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SCIENCE AND POLITICS OF FOREIGN AID Science and Politics of Foreign Aid Swedish Environmental Support to the Baltic States by Bj6rn Hassler SodertOm University, Huddinge, Sweden SPRINGER-SCIENCE+BUSINESS MEDIA, B.V. A C.I.P. Catalogue record for this book is available from the Library of Congress. ISBN 978-94-010-3969-7 ISBN 978-94-010-0123-6 (eBook) DOI 10.1007/978-94-010-0123-6 Printed on acid-free paper AH Rights Reserved © 2003 Springer Science+Business Media Dordrecht OriginalIy pubIished by Kluwer Academic PubIishers in 2003 Softcover reprint ofthe hardcover Ist edition 2003 No part of this work may be reproduced, stored in a retrieval system, or transmitted in any form or by any means, electronic, mechanical, photocopying, microfilming, recording or otherwise, without written permission from the Publisher, with the exception of any material supplied specifically for the purpose of being entered and executed on a computer system, for exclusive use by the purchaser of the work. TABLE OF CONTENTS PREFACE..................................................................................................................................VII CHAPTER1...............................................................................................................................1 INTRODUCTION......................................................................................................................1 1.FROMREALISMTOENVIRONMENTALINTERDEPENDENCE.............................1 2.ALTRUISMANDSELF-INTEREST:THEAIMOFTHESTUDY................................3 3.THEENVIRONMENTALISSUES...................................................................................5 4.CURRENTRESEARCH....................................................................................................7 5.THEORETICALDEPARTURE......................................................................................14 CHAPTER2.............................................................................................................................23 MODELINGSWEDISHENVIRONMENTALASSISTANCE.........................................23 1.CHAPTEROUTLINE......................................................................................................23 2.PERCEPTIONOFCOLLECTIVEGOODCONTENT..................................................24 3.DEFINITIONOFACOLLECTIVEGOOD....................................................................24 4.THECOSTOFENVIRONMENTALINVESTMENTS.................................................26 5.COLLECTIVEACTIONONCOLLECTIVEGOODS...................................................27 6.POTENTIALGAINSFROMBILATERALSUPPORT.................................................29 7.ANON-FORMALBILATERALGAMEONENVIRONMENTALASSISTANCE....32 CHAPTER3.............................................................................................................................45 ROOTSOFCONTEMPORARYSWEDISHENVIRONMENTALASSISTANCE.......45 1.VALIDATINGASSUMPTIONSONPREFERENCES..................................................45 2.DICHOTOMIZATIONOFSWEDISHFOREIGNAID.................................................46 3.THEPRACTICEOFTYINGAID...................................................................................47 4.EARLYSWEDISHFOREIGNAID................................................................................49 5.SWEDISHENVIRONMENTALCOOPERATIONINTHE1970S...............................59 6.FOREIGNAIDINTHE1970S:TOWHOMANDINWHATWAY?............................64 7.ENVIRONMENTALCOOPERATIONINTHE1980S..................................................67 8.DEVELOPMENTAIDINTHE1980S:GETTINGINLINE..........................................73 9.CONCLUSION.................................................................................................................81 CHAPTER4.............................................................................................................................85 THESWEDISHENVIRONMENTALASSISTANCECONSENSUS...............................85 1.THEIMPORTANCEOFHOMOGENEITYOFPREFERENCES.................................85 2.POLITICALCHANGESINTHEBALTICSTATES.....................................................88 3.THEFIRSTTHREE-YEARASSISTANCEPROGRAM...............................................89 4.THEPOLICYOFTHENEW,NON-SOCIALISTGOVERNMENT.............................94 5.THEEUROPEANIMPERATIVE...................................................................................97 6.THESWEDISHCLIMATESTRATEGY.......................................................................98 7.SAPAPPROVALOFTHEGOVERNMENTSTRATEGY...........................................99 8.THEREVISEDASSISTANCEPROGRAM.................................................................101 9.REFORMULATIONOFTHECEE-ASSISTANCEGOALS.......................................102 10.THENEWSAPGOVERNMENTINTENSIFIESTHEASSISTANCE.....................104 11.ADMINISTRATIVEREORGANIZATION...............................................................105 V 12.MINORDIVERGENCES............................................................................................107 13.DIVERSIFICATIONAMONGTHEBALTICRECIPIENTSOFSWEDISH ASSISTANCE....................................................................................................................108 14.CONCLUSION.............................................................................................................110 CHAPTER5...........................................................................................................................112 PRIORITIZEDENVIRONMENTALISSUE-AREASINESTONIA,LATVIA,AND LITHUANIA...........................................................................................................................112 1.FOCUSONTHESWEDISHSTRATEGY....................................................................112 2.BACKGROUND............................................................................................................112 3.PRIORITIZEDENVIRONMENTALISSUE-AREAS.................................................119 4.CONCLUSIONS............................................................................................................157 CHAPTER6...........................................................................................................................159 