Rommel's Afrika Korps: Tobruk to El Alamein PDF
Preview Rommel's Afrika Korps: Tobruk to El Alamein
O SPREY Battle Orders PUBLISHING Rommel’s Afrika Korps Tobruk to El Alamein SchtzRgt 155 StKp I.Btl II.Btl III.Btl [same asI.Btl] StKp 1–3 4 Intelligence anddeception–Benghazi,29January1942 Apollonia (MarsaSusa) BedaLittoria Cirene Laml GeTdoildeamaide Oberdan Belghes BaAtctiqsutiavi GuBaersncgihaazCioefiaKGrMDArRiaCnKaASAD3KAGKrRMeMAgRiaCmTBKrouiSaacmrA5abEilarFG2iDlG40zS0eiINrdDesBNeaMlarcAhaebidbidd4aaINleD2n3aM1GTSePc1n52iC 1sPhPzazr1ru5db ’KaABGnuGrnBEGuIiaSrnsSzesLinoaElNR1a5 gP1az1HamEleHl4iGaINmhDeadmiStalBaGGnuBeetAaurrdrsSacerthsieeiat 1(-E) 7 4INDELMS EnNauaghia ErRtem Ghemines TGriieasrtdeina SolAurciehte 8MG21Pz BirBalach BelFGEIaNrTanis BBirireBleGlaemrraerdi Carcuna Tilmun Sceleidima 15 (-)Msus21(-) BirelMelezz 90 DAK BirerRtima Pier Paolo Battistelli • Consultant editor Dr Duncan Anderson © Osprey Publishing • www.ospreypublishing.com Battle Orders • 20 Rommel’s Afrika Korps Tobruk to El Alamein Pier Paolo Battistelli Consultant editor Dr DuncanAnderson • Series editors Marcus Cowper and Nikolai Bogdanovic © Osprey Publishing • www.ospreypublishing.com Contents Introduction 4 Combat mission 5 Preparation for war: doctrine and training 7 Unit organization 12 Tactics 42 RaselMdauuar,30April–1May1941•Twodaysofbattle–SidiRezegh,22–23November1941 Belhamed,1–2December1941 Intelligenceanddeception–Benghazi,29January1942•FlächenmarschatGazala,26May1942 ElMreir,21–22July1942•Supply–21.PanzerDivisionatAlamHalfa,30August1942 Defeat–15.PanzerDivisionatElAlamein,2November1942 Weapons and equipment 60 Infantry•Panzers•Anti-tankandanti-aircraftweapons•VehiclesandotherAFVs Command, control, communications and intelligence (C3I) 74 Command•Control•Communications•Intelligence Unit status 81 Lessons learned 89 Bibliography 91 Abbreviations and glossary 93 Index 95 3 © Osprey Publishing • www.ospreypublishing.com Introduction On11February1941whenthefirstGermantroopsarrivedinLibya,fewwould have predicted that the struggle for North Africa was just beginning. These GermantroopshadbeensenttohelptheItaliansaftertheirdefeatatthehands oftheBritishfollowingLt.Gen.RichardO’Connor’sOperationCompass,which culminated in the destruction of an entire Italian army at the battle of Beda Fomm. Yet, against all the odds, two months later the vanguards of the Deutsches Afrika Korps (DAK), still under strength and led by an anonymous general, swept through Cyrenaica as far as the Egyptian border. For the next 18 months the DAK, along with Italian units grouped under Rommel’s Panzergruppe/Panzerarmee Afrika, fought against British and Commonwealth troopsforthecontroloftheWesternDesert.TheDAKwasbeatenonce,yetit wassoonbackontheoffensiveandeventuallythreatenedtoreachitsgoal:the Nile.Attheend,however,itwasdefeatedandwithdrewbacktoTunisia,where itfoughtitslaststand. During those 18 months of struggle, the DAK earned a well-deserved reputation as a first-class, elite fighting unit and its commander, Thearrival.Amixedgroupof Generalfeldmarschall Erwin Rommel, developed a reputation as a military GermanandItaliansoldiers watchesaPzKpfwIIAusf.Cbeing genius.Suchareputation,however,wasacquiredthehardway:inaveryshort disembarkedatTripoliharbour. periodoftimeGermancommandersandtheirtroopshadtolearnhowtofight NotehowboththePanzermänner awarinthedesert–dealingwiththeirenemiesaswellastheawfulclimateand andotherGermansoldiersare terrain.Althoughtheprocesswasarduous,theresultswereimpressiveandthat stillwearingtheirEuropean isthemajorreasonthattheDAKbecamethefirstexampleofafullymotorized uniforms.Visibleonthefronthull forcethatsuccessfullyconductedmobilewarfareagainststrongerenemyforces ofthePzKpfwIIistheinsigniaof 3.PanzerDivision.