Russell on Substitutivity and the Abandonment of Propositions

56 Pages·2011·0.3 MB·English

Russell on Substitutivity and the
Abandonment of Propositions
IanProops
UniversityofTexasatAustin
Introduction
In the summer of 1905 Bertrand Russell wrote to his American friend,
LucyDonnelley,withthenewsthathehadjustcompleted“anarticleon
GeorgeIVforMind”(Russell1994,414).Inspiteofitsmildfrivolity,such
a description of “On Denoting” contains a large measure of truth. For
this article’s puzzle about George IV does indeed have a claim to be
considered one of its main foci. This is so partly because of the well-
known role the puzzle plays in motivating the Theory of Descriptions,
butalsobecauseofthelesswell-knownroleitsfull solution—something
that requires resources beyond the Theory of Descriptions—plays in
shapingthemetaphysicaland(especially)epistemologicalviewsRussell
developsfrom1905onward.Mostnotably,inthecontextofcertainofhisother
commitments,Russell’ssolutionentailsthefollowing(shortlytobeexpli-
cated)epistemologicalprinciple:
For comments and illuminating discussion of issues in this article, I am grateful to
RayBuchanan,JoshDever,KatherineDunlop,StevenGross,IvanHeyman,CoryJuhl,
KevinKlement,LouisLoeb,PauloMancosu,AdamPautz,BryanPickel,MichaelPotter,
AdamRigoni,MarkSainsbury,JonShaheen,SanfordShieh,NicoleSmith,PeterSullivan,
Zolta´nGendlerSzabo´,andMichaelTye.VersionsofthisarticlewerepresentedatLondon
University,JohnsHopkinsUniversity,YaleUniversity,theUniversityofCalifornia,Berke-
ley,andtheUniversityofSheffield.Iamgratefultotheaudiencesoneachoccasionfor
theirstimulatingcommentsandquestions.Iamalsodeeplyindebtedtothreeanonymous
refereesforthePhilosophicalReview,whoprovidedgenerousandilluminatingcomments
onnumerousversionsofthisarticle.
PhilosophicalReview,Vol.120,No.2,2011
DOI10.1215/00318108-2010-027
q2011byCornellUniversity
151
IAN PROOPS
FullDisclosure:Wheneverasubject,S,isacquainted(inRussell’s
technicalsenseofthatterm)withanobject,x,Sisacquaintedwith
everypartofx.
This substantive principle1 has a profound relevance for Russell’s con-
ception of what is usually (if somewhat inaccurately) called a “logically
propername.”2Anameofthissort,whichIshallsimplyterma“genuine
Russellian name”—or “genuine name”—for short, is a symbol that is
not“definedincontext”—as,forexample,inRussell’sopiniondescrip-
tionsare—butratherhas“meaninginisolation”(compareRusselland
Whitehead1990,66).SinceRussellsupposesthatweunderstandagenu-
inenameonlyifweareacquaintedwithitsbearer(Marsh1956,205),Full
Disclosure entails that the bearer ofagenuinename must, in acertain
sense,revealitselffullytoanysubjectwhounderstandsitsname.Tracing
out this and other consequences of Russell’s solution to the George IV
puzzlewillbethemaingoalofthisarticle.Weshallaskwhathissolution
entails,andhowfarRussellisawareofthevariouscommitmentsheincurs
byadoptingit.
PerhapsthemostsurprisingimplicationofRussell’ssolutioncon-
cerns his conception of our cognitive relation to propositions. I shall
arguethat,inthecontextofhisothercommitments,hissolutionentails
thatwecannotbeacquaintedwithpropositions.Asweshallsee,Russellin
all likelihood appreciated this fact, and his appreciation of it would
plausiblyhavemotivatedhisadoptionoftheso-calledMultipleRelation
TheoryofJudgment.Thesedevelopments,Ishallargue,deprivedhimof
anypositive reason tobelieveinpropositions, andso promptedhimto
deviseargumentsagainstthem.Themostpromisingofthesearguments,
Ishallargue,restsonthePrincipleofSufficientReason.
