Robert Anthony Williams

235 Pages·2013·1.51 MB·English

by  Robert Williams

Peircean Naturalism
by
Robert Anthony Williams
Department of Philosophy
Duke University

Date:_______________________
Approved:

___________________________
Owen Flanagan, Supervisor

___________________________
Robert Brandon

___________________________
Kevin Hoover

___________________________
Alex Rosenberg

Dissertation submitted in partial fulfillment of
the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy in the Department of
Philosophy in the Graduate School
of Duke University

2013

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v
ABSTRACT
Peircean Naturalism
by
Robert Anthony Williams
Department of Philosophy
Duke University

Date:_______________________
Approved:

___________________________
Owen Flanagan, Supervisor

___________________________
Robert Brandon

___________________________
Kevin Hoover

___________________________
Alex Rosenberg

An abstract of a dissertation submitted in partial
fulfillment of the requirements for the degree
of Doctor of Philosophy in the Department of
Philosophy in the Graduate School
of Duke University

2013
Copyright by
Robert Anthony Williams
2013
Abstract
Naturalism faces problems caused by a lack of agreement about whether there is
or can be a meaningful and useful conception of naturalism as a general research
position. Without a widely agreed upon account of what naturalism in general amounts
to there is no clear and definitive way to adjudicate disputes as to what is consistent
with naturalism; the absence of such an account also makes it impossible for specific
projects in naturalistic inquiry to take guidance from naturalism in general. In the
following, I develop a determinate account of naturalism in general, which I think could
find acceptance among naturalists because it accounts for many of the features
commonly associated with naturalism. To do this, I first lay out the problem to be
solved, express its importance, and explain what a solution to the problem would
involve. I then make appeal to an account of naturalism developed by Penelope Maddy
and use this account to show that the published and unpublished work of Charles
Sanders Peirce offers, prima facie, a more determinate account of naturalism than is
commonly recognized and that goes beyond the account given by Maddy. With this
Peircean account developed, I then measure it against the criteria I develop and
conclude that a Pericean account of naturalism does promise to adjudicate various
disputes in the naturalism literature and to offer guidance to the development and
application of specific projects in naturalistic inquiry.

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Dedication
For and because of Izis. Thank you for providing the rock upon which to build
myself and this dissertation. I will spend a lifetime expressing my gratitude and love.
..-. --- .-. . ...- . .-. / -... .-.. ..- .

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Contents
Abstract ......................................................................................................................................... iv
List of Tables ................................................................................................................................. ix
Acknowledgements ...................................................................................................................... x
1. The need for a common understanding of naturalism ........................................................ 1
1.1 The current state of naturalism .................................................................................. 2
1.1.1 The lack of a determinate account of naturalism .................................................... 2
1.1.2 The need for a determinate account of naturalism ................................................. 7
1.2 Surveying specific accounts .......................................................................................... 10
1.2.1 The issue of scope ...................................................................................................... 16
1.2.2 Audi’s wrinkle ........................................................................................................... 20
1.3 General accounts ............................................................................................................. 23
1.3.1 Quine’s argument against first philosophy ........................................................... 26
1.4 Structure of the work ..................................................................................................... 28
1.4.1 Chapter two ................................................................................................................ 28
1.4.2 Chapter three ............................................................................................................. 31
1.4.3 Chapter four ............................................................................................................... 33
1.4.4 Chapter five ................................................................................................................ 34
1.4.5 Chapter six .................................................................................................................. 36
2. Maddy’s second philosophy as a general account of naturalism .................................... 37
2.1 A sketch of the second philosopher ............................................................................. 42

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2.2 Naturalism as a rejection of (or inconsistent with) First Philosophy ...................... 45
2.2.1 Naturalism as a rejection of two-level views ......................................................... 46
2.3 Maddy on truth ............................................................................................................... 56
2.4 Mathematical naturalism ............................................................................................... 61
2.5 Theses of naturalism ...................................................................................................... 66
2.6 Problems with Maddy’s account of naturalism ......................................................... 70
3. Peirce’s naturalistic treatment of science ............................................................................. 73
3.1 Belief fixation................................................................................................................... 74
3.2 Peirce’s architectonic of science .................................................................................... 90
3.2.1 Peirce’s coenoscopy/idioscopy distinction ............................................................ 99
3.2.2 The analytic method ................................................................................................ 107
3.2.3 The economics of research ..................................................................................... 112
3.3 Coenoscopy as a general account of naturalism ...................................................... 114
4. The will to truth ..................................................................................................................... 118
4.1 Introduction ................................................................................................................... 118
4.2 Fallibilism ...................................................................................................................... 120
4.3 The ethics of the will to believe .................................................................................. 125
4.3.1 Clifford’s ethics of belief ......................................................................................... 126
4.3.2 James’s will to believe ............................................................................................. 133
4.3.3 Peirce’s hope for truth............................................................................................. 139
4.4 Indispensability ............................................................................................................ 142
4.5 Conclusion ..................................................................................................................... 144

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5. Peircean realism .................................................................................................................... 146
5.1 Fallibilism and truth ..................................................................................................... 146
5.2 Two levels of truth ....................................................................................................... 150
5.2.1 Truth ......................................................................................................................... 155
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5.3 Self-corrective methods of science ............................................................................. 160
5.4 Community of inquirers .............................................................................................. 162
5.5 Indispensability/paper doubt ..................................................................................... 165
5.6 Regulative realism ........................................................................................................ 169
5.7 Indispensability again .................................................................................................. 182
5.8 Conclusion ..................................................................................................................... 187
6. Peircean naturalism .............................................................................................................. 189
6.1 Desiderata ...................................................................................................................... 190
6.2 Maddy’s account of naturalism .................................................................................. 191
6.3 Peirce’s account of naturalism .................................................................................... 200
6.3.1 The sin of epistemology .......................................................................................... 209
6.4 Evaluation ...................................................................................................................... 213
6.5 Future work ................................................................................................................... 217
6.6 Conclusion ..................................................................................................................... 220
Works Cited ............................................................................................................................... 222
Biography ................................................................................................................................... 225

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List of Tables
Table 1: Peirce’s Architectonic of Science (incomplete) ......................................................... 93

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Acknowledgements
I have received support and guidance for this project from various sources over
the course of many years. I thank specifically Owen Flanagan for his patience and
guidance in reading many inferior proposals, providing feedback that helped me
formulate better projects, and helping me to settle on and improve the current work. I
thank Kenneth Ketner for helping instill in me an excitement and appreciation for the
work of Peirce. Relatedly, I appreciate everyone at Texas Tech University’s Institute for
Studies in Pragmaticism for valuable discussion, access to the unpublished manuscripts
of Peirce, and the work they did in photocopying and mailing copies of various
manuscripts. I am grateful to Kevin Hoover for discussion and feedback on my vision of
Peirce. I thank Robert Brandon and Alex Rosenberg for their work on my dissertation
committee. I am grateful for Duke University’s Department of Philosophy for finding
financial support and employment opportunities for me beyond my funding years so as
to allow me to continue working on this dissertation. I thank the Houghton Library,
Harvard University for granting me permission to use sections of the unpublished
microfilm MS Am 1632 (299). I thank my parents for their support and faith in me over
the years. Finally, I am eternally grateful to Izis for her faith in and support of me in the
course of writing this dissertation even when the stress involved was a burden to us
both.

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