Rising Powers and the Future International Order

14 Pages·2018·0.094 MB·English

by  Vikash Chandra

R P A T F
ISING OWERS ND HE UTURE
I O
NTERNATIONAL RDER
The redistribution and diffusion of power in the international system has
refl ected the rise of new centres of power demanding their legitimate say.
Speculation on the preferred strategy of established powers towards the
demands of rising contenders has become an important concern. While
some scholars believe that it will be accommodation, others think that it
will be containment. This paper analyses why established states prefer to
accommodate some rising powers while opposing others and fi nds that, to
comprehend the prospects of accommodation, one must understand the
intentions of the challengers. Since intentions and perceptions are shaped
by domestic variables, attention has been given to four such factors, namely
regime type, economic system, human rights regime and social system.
This paper concludes that the prospects for accommodating nations with
revisionist intentions and wider differences in terms of domestic variables
vis-à-vis established powers are poorer than for status quoists and those with
large-scale similarities.
VIKASH CHANDRA
The post-war liberal international order was established by the victors of
the Second World War, with the United States of America (US) playing a
pivotal role in the process. The defi ning features of the shift from the earlier
international order was “the end of European imperialism and the evolution of a
more multilateral and institutionalised economic order”. (Charles A Kupchan, “Reordering
Order: Global Change and the Need for a New Normative Consensus” in Trine Flockhart (Ed), Liberal Order in a Post-
10
WORLD AFFAIRS SPRING 2018 (JANUARY – MARCH) VOL 22 NO 1
RISING POWERS AND THE FUTURE INTERNATIONAL ORDER
Western World, Transatlantic Academy, Washington DC, 2014, p3) According to noted international
relations theorist G John Ikenberry, (Liberal Leviathan: The Origins, Crisis and Transformation of the
American World Order, Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2011, pxi) the present international order
is nothing but a “hierarchical political order with liberal characteristics”. In the
hierarchy, the US is at the zenith from where it organises and manages the order.
The defi ning features of the post-World War Two international order include
in theory “liberal democracy, industrial
To maintain and expand liberal
capitalism, secular nationalism and
values such as the rule of law,
open trade”. (Kupchan, ibid) Ikenberry
(“Liberal Internationalism 3.0: America and the democracy and protection and
Dilemmas of Liberal World Order”, Perspectives on
preservation of human rights, the
Politics, vol7, no1, 2009, p71) also sees, “open
US envisaged a rule-based order
markets, international institutions,
cooperative security, democratic characterised by multilateralism.
community, progressive change, In the post-Cold War era, when
collective problem solving and the rule the distribution of power became
of law” as the defi ning principles of
unipolar, the US sought to
the liberal international order. Thus,
expand the order to hitherto non-
to maintain and expand liberal values
accommodated states, especially
such as the rule of law, democracy and
the former constituents of the
protection and preservation of human
rights, the US envisaged a rule-based Soviet Union and of the Global
order characterised by multilateralism. South.
In the post-Cold War era, when the
distribution of power became unipolar, the US sought to expand the order to
hitherto non-accommodated states, especially the former constituents of the
Soviet Union and of the Global South.
In recent years, the redistribution of power in the international system has
led to the emergence of new centres of power across the globe. With their rise,
“the hegemonic aspect of the liberal order—that is, America’s role and the old
hegemonic bargains that surround it—is under pressure”. (Ikenberry, 2011, ibid) The
liberal order is in fl ux as not all rising powers give equal respect to the principles
and values underpinning it. However, the rise of new power centres is inevitable
and irreversible. Therefore, the question that arises is whether the power
transition will be peaceful or confl ictual? It would be peaceful if established
powers accommodate rising powers and give them roles and responsibilities in
11
VOL 22 NO 1 (JANUARY – MARCH) SPRING 2018 WORLD AFFAIRS
VIKASH CHANDRA
accordance with their respective status. In this regard, TV Paul (“The Accommodation
of Rising Powers in World Politics” in TV Paul (Ed), Accommodating Rising Powers: Past, Present and Future, Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press, 2016, p2) argues that amidst the redistribution of power, while
“structural conditions can lead to confl ict ... (the) proper synchronisation of
strategies for peaceful change by established and rising powers can mitigate
the possibilities of violent confl ict”. In accounting for the treatment of rising
regional hegemons by leading states Evan B Montgomery (In the Hegemon’s Shadow:
Leading States and the Rise of Regional Powers, Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2016, p11) contends, “If a
leading state is worried that a local actor might dominate a peripheral region
... then it will prefer parity to ensure that its own access to the area is not
jeopardised. In this case, it should accommodate the rising regional powers that
are attempting to weaken local hegemons”. On the other hand, “if a leading
state is more concerned about an outside power conquering a peripheral region,
then it will prefer primacy instead because the strongest local actors are the best
barriers to intervention”. (Montgomery, ibid) This paper is divided into four sections.