My aims will also be critical. I will argue that certain of Russell’s
epistemologicalviewsentailthatthereexistcertaincasesoftheGeorgeIV
puzzlethatresisthissolution.IwillfurtherarguethatRusselleventually
1. AcquaintanceforRussellisaformofimmediateawareness;soonecannotbesaid
tobeacquaintedwithanobjectinitsentiretybyvirtueofbeingacquaintedwithoneofits
parts(asonemight,forexample,intheordinarysensebesaidtobeacquaintedwithParis
byvirtueofbeingacquaintedwiththeChamps-Elyse´es).Accordingly,FullDisclosureis
notinthiswaytriviallytrue.NordoesRussellregardFullDisclosureastruebydefinition;
for, as we shall see, he eventually comes to regard this principle as false but without
changinghisconceptionofacquaintance.
2. Thelabel“logicallypropername,”althoughwidelyattributedtoRussell,occurs,
tomyknowledge,nowhereinhiswritings.
152
Russell on Substitutivity and the Abandonment of Propositions
cametoappreciatethisproblemandthathisappreciationofitledhim
eventuallytobackawayfromFullDisclosure.
Such a project will require a more sustained examination of
Russell’sdiscussionoftheGeorgeIVpuzzlethanhasyetbeenattempted
in the scholarly literature. I submit that this task is worth undertaking
foranumberofreasons.First,commentatorshaveyettoachieveafully
satisfactory understanding either of the puzzle itself or of Russell’s
solutiontoit.Thiscircumstanceisowing,Ibelieve,toafailurecorrectly
to identify the substitutivity principle Russell intends to be defending.
Second, partly as a result of this first failing, there is a lacuna in the
scholarlyliteratureonthequestionofwhatexactlyRusselliscommitted
tobyhissolutiontotheGeorgeIVpuzzleandhowfarthosecommitments
shape his logical atomism. Third, the identification of those commit-
ments reveals Russell’s position to be more multiply buttressed than
one might otherwise suppose: features of his view that are adopted
for apparently remote reasons turn out to be also demanded by his
solution to the puzzle, and certain points of detail in his view turn out
tobemotivated,inpart,bythatsolution.
Thearticledividesintoeightsectionsandaconclusion.Thefirst
sectiondiscussesthecontextinwhichRussellintroducesthepuzzle.The
second defends a nonstandard interpretation of the puzzle and of its
solution. The third and fourth sections consider the consequences of
Russell’s solutionforhisconceptionof genuine Russellian names (and
forhisconceptionoftheirbearers).Thefifthsectionraisesaproblemfor
Russell’ssolutiontotheGeorgeIVpuzzle,arguingthat,evenwhenitis
charitablyinterpreted,thereremainrecalcitrantinstancesofthepuzzle.
ThesixthsectionarguesthatoneoftheconsequencesofRussell’ssolu-
tionisthatsomesentences needtobetreatedas“incompletesymbols.”It
argues,further,thatinthecontextofhisotherviews,hissolutionentails
thatwecannotbeacquaintedwithpropositions.Thisaspectofhisview,I
shallargue,motivatesRussell’sadoptionoftheMultipleRelationTheory
of Judgment. The seventh section asks what role, if any, the paradoxes
playedinmotivatingthistheory.Iarguethatalthoughcertainparadoxes
prompted Russell’s first experiments with the theory, they do not by
themselvesexplainhiseventualfirmendorsementofit.Theeighthand
final section examines Russell’s reasons for eventually coming to hold
thattherearenopropositions.
153
IAN PROOPS
1. SituatingtheGeorgeIVPuzzle
BeforepresentingtheGeorgeIVpuzzle,itwillbeusefultoconsiderthe
contextinwhichitarises.ThepuzzleisoneofthreethatRussellsupposes
must be solved by any adequate theory of the meanings of those
expressionshecalls“denotingphrases.”InthePrinciplesofMathematics,
first published in 1903, Russell (1996, sec. 58) identifies the denoting
phrases of English with those expressions having one of the following
forms:“allFs,”“anyF,”“someF,”“everyF,”“anF,”“theF.”In“OnDenot-
ing”headdstheexpressions“everything,”“nothing,”and“something”to
thelist.ThechallengeRussellfacesin“OnDenoting”istogiveanaccount
of the meanings of these phrases that solves all three puzzles without
generating any further conundrums orparadoxes. Thepuzzlesall con-
cernthepropertreatmentofthephrase“theF.”
Thefirstpuzzleisaversionoftheproblemofnegativeexistentials.
