saudi arabia and iran

137 Pages·2017·1.43 MB·English

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ISTANBUL UNIVERSITY
SOCIAL SCIENCES INSTITUTE

SAUDI ARABIA AND IRAN:
A READING OF MAIN FACTORS ASCENDING THEIR
RIVARLY IN THE MIDDLE EAST SINCE THE
ISLAMIC REVOLUTION

Thesis Submitted in Partial Fulfillment of the
Requirements for the Degree of
Master of Political sciences and International Relations

SAHAR BEN YOUNES

THESIS SUPERVISOR
AHMET ÖZTÜRK

ISTANBUL-2017
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Abstract

The struggle for influence between Riyadh and Tehran has reached its highest level to
encompass nearly every conflict within the Middle East. Although sectarianism has been the
main aspect characterizing this rivalry, this research extends far beyond the sectarian reading of
the crisis. In fact, it explores further political and economic factors that brought these two
countries at odds, raising the question “why can't Iran and Saudi Arabia reach cooperation
despite their shared history, culture and religion?” The primary concern of this study is to
highlight a pragmatic reading of the conflict in order to clarify the current regional turmoil. For
this purpose, this study adopts a mixed methodology conducting in-depth interviews, document
analysis and observation under the umbrella of a case study research strategy.
The results of this research show that both states have been caught in defense-offense dilemma
since the establishment of the Iranian Islamic Republic. Distrust reined the two country's
relations as the fall of Iraq and the rise of the Arab spring reshaped the preexisting regional order
by altering key alliances and redefining regional power. Each, threatened by the intervention of
the other in the neighboring failing states, has declared proxy wars in Iraq, Syria, Lebanon and
Yemen and has thus driven the rivalry to a higher level. Results underline that this political
competition was accompanied by a military buildup and an economic struggle for oil Market
share and got worsened during the implementation of “JCPOA” Iranian Nuclear Deal. The
results discuss these driving factors through Neorealist theory lenses and underline the growth
of the security dilemma between the two states proving that the nature of the regional system
and the growing threat stemming from each other is what really provokes them to behave
offensively. The study finally draws future avenues on how to resolve this conflict through
international mediation and the evocation of mutual interests that have once brought Iran and
Saudi Arabia to a détente period.
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Acknowledgements

I would like to express my sincere gratitude to my Masters’ supervisor Assoc. Prof. Dr. Ahmet
Öztürk without whose guidance and assistance this dissertation would not have been
accomplished.

I am mostly indebted to my family for their very valuable support, namely to my father Kamal
and mother Souad for always believing in me. Their constant love and endless encouragement at
all levels of this process have been a tremendous help. I would like to also thank my aunt Yosra
and brother Firas whom I am privileged to cherish for the rest of my life.

Through my Masters’s program I have been surrounded by marvelous friends; Tarek, Hela,
Amina, Zeynep, Dilara, Tuğba and Özlem to whom I am more than thankful for their endless
support and for always bringing laughter into my life.

Lastly, I would like to acknowledge and show high respect to my Master’s program professors
within the Faculty of Economy at Istanbul University for providing me with vast knowledge and
adding an immense level of depth to my years of education.
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Table of Contents

