Ronald Reagan and the Space Frontier

419 Pages·2019·6.132 MB·English

by  John M. Logsdon

R O N A L D
John M. Logsdon
R E A G A N

A N D T H E
S P A C E
F R O N T I E R
Palgrave Studies in the History of Science
and Technology
Series Editors
James Rodger Fleming
Colby College
Waterville, ME, USA
Roger D. Launius
Auburn, AL, USA
Designed to bridge the gap between the history of science and the history of
technology, this series publishes the best new work by promising and
accomplished authors in both areas. In particular, it offers historical perspectives
on issues of current and ongoing concern, provides international and global
perspectives on scientific issues, and encourages productive communication
between historians and practicing scientists.
More information about this series at
http://www.palgrave.com/gp/series/14581
John M. Logsdon
Ronald Reagan and
the Space Frontier
John M. Logsdon
Space Policy Institute
The George Washington University
Washington, DC, USA
Palgrave Studies in the History of Science and Technology
ISBN 978-3-319-98961-7 ISBN 978-3-319-98962-4 (eBook)
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-98962-4
Library of Congress Control Number: 2018953334
© The Editor(s) (if applicable) and The Author(s) 2019
This work is subject to copyright. All rights are solely and exclusively licensed by the Publisher,
whether the whole or part of the material is concerned, specifically the rights of translation,
reprinting, reuse of illustrations, recitation, broadcasting, reproduction on microfilms or in any
other physical way, and transmission or information storage and retrieval, electronic adaptation,
computer software, or by similar or dissimilar methodology now known or hereafter developed.
The use of general descriptive names, registered names, trademarks, service marks, etc. in this
publication does not imply, even in the absence of a specific statement, that such names are exempt
from the relevant protective laws and regulations and therefore free for general use.
The publisher, the authors and the editors are safe to assume that the advice and information in this
book are believed to be true and accurate at the date of publication. Neither the publisher nor the
authors or the editors give a warranty, express or implied, with respect to the material contained
herein or for any errors or omissions that may have been made. The publisher remains neutral with
regard to jurisdictional claims in published maps and institutional affiliations.
Cover image courtesy of Danita Delimont / Alamy Stock Photo
Cover design by Tom Howey
Author photo © Robert Levy Photography/rhlphoto.com
This Palgrave Macmillan imprint is published by the registered company Springer Nature
Switzerland AG
The registered company address is: Gewerbestrasse 11, 6330 Cham, Switzerland
For Roslyn, again and always
P a
reface and cknowledgments
This study of space policy during the presidency of Ronald Reagan is the third
in my studies of the space policy decisions of U.S. presidents, following John
F. Kennedy and the Race to the Moon (2010) and After Apollo? Richard Nixon
and the American Space Program (2015). It has been by far the most difficult
of the three to bring to completion.
There are a number of reasons for that observation. Both the Kennedy and
the Nixon books covered decisions made during a three-year period, and each
basically had a single narrative thread. In Kennedy’s case, that thread was first
deciding to enter a space race with the Soviet Union focused on send Americans
to the lunar surface and safely back to Earth “before this decade is out,” and
then taking the steps to turn that decision into a warlike but peaceful mobiliza-
tion of the human, financial, and technological resources required for success.
In Nixon’s case, it was rejecting the Apollo-like post-Apollo program proposed
in the immediate aftermath of the Apollo 11 lunar landing and spending the
next two years debating what the post-Apollo program should be. The out-
come was a program to be carried out at a lower priority and funding level,
centered on developing the space shuttle, a means for providing highly capable
but regular and lower-cost access to orbit.
This study covers the totality of Ronald Reagan’s eight years as president. It
does not deal with Reagan’s Strategic Defense Initiative (“Star Wars”) or other
national security space issues; its focus is civilian and commercial space policy
during the Reagan administration. There is no single narrative that runs
throughout the eight years Reagan was in the White House, except perhaps his
consistent enthusiasm regarding how the space effort embodied the best quali-
ties of American exceptionalism and leadership. The Reagan administration
had to deal with the realities of the space shuttle, both once it began flying in
1981 and after the tragic Challenger accident in 1986. The president decided
to approve the “next logical step” in space development, a multiyear, multibil-
lion dollar space station program. Administration interest in the economic pay-
offs from space activity led to an overly enthusiastic effort to commercialize
vii
viii PREFACE AND ACKNOWLEDGMENTS
various aspects of that activity. The administration made international partner-
ships a key element of its approach to space policy, first with “friends and allies”
in the space station and then tentatively with the Soviet Union under Mikhail
Gorbachev’s leadership. Despite continuing suggestions of the need for setting
