Rethinking the Agrarian Question

15 Pages·2003·0.08 MB·English

Research in Human Ecology
Rethinking the Agrarian Question: The Limits of
Essentialism and the Promise of Evolutionism
Paul McLaughlin
Department of Sociology and Anthropology
George Mason University
Fairfax, VA 22030
USA1
Abstract stages of capitalism remains a central theoretical anomaly for
sociologists of agriculture (Roberts 1996). The political
Drawing on the insights of evolutionary epistemology,I dimension of the Agrarian Question has likewise remained a
examine the persistence of essentialism in the context of the perennial concern, reemerging most recently in the late
Marxian and Neo-Marxian debate over the Agrarian 1970’s during a severe downturn in the U.S. farm economy.
Question. Specifically,I argue that Marxian theorists’failure The resulting anxiety over the survival of the family farm
to provide a convincing explanation for the survival of the helped to spur the development of a so-called New Sociology
family farm derives from their inability to construct system- of Agriculture (NSA). Although the NSA represented little
atic theories of “obstacles”to account for “deviations”from more than a rediscovery of the works of Marx, Kautsky and
predicted “natural”paths of change and not,as is sometimes Lenin, its proponents (Buttel and Newby 1980; Friedland
asserted,because essentialism is inherently deterministic,a- 1982; Newby 1983) anticipated rapid and fundamental
historical or in some way non-scientific. The persistence of advances in our understanding of the structural dynamics of
essentialism in light of the former difficulties is explained in agriculture. Unfortunately, by the mid-1980’s the field had
terms of Wimsatt’s concept of generative entrenchment as reached an impasse.
well as the need for scientific theories to adapt to both intel- Booth (1985) attributed this impasse to a metatheoretical
lectual and social environments. Organizational ecology is commitment to the “necessity”of Marxian “laws of motion.”
put forward as an alternative, non-essentialist approach to Subsequent appraisals echoed Booth’s analysis by contrast-
theorizing the structural dynamics of agriculture. ing “deductivist” theoretical approaches with those that rec-
ognize the “contingency” of agricultural development
Keywords: Agrarian Question, essentialism, construc- (McMichael and Buttel 1990; Vandergeest and Buttel 1988).
tivism,evolutionary epistemology,organizational ecology. Such criticisms are misdirected. While in practice some the-
orists may interpret Marx deterministically,Marx’s approach
Introduction to theory construction in no way entails a commitment to
“necessity” (Berstein 1996-97; Byres 1991, 1995; Meikle
The nearly 100-year-long debate over the Agrarian 1985). In fact,a good case can be made that Marx’s analysis
Question represents one of the most enduring controversies of capitalism is probabilistic rather than deterministic.
in modern sociology (Byres 1995). As first posed by Karl Specifically, it represents an application of Aristotelian
Kautsky in 1899, the Agrarian Question is actually two re- essentialism—what Sober (1980) calls Aristotle’s Natural
lated questions,the first theoretical and the second political: State Model (NSM)—which conceptualizes diversity as
(1) what are the dynamics of capitalist agriculture and (2) “deviation” from a natural state or path of change. Such an
given those dynamics,what stance should the German Social approach to theory construction is “frame-invariant”because
Democratic Party (SPD) take towards the peasantry? Kautsky its goal is to strip away the effects of “interfering forces” in
([1899]1988) answered the former by predicting the eventual order to uncover natural tendencies which are invariant
demise of small farms under capitalism and the latter by across contexts. However, as Marx ([1867]1976) well knew,
arguing that the SPD should do nothing to either “artificially” actual histories are invariably a joint product of both “natur-
hasten or retard the proletarianization of the peasantry. al tendencies” and “interfering forces.” The principal chal-
Kautsky’s questions, if not his answers, have proved lenge confronting theorists employing this model is to con-
enduring precisely because family farmers have been de- struct systematic theories of obstacles that explain the likeli-
cidedly reluctant to confirm his predictions. The tenacity, in hood of alternative historical outcomes given specific social,
some cases resurgence,of such small farms in the “advanced” economic and environmental conditions. In the absence of
Human Ecology Review, Vol. 5, No. 2, 1998 25
© Society for Human Ecology
McLaughlin
such ancillary theories, the Aristotelian dichotomy between Woolgar (1988) in his Science: The Very Idea (see also
the “natural” and the “accidental” becomes vulnerable to ad Knorr-Cetina 1983). Woolgar contends that traditional
hoc manipulation aimed at insulating a given theory from attempts to answer the question “What is science?”have been
conflicting evidence. The result is a radical disjunction premised on an untenable essentialist ontology/epistemolo-
between theory and history. Such a disjunction lies at the gy; that is, philosophers, sociologists and historians of “sci-
heart of the debate over the “Agrarian Question.” ence”have presupposed the existence of some stable,“invari-
This paper attempts to explain why—given their numer- ant” object underlying the actual historical variability of the
ous perceived and actual inadequacies—Marxian essentialis- activity we give this label. In contrast, Woolgar and other
tic theories of agriculture persist. I address this question from constructivists argue that no such stable “object” exists. In
the perspective of evolutionary epistemology. Specifically, I fact,they contend that demarcation criteria serve only as con-
argue that the persistence of the NSM within the sociology of ventionalized “post-hoc rationalizations of scientific prac-
agriculture can best be understood in terms of Wimsatt’s tice” (Woolgar 1988, 17). In short, constructivists have
(1983, 1985) concept of generative entrenchment as well as replaced an essentialist ontology/epistemology with a nomi-
the need for scientific theories to adapt to both intellectual nalist one in order to systematically undermine any attempt to
and social environments. In the following sections I:(1) con- demarcate “science”from “society”or “facts”from “values.”
trast an evolutionary theory of scientific change with essen- Woolgar takes this stance to its logical extreme by arguing
tialistic and nominalist accounts,(2) consider the persistence that sociologists of science must reflexively critique their
of the NSM as an intellectually and politically entrenched own attempts to construct science as an independent “object”
generative structure within the physical,biological and social of study.
