Roads of change: political transition and state formation in Nepal's agrarian districts

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The Journal of Peasant Studies
ISSN: 0306-6150 (Print) 1743-9361 (Online) Journal homepage: http://www.tandfonline.com/loi/fjps20
Roads of change: political transition and state
formation in Nepal’s agrarian districts
Katharine N. Rankin, Andrea J. Nightingale, Pushpa Hamal & Tulasi S. Sigdel
To cite this article: Katharine N. Rankin, Andrea J. Nightingale, Pushpa Hamal & Tulasi S. Sigdel
(2016): Roads of change: political transition and state formation in Nepal’s agrarian districts, The
Journal of Peasant Studies, DOI: 10.1080/03066150.2016.1216985
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TheJournalofPeasantStudies,2016
http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/03066150.2016.1216985
Roads of change: political transition and state formation in Nepal’s
agrarian districts
Katharine N. Rankin, Andrea J. Nightingale, Pushpa Hamal and Tulasi S. Sigdel
Thispaperexploresthepoliticalfieldthathasopenedupinthewakeoftherecentcivil
warinNepal.Wefocusoncultural-politicaldevelopmentsinagrariandistricts,where
some of the most intriguing openings, and indeed the most pernicious closures, can
be witnessed (as opposed to the national-state restructuring that commands more
mediaandpopularattention).Ourresearchaskswhatspacesopenupintheemerging
political field at the district scale to entrench or transform dominant cultural codes
andsedimentedhistoriesofsocio-economicinequality.Preliminaryresearchidentifies
specific sectors of local governance that have emerged as significant sites of struggle
over the shape and meaning of ‘democracy’, namely forest management and
infrastructure development. The primary contribution of the paper lies in specifying
ananalyticalapproachtothestudyof‘post-conflict’governanceatthelocalscalevia
three conceptual terrains of inquiry – governance and planning, political subjectivity,
and cultural politics. The ultimate objective is to develop a framework for assessing
theconditionsofpossibilityforademocraticrestructuringofeconomyandsocietyto
accompanytheofficialpoliticalinstitutionsofliberaldemocracy.
Keywords:‘post-conflict’;politicalfield;democracy;Nepal;culturalpolitics;political
subjectivity;governance
Nepal emerged in 2006 from a decade-long Maoist insurgencyand a centuries-old Hindu
monarchytoformaseculardemocraticrepublicandelectaMaoist-ledconsensusgovern-
ment.1 Since then, a critically conscious peasantry and a burgeoning public sphere have
joined ongoing donor efforts to institutionalize liberal safeguards for ‘good governance’
and‘civilsociety’.Inthisconjuncture,Nepalpresentsacasewhere insomerespects pol-
iticalspacehasopenedupforarticulatingalternativedevelopmentparadigms.Andyettran-
sitional politics, combined now with reconstruction planning in the aftermath of the 2015
earthquakes, have left many on the ground deeply skeptical about the ability of political
leaders to capitalize uponthat space.Itis therefore timely to probethe practices andcon-
textswherein‘democracy’andnewformsofrule–whetherconsideredregressiveorpro-
gressive –are emerging.
1PoliticalgroupingssubscribingtoMaoistideologyinNepal,likeinneighboringIndia,haveassumed
multipleandshiftingpartyformations.Atthetimeofthe2006ComprehensivePeaceAccord(CPA),
MaoistfactionshadjoinedastheUnifiedCommunistPartyofNepal–Maoist(UCPN-M),buthave
since split multiple times. In this paper, ‘the Maoists’ refers to the post-peace accord unified
Maoistparty.
©2016InformaUKLimited,tradingasTaylor&FrancisGroup
2 Katharine N. Rankin et al.
ThispaperexploresthepoliticalfieldthatopenedupinthewakeoftheMaoistPeople’s
War (1996–2006) and associated mass jana andolan, or People’s Movements (1990 and
2006) that succeeded in overthrowing the ruling political regime.2 It engages the notion
ofpolitical field,inthesenseinspiredbyPierreBourdieu(1977;BourdieuandWacquant
1992), as a field of political practice through which cultural codes or ideologies (doxa in
Bourdieu’s lexicon) are produced and contested. The political field is not limited to prac-
tices associated with the formal institutions of political democracy, such as political
parties. Rather, it includes the full range of practices through which power and authority
are (re)produced, as well as those through which dominant cultural codes are revealed
and challenged (seealso Nightingale and Ojha 2013).