The fi rst defi nes accommodation while the second delineates some of its
successful and failed cases. The third section explicates how the differences and/
or similarities in domestic variables shape the mutual intentions of established
and rising powers. The last part throws light on the possible scenario of the
emerging international order.
WHAT IS ACCOMMODATION?
The redistribution of power and resources is a continuous process in the
international system and as a result new states rise while the capabilities of
existing powerful states decline either in absolute or relative terms. This leads
to a problem of status recognition between established and rising powers, as
the former demonstrate a conservative and reluctant attitude to the recognition
of new states and the sharing of power while rising states want their status
recognised at the earliest to claim new roles and responsibilities as per their
status. For an amicable resolution, “the waning hegemon must cede infl uence
to the rising challenger to the point where the latter’s prestige matches its
actual power”. (Robert Gilpin, War and Change in World Politics, New York: Cambridge University Press,
1981 cited in Randall L Schweller, Rising Powers and Revisionism in Emerging International Orders, Valdai Discussion
Club Paper 16, Moscow, 2015, p3, online at http://eng.globalaffairs.ru) Such status recognition is
12
WORLD AFFAIRS SPRING 2018 (JANUARY – MARCH) VOL 22 NO 1
RISING POWERS AND THE FUTURE INTERNATIONAL ORDER
regarded as accommodation. Thus, a two-dimensional process takes place
between established and rising powers, which has been defi ned and understood
varyingly by scholars. According to Paul, (ibid, p5) accommodation stands for
status adjustment and leadership role sharing between established and rising
powers through membership and due roles in international institutions and
acceptance of spheres of infl uence. He adds that the accommodation of rising
powers simply implies that emerging powers are given the status and perks
associated with the rank of great power in the international system, including
in many instances a recognition of spheres of infl uence or the decision not to
challenge them militarily. This does not however assume deep friendship or
lack of competition.
Thus, in essence, accommodation is nothing but a readjustment of status,
manifest in two ways—membership in international organisations and
regimes and the relative position of
The accommodation of rising
states in that conglomeration. (Jeffrey
powers simply implies that
W Taliaferro, “Did the United States and the Allies
Fail to Accommodate Japan in the 1920s and 1930s” in emerging powers are given the
Paul, ibid, p175) That is, in the process of status and perks associated with
accommodation, established powers
the rank of great power in the
grant membership to rising powers
international system, including
in leading organisations and regimes,
in many instances a recognition
ample share in global governance and
recognition and respect for spheres of spheres of infl uence or the
of infl uence. The accommodation decision not to challenge them
lasts when power sharing is to the militarily. This does not however
extent that the rising powers are
assume deep friendship or lack
content with it and voluntarily give
of competition.
up their revisionist intentions, at least
for some considerable duration. Nevertheless, Paul believes that nonviolent
accommodation is a rare phenomenon because the preferred strategy of
established powers vis-à-vis rising powers is containment and preventive
wars. Once the rising powers reach threshold capability, they often try to
achieve higher status by altering the existing international order even at the
cost of war. Accommodation is “peaceful” only when competition between
the established and rising powers does not “lead to confl ict and war” and
“rising powers are willing to play by mutually acceptable norms and rules”.
(Paul, ibid, p5)
13
VOL 22 NO 1 (JANUARY – MARCH) SPRING 2018 WORLD AFFAIRS
VIKASH CHANDRA
ACCOMMODATION OR CONTAINMENT: EVIDENCE FROM THE PAST
Successful accommodation is subject to the satisfaction of certain conditions
found at the domestic, transnational and systemic levels. Martin Claar and
Norrin M Ripsman (“Accommodation and Containment: Great Britain and Germany Prior to the Two World
Wars” in Paul, ibid, p152) suggest that accommodation is possible if three conditions
are satisfi ed. First, if rising powers do not challenge the core interests of
declining powers, at least in the short term. Second, even if established powers
feel threatened, it is no more so than rising powers do. Lastly, if the dynamics
of domestic group politics in the established power system prefer cooperation.
