Article: “Revolutions Without Enemies: Key Transformations in Political Science” Author: John S. Dryzek Issue: November 2006 Journal: American Political Science Review This journal is published by the American Political Science Association. All rights reserved. APSA is posting this article for public view on its website. APSA journals are fully accessible to APSA members and institutional subscribers. To view the table of contents or abstracts from this or any of APSA’s journals, please go to the website of our publisher Cambridge University Press (http://journals.cambridge.org). This article may only be used for your personal, non-commercial use. For permissions for all other uses of this article should be directed to Cambridge University Press at [email protected] . AmericanPoliticalScienceReview Vol.100,No.4 November2006 Revolutions Without Enemies: Key Transformations in Political Science JOHN S. DRYZEK AustralianNationalUniversity Americanpoliticalscienceisacongenitallyunsettleddiscipline,witnessinganumberofmovements designedtoreorientitsfundamentalcharacter.Fourprominentmovementsarecomparedhere: thestatismaccompanyingthediscipline’searlyprofessionalization,thepluralismofthelate1910s and early 1920s, behavioralism, and the Caucus for a New Political Science (with a brief glance at the morerecentPerestroika).Ofthesemovements,onlythefirstandthirdclearlysucceeded.Thediscipline hasprovenveryhardtoshift.Despitetherhetoricthataccompaniedbehavioralism,bothitandstatism wererevolutionswithoutenemieswithinthediscipline(otherthanthoseappearingaftertheysucceeded), andthereinliesthekeytotheirsuccess. Many have tried to change the character of rulesoutatleastoneallegedrevolution,aswewillsee. Americanpoliticalscience,butfewhavesuc- What is most striking about the two movements that ceeded. The revolutionaries in question are did succeed, the statism of the disciplinary founding those who have sought in a group enterprise to set and behavioralism, is that they did not have any seri- theagenda forthedisciplineinconscious rejectionof ousenemiesinsidethedisciplinewhocouldarticulate most or all of what has gone before. In these terms, opposition to the rise of the new persuasion. These the discipline has seen five revolutionary movements. enemies only appeared after the movement’s success, (Proclamation and establishment of a new research and so paradoxically validated the transformation in program, such as structural functionalism or biopoli- question.Althoughoneshouldbecautiousaboutgen- tics, does not qualify, and “paradigm shift” in Kuhn’s eralizingonthebasisoffourcases,thesearetheonly [1962] sense is generally not an appropriate frame.) cases we have. The lesson would seem to be that the Firstcamethosewhofoundedthedisciplineinthelate disciplinecanbetransformedinrevolutionaryfashion nineteenthcenturyasaprofessionalizedstate-building onlybymovementswithnoexistingenemiesprepared scienceinaseeminglyrecalcitrantpolity—–andagainst toresist.Toputitanotherway,inacenturyandahalfof amateur political analysis. Next came the pluralists, American political science, no reform movement has whointheearlytwentiethcenturytookuparmsagainst eversucceededifitopposedtheactualpracticeofthe the monistic state and its disciplinary handmaiden. disciplineinawaythatmetwithexplicitresistancefrom Thirdcamethebehavioralistsofthemid-twentiethcen- practitioners.Americanpoliticalsciencemaybejustas tury,whorevoltedonbehalfofthestudyofactualbe- hard to reform in fundamental ways as the American havior,science,thepoliticalsystem(asopposedtothe politicalsystemthathassooftenfrustratedreformists state),and(again)pluralism.FourthcametheCaucus fromwithinourdiscipline’sranks,fromFrancisLieber foraNewPoliticalScienceinthelate1960sandearly toTheodoreLowi. 