Abstract ................................................................................................................. ii
Acknowledgements .............................................................................................. iii
Table of Contents ................................................................................................ iv
List of Figures ..................................................................................................... vii
Chapter1: Introduction ....................................................................................... 1
1.1. Background of The Study .............................................................................................. 1
1.2. Statement of the Problem .............................................................................................. 4
1.3. Research Questions ........................................................................................................ 4
1.4. Hypothesis ....................................................................................................................... 5
1.5. Objectives of The Study ................................................................................................. 5
1.6. Significance of The Topic .............................................................................................. 6
1.7. Limitations of The Study ............................................................................................... 6
1.8. Road Map of The Study ................................................................................................. 7
1.9. Definition of Terms ........................................................................................................ 7
1.9.1. Iranian Revolution’s Theory .................................................................................... 7
1.9.2. The Arab Spring ..................................................................................................... 10
1.9.3. Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) ..................................................... 11
Chapter 2: Methodological Framework .......................................................... 13
2.1. Research Design ........................................................................................................... 13
2.2. Data Collection ............................................................................................................. 14
2.3. Data Analysis ................................................................................................................ 15
2.4. Conclusion ..................................................................................................................... 16
Chapter 3: Theoretical Framework ................................................................. 17
3.1. Structural Realism ....................................................................................................... 17
3.2. Security Dilemma ......................................................................................................... 19
Chapter 4: Factors Stimulating the Rivalry .................................................... 23
4.1. Historical Context ........................................................................................................ 23
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4.1.1. The Iranian Islamic Revolution ............................................................................. 23
4.1.2. The Gulf wars ......................................................................................................... 24
4.1.3. The US invasion of Iraq ......................................................................................... 27
4.1.4. The Arab Spring effect ........................................................................................... 29
4.2. Political Features of The Conflict ............................................................................... 32
4.2.1. Power Balancing ..................................................................................................... 32
4.2.2. Opposing Alliances ................................................................................................. 36
4.2.3. A Zero-sum Game ................................................................................................... 42
4.2.4. Proxy Wars .............................................................................................................. 43
4.2.4.1. Iraq .................................................................................................................... 43
4.2.4.2. Lebanon ............................................................................................................ 49
4.2.4.3. Syria .................................................................................................................. 53
4.2.4.4. Yemen ................................................................................................................ 58
4.3. Economic Rivalry: Contest for Oil and International Market ................................ 63
4.3.1. During the Economic Sanctions ............................................................................ 63
4.3.2. The JCPOA Effect .................................................................................................. 64
4.4. Conclusion ..................................................................................................................... 67
Chapter 5: A Case Study ................................................................................... 70
5.1. Introduction .................................................................................................................. 70
5.2. Geopolitical Rivalry ..................................................................................................... 71
5.2.1. Saudi Insecurity Towards Iranian Expansionism ................................................ 71
5.2.1.1. The Houthi threat .............................................................................................. 72
5.2.1.2. Countering Iran in Lebanon ............................................................................. 73
5.2.1.3. Support for opposition in Syria ......................................................................... 75
5.2.2. Iranian strategic regional project .......................................................................... 75
5.2.2.1. Saudi Arabian Sabotage ................................................................................... 77
5.2.2.2. Deploying Forces in Syria ................................................................................ 78
5.2.2.3. Iranian Support for the Houthi Rebels ............................................................. 79
5.2.2.4. Controlling Iraq ................................................................................................ 80
5.3. Military Capabilities Balancing .................................................................................. 81
5.3.1. The Saudi Arm Buildup ......................................................................................... 81
5.3.2. Iran’s Growing Military Capabilities ..................................................................... 83
5.3.2.1. Iran’s maritime expansion ................................................................................ 83
5.3.2.2. Developing Ballistic Missiles Capabilities ....................................................... 85
5.4. Economic Rivalry ......................................................................................................... 87
5.4.1. Iran Oil Exports Under Sanctions ......................................................................... 87
5.4.2. The Nuclear Folder and Its Drawbacks ................................................................ 88
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5.4.2.1. Iran’s Economic Boost ...................................................................................... 88
5.4.2.2. Iran’s Increasing Oil Production ..................................................................... 89
5.4.2.3. Saudi Stands Against the Nuclear Deal ............................................................ 91
5.4.2.4. Oil prices and Struggle For Market Share ....................................................... 92
5.5. Conclusion ....................................................................................................... 95
Chapter 6: Results, Discussion and Conclusion .............................................. 96
6.1. Analysis Results ............................................................................................................ 96
6.1.1. The Saudi Stance .................................................................................................... 96
6.1.2. The Iranian Stance ................................................................................................. 97
6.1.3. Military Rivalry ....................................................................................................... 99
6.1.4. The Economic Contest .......................................................................................... 100
6.1.5. The Nuclear Deal Fuels the Rivalry .................................................................... 100
6.1.6. Rivalry Over The Oil Market Share ..................................................................... 101
6.2. Discussion .................................................................................................................... 102
6.2. Conclusion and Future Avenues ............................................................................... 111
References and Appendix ................................................................................ 116
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List of Figures
Figure 1: The Saudi increasing Military Spending……………………………………………………..81
Figure 2: Iran’s Decreasing Oil Exports (2011-2014)…………………….……………………………87
Figure 3: An Increase in the Iranian oil exports at the Establishment of the JCPOA…………………...90
Figure 4: OPEC dropping Oil Prices (2011-2016)……………………………………………………..93
Figure 5: Saudi Arabia’s Oil Production Increase vis-a-vis the Decreasing Prices…………………….94
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Chapter 1: Introduction
1.1. Background of The Study