(CarloPecchi in harsh terrain. The other reason was Rommel, whose skills and capabilities Collection) turnedhimintoalegendasamilitarycommander. 4 © Osprey Publishing • www.ospreypublishing.com Combat mission TheDAKwasfarfrombeinganeliteunitinearly1941.Thoughfullymotorized, both divisions sent to North Africa had many drawbacks. The first unit sent, 5.leichte Division, was a hotchpotch of different units designed to serve in a defensive role. The unit that followed, 15.Panzer Division, was an armoured divisionatnearlyfullstrength,buthadonlyrecentlybeentransformedfroman infantry division and lacked any real experience of armoured warfare. These drawbacks did not overly concern the German Army High Command, the OberkommandodesHeeres(OKH),asitonlysoughttofightadelayingaction inNorthAfricauntiltheconclusionofOperationBarbarossa–theinvasionof theSovietUnion.AlimitedattackaimedatregainingCyrenaicawasauthorized, but only after 15.Panzer Division arrived and the German troops had been properly trained and acclimatized. A major assault against Egypt was not envisaged until after the war against the Soviet Union had been brought to a satisfactoryconclusion,probablybytheendof1941. Rommel’s bold sweep across Cyrenaica thwarted these plans, but the OKH couldnotadjusttothenewrealityastheEasternFrontwasindesperateneed of motor transport in general and mechanized troops in particular. Thus, in summer 1941 the DAK was stuck in a stalemate and, unsurprisingly, allowed thebarenumberofreinforcementsbytheOKH.Thesituationdidnotchange Germanlorriesaredisembarkedat much in 1942 despite Rommel’s second drive into Cyrenaica, as both Hitler Tripoliharbourand,ladenwiththe and the OKH were still gravelyconcernedaboutthe difficultsituationon the DAK’sequipmentandsupplies,are readytomovetothefront.Many Eastern Front. As a consequence the Mediterranean remained a sideshow, Germanvehicles,liketheseBüssing- althoughtherewasanoverallstrategicplan.Thisinvolvedanassaultaimedat Nag4x2mediumlorriesshown theseizureoftheportofTobruk,whichwastobefollowedbyaninvasionof here,werebasedoncivilianmodels Maltawiththeaimofbringingthesupplyproblemstoanend. andprovedunsuitableforthe However, this plan did not take into account Rommel’s new advance, this desertconditions.(CarloPecchi time into Egypt. Although there were no significant reinforcements available Collection) fortheDAK,theOKHdidtrytoimprovethequalityofitsweaponry.Forthe Germansoldierslinedup somewhereinLibya,allwearingthe DAKtropicaluniform.Sincetwoof themwearthe‘Afrikakorps’cuff title,institutedon18July1941,the photocanbedatedtosummer 1941.Tropicaluniforms,actually unsuitableforthedesert,werestill largelyusedforceremoniesand formaloccasions.(ArchivioUfficio StoricoStatoMaggioreEsercito) 5 © Osprey Publishing • www.ospreypublishing.com ADAKcolumnmovingacross first time the German Army sought to make good its shortcomings using thestreetsofaLibyantown.The improvedweaponryandbetterbalancedcombatunits–the‘fewermen,more lorries,allsportinganeat‘palmwith weapons’ solution. However, Rommel’s unexpected successes at Gazala and swastika’DAKinsignia,appeartobe Tobruk compelled Hitler to authorize a premature advance into Egypt. The stillpaintedintheEuropeandark- result was that, by the end of July, for the first time a strained DAK faced a greyfinishandonlyhavealightcoat ofsand.Thetacticalinsigniaonthe severe crisis and was in real danger of breaking down. As a consequence new leftmudguardisadivisionalsymbol. reinforcements were