It challengesus toexplain how astatement such as“The round square
does not subsist”3 can be both significant and true.4 The puzzle arises
because,fromanaivepointofview,itcanseemasthoughthissentence
canbemeaningfulonlyifitintroducesasubjectofpredication,andyet,if
itistrue,nosuchsubjectsubsists.Russellsolvesthepuzzlebyrejectingthe
underlying assumption that this statement is of subject-predicate
form. Instead, the Theory of Descriptions treats this statement and its
fellowsasnegatedexistentialgeneralizations.Thestatementistakento
mean“Thereisnouniqueroundsquare”—thatis,“, ’x [;y (round
y &squarey $ y ¼x)]”—andsoistreatedasunproblematicallytrue.
Thesecondpuzzlearisesfromthefactthatsentencescontaining
improper definite descriptions—“The present King of France is bald,”
for example—can seem to generate counterexamples to the law of ex-
cludedmiddle.Itgainspurchase,ifitdoes,onlybecauseittakesseriously
3. Here“subsist”means“havebeing”ratherthan“havetemporalbeing”or“exist.”
4. Thisversionofthepuzzleisprominentintheparagraphof“OnDenoting”in
whichRussellpresentsitssolution(seetheparagraphnumbered“(3)”inRussell1956,
48).Butwhenthepuzzleisfirst presentedin“OnDenoting”(45),itisformulatedina
mannermorefaithfultothehistoricalpositionofRussell’sopponentinthiscontext,
AlexiusMeinong.Atthisearlierpoint,Russellpresentshistargetasbeingtheviewthatthe
likesoftheroundsquareandthepresentKingofFrance,althoughtheydonotsubsist,are
nonetheless to be “admitted” as objects (45, 47). Russell appears to be picking up on
Meinong’sviewthattheroundsquareandthepresentKingofFrancehaveabsistence
(Aussersein)(thatis,thepropertyofbeinganobject)eveniftheylacksubsistence(Sein)
(the property of being). (I am indebted to Jon Shaheen for help in understanding
Meinong’sview.)
154
Russell on Substitutivity and the Abandonment of Propositions
atraditionalformulationofthatlawinwhichnegationistakentoattach
toapredicate,namely,“A isB orA isnotB.”Soformulated,thelawcan
appear to face a counterexample because neither the sentence “The
present King of France is bald” nor the sentence “The present King of
Franceisnotbald”seemstoexpressatruth.Russellsolvesthepuzzleby
maintaining that, because descriptions introduce distinctions of scope,
the traditional formulation of the law of excluded middle is incorrect.
Theproblemwiththetraditionalformulationisthatitforcesthedescrip-
tionin“ThepresentKingofFranceisnotbald”tohavewidescopewith
respecttonegation.Thecorrectformulationwouldberather:“EitherP
oritisnotthecasethatP,”whichpermitsthenegationsigntohavewide
scopewithrespecttothedescription.
2. FormulatingtheGeorgeIVPuzzle—andInterpretingItsSolution
These puzzles are familiar and their interpretation relatively uncontro-
versial.TheGeorgeIVpuzzle,bycontrast,ishardertoformulate,andthe
detailsofitspresentationandsolutionhave—inmyview—notyetbeen
adequatelynaileddown.Thepresentsectionisdevotedtoarguingfora
nonstandardinterpretationofthepuzzle.
Russell(1956,47–48)introducesthepuzzleasfollows:
Ifaisidenticalwithb,whateveristrueoftheoneistrueoftheother,and
eithermaybesubstitutedfortheotherinanypropositionwithoutaltering
thetruthorfalsehoodofthatproposition.NowGeorgeIVwishedtoknow
whetherScottwastheauthorofWaverley;andinfactScottwastheauthor
ofWaverley.HencewemaysubstituteScott fortheauthorof ‘Waverley’,and
therebyprovethatGeorgeIVwishedtoknowwhetherScottwasScott.Yet
an interest in the law of identity can hardly be attributed to the first
gentlemanofEurope.
Inordertoanalyzethepuzzle,itwillbeconvenienttohavereferenceto
thefollowingformalstatementoftheargumentitdiscusses.
ArgumentA
P1. ScottistheauthorofWaverley.
P2. GeorgeIVwishedtoknowwhetherScottwastheauthorof
Waverley.
C. GeorgeIVwishedtoknowwhetherScottwasScott.
155
IAN PROOPS
The puzzle arises because, in argument A, a patently invalid substitu-
tional inference seems to be licensed by a substitutivity principle that,
according to the purveyor of the puzzle,has overwhelmingplausibility.