Thisorientationtothestudyofthepoliticsof‘post-conflict’transitionhingesonamore
expansive understanding of class than is commonly articulated in agrarian studies (Bour-
dieu 1986).3 It attends to socioeconomic inequality and material modes of dispossession,
and also more broadly to differentiation in structures of access to multiple forms of
capital. When capital is understood to encompass the full range of resources valued by
thesocialagentsactivewithinapoliticalfield–culturalandsymbolicaswellaseconomic
andpolitical–thentheanalyticaltaskbecomesoneofassessingthepracticesthroughwhich
class advantage is communicated and reinforced, and also recognized and contested. An
orientation to politics in this sense also brings into focus more complex temporalities
thanevokedbythewidelycirculatingmoniker‘post-conflict’(ShneidermanandSnellinger
2014).Itunderscoreshowcontinuityarticulateschange,andspecificallyhowstrugglessur-
roundingtheaccumulationanddispensationofmultipleformsofcapitaldidnotbeginand
endwithacivilwarbetweenMaoistinsurgentsandstateforces–asisglaringlyobviousin
2015withtheresurgenceofviolencesurroundingannouncementsofproposedboundaries
for the new federal units.
Investigating the political field thus requires probing the daily business of gaining
advantageandenactingandsubvertingauthoritythroughplace-basedethnographicandhis-
torical approaches. We thus focus on the politics of state formation at the district scale,
where some of the most intriguing openings, and indeed the most pernicious closures,
are witnessed. As a result of eight years of political stalemate and derailed constitution-
writing at the national scale, the district scale (including the official government planning
divisionsofVillageDevelopmentCommittees(VDCs)andDistrictDevelopmentCommit-
tees(DDCs))hasacquiredsignificanceforawiderangeofactors.Intheabsenceofelected
localgovernments(since1997,duefirsttothecivilwar,andsubsequentlytothelackofa
constitution),alooseandfluidnetworkofstakeholdersinthepoliticaltransition–including
statebureaucrats,partyleaders,civilsocietyorganizationsandethno-nationalsocialmove-
ments–partakeindistrictgovernancethroughofficiallymandatedmechanisms(Byrneand
Shrestha2014).Atthesametime,budgetsandplanningprocesseshavebeendecentralized
tothe75administrativeDDCs,whichcontinuetofunctionaspartofthestatebureaucracy.
Meanwhile,forapoliticallyconsciouspeasantry,makingclaimsontheplanningfunction
ofthelocalstatehasbecomethesurestmeansforexpressingasenseofentitlementtociti-
zenshipandinclusioninthenewfederalrepublic.Ourresearchaskswhatspacesopenupin
2ItalicizedphrasesareintheNepalilanguageandhavebeentransliteratedaccordingtotheconven-
tionsofTurner(1931).
3Thequotationmarksaroundtheterm‘post-conflict’indicatethatwerejectprevailinginterpretations
thatimagineacessationofstruggleandglossovercontinuitiesinmultipledimensionsofconflict.The
term‘post-revolution’isengagedwithoutquotationmarkstosignalsimplythetimeperiodfollowing
theCPApeaceaccord(2006).
The Journalof Peasant Studies 3
theemerging politicalfieldatthedistrict scale toentrenchortransform dominant cultural
codes and sedimented histories of socio-economic inequality.
Inthispaper,wepresentananalyticalframeworkratherthanresultsfromacompleted
researchprogram.Caseexamplesarefurnishedtoillustratetheframework,andareelabo-
rated briefly through ethnographic description. The paper is based on a pilot study con-
ducted in three districts selected to represent a range of caste and ethnic demographics,
human development, ecological zones and degrees of conflict during the insurgency.4 A
fundamental objective of the pilot study was to highlight processes of state-making from
theinteriorofthecountry.Understandingthesedynamics,wecontended,couldprovefruit-
fulforanticipatingthechallengesandpossibilitiesfacinglocalstatesoncetheirboundaries
aredetermined.Preliminaryresearchidentifiedinfrastructure developmentasasignificant
siteofstruggleovertheshapeandmeaningof‘democracy’inNepal’stransition–andour
case examples focus onroad-building in particular.5
In developing an analytical framework to investigate this contested sector, we specify
thefollowingthreeterrainsofinquiryasrelevanttothestudyofstateformationincontexts
where the political field is undergoing significant shifts: (1) What competing political
rationalities andclaimstoauthorityareemerginginpracticesofplanningandgovernance
at the district scale where development technologies encounter everyday life? (2) What
kinds of individual and collective political subjectivities are produced and enacted in
association with these multiple governance projects? (3) How are prevailing cultural
codes and practices of authority reproduced or transformed in people’s everyday engage-
mentswiththelocalstate?ThepaperbeginswithsomenotesonNepal’spoliticaltransition
andtheexpandingroleofdistrict-scalegovernanceintheallocationofresources,followed
byasectiondetailingthesignificanceofroadsasakeysiteofcontestedlocalgovernance.