THECONTENTANDADMINISTRATIONOFSWEDISHASSISTANCETOTHE BALTICSTATES..................................................................................................................159 1.DECENTRALIZEDDECISION-MAKING..................................................................159 2.THESIGNIFICANCEOFTHEBALTICSEAENVIRONMENTALACTION PROGRAMME...................................................................................................................160 3.BITSFIELDOFACTIVITYBEFORE1995.................................................................166 4.SIDAGETSTHEMAINRESPONSIBILITY...............................................................167 5.ASSISTANCEADMINISTEREDBYOTHERAGENCIES........................................169 6.CONCLUSION...............................................................................................................175 CHAPTER7...........................................................................................................................176 ANALYSISANDCONCLUSIONS.....................................................................................176 1.INTRODUCTION..........................................................................................................176 2.CLASSIFICATIONOFENVIRONMENTALISSUE-AREAS...................................177 3.THESWEDISHPROJECTPORTFOLIO.....................................................................185 4.STABLESOCIALPREFERENCES?............................................................................189 5.SELF-INTERESTANDJOINTGAINS........................................................................191 6.ASSISTANCEDYNAMCIS..........................................................................................194 7.LEARNINGFROMEXPERIENCEANDDECREASINGINFORMATIONGAPS..195 8.GEOGRAPHICALPROXIMITYASAPOTENTIALEXPLANATION....................196 9.VARYINGSTAKESINTHEENVIRONMENTALSTATUS OFTHEBALTICSEA .............................................................................................................................................198 10.SWEDISHASSISTANCETOTHEBALTICSTATES;RECENTDEVELOPMENTS .............................................................................................................................................200 11.SUMMARYANDFUTURERESEARCH..................................................................204 12.TENTATIVEPOLICYIMPLICATIONS...................................................................207 REFERENCES.......................................................................................................................209 SWEDISHPARLIAMENTBILLS,COMMITTEEREPORTS,ANDGOVERNMENT DECISIONS........................................................................................................................209 PRINTEDSOURCES.........................................................................................................210 VI PREFACE The increasing interdependence between nations in the modern world is one of the most discussed issues in contemporary studies of international relations. The interac- tion between countries, corporations, organizations, and people across country borders tends to increase wealth and a multitude of various personal and collective benefits, as well as creating friction and conflicts of interests. This book concerns the potential conflict between national self-interest and morality, in terms of provi- sion of foreign aid. More specifically, it concerns the Swedish environmental support to the Baltic States during the first half of the 1990s. This particular support is of extraordinary interest for several reasons. Not only is it an example of the diffi- culties in keeping trade and aid issues apart. It is also a case where the gains at stake are tangible for both the recipient and donor countries. The trans-boundary nature of some of the most important environmental issues of our time makes the fruits from such cooperation important to the donor as well. Finally, the rapid transformation of the Baltic States from Moscow-controlled satellites to modern liberal democracies makes the study of the potential for joint gains from cooperation in this region po- litically important, as well as scientifically tantalizing. When approaching the most important issue in this study – the rationales behind the Swedish environmental assistance to the Baltic States - it became increasingly clear to me that in order to produce a scientifically proficient study in social science it would be necessary to combine theoretical rigor with empirical depth. The ease with which one could fall into the mire of empirical bookkeeping that had little bear- ing on the production of scientific knowledge, was as great and apparent as the temptation to endlessly dwell on theoretical puzzle solving. Therefore, my ambition has been to find a middle-road, where theory is used as a sharp instrument to discern reality. Without theoretical rigor, the work would have been extremely cumbersome and probably less successful than what has been achieved. Without attempts to ex- plain real-world events, nothing of scientific interest would have been accomplished. This ambition did, however, require a significant personal effort, as well as help and advice from many colleagues. Fortunately, I have not lacked assistance from a large number of people. This book has, to a large extent, been based on the findings of my PhD studies at the Department of Water and Environmental Studies (1995-2000), at the University of Linköping in Sweden. The person to whom I feel most deeply indebted is Profes- sor Elfar Loftsson, my advisor. Since my arrival in the department, he has always been a very good friend. Numerous are the times we have discussed issues concern- ing, for example, science and politics over a cup of coffee or a glass of beer. Such conversations always left me with a sense of increased commitment and a fervent desire to continue my work. Elfar’s thorough reading of my manuscripts at countless stages of completion has been of the utmost importance to me. His sharp observa- tions of inconsistent arguments and empirical fallacies have forced me to reconsider previous lines of thought, and thus increased the quality of the study. This book has been written within the research project Social Change and Democracy in the Baltic Sea Region. I feel very