sciences, (3) analyze the role that the NSM has played in For those,like Woolgar,who are committed to empower-
shaping the 100-year long debate over the Agrarian Question ing the laity by creating a counterpoise to the authority of
and (4) suggest how organizational ecology can provide an modern science,constructivism has proven to be an effective
alternative,non-essentialist approach to theorizing the struc- tool. However, as a general account of scientific change it
tural dynamics of agriculture. leaves much to be desired. Unfortunately,its adherents’initial
goal of explaining “the content of scientific knowledge as far
Essentialism, Nominalism and Evolutionism: as possible in social terms” (Collins 1983, 272) has been
Alternative Accounts of Scientific Change translated by radical constructivists into the claim that science
can be explained solelyin social terms. Such an extreme posi-
Prior to Kuhn’s (1970) The Structure of Scientific tion not only “fails to account for the effectiveness of science”
Revolutions, most philosophers, sociologists and historians (Keller 1985,6),but also leaves itself open to a series of “tu
of science took it for granted that science was a socially quoque” (likewise you) responses. The resulting deconstruc-
autonomous and progressive enterprise. The autonomy of sci- tive spiral can only end in total relativism (Richards 1981).
ence was presumed to be guaranteed by various demarcation Fortunately,there are more than two principled answers
criteria—e.g.,verification or falsification—which insulated it to the question “What is science?” Woolgar (1988, 20) and
from other forms of social activity. Such a position is exem- other constructivists have been driven to an extreme form of
plified in the work of the sociologist Robert K. Merton ontological relativism only because they have mistakenly
(1973). Accepting the progressive character of science as posed a false dichotomy between essentialism and nominal-
axiomatic, Merton’s primary concern was to identify—and ism. As Mayr (1976, 288) notes, it was precisely this same
remove—those social,political and psychological forces that “wrong choice of alternatives”—i.e.,the assumption that cat-
interfered with its advance. Merton treated the actual content egories are either fixed or not real—that was the major
of science as a black box whose integrity was violated only impediment to the Darwinian revolution. The comparison is
in rare and exceptional instances of “deviant”science. apt, because in both instances variation and selective reten-
Kuhn’s (1970) historical analysis of scientific revolu- tion—considered as a generalized predictive system which
tions opened a small crack in the Mertonian black box,letting can be applied to any appropriate domain (Van Valen 1976)—
in just enough light to illuminate the hitherto shadowy realm provides the means for escaping both horns of the apparent
in which scientific knowledge was actually produced. The “essentialist versus nominalist”dilemma.
result has been an ongoing proliferation of alternative As applied to scientific change by Campbell (1974),
accounts of scientific change all of which recognize,to vary- Toulmin (1972), Popper (1972) and subsequent authors
ing degrees,the social embeddedness of science. (Radnitzky and Bartley 1987), variation and selective reten-
Within sociology, perhaps the most influential of these tion takes the form of a descriptive or evolutionary episte-
new perspectives is constructivism,a position summarized by mology. In contrast to the idealism and relativism of extreme
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McLaughlin
forms of constructivism, evolutionary epistemology is tends that even the most deeply entrenched generative struc-
premised on a “critical realism”—i.e.,“a commitment to the tures are still subject to environmental influences.
reality of an external world, even though the beliefs Although initially applied in a biological context,
about...that world are conceded to be imperfect” (Campbell Wimsatt argues that the phenomenon of “generative
1974,141; see also Rosa 1998). Such a perspective not only entrenchment”is a general one found in any evolving system,
allows for the possibility of differences in the degree of “fit” including cultural systems. Science, considered as a special
between scientific theories and their referents, but also pro- case of an evolving cultural system (Toulmin 1972), is
vides a mechanism—variation and selective retention (in this instructive in this regard. On Wimsatt’s account,more gener-
case the differential propagation of alternative versions of alized and polyfunctional scientific principles and presuppo-
scientific theories)—which explains how such correspon- sitions should not only possess a diminished empirical con-
dences arise in the first instance and how they are subse- tent but also be more resistant to direct “falsification.”
quently maintained and/or modified in response to changing Although such presuppositions are no less embedded in their
intellectual and social environments. By acknowledging the intellectual and social contexts than more specialized princi-
importance of both types of environments,evolutionary epis- ples, scientific changes involving the former should be rare
temology steers a middle course between Merton’s dismissal events, occurring only after attempts to “patch” lower-level
of social influences as mere “obstacles” to scientific theoretical postulates become “so complex and AD HOC that
“progress”and radical constructivists’reduction of science to increasing dissatisfaction leads to higher level changes and
politics. scientific revolutions of modest to greater, and rarely, of
Although evolutionary epistemology has thus far proven major scope”(Wimsatt 1983,12).
more popular with philosophers than with sociologists of sci-
ence,it has considerable potential as a general framework for Generative Entrenchment and the Natural
understanding scientific change. For example, Richards State Model
(1981, 72) contends that an evolutionary approach (1) pro-
vides a well articulated model with definite implications,(2) Aristotle’s Natural State Model is a prototypical exam-
is flexible enough to incorporate lower-order and/or more ple of a deeply entrenched generative structure. The NSM is
specialized theories, (3) retains the traditional distinction not a scientific theory per se,but rather a general approach to
between the contexts of discovery and justification, (4) constructing theories which can in principle be applied to any
directs students of science to carefully examine the central scientific domain. In his Physics, Aristotle (1973, 142)
environments of scientific theories, but also not to ignore writes:
“intersecting and neighboring niches”created by social,psy-
For those things are natural which, by a continuous
chological, economic or political concerns, (5) recognizes
movement originated from an internal principle,arrive at
that “standards of scientific acceptability themselves evolve,”
some completion: the same completion is not reached
(6) renders intelligible the non-progressive character of cer-
from every principle; nor any chance completion, but
tain scientific theories, which are conceptualized as either
always the tendency in each is towards the same end,if
having failed to adapt to a central environment and/or per-
there is no impediment.
