Representational Content and the Objects of Thought

221 Pages·2021·3.149 MB·English

by  Nicholas Rimell

Representational
Content and the
Objects of Thought
Nicholas Rimell
Representational Content and the Objects
of Thought
Nicholas Rimell
Representational
Content
and the Objects
of Thought
Nicholas Rimell
School of Philosophy and Sociology
Jilin University
Changchun, China
Top Discipline Construction Series by the School of Philosophy and Sociology
at Jilin University, China
ISBN 978-981-16-3516-8 ISBN 978-981-16-3517-5 (eBook)
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-16-3517-5
Jointly published with Shanghai Jiao Tong University Press
The print edition is not for sale in China (Mainland). Customers from China (Mainland)
please order the print book from: Shanghai Jiao Tong University Press.
© Shanghai Jiao Tong University Press 2021
This work is subject to copyright. All rights are solely and exclusively licensed by the
Publisher,whetherthewholeorpartofthematerialisconcerned,specificallytherightsof
reprinting, reuse of illustrations, recitation, broadcasting, reproduction on microfilms or
inanyotherphysicalway,andtransmissionorinformationstorageandretrieval,electronic
adaptation, computer software, or by similar or dissimilar methodology now known or
hereafter developed.
The use of general descriptive names, registered names, trademarks, service marks, etc.
in this publication does not imply, even in the absence of a specific statement, that such
namesareexemptfromtherelevantprotectivelawsandregulationsandthereforefreefor
general use.
The publishers, the authors, and the editors are safe to assume that the advice and infor-
mation in this book are believed to be true and accurate at the date of publication.
Neither the publishers nor the authors or the editors give a warranty, express or implied,
withrespecttothematerialcontainedhereinorforanyerrorsoromissionsthatmayhave
beenmade.Thepublishersremainneutralwithregardtojurisdictionalclaimsinpublished
maps and institutional affiliations.
This Palgrave Macmillan imprint is published by the registered company Springer Nature
Singapore Pte Ltd.
Theregisteredcompanyaddressis:152BeachRoad,#21-01/04GatewayEast,Singapore
189721, Singapore
for my parents,
and for Min
Acknowledgements
I’ve benefitted from the generosity of several individuals throughout
my work on this project. I am grateful to Jonathan Barker, Elizabeth
Barnes, Ross Cameron, Jim Cargile, Jim Darcy, Matt Duncan, David
Ingram, Derek Lam, Harold Langsam, John Mahlan, Andrew Morgan,
Paul Nedelisky, Adam Tiller, and David Vander Meulen for feedback
on chapter drafts and for helpful discussion. I’d also like to thank the
UVA Metaphysics Writing Group (some of whose members are among
those just listed). I owe special thanks to Andrei Ma˘ra˘s¸oiu and to Brie
Gertler for detailed feedback and involved discussion on multiple chap-
ters, and to Trenton Merricks for detailed feedback on multiple drafts of
the manuscript as a whole, and for extensive and involved discussion of
my project from the initial planning stage to its completion.
Thereareseveralindividualsandorganizationswhosesupporthasbeen
crucial to my developing this monograph and in preparing it for publica-
tion. These include Lu Heng, Qu Hongmei, Tian Yipeng, and Zhang
Xinyao. I am also grateful to an anonymous referee for thoughtful and
inciteful feedback, and to the editorial staff at Palgrave Macmillan. This
project was funded by the following grant: Top Discipline Construc-
tion Series by the School of Philosophy and Sociology at Jilin Univer-
sity, China. I am grateful to Jilin University’s School of Philosophy and
Sociology for its support.
There are multiple individuals whose support has been critical
throughout my work on this project. I am grateful to Matthew Adams
vii
viii ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS
andtoGalenBarry—fortheirfriendshipandsupport—aswellastoAdam
Blincoe—for opening up his home to me for a writing retreat, for his
friendship, and for his constant encouragement. I am especially grateful
to my parents, Pat and Donna Rimell, not just for their encouragement
throughoutmyworkonthisproject,butformakingmethesortofperson
whofeelsexcitedtopursuemypassions.Finally,Ithankmywife,YuMin,
for her encouragement and patience, for being a wonderful person and
partner, and for making me feel at home, wherever in the world we are.
Contents
1 Introduction 1
Reference 5
2 Narrow Representational Content 7
2.1 Narrow Content and Wide Content: The Initial
Picture 8
2.2 A Complication 13
2.3 Representational Content 16
2.4 Truth and Representational Content 20
2.5 Jackson on Representational Content 25
2.6 Chalmers on Subjunctive Content and Epistemic
Content 32
2.7 Internalism and CFT 43
2.8 Conclusion 46
References 46
3 Narrow Content and Propositions 51
3.1 The Traditional Doctrine of Belief 52
3.2 CFT and the Traditional Doctrine of Belief 56
3.3 The Case for Relativized Propositions 59
3.4 Same Proposition Rules out Relativized Propositions
as Sets of Centered Worlds (and as Functions
from Centered Worlds to Truth Values) 64
ix
x CONTENTS
3.5 Same Proposition Rules out Relativized Propositions
and, Consequently, Internalism 70
3.6 Conclusion 84
References 85
4 Private Propositions 87
4.1 The Fregean Argument for Private Propositions 88
4.2 Objections to the Fregean Argument for Private
Propositions 92
4.3 In Defense of Private Propositions 98
4.4 In Defense of Egocentric Externalism 110
4.5 Conclusion 115
References 115
5 Why We Cannot Think about Nonexistents 117
5.1 Thinking as Relational and Thinking
about Nonexistents 118
5.2 The Magician Argument 122
5.3 Formally Analyzing the Magician Argument 125
5.4 The Straightforward Analysis 127
5.5 Kriegel’s Monadic Adverbialism 130
5.6 Thinking by Proxy 133
5.7 Generalizing about Generalizing 138
5.8 The Magician Argument Arguments 143
5.9 Why We Cannot Think about Nonexistents 146
5.10 What We’re Thinking about When We Think We’re
Thinking about Nonexistents 150
5.11 Conclusion 152
References 153
6 Against Necessary Existence 155
6.1 The Argument from Propositions 156
6.2 Necessitism, Necessitarianism, and Events 161
6.3 Implications from the Varieties of Views
on Propositions 166
6.4 The Argument from Propositions Is, at Best,
Unmotivated 183
6.5 The Argument from Propositions Is Unsound 185
6.6 Conclusion 191
References 192
CONTENTS xi
7 Conclusion 197
Appendix A: Two Revised Arguments for CFT 199
Appendix B: Another Argument from Propositions 207
Name Index 211
Subject Index 213