Russian-Soviet Unconventional Wars in the Caucasus, Central Asia, and Afghanistan

231 Pages·2002·6.96 MB·English

leave1[J1Jortfl Papers
Numhef 20
Russian-Soviet Unconventional
Wars in the Caucasus,
Central Asia, and Afghanistan
by Dr. Robert F. Baumann
FOREWORD
In recent years, the U.S. Army has paid increasing attention to the conduct of unconventional warfare. However, the base of
historical experience available for study has been largely American and overwhelmingly Western. In Russian-Soviet Unconventional
Wars in the Caucasus, Central Asia, and Afghanistan, Dr. Robert F. Baumann makes a significant contribution to the expansion of
that base with a well-researched analysis of four important episodes from the Russian-Soviet experience with unconventional wars.
Primarily employing Russian sources, including important archival documents only recently declassified and made available to
Western scholars, Dr. Baumann provides an insightful look at the Russian conquest of the Caucasian mountaineers (1B01-59), the
subjugation of Central Asia ( 1839-81 ), the reconquest of Central Asia by the Red Army ( 1918-33), and the Soviet war in
Afghanistan ( 1979--89). The history of these wars-especially as it relates to the battle tactics, force structure, and strategy employed
in them-offers important new perspectives on elements of continuity and change in combat over two centuries. This is the first
study to provide an in-depth examination of the evolution of the Russian and Soviet unconventional experience on the predominantly
Muslim southern periphery of the former empire. There, the Russians encountered fierce resistance by peoples whose cultures and
views of war differed sharply from their own. Consequently, this Leavenworth Paper addresses not only issues germane to combat
but to a wide spectrum of civic and propaganda operations as well.
In particular, these cases illustrate the problems commonly confronted by conventional military powers when fighting unconven
tional foes in undeveloped theaters. Such problems include not only adjustment to the tactics of an unfamiliar enemy but the
adaptation of one·s own tactics and equipment to constraints imposed on them by terrain, climate, and distance. Political and
economic considerations also played a central role and contributed to important shifts in Russian and Soviet strategic designs. Thus,
a common thread running through each of these studies is the challenge armies face in conceptualizing and implementing changes
after combat operations have begun.
Finally, Dr. Baumann considers broad patterns of conduct apparent in these wars and even compares them with the American
experience in similar conflicts. This study will be of broad interest to military professionals and historians alike.
April 1993 RICHARD M. SWAIN
Colonel, Field Artillery
Director, Combat Studies Institute
Director
COL Richard M. Swain
Coordinating Instructor/Executive Officer
MAJ Rodolfo R. Diaz-Pons
Instructor Team I
LTC Richard V. Barbuto, Chief LTC Michael J. Silverstone
MAJ Robert E. Connor MAJ George J. Mordica Ill
Dr. George W. Gawrych Dr. Samuel J. Lewis
Dr. Michael D. Pearlman
Instructor Team II Instructor Team Ill
LTC Richard L. Kiper, Chief LTC Donald B. Connelly Dr. William G. Robertson, Chief LTC Philip J. Baker Jr.
LTC Andrew N. Morris MAJ Stephen D. Coats MAJ William M. Campsey MAJ Scott R. McMeen
MAJ Kenneth R. Dombroski Dr. Robert F. Baumann Dr. Jack J. Gifford Dr. Christopher A. Gabel
Dr. Gary J. Bjorge Dr. Thomas M. Huber Dr. Jerold E. Brown
Historical Services Committee Staff
LTC Robert D. Ramsey Ill, Chief Marilyn A Edwards, Editor SSG Samuel L. Brown SGT Dwayne L. Borders
Donald L. Gilmore, Editor Carolyn D. Conway, Sharon E. Torres
Editorial Assistant
Leavenworth Papers are published by the Combat Studies Institute, U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, Fort Leavenworth,
KS 66027-6900. The views expressed in this publication are those of the author and not necessarily those of the Department of
Defense or any element thereof. Leavenworth Papers are available from the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing
Office, Washington, DC 20402.