1970s,whichrejectedbehavioralism’sallegedcomplic- IfocushereondevelopmentsinthestudyofUnited ityinthestatusquoofAmericanpoliticsinfavorofa Statespolitics,sometimesintegratedwith,thoughmore politically committed political science oriented to the recently separated from, political theory. Much could social crisis of the times. Fifth came the Perestroika be said about comparative politics and international movement of the early twenty-first century, targeted relations, but it is orientation to the study of Ameri- against perceived hegemony of formal and quantita- canpoliticsthatdefinestheAmericandiscipline’sbasic tiveapproaches,infavorofmethodologicalpluralism, identityandnormativepurpose. qualitativeinquiry,andagainanorientationtopressing publicproblems. IN THE BEGINNING WAS THE STATE Because Minerva’s owl has yet to take flight over Perestroika, I will say little about it, but of the previ- Theconceptof“thestate”wascementedintoAmeri- ousfourmovements,onlytwosucceeded.Asuccessful canpoliticaldiscoursebyfigureswhoweretobecome revolution may be defined in terms of resetting the centraltothenewdisciplineofpoliticalscienceinthe discipline’s agenda, as validated by the recognition of latenineteenthcentury(thoughtheconcepthadfound practitioners, whether or not they shared the move- mention as far back as the arguments of the Federal- ment’s commitments. Practitioners then have to posi- istsintheconstitutionaldebates;Farr1993,69).From tion themselves in relation to the new understanding, FrancisLieber,appointedtothefirstAmericanprofes- eveniftheydonotshareit.Successmustberecognized sorshipinhistoryandpoliticalscienceatColumbiain assuch;thismayseemlikeanobviouscriterion,yetit 1857, to Woodrow Wilson and well beyond, the main practical task of political science was seen as the es- tablishment of a unitary national state accompanied John S. Dryzek is Professor, Political Science Program, Research by a virtuous national citizenry. Wilson was far from SchoolofSocialSciences,AustralianNationalUniversity,Canberra, alone in envisaging a political system with disciplined ACT0200,Australia([email protected]). ThankstoJamesFarrandRobertGoodinfortheircomments. parties presenting well-reasoned policies to informed 487 RevolutionsWithoutEnemies November2006 voters, enacted by Congress, and implemented by Americanpoliticsbygroups(SeidelmanandHarpham an expert bureaucracy practicing the best in ad- 1984,77–78).Thesamewastrueofthatotherancestor ministrative science. This administrative state would of behavioralism, Charles Merriam, who in the 1920s “breathe free American air” (Wilson 1887). Such stillsought“nationaldemocraticconsolidationandso- normative advocacy was linked to a host of empir- cial control” (Gunnell 1993, 105). Though stripped of ical studies of American institutions exposing frag- itsmoreorganicassociations,thecentralizingstatere- mentation,sectionalism,parochialism,andcorruption. mainedaliveasnormativeaspirationinthe1920s. Wilson’s(1885)ownCongressionalGovernmentexem- Normative pluralism arrived with Harold Laski plifiedthisgenre. (1917), Mary Parket Follett (1918), and their sym- Foroverhalfacentury,thecentralpurposeofpolit- pathizers. Laski and Follett were influenced by the icalsciencewasseenastheestablishmentofaunified philosophy of William James, who stressed the vari- state,supportedbyaunifiedandcompetentnation.In ety of ways in which individuals could experience the thefirstpresidentialaddresstothenewAmericanPo- world; so their pluralist ethics was rooted in diver- litical Science Association (APSA), Frank Goodnow sity of experience rather than in diversity of interest. (1904)spokeoftheroleofpoliticalscienceinassisting Follettvaluedtheorganizationofsocietyfromthebot- the “realization of State will.” Occasionally political tomupingroups,not thesocialengineering fromthe allies could be found for this project—–especially in top down that the discipline’s statists always favored. the Progressive Movement. More often the project Follett(10)famouslyasked,“Whatistobedonewith foundered in the face of the corruption, patronage, this diversity?” The statist answer was clear: erase