the field. Instead of trying to present the state
of the art, covering the ins and outs of rival approaches, I could simply
present my own view of how the theory of knowledge ought to be
approached, making clear how my own approach offers an illumi-
nating view of some issues worth thinking about. This would not just
be an opinionated overview of the field, for I would not even attempt
to survey all of its rivals. I would simply present one way of thinking
about some issues in the theory of knowledge, making the case for that
view as best I can.