Safety of Computer Control Systems 1983 (Safecomp '83). Achieving Safe Real Time Computer Systems

259 Pages·1983·28.29 MB·English

by  Ifac, England) Ifip Workshop 1983 (Cambridge, J. A. Baylis, J. A. Baylis, International Federation of Automatic Control, International Federation for Information Processing, Institution of Electrical Engineers

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AKASHI: Control Science and Technoloyg for the Progress of LANDAU: Adaptive Systems in Control and Signal Processign
Society, 7 Volumes LAUBER: Safeyt of Computre Control Systems (1979)
ALONSO-CONCHEIRO: Real Time Digital Control Applicatiosn LEININGER: Computre Aided Design of Multivariabel
ATHERTON: Multivariabel Technologicl aSystems Technologicl aSystems
BABARY & LE LETTY: Control of Distributde Parametre Systems LEONHARD: Control in Power Electronisc and Electricla Drives
(1982) (1977)
BANKS & PRITCHARD: Control of Distributde Parametre LESKIEWICZ & ZAREMBA: Pneumatci and Hydraulci
Systems Componens tand Instrumens tin Automatci Control
BAYLIS: Safeyt of Computre Control Systems (1983) MAHALANABIS: Theory and Application of Digital Control
BEKEY & SARIDIS: Identificatino and System Parametre MILLER: Distributde Computre Control Systems (1981)
Estimation (1982) MUNDAY: Automatci Control in Space
BINDER: Componens tand Instrumens tfor Distributde Computre NAJIM & ABDEL-FATTAH: Systems Approach for Developmetn
Control Systems (1980)
BULL: Real Time Programmign (1983) NIEMI: A Link Between Science and Applicatiosn of Automatci
CAMPBELL: Control Aspecst of Prosthetisc and Orthotics Control
Van CAUWENBERGHE: Instrumentatnio and Automation in the NOVAK: Softwaer for Computre Control
Pape,r Rubbe,r Plastics and Polymerisatnio Industrise (1980) O'SHEA & POLIS: Automation in Mining, Mineral and Metal
CICHOCKI & STRASZAK: Systems Analyssi Applicatiosn to Processign (1980)
Complex Programs OSHIMA: Information Control Problems in Manufacturign
Technoloyg (1977)
CRONHJORT: Real Time Programmign (1978)
PAU: Dynamci Modelling and Control of National Economise
CUENOD: Computre Aided Design of Control Systems (1983)
De GIORGO & ROVEDA: Criterai for Selecting Appropriaet RAUCH: Applicatiosn of Nonlinear Programmign to
Technologise under Different Cultura,l Technicla and Social Optimization and Control
RAUCH: Control Applicatiosn of Nonlinear Programmign
Conditions
REMBOLD: Information Control Problems in Manufacturign
DUBUISSON: Information and Systems
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ELLIS: Control Problems and Devices in Manufacturign Technoloyg
RIJNSDORP: Case Studies in Automation related to Humanizatino
(1980) of Work
FERRATE & PUENTE: Softwaer for Computre Control RIJNSDORP & PLOMP: Training for Tomorrow - Educationl a
FLEISSNER: Systems Approach to Appropriaet Technoloyg Aspecst of Computerisde Automation
Transfer
RODD: Distributde Computre Control Systems (1983)
GELLIE & TAVAST: Distributde Computre Control Systems (1982)
SANCHEZ & GUPTA: Fuzzy Informatio,n Knowledge
GHONAIMY: Systems Approach for Developmetn (1977) Representatnio and Decision Analyssi
HAASE: Real Time Programmign (1980) SAWARAGI & AKASHI: Environmentl aSystems Plannin,g Design
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HALME: Modelling and Control of Biotechnicl aProcessse SINGH & TITLI: Control and Managemetn of Integratde Industrila
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Technoloyg (1982) SMEDEMA: Real Time Programmign (1977)
HARRISON: Distributde Computre Control Systems STRASZAK: Large Scael System:s Theory and Applicatiosn (1983)
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HERBST: Automatci Control in Power Generatino Distributino and (1980)
Protectino WESTERLUND: Automation in Mining, Mineral and Metal
Processign (1983)
ISERMANN: Identificatino and System Parametre Estimatino
Van WOERKOM: Automatci Control in Space (1982)
(1979)
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(1983)
Process Control
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IFAC Related Titles
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SAFETY OF COMPUTER
CONTROL SYSTEMS 1983
(SAFECOMP '83)
Achieving Safe Real Time
Computre Systems
Proceedings of the Third IFAC/IFIP Workshop
Cambridge, UK, 20-22 September 1983
Edited by
J. A. BAYLIS
Technology, Planning & Research Division,
Central Electricity Research Laboratories,
Leatherhead, UK
Published for the
INTERNATIONAL FEDERATION OF AUTOMATIC CONTROL
by
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First edition 1983
British Library Cataloguign in Publication Data
IFAC/IFIP Workshpo on Safeyt of Computre
Control Systems (SAFECOMP '83)
(3rd: 1983: Cambridg)e
Safeyt of computre control system, s1983.