Thebulkofthepaperisdevotedtoelaboratingthethreeconceptualterrains–governance,
politicalsubjectivityandculturalpolitics–asillustratedthroughroad-building,inorderto
assess the progressive and regressive potentials in the current conjuncture. Overall, the
analytical framework is developed with the aim of contributing some insights the spaces
and practices of states-in-the-making and the possibilities they offer for democratic trans-
formationsof economyandsociety.
Revolution,political transition and district governance
Nepalisoneoftheplacesintheworldwhereinrecentyearspeoplehavemobilizedtotrans-
formthesituationthatoppressesthem.AsinPeru,BoliviaandEcuador,mobilizationwas
builtontheaspirationsofsocialistideologyalongwiththerevolutionaryagencyofthepea-
santry. Not surprisingly, analyses emanating from Nepal’s urban intellectuals and inter-
national donors alleged that peasant participants had been duped and coerced (for a
4ThepilotstudywasfundedbyaRoyalGeographicalSocietySmallGrantandInternationalOppor-
tunitiesFundgrantfromtheCanadianSocialSciencesandHumanitiesResearchCouncil(grantno.
861-2008-1010).
5Districts were selected based on prior professional engagements of the research team as well as
assessmentsof theirsignificance forrepresenting andinfluencingsubnational regionaltrends. Two
visitsweremadetoeachofthethreedistrictcenters,atotalof102interviewswereconductedwith
stakeholdersinvolvedinlocalgovernance,andgrayliteratureon‘post-conflict’transitioninNepal
was reviewed. The pilot study also collected data on the forest sector, which has been elaborated
in Nightingale et al. forthcoming. The research team was comprised of the authors of this paper,
with important inputs offered by three other researchers: Hemant Ojha, Sabin Ninglekhu and
FraserSugden.
4 Katharine N. Rankin et al.
review of these arguments see Lawoti 2010; Thapa2003).Yetthere isample evidence to
contradict such representations of villagers as victims of false consciousness rather than
political actors – not least the sheer number of combatants, over 19,600, who were regis-
tered in the cantonments established as part of the 2006 Peace Accord (ICG 2012; see
also Hutt2004; Shneiderman 2009; Thapa 2004).
As Wendy Wolford (2009) has argued, scholarship on social mobilizations has yet to
grapple comprehensively with key questions about the political consciousness of partici-
pants: why they join, why they sustain or lose interest, what contradictory subjectivities
theyexpress–or,weadd,whatformpopularpoliticalconsciousnesstakesduringstatetran-
sition and reconciliation processes. Similarly, cultural Marxism grapples with the vexing
problemofhowitispossible,historicallyandtheoretically,tobuildanemancipatorypoli-
tics premised on recognition of difference and local specificity (Haarstad 2007; Hallward
2009; Neocosmos 2012). It is in the tradition of these engagements with people’s experi-
ence that the paper takes up the themes of political subjectivity and cultural politics. In
so doing, it stakes out approaches to researching the limits and possibilities for social
andeconomictransformationinthewakeofoneoftheworld’scontemporaryrevolutionary
peasantmovements.Asafoundationforthiswork,thissectiondetailssomeofthekeycon-
textual elements of the People’s War, its antecedents in state repression and aid depen-
dency, and the political stalemate that has resulted in its aftermath.