Letuscallthisprinciple,whoseproperformulationwilloccupyusshortly,
“SP.” Russell’s first task, whatever else he might do in his discussion
of George IV’s curiosity, is to show that argument A is not in fact a
counterexampletoSP.
HowshouldSPbeformulated?Standardly,itistakentobeaprin-
ciplegoverningthesubstitutionofonelinguisticexpressionforanother
(see,forexample,L.Linsky1966,673;Soames2003,119).WhileLeonard
LinskyventuresnodeterminateformulationofSP,ScottSoamesformu-
latesitaswhathecalls“thelawofsubstitutivityofidentity”(“SI”):
SI:Whenaandbaresingularreferringexpressions,andthesen-
tencea5bistrue,aandbrefertothesamething,andsosub-
stitutionofonefortheotherinanytruesentencewillalwaysyield
atruesentence.
(Hereandhereafterboldfaceisusedasadeviceofquasi-quotation.)
Principle SI is expressly concerned with the substitution of
certain linguistic items within others. In contrast, I take SP to concern
thesubstitutionofpropositionalconstituents,whicharenot,ingeneral,
linguisticinnature,withinnonlinguisticRussellianpropositions.5Iwould
therefore formulate it as the following generalization of a salva veritate
principle(“SV,”for“Saving(truth-)Value”):
SV:Thesubstitutionofidenticalpropositionalconstituentswithin
apropositionpreservesthatproposition’struth-value.6
Bya“propositionalconstituent”Imeananythingthatisa“term”inRus-
sell’stechnicalsenseof“term”derivingfromThePrinciplesofMathematics
(hereafterabbreviatedas“Principles”butcitedas“Russell1996”).Aterm,
inthissense,isanyobjectthatisonedefinitething,asopposedtoaplural
orintrinsicallyindefiniteobject(Russell1996,sec.47;comparesec.58,
5. Sincesomepropositionsareaboutlinguisticitems,“nonlinguistic”propositions
maycontainsomelinguisticconstituents.Thepointisthatnotall oftheirconstituents
maybelinguistic—inotherwords:propositionsarenotsentences.
6. ThepossibilityofconceivingofSPinthiswaywasfirstsuggestedtomebyMichael
Potter(inconversation).TheargumentsIpresentforthisinterpretationare,however,
myown.
156
Russell on Substitutivity and the Abandonment of Propositions
footnote“*”).7Whatmattersmostforourpurposesisthatpropositional
constituents are not in general linguistic items—though, because some
propositionsareaboutlinguisticitems,incertaininstancestheymaybe.
In the present section I will explain how the Theory of Descrip-
tionssolvesthepuzzle.Itdoesso,Iwillargue,byshowingthatSP,when
construedasSV,isnot—inspiteofappearancestothecontrary—falsi-
fiedbythemanifestinvalidityofargumentA.Iwillthendiscussthemore
standardaccountofthesemattersofferedbyLinskyandSoames.Against
thisstandardreading,Iwillcontendthatthetextualevidencesupports
theinterpretivethesisthatSPisSVratherthanSI.
InordertoseehowtheTheoryofDescriptionssolvestheGeorge
IVpuzzle,itwillbehelpfultosetthepuzzleoutasanargumentforthe
falsehoodofSV.So,tothatend,considerthefollowingpairofsentences:
[A] GeorgeIVwantedtoknowwhetherScottwastheauthorof
Waverley.
[B] GeorgeIVwantedtoknowwhetherScottwasScott.
Theargumentwouldrunasfollows:
Premise1 ScottandtheauthorofWaverley areidenticals.
Premise 2 The proposition expressed by [B] results from the
proposition expressed by [A] by the substitution of
ScottfortheauthorofWaverley.
Premise3 [A]istrueand[B]isfalse.
Therefore: SVisfalse.
Russell’s solution involves rejecting this argument’s second premise on
thegroundthatthephrase“theauthorofWaverley”contributesnoprop-
ositionalconstituenttothepropositioninwhoselinguisticexpressionit
occurs. Accordingly,the proposition expressed by [B]cannot, after all,
be taken to result from the substitution of the man, Scott, for a prop-
ositionalconstituentdesignatedbythephrase“theauthorofWaverley”in
[A]. From this it follows that the proposition expressed by [B] is
notobtainedfromtheoneexpressedby[A]bythesubstitutionofiden-
ticals. The invalidity of argument A is thus shown not to constitute a
counterexampletoSVafterall.8
7. AtthisstageRussellviewedthedenotationof“aman”asanindefiniteobject
(Russell1996,sec.58,footnote“*”).