sisting in interstitial niches and (7) combines both diachron-
ic and synchronic perspectives. Whether in physics, biology or politics, Aristotle pro-
One of the specialized theories within this broader ceeds by first clearly identifying a class of objects through
framework which deserves more attention than it has received the use of “constituent” definitions; that is, each and every
is Wimsatt’s (1983, 1985) analysis of generative entrench- member of a class of objects and only members of that class
ment. Wimsatt uses the analogy of a “developmental lock”to are posited to have certain “essential” characteristics (Sober
explain Van Baer’s law which holds that morphological and 1980). Second, the essential characteristics used to define a
behavioral structures that form early in the ontogeny of an class must also explain the properties and/or behavior of its
organism—i.e.,structures that are taxonomically more wide- members. Such an explanation entails the postulation—or
spread,morphologically more generalized and polyfunction- empirical identification—of the “natural” state or path of
al—exhibit greater evolutionary conservatism. Wimsatt change characteristic of the members of that class. Third,the
argues that because such entrenched traits generate multiple natural tendencies of a given class of objects must be clearly
and more specialized structures at later stages of develop- distinguished from “deviations” caused by secondary “inter-
ment, mutations involving them should have a lower proba- fering forces.”The key point, as Sober (1980, 360) notes, is
bility of producing adaptive outcomes. Moreover, he con- that for Aristotle “Variability within nature is ... to be ac-
counted for as a deviation from what is natural.”
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McLaughlin
Essentialists thus attempt to map—i.e., through refer- a “natural”context-independent path. Instead,Darwin began
ence to interfering forces—the uniformity of hypothesized with variation and used his theory of natural selection to con-
natural states onto the diversity actually found in nature. ceptualize biological change as the product of the continuous
However, in this “frame-invariant” approach to theory con- interaction between variation and context. Such a “frame-
struction, it is the “nature” of the object which carries the relative” approach to theory construction does not allow for
explanatory weight; diversity is typically treated as a sec- the analytical separation of natural and accidental causes
ondary phenomenon—i.e., as “something to be explained or (Sober 1980). Moreover, in contrast to essentialism, which
explained away” (Sober 1980, 370). Aristotle’s model is maps uniformity onto diversity,Darwin’s theory accounts for
extremely flexible—more generalized and polyfunctional in current patterns of diversity in terms of earlier diversity, a
Wimsatt’s terminology—and has historically proven itself theoretical innovation which Mayr (1976) calls “population
adaptable to a wide range of intellectual environments. Early thinking.”
chemists’ formulation of the periodic table and Newton’s Although the shift from essentialism to population think-
“laws of motion”are just two examples of highly successful ing was perhaps the most fundamental innovation of the
essentialist-based research programs (Sober 1980). entire Darwinian revolution (Mayr 1976), it did not occur
The longstanding Western predilection for equating the overnight. In fact, the depth of the NSM’s entrenchment is
“natural” with the “good” and “evil” with whatever forces perhaps best measured by the glacial slowness with which it
disrupt or perturb the “natural” has likewise pre-adapted the has been displaced from the central intellectual environment
NSM to a wide range of social and political environments. of biology (Bowler 1983). The ink on The Originwas barely
This predilection, derived from the Judeo-Christian assump- dry when Darwin’s cousin,Francis Galton ([1892]1962),set
tion that the created order is a moral order as well as from about systematically inverting its premises in order to reas-
Plato’s belief that the essence of “The Good”lay in “self-suf- similate Darwin’s theory back into an essentialist framework.
ficiency”—i.e., freedom from all external forces (Lovejoy In his Hereditary Genius, Galton assumed that the “fitness”
1936)—creates a built-in tension between description and of both individuals and “races”could be determined a priori
prescription that makes essentialistic theories particularly according to their relative positions on the Chain of Being;
vulnerable to both conscious and unconscious political that is, Galton took it for granted that those higher on the
manipulation (Greenwood 1984) racial and/or social hierarchy were naturally more “fit” and
Despite its considerable intellectual and political adapt- therefore should leave more offspring. Galton dismissed
ability, the NSM has certain very definite limitations. Since “anomalous” cases—e.g., the proliferation of the poor in
any empirical—and especially historical—science necessari- England and blacks in America (who, in Darwinian terms
ly confronts a world full of interfering forces,the viability of have a higher fitness)—as the result of misguided social poli-
an essentialist research program within a given field depends cies which interfered with the “natural” course of evolution.
upon the ability of its practitioners to systematicallytheorize Galton’s willingness to employ such “ad hoc” arguments to
“unnatural” states—i.e., deviations must be “explained” not “patch”his version of the NSM reached comic proportions in
“explained away.”The NSM proved to be a productive meta- his discussion of the “race” of Judges. The only reason why
theoretical strategy in chemistry and physics precisely Judges left so few offspring,Galton argued,was because the
because researchers in these fields were able to systematical- financial requirements of the peerage system forced them to
ly theorize interfering forces—such as the effects of friction marry heiresses who inherited their fortunes only because
on falling bodies—to account for deviations. In contrast,the their families suffered from a congenitally low fertility! In
inability of biologists to construct convincing theories of the programmatic portions of his work,Galton called for the
obstacles eventually led to the abandonment of the NSM in removal of all such “artificial” impediments to evolutionary
this discipline. For instance, as Ruse (1979, 8) notes, “advancement.”
Lamarck’s attempt to reconcile the discrepancies between his Galton’s eugenics is just one instance of how the politi-
version of the “temporalized” Chain of Being and the fossil cal uses and misuses of the NSM in biology have ensured its
record through such “secondary mechanisms” as “use and persistence in “intersecting and neighboring niches”
disuse” amounted to “little more than an ad hoc device for (Richards 1981). More recent attempts to construct theories
getting around problems.”In effect,Lamarck used Aristotle’s of human “nature”(Wilson 1978),separate nature from nur-
dichotomy between the natural and the accidental to insulate ture (Greenwood 1984) and to reassert racial hierarchy
his theory from conflicting evidence. (Herrnstein and Murray 1996) all attest to the continuing via-
Darwin ([1859]1958) overcame Lamarck’s difficulties bility of the NSM within the nooks and crannies of the socio-
by rejecting his assumption that biological evolution follows intellectual landscape.