brought in, although it was too little too late: having (CarloPecchiCollection) failed to break through the British defences at El Alamein, the DAK had no otherchoicebuttostandonthedefensiveandwaitfortheenemyoffensiveto beunleashed. Alwaysunderstrengthandplaguedbyaperenniallackofweapons,vehicles andsupplies,theDAKwasneverthelessinbettershapethanmanyotherunits of the German Army. In many cases its equipment included modern weapons thatwerenotavailableinlargequantities.Thoughlackinginnumbers,inearly 1941 its tank inventory did not include any of the obsolete Czech tanks that wereusedonalargescaleagainsttheSovietUnion.Also,in1942itwassupplied with some of the most modern weapons available. All in all, the DAK often fielded more and better weapons, vehicles and equipment than many of the motorizedunitsontheEasternFront.Suchanoddstateofaffairswasremarked onbytheOKHwhichpointedouthowDAK’sallocationofmotortransportwas 1/10thofthatavailableforBarbarossa,whileitsactualstrengthwasonly1/78th oftheforcecommittedtotheinvasionoftheSovietUnion.Aremarkablepoint thatclearlyshowshowtheDAK,inspiteofitsmanyshortcomings,established itself as an effective fighting force and a perfect prototype for fully motorized units. 6 © Osprey Publishing • www.ospreypublishing.com Preparation for war: doctrine and training In1941theDAKlackedbothaspecificdoctrinefordesertwarfareandproper trainingforthejobinhand.However,despitetheseshortcomingstheGerman Armyhadalreadydevelopedthemostadvancedarmouredwarfaredoctrineof the time. Its root lay in the concept of Bewegungskrieg (movement warfare), deemed the only possible way to deal with stronger enemies and to avoid static, attritional warfare. The best manner to implement Bewegungskrieg was throughoffensiveactions,whichweretofollowspecificguidelinesleadingto a decision on the battlefield through the Vernichtungsschlacht (the battle of annihilation). These guidelines included concentration of force, combined- arms warfare and use of air power, all to be combined together against a selected Schwerpunkt (decisive point of effort). As soon as a breakthrough had beenobtainedithadtobeexploitedusingspeed,flexibilityandmanoeuvreto breakintotheenemyrearareas,andeventuallyenvelopanddestroyhisforces. Armouredunitsplayedamajorroleinthedoctrineofmovementwarfaresince theyweretheunitsmostsuitedtoproducingandexploitingabreakthroughin enemylines.ThePanzerkeil(armouredwedge)becameadecisivefactorinthe German Keil und Kessel doctrine, based on the principles of the ‘wedge and cauldron’toobtainthedestructionofenemyforces. However,themostimportantaspectoftheGermandoctrinewasthelackof any specific formula or rule; the doctrine only supplied guidelines, and commanders had to evaluate the situation by taking into account both the conditionsoftheterrainandthedeploymentofenemyforces.Rommeltookfull advantageofthislackofspecificitywheninMarch–April1941,contrarytoOKH directives,hedecidedtoadvancedeeplyintoCyrenaica.Althoughthewholearea wasseized(withthenotableexceptionofTobruk)andheavylosseswereinflicted on British and Commonwealth troops1, the campaign was disappointing from a doctrinal point of view. There had been neither a Schwerpunkt nor a Vernichtungsschlachtand,aboveall,BritishforceswereabletoretreattoTobruk, whichprovedtoohardanuttocrackfortheDAK.Asamatteroffact,DAK’sfirst offensive is more reminiscent of the German stormtroop tactics, based on infiltrationandpursuit,developedinthelastyearofWorldWarI,whichRommel had first-hand experience of. The result was a stalemate and the hated Stellungskrieg(staticwarfare),forwhichtheDAKwascompletelyunfit. 