TheMaoistPeople’sWarcommencedin1996followingdecadesofundergroundpol-
iticalorganizingbytheCommunistPartyofNepal(Maoist)(Thapa2004).6Itwasamong
the most violent conflicts in Asia over its 10-year period (with deaths estimated at over
13,000; UNOHCHR 2012) until a Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) was signed
in2006(Shah2008;ShahandPettigrew2009).Initiatedwithaseriesofhit-and-runguerilla
tacticsinmidwestNepal,themovementexpandednotonlyintoamorecomprehensiveand
coordinated offensive throughout the predominantly agrarian Middle-Hill belt stretching
acrossthefullwidthofthecountry,butalsointoaparallelregimewithcontroloversignifi-
cant territories (Hutt 2004; Thapa 2004). Similar to the Shining Path in Peru (Mikesell
1993;Nickson1992),theMaoistsdismantledthelocalstateandoperated‘people’sgovern-
ments’,janasarkār,atthedistrictscaleacrossthecountry.Insodoing,Maoist‘theoretical
ideology’,whichadvancedabstractnotionsofclassstruggleandrevolution,wasmatched
withastrong‘practicalideology’gearedtowarddismantlinggender,ethnicandcastehier-
archies,aswellasprovidingconcreteservicesrelevanttothedailylivesofvillagers(Shnei-
derman2009,304).ThestatedpurposeofthePeople’sWarwastooverturnthemonarchy
andentrenchedfeudalrelationsacrossthecountryaswellastowrestcontrolfromimperi-
alistsourcesofinfluence,especiallyinternationaldonors(Bhattarai1998).7Meanwhile,the
statewageditsownwartorepresstheinsurgency,backedincreasinglywithUSmilitaryaid
after 9/11 (Onesto 2005;Tamang2012).
Antecedentsoftheconflictlayinalonghistoryofstaterepressionthatproducedcovert
and overt resistance, severe poverty and pronounced socioeconomic inequality, and the
6By1996,thecommunistpartiesinNepalhadbeenthroughfivedecadesoffactionalismandideologi-
cal and tactical dispute. The permutation of CPN-M that consolidated then reflected a consensus
around the objectives of endingthe Hindu monarchy, forminga democraticrepublic and initiating
armedstruggletoachievetheseends(Thapa2003).
7UnlikeinIndia(Patnaik2006;Sundar2006),thecorporatizationofagriculturehasnotbeenamajor
targetofMaoistcritiqueandorganizingduetoitsvirtualabsenceinthemiddlehillsandtherelatively
weakcapacityoftheMaoistsintheSouthernTeraibeltwherelarger-scale,butstillsemi-feudal,com-
mercialagricultureisconcentrated(Sugden2009).
The Journalof Peasant Studies 5
marginalizationofjanajāti(indigenous)groupsliketheTibeto-Burmanlanguage-speaking
groups,Terai-basedcasteHindus(Madhesi)andTharugroupsindigenoustotheTerai,as
well as the lowest castes (dalit) (Dahal 2008; Shneiderman 2010; Whelpton 2005). As
others have argued, feudal modes of governance and cultural codes of engagement with
local populations persisted despite official reforms to land tenure and political represen-
tation in the 1950s (Nightingale and Ojha 2013; Tamang 2012). Popular, collective con-
sciousness around these issues galvanized in the late 1980s to constitute Jana Andolan I,
the people’s movement to agitate for a multiparty parliamentary democracy, which was
subsequently instituted by royal decree in 1990. On the one hand, Jana Andolan I
opened the political field to free competition among political parties and a wider scope
forethnicidentification;ontheotherhand,itexpandedexpectationsforaccountablepoliti-
calrepresentationandtheredistributivefunctionofthestateinagovernancearrangement
thatcontinuedtoaccordsignificantpowerstothemonarchyandtheHinduideologywhich
underlayit.Theseweresomeofthekeypreconditionsthatpresagedpopularsupportforthe
Maoists half a decade later.
A second people’s movement, Jana Andolan II, ended the People’s War, yet without
resolving the problems of socioeconomic mal-distribution and cultural misrecognition. It
is speculated that a galvanizing event was the assassination of the King’s family and his
brother’s ascension to the throne, during the so-called palace massacre in 2001. The new
king,Gyanendra,dissolvedparliament,institutedemergencypowersandscaledupthecon-
flictbydispatchingthearmyagainsttheMaoistswithin18monthsoftakingthethrone(on
topofanewlymilitarizedinternalsecurityforce,thearmedpolice).Theviolentrollbackof
democraticreformsandthemarginalizationofthemoremainstreampoliticalpartieshelped
catalyzeJanaAndolanIIin2006,whichunitedthecountry’ssevenmajorpoliticalparties
in an alliance that sought peace negotiations with the Maoists and forced the king to
reinstate parliament and renounce executive power. For their part, the Maoists conceded
to bringing their revolutionary struggle within the ambit of liberal political institutions
and renounced violence. A peace accord was signed and the coalition of political parties
plustheMaoistsnotonlyoustedthekingbutalsoconstitutedNepalasafederaldemocratic
republic.Onreturntomainstreampolitics,theMaoistsreconfiguredastheUnifiedCommu-
nistPartyofNepal–Maoist(UCPN-M);theywonthemostseatsinthe2008Constituent
Assembly(CA),andhelpedcreatethemostrepresentativepoliticalbody(intermsofethno-
cultural, caste and gender composition) yet to govern Nepal.