1. Automatci control — Data processgin
—Safeyt measurse — Congressse
I. Title II. Baylis,J.A.
629.8'95'0298 TJ213
ISBN 0-08-0305636-
Library of Congress Catalog Card no: 83-13419
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Therefore, the readers are asked to excuse any deficiencies
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Printed in Great Britain by A. Wheaton & Co. Ltd., Exeter
THIRD IFAC/IFIP WORKSHOP ON SAFETY OF COMPUTER
CONTROL SYSTEMS (SAFECOMP '83)
Achieving Safe Real Time Computer Systems
Organized by
The Institutino of Electricla Engineesr (IEE)
Sponsored by
The Internationl aFederatino of Automatci Control (IFAC) through
Technicla Committee on Computesr (COMPUT)
Technicla Committee on Systems Engineerign (SECOM)
Technicla Committee on Applicatiosn (APCOM)
Co-sponsored by
The Internationl aFederatino for Informatino Processgin (IFIP)
Europena Workshpo on Industrila Computre Systems (EWICS)
British Computre Socieyt
National Center of Systems Reliabiliyt (UK)
International Programme Committee National Organizing Committee
J. A. Baylis (U.K.) (Chairma)n B. K. Daniesl (NCSR) (Chairma)n
T. Andersno (U.K.) S. R. Nunns (BCS)
P. A. Bennett (U.K.) J. A. Baylis (IEE)
S. Bologna (Italy) S. Randell (IEE)
D. R. Bristol (USA)
G. Dahll (Norway)
B. K. Daniesl (U.K.)
W. Ehrenbergr e(German)y
H. Frey (Switzerlan)d
R. Gensre (Austria)
E.Johnsno (U.K.)
J. M. Rat a (Franc)e
H. Ryland(U.K).
M. G. Singh (U.K.)
B. J. Sternre (Swede)n
U. Voges (German)y
R. W. Yunker (USA)
PREFACE
Computers are now used very extensively in able. Steady progress is being made in the
control and communications systems, and their development and application of specification
advantages compared with previous technology languages, and in the design of fault toler­
are well known. However the versatility and ant systems with self-test and reconfigura­
greater capability of computers entails an tion capability. The real-time problem of
increase in complexity. This is a source of concurrency, particularly in distributed sys­
difficulty when it is necessary to give assur­ tems, of recovery time and repair are also
ance or prove that a computer system will be given due attention, arid, though most of the
reliable. Applications where both reliability papers are concerned with software, the
and safety are of high importance are the importance of hardware reliability has not
monitoring and control of high energy proces­ been neglected.
ses, of transportation systems and informa­
tion systems. In all of these the malfunc­ The programme committee are grateful for the
tion of monitoring or control equipment can support of the sponsoring organisations in
be a direct or indirect cause of danger. The encouraging interest in the event, and to the
aim of SAFECOMP is to report and discuss re­ organising committee and the Institution of
cent advances in the application of real-time Electrical Engineers, UK, for undertaking the
computer systems to such safety related tasks. administration. It is hoped that progress in
our field will continue to be presented and
The first SAFECOMP took place in Stuttgart, discussed at future SAFECOMP1s.
Germany, in 1979 and since then much has been
learnt in software engineering, in hardware
and in the management of the design process.
This progress was reported and summarised in John A. Baylis
terms of best practices, outstanding problems
and the directions for future research at the
second SAFECOMP, held at Purdue University,
West Lafayette USA last year. The mainspring
for SAFECOMP continues to be Technical Commit­
tee No. 7, "safety and security" of the Euro­
pean Workshop on Industrial Computer Systems
(Purdue Europe), and its sister at Lafayette.