Charles Kupchan too considers three conditions—institutionalised restraint,
compatibility of social orders and cultural commonality—or the political,
ideological and cultural similarity between the rising and established powers,
as key to accommodation. (Ali Zeren and John A Hall, “Seizing the Day or Passing the Baton: Power,
Illusion and the British Empire” in Paul, ibid, p117) He argues that the British accommodation
of the US in the early twentieth century was a result of similarities between the
two states. Both nations were liberal democracies with limited governments,
checks and balances and the rule of law. The extension of the franchise in
Britain coincided with a resolution of the north-south confl ict in the US, which
“created compatible social orders” in the two states. (Zeren and Hall, ibid, p129) There
already existed a cultural commonality between the two. However, because of
its limited explanatory power, Kupchan’s similarity argument has come under
fi erce criticism. Zeren and Hall (ibid) argue that the US’s accommodation “owes
little to British skills” and the former could seize power from Britain as and
when “it was able to do so”.
Other scholars state that rather than similarities, domestic and systemic
variables play a pivotal role in determining whether power transition is peaceful
or confl ictual. In the case of the US and China, domestic changes such as Richard
Nixon’s coming to power, the death of Mao Tse Tung, Beijing abandoning its
revisionist foreign policy goals and Deng Xiaoping’s four modernisations played
a pivotal role in the US’s partial accommodation of China in the early 1970s.
According to Lorenz M Lüthi, (“The US Accommodation of Communist China” in Paul, ibid, p132)
context matters for accommodation. That is, structural factors like increasing
nuclear parity between the US and the Soviet Union, the widening rift between
China and the Soviet Union, the Afghan crisis, the beginning of the new
14
WORLD AFFAIRS SPRING 2018 (JANUARY – MARCH) VOL 22 NO 1
RISING POWERS AND THE FUTURE INTERNATIONAL ORDER
Cold War and the Iranian revolution compelled the US in the late 1970s to
accommodate China fully.
If the satisfaction of certain conditions paves the way for accommodation,
the lack of it inevitably pushes leading states to opt for containment. Claar and
Ripsman (ibid) point out that the failure to accommodate rising powers depends
on environmental and volitional variables. They conclude that partisan domestic
politics, competing national interests and a restrictive environment compelled
Britain to contain Germany in the early twentieth century. On the basis of case
studies of the Japanese–Russian rivalry
If leading states believe that
(1894–1904), the South Asian crisis
regional hegemons may challenge
(1971) and Iraq’s quest for primacy
(1979–91), Montgomery (ibid, p23) their position, containment will
asserts that “a leading state should be the preferred strategy. Here
align with the weaker side in a regional the prospects of accommodating
competition to ensure that the area
rising powers increase if they
does not fall under the sway of a single
are in a position to challenge
actor”. Thus if leading states believe
regional hegemons that may
that regional hegemons may challenge
challenge the leading states. The
their position, containment will be the
US’s backing of Pakistan against
preferred strategy. Here the prospects of
accommodating rising powers increase India in the South Asian crisis
if they are in a position to challenge of 1971 and sending its Seventh
regional hegemons that may challenge Fleet was a case of balancing the
the leading states. The US’s backing
de facto regional hegemon.
of Pakistan against India in the South
Asian crisis of 1971 and sending its Seventh Fleet was a case of balancing the de
facto regional hegemon. (Montgomery, ibid, pp102–25) Britain’s response to Japan’s rise in
Southeast Asia and its war with Russia was based on the same logic that shaped
the US response to the South Asian crisis—Britain wanted to contain Russia’s
rise in Asia and therefore covertly supported Japan. The American response to
the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait and the quest to gain primacy in the Gulf region was
based on the assumption that after acquiring a hegemonic position in the regional
system, Iraq would claim a sphere of infl uence that would be incompatible with
the US’s sphere of infl uence.