Sincethen,however,thepoliticalprocesshasbeenwrackedbystalemate.ThreeCon-
stitution writing deadlines were missed by the CA; there have been five governments in
seven years, with political parties growing increasingly fractious and obstructionist and a
constantreshufflingoftopMinistryleaders;and,since1997,therehavebeennoelections
for district- and village-scale government. In April 2012, a second Maoist prime minister
leading an ineffectual coalition government dissolved the CA and ceded governance to a
cabinetofformerbureaucrats,andinsodoingfailedtoobserveeithertheParty’sowntheor-
etical or practical ideology. A second CA election 19 months later yielded a significant
swingtotheright,withthesocialdemocraticNepaliCongresssecuringmostseats,theroy-
alistpartygainingafew,andtheMaoistslosingasubstantialnumber.Anilliberaldraftcon-
stitution reversing rights that had been gained since the People’s Movements was
promulgated in June 2015 as the major political parties sought to collaborate in their
desire to share access to billions of dollars in reconstruction aid after the earthquakes.
Finally,nearly10yearsafterthecessationofconflict,aconstitutionwasratifiedinSeptem-
ber 2015; but rights for women and ethno-cultural minorities were so eroded as to spawn
new rounds of protest and violence (including an ‘unofficial blockade’ of imports of
6 Katharine N. Rankin et al.
petrol,andkerosenefromIndia,thatseverelychallengedeverydaylivelihoodsthroughout
the country for nearly 6 months) – andthe instability endures.
Thecontextofpeasantrevolutioncombinedwithstalemateatfederalscalesofgovernance
promptsourfocusonthedistrictscalewhereanassemblageofcivicorganizations,political
parties and marginalized social groups must collaborate one way or another in the absence
oflocalelectedgovernment.DuringthePeople’sWar,aswell,whenformalgovernanceinsti-
tutionswereseverelydisrupted,andwhereMaoist‘people’sgovernments’,janasarkār,could
notgaintraction,itwaswidelyreportedthatdensenetworksoflocalassociationscarriedonthe
workofmanagingresourcesandbuildinginfrastructure(NightingaleandSharma2014;Shah
and Pettigrew 2009). Meanwhile, starting with the 1994 ‘build your own village yourself’
program and subsequently the Local Self Government Act (1999), development budgets
haveincreasinglycomeunderthedirectmanagementofDDCsandVDCs.
These mechanisms corroborate the critique leveled by Gupta and Ferguson against
common representations of the state as operating through the principles of ‘verticality
and encompassment’ – that is, ruling through a hierarchy of nested scales in which local
officialsfunctionasmarginalmembersofastateapparatus.Rather,amixofstakeholders
constitutethelocalstate–inrelationtomultiplescalesofinfluenceandaction(Lund2006).
Inthetransitionperiodthespecificcompositionofthatmixoflocalstakeholderswasinfact
mandated through official mechanisms.
