Satisfying Reason: Studies in the Theory of Knowledge

254 Pages·1995·31.576 MB·English

by  Nicolas Rescher (auth.)

SATISFYINGREASON
Episteme
ASERIESINTHEFOUNDATIONAL,
METHODOLOGICAL,PHILOSOPHICAL,PSYCHOLOGICAL,SOCIOLOGICAL,AND
POLITICALASPECTSOFTHESCIENCES,PUREANDAPPLIED
VOLUME21
Editor: MarioBunge
FoundationsandPhilosophyofScienceUnit, McGillUniversity
AdvisoryEditorialBoard:
RaymondBoudon,Sociology, MaisondesSciencesdeI'Homme, Paris
GeorgeBugliarello,Engineering, PolytechnicInstituteofNew York
BrunoFritsch,ProfessoremeritusoftheSwissFederalInsituteofTechnology, ZUrich
IvanT.Frolov,PhilosophyandSocialSciences, USSRAcademyofScience, Moscow
ErwinHiebert,HistoryofScience, HarvardUniversity
PhilipKitcher,Philosophy, UniversityofCalifornia, Davis
NicholasRescher,Philosophy, UniversityofPittsburgh
MichaelRuse,PhilosophyandZoology, UniversityofGuelph
RaimoTuomela,Philosophy, UniversityofHelsinki
HaoWang,Mathematics, RockefellerUniversity, NewYork
PaulWeingartner,Philosophy, Salzburg University
Thetitlespublishedinthisseriesarelistedattheendofthisvolume.
NICOLAS RESCHER
University of Pittsburgh
SATISFYING REASON
Studies in the Theory of Knowledge
SPRINGER-SCIENCE+BUSINESS MEDIA, B.V.
Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data
Reseher, Nleholas.
Satlsfylng reason : studles In the theory of knowledge I by
Nleholas Reseher.
p. en. -- (Eplsteme : v. 21)
Ine 1u des 1n dex.
ISBN 978-94-010-4216-1 ISBN 978-94-011-0483-8 (eBook)
DOI 10.1007/978-94-011-0483-8
1. Ratlonallsm. I. Tltle. II. Serles: Eplsteme (Dordreeht,
Netherlands) : v. 21.
BD181.R45 1995
121--de20 94-33491
Printed on acid-free paper
AU Rights Reserved
© 1995 Springer Science+Business Media Dordrecht
Originally published by Kluwer Academic Publishers in 1995
Softcover reprint of the hardcover 1s t edition 1995
No part of the material protected by this copyright notice may be reproduced or
utilized in any form or by any means, electronic or mechanical,
inc1uding photocopying, recording or by any information storage and
retrieval system, without written permission from the copyright owner.
TABLE OFCONTENTS
PREFACE vii
INTRODUCTION ix
CHAPTER 1: SatisfyingReason 1
CHAPTER 2: Why Be Rational? 24
CHAPTER 3: Reason andReality 32
CHAPTER 4: Metaknowledge 54
CHAPTER 5: Fallibilismand the PursuitofTruth 72
CHAPTER 6: Methodological Optimism 87
CHAPTER 7: Meaningless Numbers 103
CHAPTER 8: Conceptual IdealismRevisited 122
CHAPTER 9: The ContrastBetween Explanatory and
Experiential Understanding 155
CHAPTER 10: TheLimitsofCognitiveRelativism 176
CHAPTER 11: TheDeficits ofDeconstructionism 212
CHAPTER 12: Exits from Paradox 226
NAME INDEX 241
v
PREFACE
The dozen essays on issues in the philosophy ofknowledge that
are collected together were written during the 1991-93 trienni
um. Two ofthem (numbers 2 and 8) have previously appeared in
print in professionaljournals and I am grateful to the publishers
involved for permission to reprint. I am also grateful to Marian
Kowatch and Annamarie Morrow for preparing a typescript of
this material serviceablefor the printer's needs.
May 1993 Nicholas Rescher
Pittsburgh, PA
vii
INTRODUCTION
Leibnizsaidwithamixtureofadmirationandexasperationthatthe
duchess Sophie ofHannover always wanted to know the reason
whybehindthereasonwhy.Andthatisjusthowrationalityworks:
itwantstoleavenolooseendstounderstanding,seekingtoenable
us to understand things through to the bitterend.
Thepresentbookpresentsadozenessaysdealingwithissuesof
cognitive rationality from one perspective or another. The open
ingessay("SatisfyingReason")considersthechangesofperspec
tive that have, over the centuries, led philosophers to soften the
requirements of reason through a step-by-step weakening of the
absolutisticandnecessitariandemandsofthegreatthinkersofthe
1600s. This softening has involved a fundamental change in our
understanding ofwhatcognitiverationality is all about.
Thesecondessay("WhyBeRational?")showshowcogentand
compelling the case for heeding the demands of reason actually
are, oncethey themselves are reasonably understood. There is no
reasonable way ofdismissingthe demands ofreason.
The third essay ("Reason and Reality") argues that despite the
compelling case for cognitive rationality one mustface the harsh
realitiesofourepistemicsituation. Theprojectofrational inquiry
is much like that ofmorality. We humans are committed in both
regards to pursue what is at best and at most a life ofeffort and
struggle that offers the prospect of achieving not perfection but
merely ongoing improvements.
Insofar as metaknowledge-knowledge about our knowledge
is achievable at all (so argue the next two essays), we must see
ix
x INTRODUCTION
ourselvesas strivinginscientificinquirytoachievebestestimates
