Russian National Security: Perceptions, Policies, and Prospects

393 Pages·2002·3.41 MB·English

RUSSIAN NATIONAL SECURITY:

PERCEPTIONS, POLICIES, AND

PROSPECTS

4-6 December 2000

Michael H. Crutcher, Editor

November 2001
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Russian National Security: Perceptions, Policies, and Prospects
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14. ABSTRACT
This is an anthology of papers presented at a conference titled "Russian National Security: Perceptions,
Policies, and Prospects" conducted from 4-6 December 2000. The book organizes the papers into six
sections - The Russian National Security Community, Russia and Europe, Russian Policy Towards the
Caucasus and Central Asia, Russia and Asia, Russia and the United States, and Russia’s Military
Transformation.
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Editor

Michael H. Crutcher

*****

Composition

Christine Williams, Mary Jane Semple

and Kimberly A. Rockwell

*****

Cover Artist

Mary Jane Semple

The editor wishes to thank MG (R) William Burns, Dr. Marybeth Ulrich, Dr. R. Craig
Nation, Dr. Stephen Blank, Mr. Les Griggs, Colonel James Holcomb, Mr. Anthony Williams,
Major Joseph Borders, Captain William Davis, and Lieutenant Colonel (Retired) John
Wheatley for their significant contributions to the success of the workshop and this
publication. The editor assumes all responsibility for any errors.
*****
The views expressed in this report are those of the participants and do not necessarily
reflectofficialpolicyorpositionoftheUnitedStatesArmyWarCollege,theDepartmentofthe
Army, the Department of Defense, or any other Department or Agency of the U.S.
Government. Further, these views do not reflect uniform agreement among the workshop
participants. This report is cleared for public release; distribution is unlimited.
*****
Comments pertaining to this report or requests for additional copies are invited and
should be forwarded to: Center for Strategic Leadership, U.S. Army War College, Carlisle
Barracks, PA 17013-5049. Comments may also be conveyed by electronic mail to
[email protected] or by calling (717)-245-3226 or DSN 242-3226.
ii
TABLE OF CONTENTS

FOREWORD . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . vii

Part One: The Russian National Security Community

Introduction

Michael H. Crutcher . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1

Roots of Russian National Security

George Kolt . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5

What is the Russian National Security Community

Andrei Kortunov . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9

Kremlin Images of the World: Old-Age Hang-Ups and Juvenile Complexes

Alexander Golts . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15

Nationalism in Post-Communist Russia: From Resignation to Anger

Illya Prizel. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25

Part Two: Russia and Europe

Introduction

R. Craig Nation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 49

Russia and Western Europe: Problems and Perspectives

Tatiana G. Parkhalina . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 53

Russian Policy vis-á-vis Western and Northern Europe

Jyriki Iivonen . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 61

Russia and the Baltic Sea Region: Security Aspects

Dmitri Trenin . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 81

Russia and the Balkans

R. Craig Nation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 95

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Russia and Ukraine: A New Policy?

James Sherr . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 117

Part Three: Russian Policy Toward the Caucasus and Central Asia

Introduction

Marybeth P. Ulrich . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 133

Chechnya and Its Consequences

Stephen Blank. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 135

Russian Military Policy and the South Caucasus

Ariel Cohen . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 157

Russia and Central Asia under Putin: The Afghan Factor

Lena Jonson . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 163

Energy and Russian Foreign Policy: Implications for Global Security and U.S. Policy

Amy Myers Jaffee

Robert A. Manning . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 183

Part Four: Russia and Asia

Introduction

Stephen J. Blank . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 205

Russia in Northeast Asia: From Confrontation to Partnership

(Perceptions, Views and Observations)

Vladimir I. Ivanov. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 207

Beijing Warms to Mowcow: A Sino-Russian Entente for the 21st Century

Andrew Scobell . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 233

Has Japan’s New Eurasian Diplomacy Been a Failure?

Peggy Falkenheim Meyer. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 251

South Asia in the Russian Strategic Calculus: Emerging Challenges and

Prospects

Anup[am Srivastava . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 269

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Part Five: Russia and the United States

Introduction

Anthony Williams. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 283

U.S.-Russian Relations: The View from Washington

John Beyrle . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 287

From Strategic Partnership to a “Pragmatic” Relationship: Domestic Sources

of Russia’s Perceptions of the United States

Mikhail Alexseev . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 293

U.S. Russian Prospects for Arms Control: Reality Versus Ambitions

Igor Khripunov . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 309

The Coming Russian BoomAgain?