28 Human Ecology Review, Vol. 5, No. 2, 1998
McLaughlin
The Natural State Model and the Social cal approach to “patching” anomalies takes on a particular
Sciences form.
Strategy 1. A common initial reaction is simply to
In the social sciences, the NSM represents a common ignore, or treat as inconclusive, conflicting or incompatible
thread which runs from Aristotle’s Politics through the writ- data. Offending evidence is often dismissed by essentialists
ings of St. Augustine,Fontenelle,and the Philosophes,to the as merely “appearances.” Such claims are usually coupled
works of Spencer,Tylor,Morgan,Durkheim and Marx in the with an assertion that the “natural”course of change isoccur-
nineteenth century and continues to persist in this century ring and that the predicted events will occur sometime in the
under the guise of various forms of “evolutionism,”function- future. In the short-term such a strategy is not necessarily ad
alism and assorted theories of “development”(Bock 1956). hoc. In fact, if it is combined with attempts to obtain addi-
Although in principlethe NSM is a perfectly legitimate tional data or reassess the adequacy of the statistical or inter-
approach to theorizing history (Sober 1980), in practice pretive procedures used to analyze it,such a strategy may be
social scientists have run into exactly the same difficulties prudent (Wimsatt 1983). However, if an anomaly persists,
that plagued pre-Darwinian biologists. The patterns of social such arguments must eventually be abandoned in favor of
history, like those of biological evolution, are extremely more direct attempts to incorporate recalcitrant findings into
diverse and subject to multiple context-specific constraints. the theory.
Incorporating such complexity within the framework of the Strategy 2.Given the assumptions of the NSM,the next
NSM requires the postulation of numerous obstacles or inter- step is to assume that some specific obstacle or interfering
fering forces to account for “deviations” from hypothesized force has slowed or deflected the system from its “natural”
natural states or paths of change. However, as Bock (1956) state or path of change (Sober 1980); that is, the theorist
notes,this is precisely where social scientists employing the attempts to elaborate a systematic theory of obstacles.
NSM have historically had the least success. Although what constitutes a “systematic” theory is difficult
It is a theory of obstacles which provides the mapping to define,at a minimum it should:(1) be a clear extension of
between the uniformity of hypothesized natural states and the the original theory, (2) be internally consistent, (3) specify
diversity of actual historical experience; without it, a additional causal mechanisms if required, (4) have clearly
researcher is left with no method by which to analytically defined boundary conditions, (5) explain the phenomenon
separate the two (Meikle 1985). Aristotle’s dichotomy can under consideration and (6) have additional testable conse-
then all too easily become a dumping ground for any evi- quences.
dence which conflicts with theoretical expectations—i.e., Strategy 3. If persistent efforts to construct a theory of
such evidence is dismissed as “accidental.” obstacles fail,a final more radical step is to redefine the nat-
Such ad hoc “patching” is obviously inimical to the ural state of the system in such a way that the anomaly is
development of cumulative theory. However, in a given eliminated. For instance,a characteristic of the system which
instance, it is often difficult to decide whether or not a spe- was originally considered “essential” can be redefined as
cific explanation is “ad hoc.” No theory exactly maps its “non-essential” or vice versa. Alternatively, the boundaries
empirical domain and researchers may legitimately disagree of the system can be redefined or the phenomenon under
over acceptable levels of agreement between the two. consideration can be argued to constitute an entirely separate
Although it is unlikely that a clear-cut set of criteria for mak- system with its own natural dynamic. However,such concep-
ing such determinations can be defined, an attempt to more tual redefinitions must be consistently and non-arbitrarily
precisely differentiate between systematic and ad hoc uses of applied; that is, they should meet the six criteria just speci-
Aristotle’s dichotomy will provide greater insight into both fied.
past and current debates over the “Agrarian Question.” In order to make these arguments more concrete, I will
examine, in turn, the attempts of Karl Kautsky, Alain de
Theoretical Anomalies and Strategies for Janvry, Susan A. Mann and James M. Dickinson, John E.
“Patching” the Natural State Model Davis and Harriet Friedmann to resolve the Agrarian
Question. This list is illustrative rather than exhaustive. With
Wimsatt’s (1983, 11) account of generative entrench- the exception of Kautsky,who provided the paradigmatic for-
ment suggests that the following rule of thumb should be fol- mulation of and strategy for resolving the Agrarian Question,
lowed: “When modifying a theory to remove an anomaly, the remaining works represent key pieces in the New
attempt modifications at as low,local,and specific a level as Sociology of Agriculture which emerged in the late 1970’s
possible,going to higher levels of generality only where nec- and early 1980’s. All of these authors use one or more of the
essary.”Within the framework of the NSM such a hierarchi- above explanatory strategies to patch-over the anomalous
Human Ecology Review, Vol. 5, No. 2, 1998 29
McLaughlin
persistence of the family farm and thus insulate Marxian ver- ([1899]1988, 139) begins by questioning the conclusiveness
sions of the NSM from conflicting evidence. of this data,characterizing it as merely “superficial manifes-
tations” (Strategy 1). Nevertheless, he goes on to construct
The Anomalous Persistence of the Family various explanations of this apparent reversal of capitalist
Farm Under Capitalism “laws of motion”by identifying factors which have slowed or
deflected the frame-invariant tendency of large farms to dis-
One of Marx’s ([1867]1976) most important hypothesis place small farms—i.e.,he attempts to articulate specific the-
concerning the “natural” tendencies of capitalism was that ories of obstacles (Strategy 2).