1Hereafter,‘British’willrefertoBritish,CommonwealthandIndianunits. Rommel,accompaniedbyItalian officers(theoneseatedtotheright ofthephoto,appearstobeGeneral Roatta,ItalianArmychief-of-staff), preparestoparadeGermanunits beforetheyheadtothefront.Note howalltheGermanofficersbut onearestillwearingtheirEuropean uniforms.(FilippoCappellano) 7 © Osprey Publishing • www.ospreypublishing.com AssoonastheyarrivedatTripoli inFebruary–March1941,5.leichte Division’sunitsparadedthrough thestreetsbeforemarchingtothe front.Thisseemstohavebeenone ofRommel’singenioustricks,aimed atshowingeverybody(British intelligenceincluded)themighty poweroftheGermanforces.The HorchKfz16mediumstaffcar, followedbyBMWcombinations, belongstoPanzerAufklärungs Abteilung3(seetacticalsignon theleftmudguard).(CarloPecchi Collection) However, the campaign of 1941 in Cyrenaica supplied valuable experience fortheforcesinvolvedandledtoRommelconcludingthattheWesternDesert ‘was the only theatre where the principles of motorized and tank warfare, as theyhadbeentaughttheoreticallybeforethewar,couldbeappliedtothefull – and further developed’. Unlike Europe, here pedestrian infantry units were useless unless employed in static, prepared positions; mobile and armoured units, on the other hand, ruled the battlefield. Therefore, the Panzerkeil doctrinecouldnotbeimplementedinthesamemannerasinFranceoronthe EasternFront,wheretheinfantryweretaskedwithsurroundinganddestroying cut-off enemy forces. The open terrain of the Western Desert also made it harder to encircle enemy mobile and armoured formations, since they could breaktheringbyconcentratingtheirweightagainstagivenpoint.Enemyunits could be successfully encircled and annihilated only when they were pedestrian (that is either infantry or mobile units short of fuel), badly led or alreadyshakenanddisintegrating. Given the numerical superiority of the British forces, it is remarkable how the DAK actually achieved such stunning victories. These were largely the result of further doctrinal developments coupled with British operational mistakes.OneofRommel’sfirstattemptstoovercomethelimitationsofmobile warfare in the desert proved unsuccessful, although it also offered valuable experience.DuringOperationCrusader,on24November1941,his‘dashtothe wire’ was a clear attempt to bring about the conditions that might have enabledthedestructionoftheenemymobileforces.Hesoughtthisthroughan extension of the Bewegungskrieg doctrine – the penetration in depth. The aim was the destruction of British supply dumps and lines of communications, BMWR75combinationsofPanzer AufklärungsAbteilung3parading inTripolibeforemarchingdue east,15February1941.(Filippo 8 Cappellano) © Osprey Publishing • www.ospreypublishing.com which, had it happened, would have brought about the paralysis – and subsequent destruction – of the British forces. Though not new, this doctrine was innovativewhencomparedtothemore‘conservative’ one that simply envisaged encirclement and destructionofenemyforcesbyspeedandmanoeuvre. It had already been successfully tested in May–June 1940 on the Western Front, when the German penetration in depth paralysed French, British and Belgian forces (though some of them successfully escapedthetrapbysea).However,inNovember1941 it was a failure: Rommel had forgotten that mobile warfarealsorequiresmobilesupplydumps,whichthe British had actually placed away from the border and theDAKneitherlocatednordestroyed. Given these premises it is not surprising that Rommelturnedbacktotheconceptofpenetrationin depthonlyonce,andwithadifferentapproach,atEl Alamein. In August 1942 his plan to attack the Alamein Line, which ended