Leavenworth Papers US ISSN 0195 3451
Cover: Commander Ahmad Shah Masoud, shown inspecting a captured Russian AKS-74 with an underbarrel 40-mm BG-15 grenade
launcher
lcaveflWOTtil Papers
NUmbef 20
Russian-Soviet Unconventional
Wars in the Caucasus,
Central Asia, and Afghanistan
by Dr. Robert F. Baumann
Printed courtesy of the U.S. Army Center of Military History, Washington, D.C.
Combat Studies Institute
U.S. Army Command and General Staff College
Fort Leavenworth, Kansas 66027-6900
Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data
Baumann, Robert F., 1952-
Russian-Soviet unconventional wars in the Caucasus, Central Asia, and,
Afghanistan 1 by Robert F. Baumann.
p. em. - (Leavenworth papers ; no. 20)
Includes bibliographical references.
1. Russia-History, Military-1801-1917. 2. Soviet Union-
History, Military. I. Title. II. Series.
DK5l.B38 1993 92-36395
94 7' .07 -dc20 CIP
For sale by the U.S. Government Printing Office
Superintendent of Documents, Mail Stop: SSOP, Washington, DC 20402-9328
ISBN 0-16-041953-0
Contents
Illustrations .. ....................... ............ .................. ....... v
Tables .............................. .............................. ...... vii
Preface ............ .................. ...... ...... .................. .... ..
1x
Chapter
1. Russian Subjugation of the Central Caucasus:
The War Against the Mountaineers . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1
2. The Conquest of Central Asia .................. ........... ... ... 49
3. The Liquidation of the Basmachi Resistance,
1918-1933 ....... .... ........... .............. .............. 91
4. The Soviet-Afghan War ............. ..... ...................... 129
5. Conclusions ............... .............................. ....... 211
Ill
Illustrations
Maps
1. Russia's southern frontier in the nineteenth century .............. 4
2. The Caucasus and Transcaucasia, 1763-1914 ..................... 6
3. The Akhulgo campaign, 1839 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
4. Russian positions, 4-22 August 1839 (up to the capture
of Akhulgo) ................................................... 18
5. The Dargo campaign, 1845 ....................................... 22
6. The Russians' linkup and final thrust into Dagestan, 1859 ....... 31
7. The Khivan campaign, 1873 ...................................... 64
8. The Akhal-Teke campaign, 1880-81 ............................. 73
9. The storming of Geok Tepe fortress, 12 January 1881 ..... ....... 75
10. The Red Army's capture of Bukhara, 1920 ...................... 110
11. Afghanistan ..................................................... 130
12. Tactical combat in a green zone ................................. 162
v
Tables
1. Vorontsov's column order .............................. ... .......... 24
2. Composition of Russian forces in the Khivan campaign ... ..... ..... 65
3. Composition of Russian garrisons outside Tashkent ................. 95
4. Soviet losses in Afghanistan, 1979-89 ............................. 148
Vll
Prelace
Prior to the Bolshevik Revolution of October 1917, Russians adhered to
the old Julian calendar, which during the nineteenth century was twelve
days behind the modern Gregorian calendar that is in general use today.
Nineteenth-century dates cited in this study are in accordance with the
custom of that period. For twentieth-century dates, this study, of course,
employs the modern calendar.
With regard to transliteration, this manuscript adheres to the Library
of Congress system with a couple of exceptions. First, Russian "hard signs"
are not transliterated into English. Second, for spellings of names and
places, this manuscript uses accepted English spellings where applicable.
I would like to acknowledge the contributions of many individuals to
the production of this manuscript. Special thanks are due to Robert H.
Berlin, E. Willis Brooks, Jerry M. Cooper, Lester W. Grau, Jim Holbrook,
Jacob W. Kipp, Bruce W. Menning, Roger J. Sl_)iller, Colonel Richard M.