accumulation within and competition between capitalists Kautsky,in fact,posits a whole series of potential obsta-
would lead to the increasing concentration and centralization cles to capitalist development in agriculture. Primary among
of industry. Furthermore, Marx assumed that non-capitalist these are the “peculiarities” of land itself as a factor of pro-
forms of production, such as petty commodity production, duction, specifically its non-reproducibility and immovabili-
although essential to the development of capitalism, were ty. These characteristics make possible the extraction of
ultimately transitory (Meikle 1985). Unfortunately, Marx, ground rent which both slows accumulation and discourages
like most classical theorists, focused almost exclusively on investments by tenants. The same characteristics likewise
industry. With the exception of his theory of ground rent— inhibit centralization by requiring the aggregation of contigu-
which is itself a theory of obstacles—Marx largely neglected ous parcels (Kautsky [1899]1988, 145, 199). Additional
agriculture (Buttel 1982). Thus,a question left open for sub- hypothesized obstacles include impediments to agricultural
sequent debate was whether or not the “tendencies” which mechanization, overwork and under consumption, “con-
Marx postulated for industry applied with equal force and scious”state intervention,diseconomies of scale,labor short-
validity to agriculture. In the late 1800’s,the apparent resur- ages, the peasantry’s ability to push up land prices, irra-
gence of the small holding in Germany raised this question to tionalities of inheritance, usury, exploitation of the country
the status of an “anomaly.” by the town and the low intelligence and conservative nature
Karl Kautsky.Kautsky ([1899]1988) wrote The Agrarian of the peasantry.
Question in an attempt both to extend Marx’s analysis of cap- In addition to these theories of obstacles,Kautsky makes
italism to agriculture and to explain the anomalous persis- two significant departures from Marx,each of which consti-
tence of the small holding in Germany. As Hussain and Tribe tutes an attempt to redefine the “essential” characteristics of
(1981,103) note,Kautsky distinguished “between two forms capitalist development in such a way as to eliminate the
of discourses on agriculture: the analysis of specific situa- anomaly of the small holding (Strategy 3). First, Kautsky
tions and of tendencies.”As is evident from his discussion of decouples the process of proletarianization from disposses-
“The Technical Superiority of the Large Farm,” Kautsky sion from the means of production. Such dispossession is,in
([1899]1988) conceptualizes the question of tendencies in effect,redefined as not essential to capitalist development in
frame-invariant terms. That is, Kautsky does not begin by agriculture (Hussain and Tribe 1981, 108; Kautsky [1899]
asking which circumstances—e.g., state policies, commodi- 1988, 168). Dwarf-holdings, in Kautsky’s view, cannot be
ties, markets, technologies, regions, climates, soils, etc.— displaced because they have withdrawn from competition
favor large farms and which favor small farms. Rather, his with capitalist farms and now serve only as “production sites”
initial concern is to establish which of the two is universally for labor power. Kautsky likewise decouples the concentra-
“superior” or “higher,” and his attempt to adjudicate this tion of ownership in the means of production from an
question is totally abstracted from the characteristics of par- increase in the size of farms by arguing that the increasing
ticular farms and from the contexts in which they operate prevalence of mortgage credit constitutes a concentration of
(Hussain and Tribe 1981). Kautsky concludes,of course,that juridical titles in the hands of mortgage banks. These banks,
the various internal and external economies of scale achieved Kautsky contends,are the real owners of land and,thus,stand
by larger farms make them inherently “superior” (Kautsky in the same relation to farmers as landlords. Thus,leasing and
[1899]1988). Thus, in the absence of interfering forces, the mortgaging are merely different “forms” or “appearances”
larger establishment will, as in industry, tend to replace the which express the same underlying essential relationship
smaller. Society,contends Kautsky,is a single “organism”and (Kautsky [1899]1988,88,92).
its parts all advance “toward the same end”(Kautsky [1899] Kautsky’s arguments are too numerous and too diverse
1988,11). to adequately assess here. However, a few points can be
Kautsky is forced, however, to acknowledge that in the made. First, as Hussain and Tribe (1981) argue, Kautsky’s
current “specific situation” the German census actually attempt to establish the “superiority”of large farms,indepen-
shows an increase in the number of small farms. Kautsky dently of specific contexts,is extremely problematic; in fact,
30 Human Ecology Review, Vol. 5, No. 2, 1998
McLaughlin
many of the advantages which he argues are inherentto larger invariably equated with the “good.” Subsequent attempts to
farms, actually depend upon specific historical contexts— resolve the Agrarian Question have employed similar explan-
e.g., state policies. Further, the various obstacles which atory strategies and,thus,exhibit many of the same defects.
Kautsky identifies range from the arguably systematic—e.g., Alain de Janvry. In recent years, the Agrarian Question
Marx’s theory of ground rent (which, however, Djurfeldt has reemerged in the context of neo-populist concerns over
(1981) argues is inapplicable to Western agriculture)—to the the survival of the family farm in the U.S. and peasantries in
clearly ad hoc—e.g., the low intelligence of the peasantry. the Third World. These concerns have stimulated a new round
However, assessing the merit of any of these arguments is of attempts by Neo-Marxists to “explain” and/or “explain
hampered by the fact that Kautsky’s main concern was to away” the persistence of small farms. De Janvry (1980) has
establish the broad tendencies of agricultural development responded to these more recent “revisionist” sentiments in
across capitalist countries,rather than to assess their validity even stronger terms than did Kautsky eighty years earlier,
in any particular social formation (Hussain and Tribe 1981). going so far as to challenge the “theoretical possibility”of the
In short, he never systematically confronts his various theo- survival of the small holding.
ries with the evidence from any single country or region. Like Kautsky, de Janvry formulates the Agrarian
Kautsky’s attempts to redefine the nature of capitalist Question in frame-invariant terms. His entire argument is
development, while ingenious, are equally problematic. For premised on the assumption that large-scale capitalist farms
instance,his disconnection of proletarianization from dispos- are inherently more “efficient” than family farms. This is
session from the means of production leaves him with no true, he argues, not so much because of any internal
mechanism by which to explain the elimination of pre-capi- economies of scale,but rather because of the ability of capi-
talist forms of organization from agriculture (Hussain and talist farms to capture external “pecuniary economies”—e.g.,
Tribe 1981). Further, there is an additional tension, perhaps lower interest rates on credit and discounts on bulk purchas-
inconsistency,in Kautsky’s explanation of the persistence of es (de Janvry 1980,157).