a destination for human space flight, either a return to the Moon or initial
journeys to Mars, the administration went no further than in its final year that
setting as a long-range goal expanding “human presence and activity beyond
Earth orbit.” Telling each of these separate stories adequately has required a
lengthy manuscript.
Most Reagan administration space decisions emerged from a contentious
and slow-moving interagency process, involving a wide range of executive
agencies and diverse elements of the White House staff. Ronald Reagan as
president almost never made “top down” decisions, at least with respect to the
space program. He much preferred to have options for his choice emerge from
this process. Thus, chronicling space policy development during the eight years
of the Reagan administration also required delving deeply into the details of
interagency arguments on a wide variety of issues.
This proved to be a challenge. As I began research on this book, I discovered
that many of the relevant documents, especially at the Ronald Reagan Presidential
Library in Simi Valley, California, had originally borne a security classification,
had been withdrawn from the archives for declassification review, and had never
been reviewed. When I early on filed a Freedom of Information request for access
to some of these documents, I was informed that the backlog before my request
could be considered was over 12 years! At that point I seriously considered giving
up on the study. I changed my mind only after my colleague Dr. Dwayne Day
told me about a collection of declassified documents available from the Central
Intelligence Agency called CREST, the CIA Records Search Tool (www.cia.gov/
library/readingroom/collection/crest-25-year-program-archive). That collec-
tion contains more than 11 million pages of declassified documents. Because
during the Reagan administration the Intelligence Community was an active par-
ticipant in interagency space discussions, many of the critical papers I needed for
my research could be found in the CREST database. Needless to say, I am very
grateful to Dr. Day for introducing me to CREST and thereby allowing me to
move forward with my research. Without his suggestion, this book likely would
not have been possible.
Even with access to the CREST document collection, I am quite aware that
in preparing this study I have not had access to all of the relevant primary
source material in the Reagan archives. I have tried to compensate for this lack
of access by seeking alternative sources of primary documents and a number of
interviews with participants in Reagan administration policy activities. Still, as
I have told many colleagues in the course of preparing this account, I feel that
I have been trying to put together a 10,000-piece jigsaw puzzle with only 7000
pieces. I can only hope that the missing pieces are not critical to the validity of
the study, but recognize that important information or perspectives may be
missing. I of course accept responsibility if that should turn out to be the case.
PREFACE AND ACKNOWLEDGMENTS ix
I have a lot of people to thank. The many individuals who shared their recol-
lections with me in formal interviews were essential to giving the narrative
nuance and context. In addition, interviewees Hans Mark, Gil Rye, Courtney
Stadd, Peggy Finarelli, and Darrell Branscome shared material from their files.
So did David Thompson of Orbital Sciences Corporation (now Northrup
Grumman Innovation Systems), David Lippy, founder in the 1980s of the
Center for Space Policy, Professor Howard McCurdy from American University,
Dr. Valerie Neal of the Smithsonian National Air and Space Museum, and Bud
Evans, formerly at NASA. Rye, Stadd, Finarelli, and Evans read portions of the
manuscript and provided valuable comments. My colleague Stephen Smith of
the Kennedy Center Visitors Center read almost every chapter in draft and
provided both helpful comments and continuing encouragement. At the
Reagan Library, Jennifer Mandel helped me navigate the archives and apolo-
gized for the lack of access to unprocessed documents, and Michael Pinckney
was very responsive in providing the illustrations in the book. Liana Sherman
and Allyson Reneau provided essential research assistance. Elspeth Tupelo of
Twin Oaks Indexing put together the comprehensive index.
As I finished the manuscript for my 2015 After Apollo? study, I wrote in its
preface: “My wife Roslyn has provided the loving foundation of my life. Maybe
now that this long-running opus is finished we can find more time to enjoy life
together.” That turned out to be a false hope; working on this sturdy has
proven even more time- and attention consuming. All I can do is repeat the
hope. In 1970, I dedicated my very first book The Decision to Go to the Moon to
my wife; after almost a half-century, she deserves another recognition of my
appreciation of her love and forbearance.
Washington, DC John M. Logsdon
May 2018
c
ontents
1 A Cowboy Comes to Washington 1
2 Getting Started 13
3 First Decisions 25
4 An Initial Reagan Space Policy 43
5 SIG (Space) Gets Started 57
6 Space Shuttle Issues: Round One 71
7 The Next Logical Step 87
8 Debates and Disagreement 101
9 The Space Station Decision 121
10 “Follow Our Dreams to Distant Stars” 141
11 Together in Orbit: Round One 149
1 2 Space Commercialization 171
1 3 Commercializing Earth Orbit 193
14 Space Shuttle Issues: Round Two 211
1 5 Finishing the First Term 227
xi