This research focuses on the ascendant struggle for power between Iran and Saudi Arabia in
the Levant and the Persian Gulf, notably in Iraq, Syria, Lebanon and Yemen since the Iranian
revolution, passing through the fall of Iraq and the outbreak of the Arab Spring till our current days.
In fact, despite the few calm periods witnessed between Iran and Saudi Arabia during this period of
time, reciprocal accusations, internal interferences, rupture of diplomatic relations, and undeclared
proxy wars kept defining their relations and made cooperation almost impossible to attain.
Many researches relate the rivalry to sectarian and ideological differences between the reactionary
Wahabis and the revolutionary Shiites and date the conflict back to the death of the prophet
Mohamed. Nadav writes that both countries claim to be the model state that should be the leader of
the Muslim world. From its side, Iran adopts a theocratic framework guided by an Islamist
ideology that has developed a democratic character. The Iranian political system is based on
Twelver Shiism, believing that the twelfth imam, who disappeared in 874AD, will one day return
as the Mahdi or the promised one and that cleric should fill the authority gap until he shows up;
meanwhile people have to submit to their rule. Similarly to Iran, Saudi Arabia sees its political
system as an ideal Islamic one. However, it follows a hereditary monarchy that allocates unlimited
power to the king, who must be a descendent of the first Saudi monarch, Abdul Aziz Ibn Saud. The
Al-Sauds are not familiar with democracy and base their power on Wahhabism; a conservative
branch of Sunni Islam that dates back to the 18th century when Mohammad Ibn Abd al Wahhab
founded the Wahhabi movement.1
Nader thinks that main divergence between the two rivals does not only remain in the different
Islamic political structures they follow but also in their perception of the right to lead the Muslim
world and the totalitarian and supremacist ideology that they seek to export.2 Venetis develops this
argument and explains that Iran believes in “Velayat-el fakih” leadership; which means the broad

1 Nadav, Safran. (1988). Saudi Arabia: The Ceaseless Quest for Security, Cornell University Press, p.34-45.
2 Nader, Alireza. (2014). The Days after The Deal with Iran: Continuity and Change in Iranian Foreign Policy,
RAND Corporation, p.1-13.
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rule of the supreme jurisprudent. Following this concept, Iran views its future through the prism of
its glorious history which is totally different from that of the British “invented” Gulf countries. The
Iranian clergy believe that they should replace nation-states structure in Islamic world by emirates
which would later unite under a sultanate that follows their Islamic law.3 Bazzi further explains
that this ideology directly opposes to the Saudi’s leadership claim, as they relate their headship
over the wider Muslim world to the fact that the kingdom is the home of Islam’s two holiest cities,
Mecca and Medina, where the religion was founded. The Sauds take a political legitimacy from the
medieval concept claiming that Muslims should obey to their rulers without any dispute, as long as
they can properly apply Islamic laws.4
Nahas underlines that while the Saud dynasty views itself as the only rightful leader of the Muslim
world, Iran kept challenging that leadership for decades, particularly, after the 1979 Islamic
Revolution. Indeed, the core of Iran’s revolutionary ideology is Islamic resistance. Iran believes
in leading an existential encounter against imperialism and religious extremism. It worked on
manicuring an image of resistance and independence that surpasses ethnic divides and resonates
with popular anti-Zionist, anti-U.S, and anti-extremist approach in the region.5 Furthermore, Iran
protagonist ideology is not towards Shiite Muslims only, but also towards all Muslim. The Imam
Khomeini’s foundational political ideology was mainly about promoting a pan-Islamic unity. In
fact, Khomeini did not envisage himself as making a revolution in only one country. His ideology
of clerical rule and the denunciation of the Western colonial heritage was a universal message,
Friedland elucidates. Therefore, the Iranian clerical elite believe that their mandate to rule is not
limited by geographical borders and that they must extend their influence and power to regional
countries.6 Likewise, Ali Shariati believed that third world countries need, first, a national
revolution to put end to imperial domination and vitalize their culture and identity; second, a social