dwarf holdings. While his theoretical requirement for persis- Given the inherent superiority of capitalist farms, de
tence is that such households produce solely for their own Janvry argues that the only theoretical possibility for family
consumption, Kautsky ([1899]1988, 322-23) later acknowl- farms to persist is if their willingness to accept lower levels
edges that such farms typically market some commodities, of imputed wages—i.e.,self-exploitation—creates a cost gap
albeit commodities different from those marketed by capital- sufficient to overcome the productivity advantages of capital-
ist farms. Kautsky’s decoupling of concentration of the ist farms. Such a gap would allow family farmers to erect
means of production from an increase in farm size is likewise obstacles to capitalist penetration by driving up land prices in
“more formal than real,” and serves only to obscure signifi- certain branches of production (Strategy 2). Which branches,
cant differences between leasing and mortgage credit de Janvry argues, depends upon “local conditions,” but typi-
(Hussain and Tribe 1981). cally in commodities which are labor intensive,insensitive to
Despite these difficulties,and despite the fact that in the economies of scale, and which have a low turnover rate of
first half of his work Kautsky concedes the theoretical possi- capital.
bility that small farms might persist indefinitely, in the sec- However,de Janvry treats this theory of obstacles to cap-
ond half of The Agrarian Question Kautsky proceeds to use italist penetration as purely hypothetical, claiming that it is
his analysis of the “natural” tendencies of capitalist agricul- premised on two untenable assumptions. Even given a cost-
ture to justify an orthodox political stance toward the peas- productivity gap, the avoidance of further differentiation
antry. Kautsky now asserts that the proletarianization of the within family farms would require either that: (1) family
peasantry is, in the long run (Strategy 1), inevitable. The farmers are dispossessed of all of their surplus value and thus
peasantry’s political demands and the revisionists’ calls for are unable to expand their holdings, or (2) they behave as
political pragmatism can both be safely ignored. The only nonprofit maximizers and use what little surplus value they
hope for peasants is to ally themselves with the urban prole- obtain for increased consumption rather than expansion. The
tariat. Given his theoretical analysis,Kautsky’s political con- first assumption,de Janvry argues,is untenable because there
clusion is clearly a non-sequitur. As Sober (1980) notes and will always be a distribution of productivities among farms.
Kautsky initially acknowledges,there is nothing in the logic Thus,surplus extraction will always be incomplete,and some
of the NSM which precludes obstacles being permanent (or farmers will be able to expand, albeit slowly. The second
desirable!). However, the ease with which Kautsky moves assumption is invalid because it represents a neo-populist
from his theoretical analysis of tendencies to his political confusion between “fact” and “essence.” Under capitalism,
conclusions does underscore the tension between description the reasons why family farms receive low returns are “struc-
and prescription that is built into the NSM—the “natural” is tural”not “behavioral.”
Human Ecology Review, Vol. 5, No. 2, 1998 31
McLaughlin
At this point, the internal consistency of de Janvry’s Mann and Dickinson (1978, 466) contend instead that
argument begins to break down. The assumption that non- “the secret of this ‘anomaly’lies in the logic and nature of
profit maximizing family farmers will increase consumption capitalism itself.” Demonstrating this, however, requires the
rather than reinvest in expansion pertains to how such farm- recognition that Marx’s analysis of capitalism posits only
ers dispose ofsurplus value,notto the structural determinants “tendencies”and not “inexorable laws.”Furthermore,“Marx
of the sizeof this surplus. In addition,de Janvry’s claim that does not treat agriculture as a monolithic whole, but rather
the neo-populists have confused “fact”and “essence”in rela- draws our attention to the peculiar nature of certain spheres
tion to the causal primacy of structure versus agency repre- of agricultural production”(Mann and Dickinson 1978,471).
sents an illegitimate use of Aristotle’s dichotomy between the As this statement and their title suggest,Mann and Dickinson
“natural” and the “accidental” to settle a priori what is pri- argue that the natural dynamics of capitalism have been
marily an empirical question—i.e., whether or not family blocked or deflected by specific interfering forces (Strategy
farmers do,in fact,work under different behavioral assump- 2). In particular, they contend that the noncoincidence
tions. Further, it represents a commitment—characteristic of between production time and labor time “establishes a whole
proponents of the NSM—to the explanatory primacy of the series of obstacles to the capitalist penetration of agriculture,”
“nature” of the object changing—capitalism—and a con- including “the inefficient use of constant capital, labor
comitant devaluing of the explanatory power of diversity recruitment problems, a lower rate of profit, and complica-
itself. The latter is,rather,something to be “explained away,” tions in the smooth realization of value in the sphere of cir-
as de Janvry proceeds to do: culation”(Mann and Dickinson 1978,473,478). All of these
disincentives to capitalist investment leave affected agricul-
There is no theoretical possibility for peasants to remain
tural subsectors temporarily in the hands of petty commodity
in their contradictory class location. However lengthy
producers. However, Mann and Dickinson (1978, 478) con-
and painful the process may be,their future is full incor-
clude that, “when” scientific and technological advances
poration into one or the other of the two essential class-
remove these barriers, capitalism’s natural dynamic will
es of capitalism—the bourgeoisie and the proletariat (de
again reassert itself (Strategy 1).
Janvry 1980,159).
Mann and Dickinson’s thesis meets at least 3 of the 6 cri-
Having mechanistically “demonstrated” the theoretical teria for a well-constructed theory of obstacles—i.e., it is a
impossibility of the persistence of the family farm,de Janvry clear extension of Marx’s original theory,it is internally con-
(1980,159) examines the evidence which appears to indicate sistent and it provides additional causal mechanisms.