TC 7 judged that a SAFECOMP in Europe in 1983
was warranted in order to carry the work for­
ward. The "Call for Papers" confirmed the
high level of interest and activity, and the
papers selected for the Workshop come from 12
different countries and span applications in
aerospace, electric power generation, mari­
time systems, mining and railways. Control
and protection of nuclear reactors continue
to be the application receiving most atten­
tion.
The papers cover the full range of topics
associated with reliability and safety, as
indicated in the titles of the sessions.
They indicate the continuing difficulty in
establishing metrics for software reliability,
but on the other hand over half the papers
refer to systems already installed. This
growing body of practical experience is pro­
viding a firm basis for establishing design,
development and testing guidance and metho­
dologies. Moreover feedback on the reliabil­
ity of installed systems is becoming avail­
vii
Copyright © UKAEA 1983 SESSION 1 - SAFETY AND RELIABILITY ASSESSMENT
SAFETY INTEGRITY ASSESSMENT OF
PROGRAMMABLE ELECTRONIC SYSTEMS
B. K. Daniels*, R. Bell** and R. I. Wright***
* National Centre ofSystems Reliability, Wigs haw Lane, Culcheth, Warrington, UK
**Health & Safety Executive, Factory Inspectorate, Chapel Street, London, UK
***Systems Reliability Service, Wigshaw Lane, Culcheth, Warrington, UK
Abstract. As Programmable Electronic Systems (PESfs) are introduced into the
industrial environment to control or monitor possibly hazardous processes, the
question arises of whether the safety integrity of such systems is adequate for a
particular application. The detailed operation of many of these systems is complex
and is rarely fully understood by, or even made known to, the user. This leads to a
certain amount of disquiet in some applications where a hazard is possible if the
PES malfunctions in a particular way, perhaps by a particular failure mode or by
aberrant behaviour. A natural reaction of the user is to ask whether a particular
system will be as safe as the equivalent conventional control system with which he
may be more familiar.
Unfortunately there are many difficulties in applying the same safety assessment
techniques to PES's as have been applied in the past to conventional systems. This
paper discusses these problems and outlines an assessment methodology which is being
developed to enable the user or the Inspectorate to determine whether or not a PES
installation is of a suitably high safety integrity for the application.
Keywords. Safety assessment, reliability theory, quality control, digital systems,
computer applications, computer selection and evaluation, computer software.
INTRODUCTION failures are termed systematic failures and
although they also occur in hardwired
Techniques for the safety assessment of systems, random failures are normally the
electronic systems in safety related dominant cause of failure. Systematic
applications are well developed and have been failures are particularly important in PES's
in use for many years. These methods are because of the complexity of the functions to
mainly concerned with how failures of the be performed and their ability to be
system hardware affect the safety of the changed.
system and with assessment of the hardware
reliability. Generally there is an Reliability and safety integrity assessments
assumption that hardware failures are random, are likely to be essential in many areas
and also occur independently. where the control system is PES based. Where
there are safety implications in the event of
But the possibility of random hardware PES failure, additional safety syterns are
failures is only one consideration in the sometimes incorporated. If these are based
assessment of PES safety integrity. There is on non-PES technology then conventional
a large element of human activity in the reliability and safety integrity assessments
design, operation and maintenance of a PES can determine that the required level of
and these activities are, like all human reliability/safety integrity has been
activities, prone to error. These errors may achieved. Increasingly in the future there
manifest themselves as faults in the hardware will be economic pressures to use the PES for
or software design or even as faults in the both production and safety purposes, and
specification of the PES functions. These consequently this means there is a need to be
faults may cause failure under some able to assess the safety integrity of
conditions of use or environment. Such systems incorporating PESfs. Such a design
2 B.K. Daniels, R. Bell and R.I. Wright
assessment methodology must apply to the PES services. The technique is described by
hardware, PES software and any additional Robinson (1978).
safety systems.