Marshall I. Goldman . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 315

Part Six: Russia’s Military Transformation

Introduction

James F. Holcomb. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 331

Russian Armed Forces: Status and Prospects

Robert L. Arnett. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 333

The Great Exception: Russian Civil-Military Relations

Professor Stephen Blank . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 345

Russia’s Strategic Nuclear Force Options and New Uncertainties

Stephen J. Cimbala . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 367

ABOUT THE CONTRIBUTORS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 389

v
FOREWORD

Thisanthologyistheresultofaconferencetitled“RussianNationalSecurity:Perceptions,
Policies, and Prospects,” held at the Collins Center of the Army War College’s Center for
Strategic Leadership from 4 through 6 December 2000. The conference followed a February
2000 conference on “The Russian Armed Forces at the Dawn of the Millennium,” which
addressed the socio-political environment of the Russian armed forces. These conferences
complement the Center’s objective of examining the changing environment in which the
United States—including its armed forces—finds itself. The conference brought together
over 60 individuals from Western and Northern Europe, Japan, Russia, and the United
States to examine the a wide range of issues related to Russian national security policy. The
workshop examined that policy in terms of factors influencing Russian national security
policy formulation, Russia’s perceptions of the world and itself, current Russian security and
foreign policies in key regions of the world, and prospects for Russian interests and actions in
the world, considering especially implications for the United States.
Part One begins with an examination of the roots of Russian national security policy, the
playersintheRussiannationalsecuritycommunity,currentRussianperceptionsoftheirrole
in the world, and the role of nationalism in post-Communist Russia. The authors voice both
concern and optimism about Russia’s role in the international community. Part Two turns to
Russia’s relationship with Europe, examining the complex relationships between Russia and
the rest of Europe. Here, the choice is between historical patterns of distrust and leverage
and new relationships based upon cooperation and integration of Russia into the European
community of nations; the authors’ viewpoints are characterized by guarded optimism.
PartThreeaddressesRussia’sevolvingrelationshipswiththeCaucasusandCentralAsia.
It examines the failures, costs, and impact of Russian military efforts in Chechnya, noting
that the trends there point to a very real risk of the rise of a police state in Russia. In the South
Caucasus, Russia exhibits a new assertiveness, applying traditional instruments of power to
pursue its interests, while failing to attenuate conflict in the region. Russian efforts in
Central Asia have engendered suspicion in some of the region’s nations, even as they—and
Russia—are concerned about the spread of radical Islamic terrorism from Afghanistan. An
examination of energy issues in Russian foreign policy, a key factor in Russian policy in the
Caspian Basin, concludes that other powers must understand the role energy plays in
Russian policy formulation. Part Four examines Russia’s relations with Asia, identifying the
state of Russia’s economy as a key issue in its ties to the region. Arms sales and energy
supplies are key factors in Russia’s policies, although traditional security issues also affect
relations, most notably with Japan. Relations with India are likely to change as that country
vii
now has expanded options and Russia’s economy remains troubled. While China is
increasingly important to Russia for both traditional security and economic reasons, Russia’s
economicweakness,particularlyintheFarEast,isagainafactorlimitingRussia’sflexibility.
Part Five examines U.S.-Russian relations, and the authors reach a relatively pessimistic
view of that relationship (in examining these papers, the reader should remember that they
reflect the status of U.S.-Russian relations of almost a year ago—see below). The first paper
points to cooperation achieved during the Yeltsin era but expresses concern that the Putin
administration may be turning back to a more assertive stance, particularly in the Near
Abroad. The second paper examines Russian perceptions of the United States and argues
that Russian political leaders may be the victims of “mirror-imaging” when evaluating U.S.
foreign policy positions. The next paper looks at the U.S.-Russian arms control relationship,
noting that while the two countries regard each other with suspicion and that Cold War
motivations for arms control are no longer so compelling, the two countries are likely to
continue the arms control dialogue out of self-interest. Finally, an examination of the
Russian economy gives little comfort to the hope that fundamental economic changes and
modernization steps are being made in Russia; indeed, some efforts of the Putin
administration may be aimed at reestablishing government control over the economy. If this
is so, the author points out, Russia is unlikely to obtain the foreign investment needed to
revive the country’s economy.
Part Six turns to the issue of Russian military transformation. The first paper
underscores the dismal record of Russian military reform and the risks posed by nostalgia for
superpower status on the part of elements of the Russian military. This is followed by an
examination of the strategic nuclear relationship between the United States and Russia that
underscores the continued role of deterrence and arms control. This element of continuity
from the Cold War era takes on a new importance in light of Russia’s increasing reliance on
nuclear weapons as a deterrent across the spectrum of conflict, although the American
initiative for missile defense is likely to force a reexamination of past and current
assumptions in this arena. In the conventional realm, the Russian military appears to be
focused on the wrong threat, requiring the maintenance of expensive force structure that
serves little useful purpose, the impact of which is exacerbated by a dearth of funding. As a
result, the Russian military has been living off of war reserves and stopgap measures.
Russian military leaders are likely to address force structure, modernization, and force
manningissuesrealisticallyonlywhentheyareforcedtodosobyanemptyresourcebarrel.
The world has changed much since this conference was held. A new administration is in
place in Washington, and the September 11 attacks against the United States have radically
altered the landscape of international affairs. Russian President Putin has voiced strong
support for U.S. efforts to counter terrorism, indicating that on this issue, at least, Russia
viii
perceives more to be gained from cooperation with the West than “going it alone.” This is but
one of many choices Russia will face in the months and years ahead, and the other challenges
outlined in this anthology are still to be met.
Iwouldliketocommendalltheauthorsfortheircontributionstoabetterunderstandingof
the issues, as well as the attendees for their valuable additions to the discussions throughout
the conference. Their efforts shed considerable light on the challenges faced by the Russian
leadership as it seeks to determine Russia’s role and its relationships in the world community
in the years ahead.
DOUGLAS B. CAMPBELL