grateful to the other members of this VII research group for their support as well as for their critical remarks. In addition to Elfar Loftsson, who has headed this research project, Wojciech Szrubka and Yon- hyok Choe have made significant contributions to my work, and have also ensured my social well-being. During the work on this book, I have had the pleasure of being employed by Södertörns högskola. Being a member of the large political science team at Södertörn has been an inspiration. From the first day, I felt very welcome. It is a young University/College where everyone has been excited about the prospect of building a new academic center. I am thankful that I had the opportunity to be a part of this important endeavor. A number of external professionals have been of great importance to my work, as readers of early parts of the manuscript. My brother John made several sugges- tions for improvements in the theoretical parts of this study. His sharp observations from an economist’s perspective have been most valuable. Additional insightful comments from various disciplinary perspectives have been given to me by Jan Lindvall and Örjan Widegren at the University of Linköping, Kenneth Kollman at the University of Michigan, and Lasse Ringius at the UNEP Collaborating Centre on Energy and Environment. I would also like to give a special thank you to Åsa Danielsson and Charlotta Pers for their contribution to the development of my skills in statistical methods. The anonymous reviewer assigned by Kluwer Academic Pub- lishers has provided me with numerous valuable comments and suggestions on how the text could be improved, for which I am deeply grateful. Working in cooperation with the staff at Kluwer Academic Publishers in general, and Mrs. Gloria Verhey in particular, has been a pleasure. The encouraging and constructive dialogue during the process of writing has been valuable to me. The kind and helpful assistance given to me when making the final preparation of the manuscript has been especially useful. Finally, I would like to thank the administrative staff of both the Department of Water and Environmental Studies and Södertörns högskola for their kind and pro- fessional assistance. This research study was originally financed by the Department of Water and Environmental Studies and the Baltic Sea Fund (Östersjöstiftelsen). I am very grateful to them both for their support. VIII CHAPTER 1 INTRODUCTION 1. FROM REALISM TO ENVIRONMENTAL INTERDEPENDENCE The Second World War shaped the modern study of international relations in several important ways. The destruction and evil demonstrated by the war convinced most scholars that the idealistic approach was not in accordance with reality. Realism was essential in order to find a more accurate description of the interaction between sov- ereign states in a world without institutions above the state level with coercive power. The outcome of the interaction was determined not so much by ideological or moral standpoints as by the power of individual states or coalitions. The devel- opment in international relations studies in the 1950s seemed to confirm this conviction. The need to understand the processes in the international system as a struggle between sovereign states was epitomized for example by Hans J. Morgen- thau in his seminal work Politics among nations: the struggle for power and peace, first published in 1948. During the 1950s, the international scene became increasingly dominated by the tension between East and West, between the Warsaw Pact and NATO. Scholars in international relations described this dichotomization as the emergence of a bipolar international system. Kenneth Waltz emphasized the important distinction between a bipolar and a multipolar world system. The issue was still about power and military capability. According to Waltz’ analysis in his Theory of international relations, published in 1979, a bipolar structure was preferable to a multipolar structure, since the power balance would be more stable in the former. The occurrence of periods of détente between East and West as well as the in- creasing importance attached to the interdependent nature of the relations between nations in the late 1970s and early 1980s, indicated that the classical power- approach in studies of international relations could only partially explain observed behavior. Although military capability was still very important, it was argued, by for example Robert Keohane (1977) and Robert Gilpin (1981), that the incentives for choosing different strategies had to be added to the capability parameter. It was not reasonable to assume that states would act as expansionistically as their military capability allowed them, without regard to the cost of such policies. In the age of nuclear devices, it was also appreciated that even if a state possessed superior strength, this superiority could not easily be converted into influence over other states’ behavior. Instead of relying only on military capability as the explanatory variable, a more reasonable assumption seemed to be that states choose strategies from expected cost-benefit ratios. States choose strategies to increase the welfare of dominant do- 1 B. Hassler, Science and Politics of Foreign Aid © Kluwer Academic Publishers, 2003 2 CHAPTER 1 mestic interests. Not necessarily because of the benevolence of the governments, but rather due to the power and preferences of national interest groups. It seemed to be- come more and more obvious that the interest of the states was not confined to is- sues of war and peace. As the volume of trade and mobility of capital kept increasing, the economic interdependence in the international system became a pro- gressively imperative feature. Larger trade volumes meant increased prosperity and thereby amplified economic power. In the late 1970s and early 1980s, the transnational nature of many kinds of envi- ronmental issues became apparent to scientists as well as to electorates. The United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP) had been created as a direct outcome of the 1972 Stockholm Conference on Human Environment. In the 1980s, the World Bank (IBRD) began to change its policies in a more environmentally adapted direc- tion, due to criticism from several of its member countries and Non-Governmental Organizations (NGOs). Slowly, these changes began to change practices in the field. At the regional level, several conventions were formulated at about the same time as UNEP was created, for example the Helsinki Convention on the Protection of the Marine Environment of the Baltic Sea Area. Increasing resources were allocated to studies of environmental disturbances crossing national borders in most Western countries. Negotiations targeted towards joint action to tackle transnational environ- mental issues are seldom a zero sum game. There is almost always a potential for Pareto-sanctioned improvements, where at least one participant gains without others losing. This does not mean, however, that the benefits will be equally distributed, or that there are no incentives to free-ride, to let others bear the costs while benefiting from their action. On the contrary, typically the action taken will benefit the actors unevenly and there will be serious incentives to free-ride. Both factors tend to in- duce strategic behavior that might cause inertia, despite the potential for joint gains. The classical approach emphasizing power and military capability as the main explanatory variable has proved to be unsuitable for the analysis of state interaction on environmental issues. Brute force is seldom a feasible instrument, thus making such threats less credible. Interest has instead been focused on two different paths propounding the explanation of successful, as well as unsuccessful, initiatives to joint action. The first is based on the incentive approach. To explain outcomes in, for example, transnational environmental negotiations the interests of the involved actors have to be analyzed. Based on these interests, hypotheses about preferred strategies of the actors can be inferred. The other broad category does not focus on the incentives facing the actors, but rather on the potential to reach a cognitive mu- tual understanding of the problem at hand. It is a priori assumed that there exists a solution acceptable to all actors. If such an understanding of an acceptable solution can be reached, it is assumed that the actors will work towards this solution. In this study, the Swedish environmental assistance to the Baltic States in the pe- riod 1991-1996 is analyzed, using the approach based on the interests of the actors. This assistance will be interpreted as a mechanism to alter the behavior of the Baltic States, when the use of force is neither available, nor desirable. It is assumed that the transfer of Swedish resources is used to change the preferences of the Baltic States over potential environmental investments, in directions desirable to Sweden. When Sweden is covering some of the investment costs in particular environmental sec- INTRODUCTION 3 tors, the governments of the Baltic States are induced to cover the remaining costs in order to get the investments implemented. It should be emphasized, however, that since the realization of a particular cooperative project requires consent from both the donor and the recipient, the outcome is expected to be mutually beneficial. In other words, the “game” being played is not zero sum, but one with a positive over- all sum. 2. ALTRUISM AND SELF-INTEREST: THE AIM OF THE STUDY As a starting point it seems reasonable to assume that the Swedish environmental support to the Baltic States is perceived as being part of general foreign assistance and thus primarily guided by an intention to help people suffering from poverty, oppression, diseases, environmental hazards and similar hardships. The Swedish assistance to Central and Eastern Europe (CEE) was, in the first years, financed from the aid budget, and the need to support the countries in transition in their strug- gle to become de facto sovereign states was expressed time and again in government propositions and declarations, as well as in parliamentary bills by the political par- ties in opposition. Although there were certainly also other less altruistic aspects influencing Swedish foreign aid in general, the official ambition as well as the per- ception of the public was that foreign aid should primarily benefit poor people in poor countries. From this perspective, the apparent aspects of self-interested consid- erations in the Swedish environmental assistance to the Baltic States seem sur- prising. This observation forms the basis of this study, where the primary objective is to analyze to what extent this particular assistance can be explained by self- interested Swedish behavior. It should be emphasized that self-interested behavior does not necessarily mean that the interests of the recipient country are compro- mised. A self-interested actor finds no pleasure in obstructing the policies of other actors per se. Self-interest here means that the interests of the other actors are not taken into consideration. But if it is, for example, the case that mutual gains might be realized, a self-interested actor would have no problems at all with the fact the others also gain from a particular initiative. Foreign aid is defined as purely altruistic if the only determinant of relevance to the donor country is its perception of the recipient’s utility from the assistance un- dertaken. The donor country in this case only cares about the recipient’s gains. Domestic interests are only addressed if this does not negatively affect the utility derived from the assistance to the recipient. This does not imply, however, that effi- ciency issues are irrelevant. The common notion of cost-benefit ratio may still be used, but only the utility of the recipient and only the cost for the donor country would be relevant. Trying to maximize recipient utility to a given cost does not vio- late the definition of altruism above. In contrast to this truly philanthropic donor, the ideally self-interested one only cares about the effect on domestic considerations. It is difficult, indeed, to imagine any aid policies at all under such auspices, since the money spent on assistance would almost always be of more utility to the donor not taking the path through aid disbursements. Why not allocate the resources directly into the domestic economy,

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Most books are stored in the elastic cloud where traffic is expensive. For this reason, we have a limit on daily download.