it. partymachines,parochialism,andregionalismthatthe Beyondvaluingit,herownanswerwaslessclearinits statists sought to supplant, and the recalcitrance of implicationsforpoliticalreform. theMadisoniansystemthatthediscipline’sleadersbe- According to Gunnell (2004), the rise of plural- lievedwasinadequateforadynamicmodernindustrial ism in the 1920s constituted the only true revolution economy and society. Some, though not all, opposed in the history of American political science. Gun- federalisminthenameofaunifiednationalstate. nell’skeyfigureisGeorgeCatlin(1927),notLaskior The discipline was, then, founded not only to study Follett. Catlin was influenced by Laski, but rejected politicsbutalsotoadvanceapoliticalagenda—–andall Laski’s ethics in favor of disinterested science. Un- subsequent revolutionary movements share this fea- like Laski and Follett, Catlin’s pluralism was based ture (though in the case of behavioralism it was not on the self-interest of groups, not on their diversity initially admitted). The founders were of course en- ofexperience—–andinthishewasfollowedbytheplu- gagedinestablishingthedisciplineratherthanchang- ralistsofthebehavioralera,whotoGunnellwerenot ingit,buttheyconsciouslyrejectedaparticularkindof revolutionaries at all, but mere successors to Catlin’s amateur political analysis; they were in this sense in- paradigmshift. tellectualrevolutionaries.Theamateurapproachtothe YetifwelookatthesubstanceofCatlin’swork,we studyofpoliticswasmanifestedintheAmericanSocial see an explanation of politics that the statists could Science Association (ASSA), founded in 1865 and fi- acceptwithouttoomuchdifficulty—–rememberingthat nallyputtobedbytheestablishmentofAPSAin1903 they had often recognized plurality, but saw it as and the American Sociological Association in 1905. a problem to be overcome. Thus Catlin’s pluralism ASSA was largely reformist, Christian, activist, and as empirical reality was hardly revolutionary. Even oriented to public welfare (Seidelman and Harpham William Yandell Elliott, identified by Gunnell as the 1984,20),andnotconducivetotheseriousstudyofpol- leader of the statist opposition to pluralism in the iticsthataskedhardquestionsaboutthefundamental 1920s, could accept pluralism as explanatory theory, character of American political reality. The founders as Gunnell himself admits (Gunnell 1995, 36). It was of the professional discipline of political science did, onlynormativepluralismthatElliottopposed.Thusit then,establisharadicallynewintellectualagenda,and is only in its normative aspects that pluralism could the concept of “the state” was professionally central be truly revolutionary—–and in this sense Laski and in establishing the new discipline’s identity (Gunnell Follett were better placed to lead a revolution than 1995,21).Therewasnoresistancetothisprojectfrom Catlin. But clearly their work did not reorient the insidethenascentdisciplinebecausethosesupplanted discipline—–whichadoptednormativepluralismexplic- remainedfirmlyontheoutside. itlyonlyinthe1950s,andtheninverydifferentterms, stressing interest rather than experience as the root ofplurality(seeSchlosberg1998ondifferencesacross THE PLURALIST REVOLT generationsofpluralism). TheUnitedStateshadalwaysbeenamorepluralpolity The main reason we cannot categorize the dispute than the discipline’s statists desired; they recognized of the 1920s as a revolution is that it was not vali- pluralism as a fact, but were likely to call it frag- datedassuchbydisciplinarypractitionersintheafter- mentation, a problem to be overcome rather than a math, and so was not in a position to orient the work condition to be valued. This was true even of Arthur of the discipline thereafter. Can a revolution happen Bentley,whose1908bookTheProcessofGovernment withoutanyonenoticing?Gunnell’s(2005)solutionto wastreatedasaprecursorbybehavioralism’spluralists. thisproblemistoquoteKuhn(1962)onthe“invisibil- InhislaterunpublishedworkMakers,UsersandMas- ity”ofrevolutionsasthenewunderstandingcomesto