8. Itisworthnotingthatoneviewofthesemanticsofdefinitedescriptionsthatis
rejected in“OnDenoting”would also resolve thepuzzle.This isRussell’sview inthe
157
IAN PROOPS
TheTheoryofDescriptionsexplainswhythephrase“theauthor
ofWaverley”contributesnopropositionalconstituenttotheproposition
expressed by [A]. This theory maintains that all definite descriptions
are“incompletesymbols,”meaningtherebythattheyhavenomeaning
in isolation but are merely defined in context (compare Russell and
Whitehead1990,66).Thetheory,whenfullydeveloped,comprisestwo
contextual definitions, which show us how to eliminate descriptions
fromthecontexts“TheFisG”and“TheFsubsists”—or,strictlyspeaking,
fromscope-disambiguatedcounterpartsofthesecontexts.Glossingover
the (in other contexts important) detail of scope, we may state these
definitionsasfollows:
TheF isG ¼ ’x [;y (Fy $ y ¼x)&Gx] Df.
TheF subsists ¼ ’x [;y (Fy $ y ¼x)] Df.
Russelltakesthesedefinitionstoshowthatthemeaningfulnessof
the expression “The F” does not consist in its contributing a proposi-
tionalconstituenttothepropositionsinwhoseverbalexpressionitoccurs.
Rather,itsbeingameaningfulexpressionconsistsonlyinitscontributing
systematically(inthewayshownbythesedefinitions)tothedetermination
ofthepropositionexpressedbythesentenceinwhichitoccurs.
It is important to note that Russell regarded the provision of a
theory according to which the phrase “the author of Waverley” has no
meaninginisolationasconstitutingafull solutiontothisinstanceofthe
puzzle. His supplementary remarks about the permissibility of substi-
tutionswhenthedefinitedescriptiontobereplacedhas“primaryoccur-
rence,”althoughtheyguardagainstapossiblemisunderstanding,arenot
essentialtothestatedpuzzle’ssolution.(Thesepointswillbeelaborated
uponlater.)
By combining the Theory of Descriptions with the description
theory of ordinary names (and mass terms), Russell’s solution may be
extendedtocasesofapparentsubstitutionfailureinwhichtheexpression
tobereplacedisanordinarypropername(oramassterm),ratherthana
description.From1903onward,Russellcomestotreatordinaryproper
names of “mythical personages” such as “Apollo” as disguised definite
PrinciplesofMathematics accordingtowhichadefinitedescriptionexpressesadenoting
concept.Accordingtothistheory,thepropositionexpressedby[B]doesnotresultfrom
theoneexpressedby[A]bythesubstitutionofidenticalssincewhatScottreplacesisnot
anauthorbutadenotingconcept.Russell,however,rejectsthePrinciples’theoryforother
reasons,amongthemthenotoriouslyobscure“Gray’sElegyArgument.”
158
Russell on Substitutivity and the Abandonment of Propositions
descriptions.9Atthistimehetakesasimilarviewofnamesof“interesting
persons,”presumablybecausethesenamesoccurinthedictionarywhere
their meaning is given by a definite description (Russell 1994, 285). In
1904, he extends this account to terms for mythological stuffs, for
example, “nectar” and “ambrosia” (Russell 1973a, 100). It is less clear
exactly when he first comes to view ordinary names of (so to speak)
uninterestingpersonsandnonmythologicalmaterialobjectsastruncat-
ed definite descriptions; but a commitment to doing so is clearly already
presentin“OnDenoting”;fortherehedeniesthatwehaveacquaintance
withmaterialthingsorwithotherminds(Russell1956,56).Ifwecannot
beacquaintedwiththesethings,wecannotnamethem.Butifwecannot
name them, their apparent names (for example, “Venus,” “Balfour”)
must be disguised definite descriptions for they clearly have meaning
of some kind inasmuch as they allow us to say true things by uttering
the sentences in which they occur. I take it, therefore, that as early
as 1905 Russell is likely to have been aware of the applicability of his
solutionto the George IV puzzle (in its extended form) to cases ofthe
puzzle generated by nonintersubstitutable but apparently coreferring
ordinarypropernames.