Swain, Graham H. Turbiville, and Lawrence A. Yates for their suggestions
and assistance in the research and writing of this study. The author also
appreciates the thoughtful observations of colleagues in the Combat Studies
Institute (CSI), as well as numerous USACGSC students who read draft
versions of this book as part of their course work. Don Gilmore of CSI
provided invaluable help in the editing of this manuscropt. Carolyn Conway
and Marilyn Edwards also played important roles in guiding this Leaven
worth Paper through the publication process. Robin Inojos and AI Dulin
provided skillful assistance with graphics and maps. Librarians Mary Jo
Nelson and Timothy L. Sanz again and again helped obtain difficult-to- ·
locate materials. Cooperation from the Slavic Reference Service at the
University of Illinois was also most appreciated.
lX
Russian Subjugation of the
Central Caucasus: The War
Against the Mountaineers
The War Against the Mountaineers
Though little known, Russia's Caucasian campaigns from 1801 to 1864
constitute one of the most fascinating and instructive episodes in modern
warfare. Pitted against the determined, resourceful Muslim tribes of the
mountains and forests of the central Caucasus, Russia's military forces
compiled a frustrating record that reflected many of the difficulties inherent
in armed conflicts between Western-style, conventional armies and non
Western, unconventional forces in theaters lacking a highly developed trans
portation and communications infrastructure common to urbanized societies.
Repeated Russian failures, the product of errors and the increasingly skillful
leadership of the resistance, forced Russian military analysts to reexamine
their approach. In the end, the conquest of the interior Caucasus depended
upon the Russians' gradual recognition of the distinctive nature of their
opponents and the local conditions, subsequent adaptations of their strategy
and tactics in the face of intellectual and institutional inertia, and relentless
and methodical prosecution of the war.
The southward extension of Russian imperial power into the Caucasus
during the nineteenth century reflected the logic of political geography.
Unchecked either by natural barriers or the once powerful empires of
Ottoman Turkey and Persia, Russian penetration of the Caucasus was inevi
table. Although Russian involvement in the Caucasus began in the sixteenth
century when Ivan IV (the Terrible) established relations with the little
kingdom of Kabarda at the northern edge of the Caucasus Mountains, only
under Catherine II (1762-96), two centuries later, did Russia possess the
might to assert direct influence in the region.1 Thanks to the efforts of
Prince Grigory Potemkin, appointed first viceroy of the Caucasus in 1785,
and the gifted General Alexander Suvorov, Russian columns campaigned
deep into the Caucasus to extend Russian power on the Caspian and Black
Sea coasts., However, with Catherine's death, Russian forces withdrew north
ward to the so-called Caucasian Line-a string of forts, fortified points, and
Cossack settlements following the Kuban and Terek Rivers across the
northern tier of the Caucasus. The Caucasian Line defined the southernmost
limit of effective Russian control over the land, populace, and lines of
communication.
1
2
Catherine II (the Great)
A single event, Russia's annexation of the small Christian kingdom of
Georgia in 1801, solidified Russia's long-term stake in the heart of the
Caucasus. In 1799, Georgii XII, Georgia's ruler, sought Russian protection
to avoid destruction of his kingdom by his more numerous Muslim neighbors,
especially Persia and Turkey. By forcing reunification of the old Georgian
lands and defeating Persia, Tsar Alexander I obtained title to a band of
territory extending from the Black Sea to the Caspian Sea along the southern
rim of the Caucasus Mountains. However, in asserting sovereignty over
Georgia, Russia also cla\med the intervening territories northward to the
Caucasian Line (see map 1). But the predominantly Muslim tribes native to
this area proved far less willing to give their allegiance to a Christian
sovereign. Thus, in practical terms, Georgia formed an island of tsarist
power in the southern Caucasus. Consolidation of Russia's position in the
Caucasus required the subjugation of the tribes hemmed in between Georgia
and the Caucasian Line.
Theater Overview
Home to a cluster of ancient peoples, the Caucasus region has served
historically as a crossroads between Europe and Asia, a meeting ground of