“the continued numerical importance of family farms and However, it has engendered a heated debate over the clarity
peasants” and dismisses it as inconclusive (Strategy 1). of its boundary conditions and especially over whether or not
However, assured of the inevitability of its demise, he goes it actually explains the “anomaly” of the family farm.
on to argue that the petty bourgeoisie has become a reac- Although Mann and Dickinson provide some suggestive
tionary political force which has “outlived its capacity for anecdotal evidence, Mooney’s (1982) article is the first
social change” (de Janvry 1980, 166); its members’ultimate attempt to empirically assess the Mann-Dickinson (M-D) the-
fate is proletarianization and they must be made to accept this sis. On the basis of comparisons between variances in labor
outcome. demand and various measures of capitalist penetration in dif-
Susan A. Mann and James M. Dickinson. In contrast to ferent commodity groups, Mooney concludes that the M-D
de Janvry’s cavalier dismissal of any contrary evidence, thesis must be rejected (see also Roberts 1996). He (Mooney
Mann and Dickinson (1978,467) premise their arguments on 1982, 289) further suggests that theorizing the “detours” to
the assumption that the persistence of family labor farms in capitalist development may require “stepping outside the
advanced capitalist countries constitutes a “significant anom- problematic of Marxist structuralism and into the realm of
aly”in relation to Marx’s “theory of the transitional nature of subjectivity,” alluding to a Marx-Weber synthesis which he
petty commodity production.” However, like de Janvry, they (Mooney 1983) later elaborates.
reject “subjectivist” explanations of this persistence—e.g., Mann and Dickinson (1987a,1987b) reject the “subjec-
self-exploitation—on the grounds that such explanations tivism” of Mooney’s proposed Marx-Weber synthesis and
entail an acceptance of the notion of a “dual economy” and contend that his “a-historical positivist methodology”is inad-
are therefore not “universal.” Implicit in both objections is equate to test the validity of their thesis. However, while
the assumption that capitalism is a single integrated system Mooney’s test of the M-D thesis is neither “a-historical”nor
with a single natural path of development. Mann and definitive, Mann and Dickinson’s own use of “historical”
Dickinson reject “technological determinist” arguments on methodology leaves much to be desired. For example,Mann
similar grounds. and Dickinson’s (1987a, 271, 1987b) contention that
32 Human Ecology Review, Vol. 5, No. 2, 1998
McLaughlin
Pfeffer’s (1983) work demonstrates that capitalism can pene- and “laborer” and (2) the capitalist exercises control over
trate certain agricultural subsectors “despite problems with decision making. Davis argues that contract farming meets
the nonidentity of production and labor time” because of both criteria and, thus, constitutes already extant capitalist
“historical conditions” clearly represents an ad hoc use of relations of production.
Aristotle’s natural/accidental dichotomy. Additional “histori- While Davis’ argument serves to draw attention to the
cal conditions” must either be systematically incorporated potentially exploitative character of contract farming, his
into the original M-D thesis,or its boundary conditions must overall thesis confronts a major difficulty—the evidence,
be explicitly redefined. Otherwise, Mann and Dickinson are which he concedes is “difficult to assess” (Strategy 1).
inappropriately using “history” as the explanans rather than Although some sectors of U.S. agriculture are dominated by
as the explanandumin their arguments. contract farming, overall it accounts for only 17% of total
The debate over the M-D thesis is instructive in two output (Davis 1980). Further, Davis’ definition of contract
respects. First, it underscores my contention that theorizing farming is itself based on an “ideal type”which may include
historical diversity and context-specific constraints is prob- farms not subject to capitalist relations. Thus, on the one
lematic within the framework of the NSM. Second,it serves hand he argues that 17% may represent an “inflated measure”
to demarcate possible alternative paths for constructing a new of capitalist penetration; on the other hand, he argues that
sociology of agriculture. Mooney’s shift away from his initial 17% may be an underestimate, since petty commodity pro-
objective of theorizing the “detours” to capitalist develop- ducers are subject to other forms of exploitation,a contention
ment (Mooney 1982,1983) to his later desire to “undermine which he immediately qualifies by noting that exploitation
the notion that capitalist development need flow in any par- does not necessarily entail capitalist relations.
ticular direction” (Mooney 1987, 293) reflects an increasing Davis’ attempt to massage the data in this way under-
willingness on his part to reject the frame-invariant assump- scores the fuzziness of his original definition of capitalist
tions of the NSM and to instead treat such diversity not as relations. However, regardless of how these difficulties are
“deviation” from the natural dynamics of capitalism, but resolved, his thesis remains open to two major objections.
rather as a theoretical starting point (Mooney 1982, 1987). First,why has contract farming not spread to all subsectors of
The latter position represents a partial yet clear step towards U.S. agriculture? Second,if “ownershipof the means of pro-
frame-relative thinking. duction remains critical” (Davis 1980, 147), what has pre-
In contrast, Mann and Dickinson’s rejection of vented the further differentiation of petty commodity produc-
Mooney’s proposed Marx-Weber synthesis is premised on a ers? Davis answers neither question. Thus, given that the
commitment to the NSM and the “nature of capitalism” as “organizational detritus of the past” (Davis 1980, 133)
both a theoretical starting point and explanatory touchstone. remains largely intact, he is left where he started—i.e., with
While in principle there is nothing objectionable about such an anomaly.
a strategy, at this point the M-D thesis has failed to system- Harriet Friedmann.Perhaps the most intriguing attempt
atically incorporate the anomaly of the family farm into the to resolve the anomaly of the family farm is Harriet
Marxian tradition. The final two authors considered, Davis Friedmann’s (1981). Friedmann chastises both classical and
and Friedmann, represent more radical attempts to accom- contemporary theorists for ruling out the possibility of “fam-
plish this incorporation. ily labor as a stable,even sometimes emergent,form of pro-
John E. Davis. In contrast to previous authors, Davis duction” (Friedmann 1978b, 552, 1981, 1). She seeks to
(1980) explicitly rejects strategies 1 and 2 and their con- escape from the developmental teleology which she claims
comitant assumption that the persistence of the family farm has characterized earlier attempts to theorize simple com-
constitutes a lack of capitalist relations in U.S. agriculture. modity production (SCP) and criticizes previous researchers
Instead,he attempts to redefine certain key concepts in order for treating SCP as a logical construct rather than a concrete
to demonstrate that this “anomaly” is merely apparent historical category (Friedmann 1978a,1980,1981). Thus,in
(Strategy 3). Specifically, he argues that separation from the sharp contrast to the above authors, Friedmann explicitly
means of production is not an essential characteristic of cap- rejects formulating the Agrarian Question in developmental
italist relations of production. Rather, petty commodity pro- terms and argues instead that it should be posed in terms of
ducers,even though they retain possession of their means of specific requirements for “reproduction”in relation to histor-
production, can nevertheless be considered participants in ically identified “conditions of existence”(Friedmann 1978a,
capitalist relations as “propertied labor.”Propertied labor,he 72). However, although Friedmann formulates the Agrarian
argues,is analogous to piece-wage work,a primitive form of Question in a more “frame-relative”fashion,the explanatory
capitalist relations, provided that two “essential” criteria are strategy she employs to answer it throws into sharp relief the
met: (1) a contractual relationship exists between capitalist central contentions of this essay.