DIRECTOR,

CENTER FOR STRATEGIC LEADERSHIP

U.S. ARMY WAR COLLEGE

ix
Part One

The Russian National Security Community

Introduction

Michael H. Crutcher

Like the defeat of Nazi Germany and Imperial Japan in 1945, the collapse of the Warsaw
Pact and the dissolution of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, both in 1991, were not only
the result of traumatic experiences but marked also the beginning of new political, social, and
economic traumas for the Russian Federation. Both Germany and Japan experienced radical
political, social, and economic change in the wake of their defeat, and, today, both countries
pursue foreign policies radically different in both form and substance from those of their
wartime predecessors. Arguably, their citizens are far better off, both materially and in terms
of the rights they enjoy, than they would have been had their wartime governments instead
been the victors of the Second World War.
Two factors, however, distinguish the events of 1991 from those of 1945. First, unlike the
victories of 1945, the collapse of the Warsaw Pact and dissolution of the Soviet were not
imposed by conquering armies. While the Cold War defeat was certainly a humiliation for the
Soviet Union, that defeat did not entail the occupation of territory, trials of government
leaders, and the temporary loss of sovereignty. To a significant degree, the Soviet defeat was
self-inflicted, caused by the decades-long accumulation of internal economic and political
contradictions, a disregard for basic human rights and dignity, and a determined drive for
military superiority drive moderated only in the final years of the Soviet era by the last Soviet
leader, Mikhail Gorbachev and resolute Western leadership in the Cold War. Second,
Western aid and advice programs notwithstanding, Russia, its leaders, and its people were
not forced to reevaluate their basic understanding of the relationship between the citizen and
the state and relations among states. Russia was left pretty much on its own as it sought to
reevaluate, if not redefine, these understandings.
This chapter examines some of the fundamentals of these understandings. What are the
roots of Russian national security policy in the post–Cold War era? Reaching back to the
long-term theme in Russian history, what elements of continuity and change are discernible?
Who makes security policy in Russia? How has Russia reacted to the changes it faces, both
those imposed on it and those that are taking place without particular regard to the Russian
Federation, at the beginning of the twenty-first century? To undertake this effort, we turned
to four distinguished individuals.
George Kolt examines the roots of the Russian national security outlook. He argues that,
while objective factors such as a nation’s geography, resources, and population are major
factors, they do not lead to “permanent interests.” Instead, he says, a country’s elites actually
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