Letustakestock.WehaveseenthatRussell’ssolutiontotheinitial
puzzleaboutGeorgeIV—thatis,thepuzzleabouthowSVistobesaved
fromcounterexample—makesnoappealtoscopedistinctions.Hissolu-
tion’stwoessentialelementsare:(a)theidea,securedbytheTheoryof
Descriptions,thatdefinitedescriptionshavenomeaninginisolation,and
(b)thedescriptiontheoryofordinarynames.Eachoftheseelementsis,
ofcourse,opentochallenge,andindeed(b)isnowadaysalmostuniver-
sallytakentohavebeenrefutedbySaulKripke’sargumentsinhisNaming
andNecessity(1980).Nonetheless,inviewofthespecialplaceoccupiedby
“OnDenoting”asoneofthefoundingdocumentsofanalyticphilosophy,
itseemsworthaskinghowwellRussell’ssolutionfaresonitsownterms—
thatis,granting(a)and(b)forthesakeofargument—andseeingwhatit
entailsforhisphilosophy.Wewillturntothesequestionsshortly,butfirst
itwillbenecessarytodefendourinterpretationofSPasSVratherthanSI.
Perhapsthemostobviousconsiderationinfavorofthisinterpre-
tation is that SV possesses a degree of obviousness that SI lacks. This
9. SeeRussell’sunpublishedessay,writtenin1903,“OntheMeaningandDenota-
tionofPhrases”(Russell1994,285–96).Andforausefuldiscussionofthedevelopment
ofthedescriptiontheoryofnames(fromwhichthisarticlehasbenefited),seeKaplan
2005,especially987–89.
159
IAN PROOPS
mattersfortworeasons.First,ifthepuzzleistohaverealforce,oneshould
not be able to solve it simply by denying SP. Russell, after all, takes the
TheoryofDescriptionstoprovidethekeytothepuzzle’sresolution.And
yet, on the standard interpretation, it is hard to say why he should not
rather just take apparent failures of substitutivity to refute SP. (Some
commentators who are apt to read SP as SI are, accordingly, inclined
nottoseeapuzzlehereatall,simplybecausetheytakeSItobeobviously
false.See,forexample,Sainsbury1979,107.)Second,andrelatedly,Rus-
selltakesSPtohaveadegreeofobviousnessequaltothatofaparticular
logicalprinciple,namely,theindiscernibilityofidenticals.Thatmuchis
evidentfromthefactthat,intheparagraphthatservestointroducethe
puzzle(Russell1956,47–48,quotedabove),herunsthetwoprinciples
togetherandseemstosuggestthattheformerismerelyareformulation,
or perhaps a corollary, of the latter. The principles are close cousins—
especially so in an early Russellian setting—but they are not identical.
Nonetheless, the fact that Russell seems to regard them as closely con-
nectedsuggeststhatSPshouldbereadashavingtheevidenceofalawof
logic.PrincipleSI,Icontend,lackssuchevidence,whileSVpossessesit.
A more subtle consideration counting in favor of our reading
concerns its ability to accommodate an otherwise problematic feature
of the passage in which the solution is presented. This passage, which
forconvenienceweshallcall“passageA,”runsasfollows:
ThepuzzleaboutGeorgeIV’scuriosityisnowseentohaveaverysimple
solution. Theproposition‘ScottwastheauthorofWaverley,’whichwas
writtenoutinitsunabbreviatedforminthepreviousparagraph,doesnot
containanyconstituent‘theauthorofWaverley’forwhichwecouldsub-
stitute‘Scott.’(Russell1956,51–52)
A prima facie problem for the standard reading is that the sen-
tence“ScottwastheauthorofWaverley”plainlydoes containthelinguistic
constituent: “the author of Waverley.” On the standard reading, then,
Russell is, on the face of it, denying the obvious. This is not a problem
forourreadingsincewetakeRusselltobesayingthatthenonlinguistic
proposition expressed by the sentence “Scott was the author of
Waverley”10containsnopropositionalconstituentcorrespondingtothe
words“theauthorofWaverley.”
10. LeonardLinsky(1966,674)contendsthatthepassagejustquotedcontainsa
slip.Thesentenceintowhichtheword“Scott”wouldbesubstitutedinargumentAisnot
“ScottwastheauthorofWaverley”but“GeorgeIVwishedtoknowwhetherScottwasthe
160