ters, Bentley actually condemned the domination of dominate. But here Kuhn is referring to the tendency 488 AmericanPoliticalScienceReview Vol.100,No.4 of adherents of a victorious paradigm to rewrite the System, characterized by Farr (1995, 207) as “the sin- past so as to recast their predecessors as precursors gle most important manifesto lodged against tradi- in a cumulative history; and nothing like this actually tional political science during the behavioral revolu- happened in political science between the 1920s and tion.” Easton is lauded by Gunnell (1993, xi) as “the 1940s.Moreover,onKuhn’saccountthoseresponsible movement’s most significant theoretician.” Chapter 2 forthebreakthroughwouldberecognizedandpraised of The Political System, “The Condition of American fortheirachievements,elevatedtothedisciplinarypan- Political Science” (with a section on “The Malaise of theon. Catlin was not recognized in these terms. The Political Science”) is the most polemical. The chapter onlyattemptedrevolutionofthe1920swasthatofthe contains28footnotes,noneofwhichnamesacontem- normative pluralists; and that did not succeed. Resis- poraneous American political scientist guilty of the tancewithinthedisciplinewasstiff,includingCharles allegedsinsofhyperfactualismandfailuretotheorize. Beard, Walter Shepard, Francis Coker, and William NamesthatdofigureinthesefootnotesareKey,Simon, Yandell Elliott, among others. Laski was stigmatized Merriam, Herring, Appleby, Lasswell, Gosnell, and asaradicalsocialist,andpluralismitselfwascharacter- Eldersveld,praisedforbeingexceptions.Inthesection izedbyElliott(1928)asrelatedtoItalianfascism.Nor- ofChapter3on“Hyperfactualism,”theonlysustained mativestatistaspirationsremained,thoughtheywere critique is of the writings of James Bryce, works by subsequently to diminish (before revival in Theodore then half a century old. In Chapter 10, Easton criti- Lowi’s [1969] The End of Liberalism, linked to the cizes political theorists for retreating into the history earlierstatistsinwhatSeidelmanandHarpham[1984] of political thought; but of his main references, only callthe“thirdtradition”ofcentralizingandreformist GeorgeSabineremainedactive. political science). Language changed, and by midcen- Much later, Easton (1993, 292–93, originally pub- tury“thestate”hadalmostdisappearedfromthedis- lished1985)describes“traditionalpoliticalscience”of ciplinarylexicon,exceptininternationalrelations. the 1920s to 1940s as focusing on parties and pres- sure groups (NB: not on the state). His references onpressuregroupsareBentley(1908)andPendleton BEHAVIORALISM Herring(1929).By1953Bentleyhadpassedfromthe Behavioralism may be defined in terms of its com- scene—–and was also revived as a protobehavioralist, mitments to “(1) a research focus on political behav- especially by Truman (1951). Herring was alive and ior, (2) a methodological plea for science, and (3) a well, and had in 1949 been instrumental in establish- political message about liberal pluralism” (Farr 1995, ingtheCommitteeonPoliticalBehavioroftheSocial 202), as well as the organizing concept of a polit- ScienceResearchCouncil(ofwhichhewaspresident), ical system (Easton 1953). Although behavioralism oneoftheinstitutionalsponsorsofthebehavioralrevo- emphasized the individual, there was no problem in lution.Easton(1993)reiteratesthebehavioralists’con- studying “...individuals acting in groups to realize tentionthatthetraditionalistsmixedfactsandvalues, their collective interests” (Farr, 204). The two most had too much description and too little explanation, prominentgrouptheoristsoftheearlybehavioralera, andofferedfewoverarchingtheories.ButEastonthen Robert Dahl and David Truman, were also commit- identifies Merle Fainsod’s “parallelogram of forces” tedbehavioralists(TrumanchairedtheSocialScience as the main “latent theory” of the traditionalists. In Research Council’s Committee on Political