HAZOP studies are useful in plants with the
potential for a serious accident but which
SAFETY INTEGRITY are too complex for possible accident causes
to be identified with any degree of certainty
What do we mean by Safety Integrity? In very by any means other than a systematic search.
general terms this is the continued operation They can however be time consuming and costly
of a system in all its possible states in to carry out.
such a way that the risk to the health,
safety and welfare of employees, the system HAZOP studies could be particularly relevant
itself, any product being processed, and the to PES safety integrity assessment since
environment is kept to an "acceptable level". PES's are commonly used for the control of
The legal aspects are further discussed in parameters in large and complex chemical
Bell, Daniels and Wright (1983). plants and many of the parameter deviations
considered in the HAZOP study could be a
The assessment of Safety Integrity involves a direct result of a PES failure.
number of important stages, which include:-
• The identification of potential hazards Failure Mode and Effect Analysis
• The evaluation of event sequences which
can lead to a hazard FMEA is a systematic examination of the
• Making allowance for any safety equipment system to determine the effect on the plant
which curtails an event sequence prior to of each mode of failure of each part of the
the hazard, or mitigates the consequences system. The reasoning used is "bottom up" or
of the hazardous event inductive. The analyst asks the question
• The recognition of system failure modes "What happens if this component fails in this
which form part of event sequences, or particular failure mode?" In general, it can
would prevent safety equipment carrying be applied at any level of breakdown of the
out their function. system e.g., sub-system, module or component
level according to the level of risk,
In considering the role which a PES may play resources available or the level of detail
in any system, the assessor must identify the required. When applied to PESTs it is
way in which a malfunction could contribute usually convenient to perform an FMEA at the
to an incident causing injury to people or functional block level by considering the
damage to property on or off the site. The effects of each mode of failure of:-
seriousness of the consequences of such an
incident should also be ascertained in terms • Plant sensors
of the number of people affected and the • Plant actuators
likely extent of injury or damage to health • Operator interface devices
or the likely cost of damage to property. • I/O modules
There are several hazard analysis techniques • Communications interfaces
each with particular strengths and weaknesses • Busses.
and fields of application. There is no
single "correct" approach to a particular It is possible to consider failure modes of
problem and often a combination of methods is an item taking a "hardware" or a "functional"
required. Suffice it to mention very briefly approach. There are some particular problems
a number of the more widely used techniques. in the FMEA of PES's, viz:-
• The analyst must have a complete knowledge
Hazard and Operability Studies of the requirements specification and the
software of the PES.
The HAZOP analyst studies the instrumented • The effects of the failure may be
flow diagram, sometimes called the Piping & different in different phases or modes of
Instrument (P&I) line diagram, of a process PES operation. A "phased mission" FMEA
plant and considers the effect on the plant may be required.
of deviations in the normal parameters of the • The effect of the failure may be different
substances contained by every pipe and depending on the point in the program exe­
vessel· As an aid to thoroughness, the cution reached when the failure occurs.
analyst uses "guide words" to ensure that For instance, a data validity check may be
every possible deviation is considered. carried out at the start of a control
Typical words include:- sequence but not during the sequence.
Therefore failures occurring before the
• MORE OF · FASTER validity check may be safe but failures
• LESS OF · SLOWER occurring after it may be dangerous.
The effects of each of these deviations is Provided these factors are recognised, FMEA
considered in each phase of operation can be applied successfully to the plant
including maintenance, commissioning, sensors, actuators, interfaces etc this
testing, start up, shutdown and failure of "hardware approach" is difficult to apply to
Safety Integrity Assessment of Programmable Electronic Systems 3
the CPU of the PES, however, and a functional combination of failures and events would
approach should be adopted to identify cause the top event?"
possible dangerous failure modes. The
functions of the PES should be listed at the The completed fault tree is a logical
most appropriate level and the question asked representation of all the combinations of
"In what way can this function fail?" The basic events which cause the top event. Each
effects of each mode of failure of each basic event is a Boolean variable and the
function are then assessed in the usual way. logic for the top event can be written as a
Boolean expression and may be manipulated and
The advantages of FMEA are that it can be perhaps simplified by the laws of Boolean
used without first identifying the possible algebra. By such manipulation or by
accidents and can therefore help in revealing inspection those combinations of basic events
unforeseen hazards. FMEA is good at which cause the top event and which include a
identifying potentially hazardous single failure mode of the PES can be identified.
failures, but normally does not consider
multiple failures and, since all failures FTA is a well accepted technique. It is good
including non-hazardous failures are at identifying and representing combinations
considered, it can be time consuming and of events contributing to an accident. Its
expensive. main disadvantages are that fault trees can
become very large and difficult to relate to
Techniques for performing an FMEA are the plant and its operation and they can be
described in Henley and Kumamoto (1981) and difficult to quantify. Their accuracy relies
MIL-STD-1629A. on the ability of the analyst to deduce what
can cause an event.