With the cessation of local elections, bureaucratically appointed VDC and DDC sec-
retaries–non-gazettedclericalofficials–hadinheritedthefullfunctionsoflocalgovernance
andheldformalexecutiveauthority.Aninterimprovisionforlocalgovernance,knownasthe
AllPartyMechanism(APM),formalizedwhathadbecome(sincetheendofthetermofthe
lastelectedgovernment,2002)theiradhocpracticeofconsultingwithlocalelites,especially
political party leaders, about resource allocation (see also Byrne forthcoming; Byrne and
Shrestha 2014). Through the APM (2009) the cabinet gave political parties a mandate to
serveasaconsultativeapparatusfortheVDCandDDCsecretaries(TheAsiaFoundation
2012).TheAPMwasdissolvedin2012,underallegationsofcorruptionfollowinginvesti-
gationbytheCIAA(CommissionfortheInvestigationofAbuseofAuthority,thegovern-
ment agency charged with investigating abuse of authority and other modes of
corruption).Butinpractice,thestyleof‘consensuspolitics’thattheAPMsoughttoinstitu-
tionalize,andthathadactuallybeenpromotedbythe2007interimconstitution,hascontin-
ued. In fact, it has now expanded to encompass what is specified in the VDC Grant
Operational Manual (2010) as the Integrated Plan Formulation Committee (IPFC), which
includes the VDC secretary, the health post in-charge, the public school headmaster and
membersofexcludedgroups(women,dalit,janajāti).ThroughtheIPFC mechanism,pol-
iticalpartiescontinuetowieldconsiderableinfluenceindecisionsaboutlocaldevelopment.
BecauseoftheinformalnatureoftheauthorityvestedinIPFCs(andthediversityofpartyand
civil-societyconfigurationsatthedistrictscale),however,thespecificdynamicsofauthority
andinfluencevaryconsiderablybydistrict(seealsoNightingaleetal.forthcoming).
Underthesecircumstances,thelocalanddistrictscaleshad,whenweconductedinitial
researchin2009–2011,acquiredheightenedsignificanceforaproliferatingrangeofinsti-
tutionalized stakeholders operating at multiple spatial scales. Donors continued to follow
legal provisions laid out after 1990 that mandate engagement of local non-governmental
organizations (NGOs) to implement their programs; in so doing they were both playing
akeyroleincatalyzingtheburgeoningNGOsectorandeffectivelybypassingthedysfunc-
tionalnationalstate.NGOs,fortheirpart,werefurnishinganimportantmechanismforlocal
elitestoshoreuppowerandauthority.Regionalpartyleadersfoundthatintheabsenceof
viablenationalpartyorganizations,theirauthorityderivedmorereliablyfromacapacityto
The Journalof Peasant Studies 7
collaboratewithothers–otherparties,donors,civilsocietyleaders,NGOs–toactuallyplan
andgetthingsdone,suchasbuildingroads.Thiswasnottheclassicneoliberalgovernance
scenario where the state devolves public functions to civil society (Ferguson and Gupta
2002;Lemke2002;Swyngedouw2005);rather,thesemultipleandoftenoverlappinginter-
estsconstitutethelocalstatethroughprocessesthathavebeenconspicuouslyunderstudied
(Gupta2012).Thesedynamicsnotonlypersist,theyhavebecomemorepronouncedinthe
contemporarypost-earthquakereconstructionperiod.Buildingfromrecentscholarshipthat
examinesthecontestedandoftenviolentlocalprocessesthroughwhichstateandnon-state
actorsvieforauthorityintheconstitutionofnationalpolities(HansenandStepputat2001;
Lund2006;Raeymaekers,Menkhaus,andVlassenroot2008;Vandekerckhove2011),our
framework helps think through how polities are being built from the ground up through
everyday governance practices of these colliding interests.
The contestedgovernance of roads
Akeypremiseoftheanalyticalframeworksketchedouthereisthathowpeopleunderstand
andperform‘democracy’intheireverydayengagementswiththelocalstatehassignificant
consequencesforthepossibilitytoovercomestructuralinequalityattherootofviolentcon-
flict(Michelutti2008).Therevolutionsucceededinoverturningthemonarchyandpromul-
gatingaconstituentassemblyforthenewfederalrepublic.Yetinthecontextofparalyzing
stalemateatthenationalscale,weneedtoassessprocessesatsub-nationalscales,wherethe
political base for change lies, to investigate the ways in which old cultural codes reassert
themselves,aswellastheformandpracticesassumedbynewmodesofcollectivepolitical
subjectivity.