Behavior this parallelogram, policy decision was explained as in the 1950s). The pluralism in the political message the resultant of the various forces pulling in different was based on economic interest rather than on ex- directions. If this is the essence of “traditional polit- perience, and on an underlying consensus on funda- ical science” of that era, there should have been no mentals across different interests that in the United reasonforitspractitionerstoobjecttoanythinginbe- States could be assumed, rather than struggled for havioralism;andtheydidnot.Fainsodhimselfbecame (see, notably, Dahl 1956). By the early 1960s many president of the APSA in the behavioral era, and as workswereappearingthatcelebratedbehavioralism’s president in 1968 was instrumental in defending the triumph (notably Dahl 1961). This certainly felt like discipline’sestablishmentagainsttheCaucusforaNew a revolution, recognized as having reoriented the dis- Political Science by restricting access to the Annual ciplinary agenda—–by those who eventually criticized Conference’sprogram. behavioralism,aswellasthosewhosupportedit. Norcouldanyhostilitytobehavioralismbefoundin But what exactly did behavioralism oppose? The anyallegedpractitionersofformalinstitutionalanaly- rhetoricoftherevolutionarieswasdirectedagainstfor- sisasopposedtoscience.Criticismofexcessformalism mal,historical,and,inEaston’s(1953)words,“hyper- and advocacy of science had been in place since the factual”work,definingsomethingcalled“traditional” discipline’s founding. Formalism had been attacked politicalscience.Butwhoexactlywaspracticingtradi- byBentleyandWilson,amongothers(Seidelmanand tional political science, and what was it? The behav- Harpham 1984, 75). And nobody was against science. ioralists were strangely silent on the identity of their Throughout the discipline’s history, criticism of the opponentsandtheactualcontentofspecificpiecesof preceding generation for its want of science is a con- work. Garceau’s (1951) Review manifesto contained stant refrain. The constitution of the APSA adopted noreferencesatall,positiveornegative.Themostsus- at its founding in 1903 proclaimed its main objec- tained attack on the alleged status quo was Easton’s tive as “the encouragement of the scientific study of (1953) self-consciously revolutionary The Political politics.” 489 RevolutionsWithoutEnemies November2006 If the behavioral revolution’s main tenets are WorldWar,andaColdWaragainstathird,itwashard behavior, science, pluralism, and system, then to argue for anything that looked like an overhaul of “traditionalists” had little reason to oppose it. Re- Americanpoliticsalongstatistlines. searchonbehaviorattheindividuallevelwasalready None of this meant that behavioralism had a com- beingdoneinthe1930sand1940s(byHerring,Gosnell, pletelyeasyride.Easton(1991,208)complainsthatin Lasswell,Lazarsfeld,andothers)—–andthosewhodid thelate1950sbehavioralistsstillfeltexcludedfromthe not do it had little objection to those who did. The Review and the Association—–though that may have commitment to science was of long standing, though been a matter of institutional inertia rather than pol- as Easton (1991, 209–10) points out, an emphasis on icy.Thecomplaintsshouldnothavebeentooloud,for basicscienceasopposedtosocialproblemsservedthe in 1951 the Review had published Oliver Garceau’s disciplineparticularlywellduringtheMcCarthyeraof (1951) behavioral manifesto, and by 1955 Angus politicalwitch-hunts.