Failure Mode, Effect and Criticality Further description of FTA techniques can be
Analysis found in Henley and Kumamoto (1981) and
Fussel (1976).
This is an extension of FMEA which
categorises each component failure according
to the seriousness of its effect and its Failure Logic Diagrams
probability or frequency of occurrence. It
is of use when several levels of hazard are Failure logic diagrams can be used to show
possible in determining the most critical how combinations of events lead to a top
components and where reliability engineering event. They may have an identical form to a
resources should be allocated to greatest fault tree but they are not produced by the
effect. disciplined top down reasoning of FTA. They
are constructed using a combination of top
down and bottom up reasoning and are often
Event Trees more compact than the equivalent fault tree
since logical simplifications can be made in
Event tree analysis is useful in representing their construction. They do not however
and evaluating the possible sequences of represent an analysis procedure as rigourous
events following from a failure in a critical as FTA or FMEA.
part of the system. It is only practicable
to apply the technique to failures which are
known to be potentially hazardous. The HAZARD RATE QUANTIFICATION
technique uses the same bottom up reasoning
as FMEA in that the assessor asks the The most widely used measure of safety
question "What happens if this component integrity is the expected frequency with
fails?" However, an event tree can represent which a given accident will occur. This is
multiple and cascade failures and so is often termed the hazard rate. A hazard
useful when there are several lines of arises from some initiating event occurring
defence between the initiating failure and in a particular set of circumstances and the
the final accident. It is also possible to hazard rate is given by;
introduce a time dimension into an event tree
and so to represent the effects of different Hazard Rate, H ■ (Rate of initiating event) x
system response times. (Probability of initiating
event causing an accident)
The role of the PES in this equation varies
Fault Tree Analysis according to whether it has a control or a
protective function.
FTA can be used when a particular accident or
undesirable event has been identified and it In some continuous control applications,
is necessary to determine the combinations of failure of a PES may directly cause a hazard.
failures and operating circumstances which An example might be the spurious or
could cause that accident. The method uses unexpected movement of a robot or other
top down or deductive reasoning. Starting machine with unrestricted motion. Depending
with the accident or "top event" the analyst on the situation, this may be a hazard to
asks the question "What failure or event or plant or structures, a fire risk or a direct
4 B.K. Daniels, R. Bell and R.I. Wright
hazard to persons. Assuming that a person It is assumed that there are four sources of
within the immediate vicinity of the robot system failures which could affect safety:-
either has no time to move, or that he will
fail to diagnose robot failure, the hazard (A) Errors or omissions in the system safety
rate is given by: requirements specification.
H β (failure rate of PES causing spurious (B) Random hardware failures.
machine movement) x
(probability of person being in field (C) Systematic hardware failures.
of movement)
(2) (D) Software failures.
PES's are used in continuous monitoring For a non-redundat n system, the overall
functions and to initiate some safety reliability may be representde by a
function on detection of a potentially reliability block diagram as in Fig. 1.
hazardous condition. A hazard arises if a
demand for the protective action occurs and
the PES fails to respond to the demand. In
this case the hazard rate is:
H » (demand rate) x (probability of failure
of PES on demand) x (probability of
resulting event causing an accident) A B C LJLJ
(3)
As an example, consider the risk to people
from an explosion in the reaction vessel of a
chemical process which has a PES protective
system. The hazard rate is given by:
Fig. 1 Reliability block diagram
H = (rate of dangerous plant condition representing 4 failure causes
arising) x (probability of failure of PES for a non-redundant system
protection system) x (probability of
injury from explosion)
(4) Since failure of the system occurs if any one
or more of the series blocks fails it is
In general, the probability of failure of a necessary that adequate reliability is
system is an increasing function with time. demonstrated for each of these 4 aspects or
In order to limit the probability of failure, where the requirements for safety related
protective systems are usually given a applications have not been met that adequate
periodic proof test to ensure that the system justification is given.
is working and to repair it if not. Under
these conditions, it is possible to define an The reliability block diagram for a system
average probability of being in the failed with two identical redundant computers
state and so to obtain the mean probability operating under identical conditions is shown
of failure to operate on demand. This average in Fig. 2.