whose ultimate correctness is nowise assured. Our condition is
such that in thecognitive life there are no guarantees with regard
to the big theoretical issues to which science addresses itself.
We have to do the best we can, realizing that it may ultimately
transpire thatourbesthas not been good enough.
What is called for in this situation (so argues the sixth essay
on "Methodological Optimism") is a positive and constructive
attitude that grants a presumption ofadequacy to ourestablished
procedures.Andwhatrecommendsthismethodologicaloptimism
is exactly its positivity: the fact that if good results are to be
achievable by us at all, then this way of proceeding is-on all
available indications-themosteffective way to realize them.
The remaining six chapters address various issues relating to
the use and abuseofreason.
Chapter seven criticizes the misguided tendency to think that
the domain of clear and adequate understanding is confined to
those issuesthatcan betreatedquantitatively. Measurementis all
very well in its place, but this is not ubiquitous throughout the
domain ofrigorous thought.
Chapter eight argues that a proper understanding ofthe world
weliveincallsforendeavoring tograspitnotintermsofabstract
necessities but rather in terms of familiar, first-hand accessible
categories ofthe human mind andits experiential repertoire.
The next chapter develops further the contrast between
causal/explanatory understanding and experiential/normative
understanding. It stresses the idea that Homo sapiens as a mem
ber of both the rational and also the specifically human order
of things, must adopt a view of the world and our place in it
that takes account of both the scientifically explanatory and the
humanistically affective dimensions.
The tenth chapter depicts "the definitive truth" about reality
as an idealization thatcontrasts with our putative truths-ouresti
matesoftherealtruthofthingsaswearebestabletodevelopthem.
INTRODUCTION xi
Since that this sort of estimation is a matter of the information
al context, the issue becomes colored with a tinge ofrelativism.
But this contextuality certainly does not warrant an indifferentist
relativismofarbitrary choice. Insofaras we notonly form beliefs
but act on them, the situation is that ofa functuationalism where
we may make our own proposals but the actual disposing lies
elsewhere-with the world's humanity-indifferent modus operan
di. Rational inquiry is certainly no matteroffree construction as
we have itin belles lettres.
Chapter eleven maintains that indifferentist relativism is an
inappropriate cognitive stance even in the interpretation oftexts.
Texts (literary and other) are not infinitely plastic materials with
which we interpreters are free to do as we will. Texts have con
texts which every sensible interpreter must take into appropriate
account.
The final chapter seeks to came to grips with the paradoxical
character ofsome ofwhat we putatively know that is inherent in
thefact thatourconvictionsregarding mattersoftruthand reality
are often mutually incompatible. The orthodox strategy here is
to insist that when this happens the culprit contentions involved
are "semantically meaningless" by way oflacking a truth value.
The present discussion argues that this approach is not optimal.
Thealternativeofacceptinginconsistencyandshiftingfromtruth
value gaps to truth-value overlaps is notonly feasible butenjoys
certain theoretical advantages. The inconsistency ofour putative
knowledge is not an absolute disaster; it is something that even
fully rational peoplecan take in stride and learn to live with.
Throughout,thebookseekstodevelopanddefendthefollowing
perspective:
• that rationality is acardinal virtue in cognitive matters;
• that this is not something simple and cut-and-dry. In the
pursuit of truth through the development of knowledge we
face obstacles-sometimeseven insuperableones;
xii INTRODUCTION
• allthatwecando, hereaselsewhere, istodothebestwecan,
realizing thateven ourvery bestmay stillbe imperfect;
• thatneverthelesstheventureisfarfromhopeless: whileabso
lutesareunattainableinthecognitiveventure,somesolutions
are situationallyoptimalin beingthecomparativelybestthat
can be managedin thecircumstances;
• that reason itselfenables us to come to terms with this state
of affairs and urges us to accept the best that we can do as
goodenough.
Idealizedrationality, like idealized morality, may require more
ofus than we can ever effectively accomplish. But rationality is
also realistic. In urging us to see things as they are, reason is
prepared to face up to its own limitations. Insofar as we seek to
meetthe demands ofreason, reason itselfinsists upon ourresting
satisfiedwiththesubidealbestthatcanpracticablybeachievedin
the prevailingcircumstances.