(Thisconsiderationmayalsohelp Campbell,JamesC.Davies,SamuelEldersfeld,Heinz explainthelackoftractionofLasswell’spolicyscience Eulau, V. O. Key, Avery Leiserson, Warren Miller, approach,developedinthatera.)Pluralismasempiri- William Riker, and Herbert Simon had all published caltheorywashardlynew—–indeed,the“latenttheory” intheReview. ofthetraditionalistsascharacterizedbyEastonsounds Behavioralism did have its critics, but these did a lot like pluralism. Easton’s own “political system” not arrive until the 1960s; indeed, their arrival con- conceptwasmorenovel—–thoughitsmainfunctionwas firmed behavioralism’s success in setting the disci- toprovideanewvocabulary(inputs,outputs,andfeed- pline’s agenda, as recognized even by those who op- back)ratherthanacomprehensivetheoryofpolitics. posedit.ContraFarr(1995,216),theopponentswere What, then was the behavioral revolution? The an- not “those stigmatized as ‘traditionalists”’ (Farr pro- swer is that it was a selective radicalization of exist- videsnonames).OnesetwascomposedofStraussian ing disciplinary tendencies, especially when it came theorists (Storing 1962). The Straussians did not rep- to behavior, science, and pluralism as description and resentanyprebehavioraldisciplinaryorthodoxy;their explanatorytheory.Behavioralismledtomoresurvey school developed alongside the riseof behavioralism, research being funded and published, an increase in and was doubly isolated as a minority sect within the the relative frequency of quantitative studies in the newly marginalized subfield of political theory. The discipline’stopjournals,andarelativedeclineinwork othersetwascomposedofthoseonthediscipline’sleft addressed to public policy. The emphasis on science (Charlesworth1962,Bay1965)whoseheatwasturned facilitated access to new funding sources such as the upinthelate1960s.Theleftcriticsdidnotdefendany NationalScienceFoundation.Behaviorovershadowed “traditionalism”(thoughhistoriansofpoliticalthought institutions, though institutions were never forgotten. wereamongtheirnumber).Rather,theysoughtamore Most of these changes involved shifts in emphasis critical and committed political science as an alter- ratherthanradicalnovelty. native to behavioralism’s alleged ideological complic- Thekindofworkthatbehavioralismwasmostclearly ity in an unjust status quo in politics in the United ashiftfromwasarelativelynewsortofpoliticaltheory, States. which had the effect of crystallizing political theory as a separate and marginalized subfield. Prior to the CHILDREN OF THE REVOLUTION: THE behavioralrevolution,theorists(pluralistsandstatists CAUCUS FOR A NEW POLITICAL SCIENCE alike)werecentraltothedisciplineanddebatesabout itsidentity.Butbytheearly1950s,emigre´scholarssuch Theleft’scriticismsofbehavioralismcoalescedin,and as Hannah Arendt, Leo Strauss, and Eric Voegelin helped define, the next movement that tried to reori- were lending a decidedly antiliberal cast to political ent American political science, the Caucus for a New theory.Thesolution,onGunnell’s(1988)account,was Political Science. The Caucus was organized at the adivorcebetween politicaltheoryandthenewmain- 1967 Annual Meeting of the American Political Sci- streamthatsuitedbothsides.Behavioralistscoulddis- enceAssociation.ProminentmembersincludedPeter tancethemselvesfromanypoliticalcritiqueofAmer- Bachrach, Christian Bay, Theodore Lowi, Michael ican liberal democracy. The only kind of broad-gauge Parenti, Alan Wolfe, and Sheldon Wolin. Room was politicaltheorythatcouldstaywithinthemainstream also found for the international relations realist Hans was the liberal democratic work of scholars such as Morgenthau (who opposed the Vietnam War), the Dahl(1956). CaucuscandidateforAPSApresidentin1971.Among Beyondshiftsindisciplinaryemphasis,theonlytruly theirnumberwerepoliticaltheoristskeentobringthe novel aspect of the behavioral revolution came in critiqueofU.S.liberaldemocracyintothedisciplinary interest-based pluralism as normative theory (despite centerfromthemarginsofthesubfieldtowhichithad the ostensible commitment to value-neutral inquiry). been exiled in the early 1950s. In step with the dissi- Bythe1950stheoldnormativetheoryofthestatehad dent politics of the late 1960s, the Caucus demanded few disciplinary advocates. Even Elliott, who in the everythingthatbehavioralismwasnot:anorientation late1920shadonGunnell’s(2005)accountorganized to the social problems and political crises of the time