15
VOL 22 NO 1 (JANUARY – MARCH) SPRING 2018 WORLD AFFAIRS
VIKASH CHANDRA
DECODING THE INTENTIONS OF RISING POWERS
The mere convergence or divergence of interests does not explain why
established powers accommodate or contain rising powers. Rather,
one has to look at the intentions of the rising powers, that is, whether they
are “poised to reinforce, establish, undermine, or overturn the type of local
order that leading states prefer”. (Montgomery, ibid, p17) Despite intentions being
an important variable in shaping state behaviour, the problem that persists is
that states cannot always be certain about the intentions of other states. (John J
Mearsheimer, The Tragedy of Great Power Politics, New York: WW Norton, 2001, p31) On the basis of the
behaviour and foreign policy goals of rising powers, two types of intentions
may be discerned—revisionist and status quoist. Revisionist states are not
satisfi ed with their status and seek to “undermine the established order for
the purpose of increasing their power and prestige in the system”. (Randall L
Schweller, Deadly Imbalances: Tripolarity and Hitler’s Strategy of World Conquest, New York: Columbia University
Press, 1998, p24) Whereas satisfi ed states “accept the existing ordering principles of
the international system” (Steve Chan, “Can’t get no Satisfaction: The Recognition of Revisionist States”,
International Relations of the Asia–Pacifi c, vol4, no2, 2004, p216) and voluntarily show willingness
to “preserve the essential characteristics of the existing international order”.
(Schweller, 1998, ibid) States that have political regimes, economic systems, social
systems and human rights regimes in line with the existing international order
are less likely to be revisionists while those with distinct visions are more
like to be so, as they believe they are discriminated against. Despite their
respectable positions in the international system, the international order does
not refl ect their norms and values. Thus, the intentions of rising powers are
important—for status quoists or states wanting to make only slight changes
to the existing international order the prospects of accommodation are better
than for revisionists.
China’s preferences and behaviour show mixed motives. Its engagement in
multilateral organisations indicates a status quoist stance. However, its political
regime, economic system, closed society and human rights regime create
suspicion. Although the West formally respects the principle of state sovereignty
and territorial integrity, on grave human rights violation issues it appears to
move away from the Westphalian notions of sovereignty and non-interference
in domestic jurisdiction towards a pro-interventionist stance. China however
16
WORLD AFFAIRS SPRING 2018 (JANUARY – MARCH) VOL 22 NO 1
RISING POWERS AND THE FUTURE INTERNATIONAL ORDER
vociferously “tends to defend the principle of non-interference”. (Yang Razali Kassim,
The Geopolitics of Intervention: Asia and the Responsibility to Protect, New York: Springer, 2014, p44) Contrary to
American liberal values that put the individual and human rights at the centre,
China believes that “sovereign rights will always be more valued than individual
rights” because Chinese society, unlike Western liberal society, is organised around
a group or society and not the individual. (Ashley J Tellis and Sean Mirski, “Introduction”, Crux
of Asia: China, India and the Emerging Global Order, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, Washington DC,
2013, p8) According to Chinese strategic culture “the optimal hierarchy of political
priority should be tianxia (the world) > country/nation > family and not the
current, undesirable order of individual > community > country/nation”. (Fei-Ling
Wang, “From Tianxia to Westphalia: The Evolving Chinese Conception of Sovereignty and World Order” in G John
Ikenberry, Wang Jisi and Zhu Feng (Eds), America, China and the Struggle for World Order: Ideas, Traditions, Historical
Legacies and Global Visions, New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2015, p57)
The Chinese and American conceptions of human rights also vary. Henri
Feron (“The Chinese Model of Human Rights”, China Legal Science, vol3, no5, 2015) highlights that
America bestows universal abstract
Beijing’s adherence today to
human rights while China has
multilateral institutions and the
cultural relativist Asian values. The
international order is suspect
American model prioritises civil and
because many believe that once
political rights while the Chinese
model prioritises social and economic it becomes powerful enough to
values. While the universal conception alter the existing order, it will
is based on individual rights, in the not hesitate to take measures to
Chinese conception, society is above
place itself at the centre of the
the individual or the individual is
international system.
subordinate to society. Although
China and the US share capitalism, Chinese style capitalism is distinct from
its American counterpart. In this regard, Yasheng Huang (“Debating China’s Economic
Growth: The Beijing Consensus or the Washington Consensus”, Academy of Management Perspectives, vol24, no2, 2010,
p33) argues that since the early 1990s, the “China model (has been) ... more
statist in orientation ... (with an) emphasis on fi nancial and political control”.