3 Venetis, Evangelos. (2011). The Rising Power of Iran in The Middle East: Forming an axis with Iraq, Syrian and
Lebanon University of Leiden, ELIAMEP, Middle Eastern Studies Programme, No 2, p.6-11.
4 Bazzi, Mohammed. (2015). King Salman’s War: Why the new Saudi ruler will likely ratchet up the region-wide
conflict with Iran, Politico Magazine,

http://www.politico.com/magazine/story/2015/01/saudi-arabia-king-salman-114583.
5 Madridi, Nahas. (1985). State System and Revolutionary challenge: Nasser, Khomeini, and the Middle East,
International Journal of Middle Eastern Studies, p.507-527.
6 Friedland, Elliot. (2014). Iranian Regional Hegemony Fact Sheet, The Clarion Project, p.1-12.
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revolution that eradicates exploitation, poverty and capitalism. Moaddel writes that Shariati called
for “Nezam-e Tawhid” (unitary society), believing that the Prophet’s message was not only about
establishing a monotheistic religion but also about bounding people together by public virtue and a
good common will.7
To that end, Iran has always been ready to prop up Islamist movements and insurgent groups that
lined up with its goals. In the beginning of the Arab Spring, Iran hosted the first International
Conference on the Islamic Awakening in Tehran with more than 700 delegates from 84 countries,
Payam explicates.8 During the conference, Ayatollah Ali Hosseini Khamenei insisted on the need
for Islamic government and the overthrow of the Arab dictators and monarchs, including those of
Jordan, Bahrain and Saudi Arabia.9 According to Crooke this has brought Iran directly into
conflict with Saudi Arabia which has never feared Iranian tanks sitting on its borders as much as it
feared the revolutionary concepts embedded in the Iranian thinking and the possibility of their
spread throughout the region.10 Cronin et al. sum up this conflict writing that the conservative
Wahhabis and the revolutionary Iranians are at odds in terms of “clericalism versus monarchism”,
“populism versus elitism”, “regionalism versus peninsularism”, “Shiism versus Sunniism”, and
“anti-Westernism versus pro-Westernism”.11 This conflict has revived a centuries-old sectarian
rivalry over the true interpretation of leadership in Islam.12

7 Moaddel, Mansoor. (1993). Class, Poltics and Ideology in the Iranian Revolution, New York Colombia University
Press, p.130-154.
8Payam, Mohseni. (2013). The Islamic Awakening: Iran’s Grand Narrative of the Arab Uprisings. Brandeis
University, Crown Center For Middle East Studies, no.71.
9 F. Worth, Robert. (2012). Effort to Rebrand Arab Spring Backfires in Iran. The New York Times.
http://www.nytimes.com/2012/02/03/world/middleeast/effort-to-rebrand-arab-spring-backfires-in-iran.html?_r=0
10 Crooke, Alastair. (2015). America Immobilized as Iran-Saudi Arabia Proxy War Turns Bloody, The World Post,
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/alastair-crooke/america-iran-saudi-war_b_7001776.html
11 Cronin, Stephanie and Masalha, Nur. (2011). The Islamic Republic of Iran and the GCC States: Revolution to
Realpolitik? The Kuwait Programme on Development, Governance and Globalization in the Gulf States, London
School of Economics and Political Science. No.17, p.1-32.
12 Ro, Julia. (2016). The Sunni-Shia Divide. Council on Foreign Relations,
http://www.cfr.org/peace-conflict-and-human-rights/sunni-shia-divide/p33176#!/?cid=otr-marketing_url-sunni_shia_
infoguide.