resistance to pluralism and in the 1950s remained an and a discipline that would take collective stands on important presence in the discipline, did not come to controversialpoliticalissues(Bay1968).TheVietnam the state’s defense. The state, it seems, had withered War, race, and poverty loomed especially large at the away (at least in the discipline). In a political context outset,andenvironmentalandfeministconcernswere definedbytherecentdefeatoftwoabsolutiststatesina soon added. Though not unanimously opposed to the 490 AmericanPoliticalScienceReview Vol.100,No.4 scientific study of politics, Caucus members believed PROLIFERATING RESEARCH PROGRAMS, that science should take a back seat to commitment BUT NO FURTHER REVOLUTION andrelevanceandthattheexplanationofpoliticalbe- Much has changed in the discipline in the postbehav- havior was definitely not the proper center of gravity ioralera.Duringthe1980s,thestatewasbroughtback ofthediscipline.Likeitsthreepredecessormovements, in(Evans,Rueschemeyer,andSkocpol1985),suggest- the Caucus combined intellectual and political aims, ing a cycle within the discipline (for an explanation thoughitspoliticalaimsweremuchmoreexplicitthan ofsuchcyclesintermsofchangingpoliticalproblems, thoseofbehavioralism. see Dryzek 1986). However, the state returned in a Much of the energy of the Caucus was devoted to formfardifferentthanthatinwhichitleft.Gonewas reform of the APSA itself. It ran candidates against thecomprehensivenormativestatismofthediscipline’s the official slate for both President and Council, and founding.Reactingagainstallegedsocietalreduction- although never successful in electing a president, did ismofthebehavioralera,thenewstatistssawthestate get several members on the Council. (After the pas- as an independent variable in the sense that public sage of several decades, erstwhile Caucusistas such as officialscouldhaveinterestsoftheirownthatdidnot TheodoreLowiandIraKatznelsoncouldbecomePres- simplyreflectsocialforces.Thiswasnorevolution,just idents via the official slate.) Resistance from the now a highlighting of particular kinds of actors and moti- mostly behavioralist APSA hierarchy could be fierce: vations; behavioralists such as Truman happily recog- at the 1968 Annual Conference, panels proposed by nizedpublicofficialswithinterestsdeterminedbytheir thecaucuswerefrozenout.DavidEastonin1969was institutional home as participants in pluralist interac- more conciliatory, offering in his presidential address tion. As Almond (1988, 858) put it (referring to the a “New Revolution in Political Science” that would work of Eric Nordlinger, but the point is more gen- essentially put behavioral techniques in general and erally applicable) “...there is no change in paradigm hissystemsmodelinparticularintheserviceofsocial here but rather a research program of considerable problems. But the new set of dependent variables of- promiseintendedtodistinguishamongpolitiesaccord- fered by Easton did not assuage the Caucus or heal ing to which state (governmental) personnel take the the split (though it did help legitimate the develop- initiative in the making of public policy...” This new ment of the subfield of public policy in the 1970s; see statism could be ignored by non-practitioners of its Torgerson 1995, 229–30). The behavioralist hierarchy program,andthelanguageof“thestate”stilldoesnot was still firmly in place (even if its confidence was comeeasilytomostAmericanpoliticalscientists. shaken),resolutelyopposedtopoliticizationofthedis- Bythe1990sitwasmuchharderforAmericanpolit- cipline. AsEulau (1972,438) put itinhispresidential icalscientiststoavoidtakingaviewonrationalchoice report, “we are not set up or organized for political theory.Thisapproachhadbeenpresentforalongtime, action,orthepropagationofpoliticalpointsofview.” beginninginearnestinthe1950swithworkbyKenneth Upon completing his term as editor of the Review in Arrow, Duncan Black, Anthony Downs, and William 