is also termed the Fractional Dead Time and
is equal to the Steady State Unavailability In this case, the system fails when both
of the system. computers fail due to random hardware failure
or due to a systematic failure. However, the
system may also fail due to a single
ASSESSMENT METHODOLOGY DIRECTED TOWARDS PES specification error (A), a single systematic
failure affecting both computers (Common
A PES may fail either because there is a Cause Failure, Cccf) or a single software
random hardware failure which could have been failure(D). Clearly, as more redundancy is
predicted or because an error has been made adopted to provide tolerance against random
in its design or construction. The error may hardware failure, then other failure causes
result in failure under a particular become more important.
combination of inputs, due to a particular
environmental condition or due to some Therefore, it is necessary to assess not only
operator action. These latter types of hardware reliability with respect to random
failure are termed systematic failures. failures but also system reliability with
They occur in both PES's and hardwired respect to design errors. Quantified
systems but are particularly prevalent in assessment techniques can be applied to some
PES's because of the large element of complex aspects of hardware but assessment of other
design unique to the application. By its aspects of PES reliability is mainly a
very nature applications software is non- qualitative process based on a study of the
standard. In redundancy systems, systematic procedures used in specification, design,
failures may be a cause of common cause implementation and operation of the PES. The
failure (CCF) and may dominate the total aim of qualitative assessment is to determine
system reliability. whether all reasonably practicable
Safety Integrity Assessment of Programmable Electronic Systems 5
general aspects have been covered
satisfactorily.
There are 5 sections to this checklist which
cover
Cl_tl
* Safety related functions
CCCF D » Operator interface
* Plant interface
c
B 2 * Physical environment
2
0 Maintenance and Modification.
In an earlier paper Bell, Daniels and Wright
(1983) gave examples of the contents of the
Safety Related Functions section of the
checklist. Here examples are given in Table
1 from the maintenance and modification
Fig. 2 Reliability block diagram for a section.
system with dual redundancy
TABLE 1 Section of Requirements Checklist
precautions have taken in each of these
activities to ensure safety.
The full assessment methodology will be Maintenance & Modifications
published later in 1983 to accompany a code
of practice to be issued by the Health and (a) Has provision been made for plant
Safety Executive. The next sections of the safety during maintenance and modifi­
paper illustrate various aspects of the cation of the PES?
methodology and give examples of the
checklists which are provided to assist the
assessor to consider whether each item in the (b) Has a means been defined for "by­
list is relevant to the particular PES, passing" or "defeating" safety
whether the item is satisfied and any functions in a controlled way without
omissions justified by the user. the need for ad hoc fixes?
IS THE PES SAFETY REQUIREMENTS SPECIFICATION (c) Has a means been defined of ensuring
CORRECT AND COMPLETE? the removal of by-passes after
maintenance?
If a system is to perform safety related
tasks reliably, it must be designed to take
the correct action in any set of (d) Has provision been made for proof
circumstances which may arise. The safety testing of safety functions with a
related functions must be specified correctly minimum of physical operations?
and completely and the system must meet that
functional specification. Since the
specifications and test schedules for each
aspect (hardware and software) and each phase
of system design both originate from the HARDWARE RELIABILITY ASSESSMENT - RANDOM
system requirements specification, errors in FAILURES
specification may not be revealed until the
operations phase. This could be hazardous in Techniques were surveyed earlier in the paper
itself or may result in system modifications for identifying which failure modes of the
which degrade the overall integrity of the PES could contribute to hazards. If the PES
system. While this is true of both PES's and is used for the control of a hazardous
hardwired systems, the problem of process it may be that any failure of the PES
specification is particularly severe for a will constitute a danger whereas if the PES
PES since it may be required to perform many is used for automatic protection of a plant
complex tasks and each application of a PES only certain failures ("failures-to-danger")
tends to have some unique features. Very may be of concern. In systems without
often, insufficient effort is put into redundancy, the total system reliability is a
producing a system requirements specification function of the reliability of each of the
and the result is a specification which is component parts for which reliability data
insufficiently detailed and ambiguous. are often available.
Although it may not be possible to check the If the reliability of the system with respect
correctness and completeness of the to particular system failure modes must be
requirements specification against the quantified, then subject to the limitations
operating characteristics of the plant, the mentioned earlier a quantified FMEA may have
assessor should ascertain whether certain to be carried out.