Human Ecology Review, Vol. 5, No. 2, 1998 33
McLaughlin
Friedmann’s explanation of the persistence of the family fuzzy at best. Although such line-drawing problems are not
labor farm is based upon a radical redefinition of what has necessarily fatal to essentialism (Sober 1980), they do make
traditionally been defined as “essential”to capitalist develop- the application of essentialistic categories extremely difficult
ment (Strategy 3). She premises her entire argument on a in practice. In Friedmann’s case,these difficulties are partic-
conceptual distinction between “modes”and “forms”of pro- ularly problematic because the distinction in question plays
duction. The former describes “a broad historical period such a crucial role in her argument.
defined by characteristic laws of motion,”while the latter has A more important difficulty with Friedmann’s approach
a more historically-specific “concrete character” and is thus is that the philosophical categories which she employs to
“more variable and transitory” (Friedmann 1978b, 553, construct her argument are the same categories that underlie
1980, 160). Most importantly, Friedmann distinguishes the teleological thinking she is trying to avoid,namely,essen-
between those forms of production which are and those tialism. Friedmann has simply placed SCP—and other
which are not “constitutive”of a mode of production. Finally, “forms” of production—on the “accidental” side of
she (1981, 9) concludes that SCP is not an essential compo- Aristotle’s natural/accidental dichotomy. While this concep-
nent of the capitalist mode of production (Strategy 3). tual maneuver buys her enough theoretical elbow room to
Friedmann’s reconceptualization of SCP contrasts sharply deploy her non-teleological analysis of SCP reproduction,
with Marx,who held that SCP was both an essential precon- she pays a heavy price for it. Specifically,it creates a radical
dition and part of the “coming-to-be” of capital (Meikle disjunction between the developmental and the historical
1985; Goodman and Redclift 1985). dimensions of her analysis. Throughout Friedmann’s work
Friedmann combines the concept of a simple commodi- there is a recurring inconsistency between her characteriza-
ty form of production with a non-teleological application of tion of the capitalist mode of production as “necessary” and
Marx’s concept of reproduction. As she writes: “logical” and her depiction of the process of SCP reproduc-
tion as “anomalous,” “marginal,” “incidental,” “contingent”
Reproduction implies no teleology....The point is to
and historically “unnecessary” (Friedmann 1978a, 73, 1981,
explain both reproduction and the failure of reproduc-
26, 1987, 249). Friedmann’s characterization of SCP in the
tion through empirical identification of present or absent
latter terms tends to undermine her claim that it is a “stable”
conditions.The virtue of the concept is that it combines
and “emergent” form of production, at the very same time
historical indeterminacy with testable theory (Friedmann
that her distinction between modes and forms of production
1981,10-11; emphasis mine).
provides the central premise of her entire argument.
Friedmann’s concept of reproduction bears a remarkable sim- Friedmann’s difficulties, I would argue, stem from an
ilarity to Darwin’s theory of variation and selective retention. unresolved tension between her reliance on the frame-invari-
Moreover,she uses this concept with great efficacy to explain ant “laws of motion” of capitalism to provide the broader
how family labor farms were able to undermine capitalist context for SCP and her more frame-relative application of
farms in certain branches of agriculture in the late 1800’s the concept of reproduction to explain the origins and dynam-
(Friedmann 1978a, 1978b). Specifically, Friedmann argues ics of SCP itself. In particular, there is an inconsistency,
that SCP’s fewer and more flexible costs—combined with cer- between Friedmann’s (1978a, 87, 1978b, 562, 1981, 14)
tain specific “historical” conditions—allowed family farmers claim that SCP entails no structural requirement for expan-
to undermine capitalist wheat farms in the U.S. and, through sion—beyond cultural and demographic pressures culminat-
their impact on international wheat markets, England and ing in a “fissioning” of the household enterprise into new
Germany as well. Friedmann’s focus on the “conjunctural enterprises with the same scale of production—and her claim
superiority” of SCP within specific historical contexts con- that it obeys the same laws of concentration and centraliza-
trasts sharply with previous authors’characterizations of fam- tion as capitalism (Friedmann 1981,11). If SCP really has no
ily farmers as little more than anachronisms stoically awaiting structural requirement for expansion, what does it mean to
the removal of the last barriers to capitalist penetration. say that it is subject to a tendency towards concentration and
Although Friedmann’s theory of SCP has many centralization? Conversely,if SCP is subject to such tenden-
strengths, it has major weaknesses as well. In several cies, what has prevented it from increasing in scale beyond
respects, Friedmann’s attempted escape from teleology is the range of family labor? As Goodman and Redclift (1985,
only partially successful. Her entire analysis is premised on 238) note,Friedmann treats the conjuncture between prevail-
the contention that SCP is a form of production that is not ing technical conditions of production and the labor supply of
“constitutive” of capitalism. However, as Goodman and households as entirely fortuitous. However, if a “tendency”
Redclift (1985) point out, the widespread use of wage labor remains for SCP to exceed these limits, how has Friedmann
in SCP renders Friedmann’s particular conceptual distinction avoided teleology?
34 Human Ecology Review, Vol. 5, No. 2, 1998