1971,AustinRanneyrecallsthatinhelpingtoappoint Riker. Its territory, and share of the Review’s pages, hissuccessor“Iwasveryclearinmymindthatitwasn’t subsequentlyexpandedtothepointwhereitappeared goingtobeanycaucustype”(Ranney1991,230),and toconstitutethediscipline’smostpopularresearchpro- itwasnot. gram. But rather than revolutionalizing political sci- Rather than develop links with the social and po- enceasawhole,rationalchoicestoodalongsideestab- litical movements of the counter-culture, the Caucus lishedsortsofbehavioralscholarship,thenewstatism, sooninvestedmostofitsenergiesinmoreprofessional cultural analysis, new institutionalism (of the nonra- endeavors.AsLowi(1973,43–44)lamented,itbecame tional choice variety) and other research programs in “theCaucusforaNewPoliticalScienceAssociation.” anincreasinglydiversediscipline.Somerationalchoice Its assault on the commanding heights of the APSA practitioners presented their approach as an advance having failed, the Caucus settled down to life as one onatheoreticalbehavioralism,ignoringthesortsofthe- of the APSA’s ever-proliferating Organized Sections, orythatwerepresentinbehavioralism(suchasDahl’s sponsoringitsown(eventuallyquitesmall)setofpan- liberal democracy and Easton’s systems theory). And els, and publishing a journal, New Political Science, even if they fell short in practice, behavioralists had largely ignored by the rest of the discipline (it did always proclaimed a belief in cumulative explanatory not appear in the ranking of 115 journals in political theory. science compiled by Garand and Giles [2003]). Many oftheyoungermembersofthePerestroikae-maillist intheearly2000swereapparentlyunawareofthislast CONCLUSION attempted reformation of the discipline, and needed remindingthatoncetherewastheCaucus,andindeed ReorientationsoftheAmericandisciplineofpolitical thatitlivedstill(Swidorski2004). sciencehavebeenrare,withonlytwoclearepisodesin The Caucus carried out a full frontal attack on be- acenturyandahalf.Thisrarityhasnotbeenthrough havioralism, but met substantial resistance. Applying want of trying. The discipline has been very hard to thetestforasuccessfulrevolutionwithwhichIbegan, shift. If a movement takes direct aim at established the Caucus did not re-set the discipline’s agenda in a practices and understandings and meets with explicit wayrecognizedbyallpractitioners.Inparticular,those resistance,historysuggestsitdoesnotsucceed. who rejected the Caucus program could simply and Becausesuccessfulrevolutionsre-setthediscipline’s safelyignoreit. agenda,theydefinethetermsoftheiropposition,which 491 RevolutionsWithoutEnemies November2006 appearsonlyafterthemovementhassucceeded.(Itis Eulau,Heinz.1972.“ReportofthePresident.”PS5(Autumn):436– in this sense that the Caucus was constituted by chil- 38. drenofthebehavioralrevolution.)Butevensuccessful Evans, Peter, Dietrich Rueschemeyer, and Theda Skocpol. 1985. Bringing the State Back In. Cambridge: Cambridge University revolutionscanfindtheiragenda-settingabilityfading Press. withtime.Soby1950thenormativestatismthatdomi- Farr, James. 1993. “Political Science and the State.” In Discipline natedthedisciplineinitsearlydecadeswasexhausted. andHistory:PoliticalScienceintheUnitedStates,ed.JamesFarr Behavioralism’slegacyofmethods,techniques,andre- and Raymond Seidelman. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press. searchtopicspersiststothisday,perhapsmoststrongly Farr,James.1995.“RememberingtheRevolution:Behavioralismin inthesubfieldofpoliticalpsychology.Butitscapacity American Political Science.” In Political Science in History: Re- tosetthedisciplinaryagendahasfadedsincethe1970s searchProgramsandPoliticalTraditions,ed.JamesFarr,JohnS. in the face of a proliferation of research programs, as Dryzek,andStephenT.Leonard.Cambridge:CambridgeUniver- confirmedbythelamentsofprominentbehavioralists sityPress. Follett, Mary Parker. 1918. 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