Aneight-wheeledPanzerfunkwagen in the battle of Alam Halfa, was based on this concept. Once the Panzerkeil SdKfz263,aheavycommunications had broken the southernmost defences of the line, it was to move to the armouredcarmountinga30-watt Funkgerät8withalargeframe north-east until it reached the area south-west of El Hamman, some 40km antenna.Itprobablybelongedto east of Alamein and about 50km from the start line. Here, their flanks 3.Kompanie/NachrichtenAbteilung protected by infantry units, the armoured formations were to threaten the 39(mot).(FilippoCappellano) British supply areas thus compelling enemy motorized forces into a decisive battleintheopen.Thedefeatoftheseforcesshouldhavebroughtaboutthe collapseofthewholeAlameinLine.DifferencesfromthebasicBewegungskrieg doctrineareclearlynoticeable:victoryisnotsoughtaftertheencirclementor paralysis of enemy forces, but rather through provoking an open battle in which Axis forces were superior to the British – at least in terms of tactical abilityandmanoeuvrability. This is the approach Rommel took when he adapted the German BewegungskriegdoctrinetowarfareintheWesternDesert.Aftertheseconddrive into western Cyrenaica in January–February 1942 (which once again saw British units escaping the Axis’ Kessel), Rommel decided to attack the British Gazala Line using classic Flankenangriff (flank attack) tactics. He intended to perform a turning movement (a ‘hook’) behind the British defences, which wouldthenbeattackedbothfrontallyandfromtherear.TheencircledBritish infantry units would then be crushed and the Gazala Line destroyed. This A1-tonhalf-trackedDemagD7 SdKfz10withtraileronwhichthe tacticalinsigniaofaPanzerjägerunit isjustvisible.Thatmakesitvery likelypartofthePanzerjäger Abteilung39.(CarloPecchi Collection) 9 © Osprey Publishing • www.ospreypublishing.com Abrand-newlooking105mm leichteFeldhaubitze18towedby a3-tonhalf-trackedHanomagH kl6SdKfz11tractorinfrontofa largecrowdofItalianandGerman officers.Thesequiteclearly belongto5.leichteDivision’s I.Abteilung/ArtillerieRegiment75. (CarloPecchiCollection) would then provoke the British armoured and mobile forces into an open battle where the DAK could take full advantage of its better tactics, unit coordination,manoeuvrabilityandbattlefieldskill. Therearethreespecificpointsthatareworthmakingaboutthisplan.Firstly, fixed defences are only seen as a hindrance for the attacker, not as an overwhelmingobstacle.Secondly,Rommelsoughtbattleintheopen,inwhich theDAKwouldhaveoutmanoeuvreditsadversaries,andthirdlyhealsosought to attain local superiority against an otherwise stronger enemy. Although the plan only lasted two days before the battle took a different course, the basic conceptsofacquiringlocalsuperiorityandofseekingbattleintheopenproved soundandsuccessful.SubsequentdevelopmentsofwhatremainsRommel’smost successful campaign in the Western Desert followed the same pattern: British forces were surrounded in groups and, with the Germans taking advantage of localsuperiority,weredestroyedpiecemealbothatTobrukandatMatruh. The plan to attack the Alamein Line in July 1942 was not much different fromtheonethathadbeenusedatGazala.Britishdefenceshadtobebroken close to El Alamein and then, while infantry formations protected the left PzKpfwIIIAusf.G(Trop)of 1.Kompanie/PanzerRegiment 5paradingthroughthestreets ofTripoli.Notonlyarethey stillpaintedinthedark-grey Europeanscheme,butthecrews arestillwearingtheirblack uniformsthatwouldsoonbe replacedbytropicalones.(Carlo 10 PecchiCollection) © Osprey Publishing • www.ospreypublishing.com
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