Ourdesiretoprobehowideasofdemocracyarelivedandexperiencedbymarginalized
sectorsofNepalisocietyispremisedfundamentallyonanunderstandingofthestateitself
as a fragmented and variegated terrain of material and symbolic production comprising
multiple scales and sectors of practice (Fuller and Harris 2001; Hansen and Stepputat
2001; Harris 2012; Lund 2006). It dispenses with interpretations of the state as a unitary
agent and instead emphasizes how the ‘state idea’ is constituted as much through partial
everydayencounterswithlocal-scaleofficials,politiciansandbureaucrats,asthroughideo-
logical fiat at the national scale (Ferguson and Gupta 2002; Gupta 2012; Lund 2011;
Spencer 2007). The fragmented local governance arrangements in post-revolution Nepal
create an additional imperative to understand the numerous situated practices and knowl-
edges that might reveal the conditions of possibility for state restructuring to catalyze
radical social transformation(see also Gupta 2012).8
In order to develop an analytical framework for the study of transitional politics, our
pilotresearchthusselectedthreeagrariandistrictsexhibitingarangeofclass,ethno-cultural
and political configurations and three different ecological zones: Mugu (Himalayan zone,
remote, least developed), Khotang (Middle Hills, mixed development, conflict-affected,
ethnically diverse, active hill ethnic movement) and Morang (Terai, pockets of extreme
poverty, active Madhesi political movements).9 In Mugu, people identify around a
8SeeAkhilGupta’sRedtape(2012)foracompellingillustrationofhowseeingcorruptionfromthe
standpointofpoorpeasantsinIndiafurnishescrucialinsightsonhowbureaucraciesoperatingatthe
localscaleenablestructuralviolencetobeperpetratedagainstthepoor,eveninthemidstofuniversal
politicalfreedomsandextensivepoverty-alleviationprograms.
9Weusetheterm‘agrarian’simplytodenotetheprevalenceofagrarian-basedlivelihoodsthroughout
Nepalandtosignaladifferentscalarfocusforunderstandingpoliticaltransitionthancanusuallybe
8 Katharine N. Rankin et al.
sharedsenseofgeographicisolationandlivelihoodinsecurityandalonghistoryofoutmi-
gration;casteandethnichierarchiesareparticularlypronounced;asNepal’sleastdeveloped
district in terms of human development indicators, Mugu has only post-2006 become a
majorfocusofdonorandstateinvestment.InKhotang,livelihoodsecurityisrepresentative
oftheMiddleHills(mixed,butsound);KhotangwasaMaoiststrongholdduringtheinsur-
gencyaswellasasiteoftheKhambuwanNationalFrontandtheKiratJanabadiWorker’s
Party, manifesting a strong hill ethnic-based social movement. For these reasons, and
because of its status as the poorest district in the eastern Middle Hills, ithas also become
a focus of much new investment by bilateral donors and, at the time of our research,
someinterestingexperimentationincommunityeconomy.Morangfeaturessignificantagri-
cultural market development, persistent modes of feudal tenure arrangements, absentee
landlordism, a political class well represented in powerful bureaucratic positions (Sugden
2009),andtheTerai-basedMadhesimovementandparties,whichhaveplayedasignificant
roleinpromotinganethnicbasisforfederalism(ICG2012).Eachofthedistrictsrepresents
(and,indeed,influences)significanttrendsintheemergingconjunctureofstaterestructur-
ing, as evidenced through the specific dynamics of the Integrated Planning Formulation
Committeesandthestakeholdersthatconstitutethem.Comparativeresearchacrossthedis-
tricts furnishes an opportunity to assess the ways in which governance by local ‘stake-
holder’ groups could have progressive or regressive outcomes.
Ourpilotresearchrevealedthatnewinfrastructuredevelopmentssuchasroadsconsist-
ently enroll the aspirations, labor time and strong opinions of nearly everyone in all of
our research sites, as well as the highest proportion of local budgets. Not coincidentally,
infrastructuredevelopmentsareoftentiedtotheresourcebaseofsubsistenceagrarianlive-
lihoods, itself in the midst of a transition as foundational as Nepal’s political transform-
ations. Widespread outmigration and shifts in rainfall patterns linked to climate change,
combined with highly fractious and uneven political economies within Nepal, mean that
now more than ever, people are looking to infrastructure development as a basis for new
rural enterprises. These are the issues that consistently emerged in our work as terrains
of conflict and struggle, around which old cultural codes cement as well as alternative
modes of citizenshipand belonging become articulated.