These principles and practices are often referred to as the “Beijing Consensus”,
whose defi ning features include gradualism, managed globalisation, export-led
growth and state capitalism. It “offers an alternative to the policy toolkit offered
to developing countries”. (Mustafa Yağci, “A Beijing Consensus in the Making: The Rise of Chinese
Initiatives in the International Political Economy and Implications for Developing Countries”, Perceptions, vol11, no2,
17
VOL 22 NO 1 (JANUARY – MARCH) SPRING 2018 WORLD AFFAIRS
VIKASH CHANDRA
2016, p30) Certain elements of China’s strategic culture also raise suspicion. For
instance, the concept of tianxia (all under heaven) places China at the centre
of the international system, where other “countries acknowledge its cultural
and political superiority”. (Elizabeth C Economy, “History with Chinese Characteristics: How China’s
Imagined Past Shapes its Present”, Foreign Affairs, July–August 2017) Fei-Ling Wang (ibid) avers that the
worldview/concept of tianxia has made “a strong rearticulation in China”. It is
not only “entirely different from ... (but also) opposing to the dominant Western
worldview of nation-states that implies national sovereignty, competition and
balance of power”.
China for the most part has shown revisionist intentions. It believes that “the
tianxia worldview is the precondition for a new, better, more harmonious and
rational world order”. (Wang, ibid) With regard to Chinese revisionist intentions,
Joshua Cooper Ramo (The Beijing Consensus: Notes on the New Physics of Chinese Power, Foreign Policy
Centre, London, 2004, p3) notes, “China is assembling the resources to eclipse the US
in many essential areas of international affairs and constructing an environment
that will make US hegemonic action more diffi cult”. Beijing’s adherence today
to multilateral institutions and the international order is suspect because many
believe that once it becomes powerful enough to alter the existing order, it will
not hesitate to take measures to place itself at the centre of the international
system. The institutionalisation of the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank and
the BRICS (Brazil–Russia–India–China–South Africa) led New Development
Bank support this argument. Moreover, China has as we have shown an
authoritarian political regime, an economic system with features distinct from
liberal conceptions, a human rights regime that keeps society instead of people
at the centre and a social system that also keeps society at the core and the
individual at the periphery.
Unlike China’s mixed motives, non-democratic regime, divergent ideology
and contrary organising principles of society that create mutual suspicion,
there are greater similarities between India and the US that create positive
mutual perceptions. India is the largest democracy in the world with an
increasingly open market economy. Along the lines of Western liberal
democracy, civil society in India is being strengthened even at the cost of state
power. (Tellis and Mirski, ibid) To bring in transparency and empower the people,
the government introduced the Right to Information Act in 2005. Further,
New Delhi supports multilateralism and multilateral institutions, especially
18
WORLD AFFAIRS SPRING 2018 (JANUARY – MARCH) VOL 22 NO 1
RISING POWERS AND THE FUTURE INTERNATIONAL ORDER
the United Nations and its principles and purposes and is a staunch supporter
of a rule-based system. Instead of being a revisionist state seeking to challenge
and disrupt the present international order, India is a “status quo power ...
(that) aspires to a seat at the table”. (Aseema Sinha, “Partial Accommodation without Confl ict:
India as a Rising Link Power” in Paul, ibid, p226) In the post-liberalisation era, a consensus
has emerged that state intervention in the economy should be minimal and
the role of the public sector reduced. Consequently, the disinvestment process
has been gradually intensifi ed. India also advocates a human rights regime
consistent with universal human rights.
This however does not mean that India does not have any disagreement with
the existing international order. Despite an adherence to a rule-based system,
it opposes hegemonic adventurism in
While India does not have
multilateral fora. India has reservations
an alternative vision of the
against the way some norms and
international order, it does
principles have been selectively
implemented. It stands for the principle disagree with the US on the
of non-intervention and strongly existing international order.
adheres to the national sovereignty and Therefore, it is likely that New
territorial integrity norms enshrined
Delhi will adhere to the present
in the United Nations Charter and
international order but with
international law according to which
slight modifi cations.
intervention should be as a last resort.
New Delhi believes that exceptional breaches of state sovereignty and non-
intervention norms should require the consent of host states, in self-defence and/
or with the authorisation of the United Nations Security Council. Moreover,
while India does not have an alternative vision of the international order, it does
disagree with the US on the existing international order. Therefore, it is likely
that New Delhi will adhere to the present international order but with slight
modifi cations.
Russia to a certain extent represents revisionism and its relationship with
the US has been mired in mistrust and mutual suspicion. It does not support
American-style unilateral adventurism in a rule-based system but instead believes
in “collective leadership of the major states”. (Nicola Contessi, “Prospects for the Accommodation
of a Resurgent Russia” in Paul, ibid, p275) Russia is unwilling to accept the US’s unilateral
leadership model and regards incidents like the US led bombing in Serbia,
19
VOL 22 NO 1 (JANUARY – MARCH) SPRING 2018 WORLD AFFAIRS