Rumbles of Thunder: Power Shifts and the Danger of Sino-American War

332 Pages·2022·1.901 MB·English

by  Steve Chan

RUMBLES OF THUNDER

RUMBLES OF THUNDER
P OW E R SH I F T S
and the
DA N G E R O F
SI N O - A M E R IC A N WA R
STEVE CHAN
Columbia University Press
New York
Columbia University Press
Publishers Since 1893
New York Chichester, West Sussex
cup . columbia . edu
Copyright © 2023 Columbia University Press
All rights reserved
Library of Congress Cataloging- in- Publication Data
Names: Chan, Steve, author.
Title: Rumbles of thunder : power shifts and the danger of
Sino- American war / Steve Chan.
Description: New York : Columbia University Press, 2022. | Includes
bibliographical references and index.
Identifiers: LCCN 2022014295 (print) | LCCN 2022014296 (ebook) |
ISBN 9780231208444 (hardback) | ISBN 9780231208451 (trade paperback) |
ISBN 9780231557436 (ebook)
Subjects: LCSH: Balance of power. | War— Causes. | United States— Foreign
relations— China. | China— Foreign relations— United States.
Classification: LCC JZ1313 .C475 2022 (print) | LCC JZ1313 (ebook) |
DDC 327.1/12— dc23/eng/20220701
LC record available at https:// lccn . loc . gov / 2022014295
LC ebook record available at https:// lccn . loc . gov / 2022014296
Columbia University Press books are printed on permanent
and durable acid-f ree paper.
Printed in the United States of America
Cover design: Milenda Nan Ok Lee
Cover image: Decha Anunthanapong/Alamy Stock Photo
CONTENTS
INTRODUCTION
1
1. POWER SHIFT EXPLAINS BETTER WORSENING
SINO- AMERICAN RELATIONS
43
2. CONCEPTUAL AND MEASUREMENT PROBLEMS
IN STUDYING POWER
85
3. PERSISTENCE OF WASHINGTON’S STRUCTURAL
POWER IN U.S. GLOBAL DOMINATION
111
4. DOMESTIC SOURCES OF FOREIGN POLICY
142
vi(cid:2)CONTENTS
5. TAIWAN AS A POSSIBLE CATALYST FOR
SINO- AMERICAN CONFLICT
176
CONCLUSION
206
Acknowledgments 233
Notes 235
Bibliography 277
Index 307
RUMBLES OF THUNDER

INTRODUCTION
T
his book challenges much of the received wisdom about Sino-
American relations. It will likely be a source of discomfiture, irri-
tation, and even sharp disagreement for many readers. If it is, it
will thus offer an opportunity for a vigorous debate. As a Wall Street pun-
dit supposedly said, “I become worried when everyone gets to one side of
the boat.” Even smart people can sometimes become victims of what we
now know as groupthink.1 Scholars, no less than people in other profes-
sions, can exhibit conformity to conventional thinking and narratives.
We see nowadays elite and public opinion coalescing in both China and
the United States about the other country’s inherent hostility and bad faith
and the need to take a tougher stand against it. This is the stuff that con-
tributes to a conflict spiral, each side developing a mirror image of the
other. The silencing of dissident voices, whether by self- censorship or oth-
erwise, abets a sense of self- righteousness, contributing to an escalation
of mistrust and tension. Hard- liners in each country become their coun-
terparts’ best allies as their reciprocal recrimination feeds on each other.
Readers of this book will find many contrarian views challenging main-
stream ideas circulated in popular media and academic discourse.
Americans will find contradictions to their self- image of the United States
as a benevolent, rule- abiding, and status- quo hegemon. The idea that dem-
ocratic politics, sometimes reflected in populism, is likely to hamper
rather than contribute to easing Sino- American tension is also likely to
2(cid:2)INTRODUCTION
be controversial, even abhorrent, to many American readers. They will
find in the following pages criticisms of their country’s crusader impulse
to convert the world in its image and their leaders’ double standards in
constructing narratives about Sino- American relations. Many will also
likely object to the claim that the United States has in recent years acted
more like a revisionist power than China, and that it has done so more
assertively and aggressively than China.
At the same time, Chinese readers will be disappointed to hear that it
is still a world dominated by the United States and that it will remain so
for some considerable time to come. Moreover, they will be disturbed to
hear of a pervasive negative image of China in foreign countries— even
though foreigners’ trust and confidence in the United States also plum-
meted during the Donald Trump administration and despite popular
skepticism about and even resistance to democratic and capitalist insti-
tutions.2 China’s values and identities do not appeal to many people in
other countries.3 Despite the supposed success of its development model,
Beijing cannot compete with Washington’s soft power.4 Its actions in Xin-
jiang and Hong Kong and toward Taiwan lead foreigners to see China in
a negative light. A country that mistreats its own citizens cannot reassure
foreigners that they will receive better treatment. This observation also
applies to the United States given its persistent racial inequities and dis-
crimination that have spurred mass protests such as the Black Lives Mat-
ter movement.
What citizens and pundits say about another country often reveals
more about themselves than the subject of their commentary. Andrew
Bacevich observes that “American statecraft is not, in the first instance,
about ‘them;’ it is about ‘us.’ ”5 Hubris, prejudice, excessive confidence,
overweening ambition, and scapegoating and stereotyping are on display
on both sides of the Pacific. These human tendencies are in the final anal-
ysis the ingredients that can precipitate a dangerous confrontation. After
all, people rather than structural conditions make decisions. The perti-
nent structural conditions include not just what is happening at the inter-
state level of analysis, such as the shifting power balance between two
countries. The domestic alignments of political power and interests are
also pertinent. They can alter the nature of political discourse by empow-
ering hard- liners whose rhetoric gives further fuel to popular grievances
and self- righteousness.6