Astheiconicsymbolofmodernity,roadsoccupyacentralplaceinthenationalimagin-
ary (Campbell 2010). Everyone wants a road despite the fact that they notoriously flood,
erodeandlosevehiclesoffsharp,precipitouscorners.Roadsholdoutthepromiseofcon-
nectivity,politicalpower,culturalstatusandeconomicgrowth.Aftertheconflict,Nepal’s
hillandmountainregionshadsomeofthelowestroaddensitiesintheworld,andaquarter
ofthepopulationstilllivedmorethanfourhours’walkfromthenearestroadhead(Shrestha
2009).Rural‘feeder’and‘branch’roadshavethusbeenamajorsiteofgovernmentinvest-
ment in the transitional phase. Budgets for infrastructure development were decentralized
withanemphasisonlocallabormarkets,localresourcesandlocalplanning–anorientation
that is promoted as ‘green roads’ (Shrestha 2009). At the same time, rural roads have
become a major focus for the governmental ambitions of a wide range of multi-scalar
stakeholders – donors promoting environmentally sustainable development, political
parties securing local construction contracts, trucking syndicates controlling the terms of
found in media and popular analyses, which tend to concentrate on national-scale restructuring.
MadhesireferstopeopleofIndianoriginwhoinhabitmostlytheeasternTeraiofNepal,aswellas
to their political mobilization in the form of a social movement and numerous political parties
vyingtoenddiscriminationandhavetheirrightsrecognized.
The Journalof Peasant Studies 9
trade once roads are built. Roads also furnish opportunities for more community-based
forms of market engagement, such as agricultural export cooperatives (Campbell 2010).
While the social science literature amply explores unintended effects of road-building
in hard-to-access places (Blaikie, Cameron, and Seddon 2005; Butz and Cook 2011;
Campbell 2010), the literatures on mobilities and infrastructure have only recently begun
to explore the contradictory governance processes producing those outcomes (see, e.g.,
Harvey andKnox 2015), which are integrally connected to ourconcerns with transitional
politics at the local scale.
Researchingpolitical transition and state restructuring at thegrassroots
Ourinterviews,doneoverathree-yearperiodin2009–2012,askedaconsistentsetofques-
tionsaboutperceptionsofdemocracy,theproliferationofinstitutionsinvolvedinlocalgov-
ernance, dispute resolution and sources of local authority. These questions elicited road-
building as a key zone of contest and struggle, and also helped identify three conceptual
terrainsofinquiry–intheareasofgovernanceandplanning,politicalsubjectivity,andcul-
turalpolitics–throughwhichtoprobeeverydaypracticesofstatetransitioninNepalandin
other contexts where the politicalfield has significantly opened.
Governanceand planning
The first terrain of inquiry is concerned with how planning happens through the loose
assemblage ofpractices andactors thrownupbythe2006peace (CPA).Itdraws onrela-
tionalapproachestounderstandingthestateascomposedofcompetingrationalities,actors
andinstitutions(Jessop2007;Mitchell1991)andtotracking‘governancebeyondthestate’
throughhorizontalandnetworkedarrangementsgeneratedinthewakeofdecentralization
(FergusonandGupta2002;HansenandStepputat2001;Lund2006;Swyngedouw2005).
In Nepal, at the district scale, these encompass users groups, NGOs, community-based
organizations (CBOs), political parties, donor organizations, and caste- and ethnic-based
social movements. Collectively, these institutions constitute an ensemble of competing
projects of rule bearing a range of multiple, sometimes rival, political rationalities
(Jessop 2007; Raeymaekers, Menkhaus, andVlassenroot2008).
Thetheoryinformingdecentralizationadvocatesthevirtuesofcitizen-communitypar-
ticipation premised on shared values, iterative exchange and democratic representation;
critics caution against a democratic deficit as the public sector thins and customary forms
of power and elite capture re-assert themselves (Ribot 2003; Swyngedouw 2000, 2005).
It isimportant to emphasize, however, that these critiques of decentralization were devel-
oped in relation to instances of neoliberal governmentality, wherein the state not only
devolves governance onto responsible individuals, civil society and private entities, but
also withdraws state resources and programming (Ferguson 2006; Li 2007). The Nepal
context is different, and the difference proves instructive for developing an approach
to researching post-revolution state formation. The proliferation of actors involved in
local governance does not signal the retreat of the state; rather, those actors contribute to
constituting the local state, in the form of relatively ad hoc decision-making processes
(IPFC and APM) (Byrne forthcoming; Byrne and Shrestha 2014). Meanwhile, centrally
mandated state programs are also alive and well, and local bureaucracies – the District
Forest Office and the Department of Roads, for example, as well as the DDC and VDC
– are staffed with officials responsible for implementing development plans. Now more
than ever, Nepali state institutions are evidenced at the local scale, in the form of various